Managers work with words
- an introduction

by
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Abstract

This report tries to establish a theoretical position on the problem of dealing with contradictory goals in organisations. Our most prominent theories point to “sequential attention to alternatives” or “sequential attention to goals” and describe the process of accommodation by referring to “negotiation.” This activity has mostly been analysed in game theoretic frameworks. This paper seeks to introduce a cooperative approach where people present and evaluate arguments in a common effort to solve problems. Speech act theory and one of its latest developments (Cooren 2000) is described as a possible approach to the study of how competent persons achieve agreement on courses of action without giving up their own missions. The argument is deemed especially relevant for project management.
Managers work with words – an introduction

Introduction

This report will try to show how words can become objects that have organising effects on groups of people, and how managers can become more skilful in getting work done through words by paying attention to how utterances do their work for them.

If you are one of those who still believe that it is the intention of the speaker that determines the meaning of a statement or that words cannot effect people (only physical objects, like other people can) think about this. You see a sign on a fence post and it reads ”Beware of the dog!” What do you do? You probably get ready for a surprise. The dog might come rushing around the corner barking. If you are not prepared for that kind of acoustic surprise you might get a heart attack. You also look for a gate, it might be open. No doubt you will agree that the words on the sign has had a physical effect on you without a speaker with intentions in sight. Even if there was an author/speaker who made that sign, that ”speaker” surely did not intend your pulse to raise and your eyes to flicker around or your step to become more jerky as you try to walk by in a manner that will show to everybody that you are not an easily scared person.

The person who put up the sign (the author of it) probably wanted to keep thieves out and your reaction to the geographical position of the text (on the fence post) is proof that the intentions of the author do not have complete control over meaning of the uttered words. The statement has become separated from the author and it has an organising effect on your Sunday stroll. The words have become an object that has given you something (a warning and a faster heart beat). How does this come about?

A second issue related to the title is what could be meant by managerial work. The standard text book on management will describe management as an activity oriented towards decision making. The different chapters will deal with different kinds of decisions related to different situations (pricing, resource allocation, resources acquisition, resource development) usually with an assumed set of alternatives to
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choose among. And as we all know the proper managers choose the best alternative given the current objectives. There are few studies of how alternatives are worked out, but Bower (1970) and Aharoni (1966) to take two examples, do not impress upon us that managers are an especially rational brand of human beings (description of main findings concerning investment decisions by American firms in Israel). These limits to rationality were noted early (e.g., Simon 1947, Selznik 1949, Lindblom 1959) but little was made of it. In March & Simon (1958) it was noted that there appears “conflicts of interest” between members of the organisation. The solution is “negotiation” and the form of the process taken up by March & Simon was “sequential attention to alternatives” (p. 154 ff.) a few years later Cyert & March (1963) dealt with the same problem (“negotiation”) by “sequential attention to goals” (p. 36). The shift from “alternatives” to “goals” may not be too significant. In both cases the topic is satisficing rather than optimising choice. The same school of thought found themselves describing decision opportunities as “garbage cans” (Cohen et al 1972) into which solutions, problems and alternatives are thrown depending on what actors are present and what moods arise.

For a short period it was assumed that structures outside but related to the decision might determine what choices are made. The “Aston School” (Pugh et al 1969) introduced contingency theory pointing to technology, variety etc as determining dimension. However, as correlations failed to emerge as expected this perspective was largely abandoned. Only in some areas of management accounting did the idea hold on that structural factors will influence what design of information systems companies will choose (Brownall & Dunk 1991). It seems safe to claim that with no alternative view of managerial work emerging as a strong contender the mainstream decision making manager has survived to this day. Possibly the most promising development within this basic ontology of rational choice is game theory. Not that this approach can be expected to develop an ontology that is descriptive of managerial work (and thus possible to test against empirical observation), but it may continue to develop analytical tools and intuitively appealing experiments as happened in the case of Prisoner’s Dilemma.

The prisoner’s dilemma has sometimes been used as an illustration to how logic forces us to be opportunistic. The game is constructed to give the two players a “reward” if
they cooperate (say +3) and a “punishment” if both defect from cooperation (say +1), but there is a “temptation” to defect from cooperation (say +5 for the one who defects) and a “sucker’s pay-off” (say +0) for the player who is cheated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>+3 (reward)</td>
<td>+0 (sucker’s payoff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>+5 (temptation)</td>
<td>+1 (punishment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Figure X:** Prisoner’s dilemma with outcomes as seen by player A

The general formulation of the prisoner’s dilemma is such that the temptation is greater than the reward which is greater than the punishment which is greater than sucker’s pay-off and this formalisation was first presented by Flood and Dresher of Rand Corporation in 1950.

A story which gave the game its name was invented some months later by Tucker (also at Rand). The story was that two prisoners are caught by the police. Both have the options to confess (defect) or keep silent. If both confess they will get the same low punishment, if both stay silent they will go free (reward) and if either confesses while the other stays silent the one who confesses be rewarded (temptation) and the one which stays silent will be punished (sucker’s pay-off). The prisoners are not allowed to communicate; the prisoner’s dilemma is what strategy is best, confess (defect) or keep silent? Logically I must confess because if my colleague stays silent I will be rewarded and if he confesses I will get a mild sentence. My colleague will reason in the same way. Logic forces both to confess (defect) and forego freedom. This situation can be found everywhere where loyalty is competing with immediate profit, like in alliances or in all kinds of use of common resources (the free rider problem).
The disappointing solution of the game is built on the assumption that the players are selfish and opportunistic, like the economists’ economic man.

The interesting thing about this game is, however, how it should be played if the game is repeated, e.g., when there is learning.

Developments in this direction did not appear until the late 1980ies although the original designers of the game had immediately discovered that in real life rational people will tend to cooperate if the game is repeated. Flood and Dresher had asked two colleagues (Alchain and Williams) to play the game a hundred times while making notes about their thinking as they progressed. It turned out that they cooperated in 60 out of the 100 games and got the reward. The notes told Flood and Dresher that both players tried to persuade the other to be nice by being nice themselves. With repeated games niceness seemed to prevail over logic.

It was Axelrod (1984) who set the ball rolling by inviting people to submit computer programs to a prisoner’s dilemma competition. The programs were to play the game 200 times against every other submitted program, against itself and against a random program. At the end of the tournament a very simple strategy had scored the largest number of points - Tit-for-Tat. It was cooperative strategies that occupied the first 8 positions on the ranking list and the simplest had won! The Tit-for-Tat strategy (submitted by Rapoport) simply started out by cooperating and then did whatever the other player did the last time. It could be classified as a “nice” (but retaliating) strategy and the basis for its success is that the relationship is stable and repetitive. In further tournaments Axelrod let “nice” and “aggressive” strategies meet randomly in a survival-of-the fittest war where the strategies compete for space on the computer screen. First the aggressive strategies were successful at the expense of the “nice” (cooperative) strategies, only retaliating Tit-for-Tat could keep up with them. But soon the aggressive strategies increasingly came up against each other (as the nice strategies had been more or less eliminated) and reduced each other in number. Tit-for-Tat now advanced and in the end it won. The point is that Tit-for-Tat loses or draws battles but wins the war by lining up rewards. Tit-for-Tat does not wish to beat the opponent but treats each game as a deal struck between the participants! It wins by not competing!

How does this come down with economists? There was criticism, mostly aiming at the
realism of the game conditions and at generalisations from computer simulations (Axelrod 1984), but Axelrod had demolished the "generalisation" from logical deduction that in prisoner’s dilemma the only rational strategy is to be "aggressive". Still the conditions of the game were deterministic. What happens in a more realistic world, where strategies would make random mistakes (with certain probabilities) or switch to new strategies in a probabilistic way, but still could learn by keeping improved strategies and dropping unsuccessful ones. Nowak, May and Sigmund (1995) designed such a tournament and it turned out that a strategy similar to Tit-for-Tat, called Generous-Tit-for-Tat, was most successful. The generous version forgives single mistakes occasionally. Not all but occasionally - a strategy that would always forgive single defections would invite an adapted counter strategy which would exploit the regularity of that strategy. To forgive breaches of loyalty occasionally, about one third of the time, is remarkably effective in breaking cycles of mutual revenge and still remain immune to exploitation by defectors.

The problem was that the generous version of Tit-for-Tat could not keep naive "nice" strategies as "Always cooperate" at bay. "Always cooperate" thrives among "Generous Tit-for-Tat" without defeating them but is easily invaded by "Always defect". "Always defect" cannot beat Generous but when they start playing "Always cooperate" they strike and this will unleash general, perpetual defection. We are back where we started. In this situation Sigmund and his colleagues re-entered a strategy which Rapoport & Chummah (1965) had dismissed as hopeless (because it has no chance against "Always defect"). Now it was played in the world dominated by Tit-for-Tat and it won and has stayed invincible. The strategy was called Simpelton by Rapoport and Pavlov by Nowak and Sigmund. The strategy says "Win/stay - lose/shift", i.e., if the outcome of a game is "reward"(3) or "temptation"(5) it stays with the same strategy, and if the outcome is "punish" (1) or "sucker's pay-off"(0) it shifts. This is what we do all the time in life. The problem with this strategy is that it cannot manage if it meets "Always defect"( since it keeps shifting to cooperation) so it cannot win until Tit-for-Tat has cleared away all the "Always defect" strategies. This happened in a world of probability and learning. Pavlov is evolutionary stable.
A non-technical overview of non-cooperative game theory.
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One conclusion that seems obvious when considering this development of the research around prisoner’s dilemma is that humans, who have been playing different varieties of this game since the beginning of time. The fascination with games is that they are constituted by the very fact that the players are following the rules. In situations where rule-following is not guaranteed people realise the importance of selecting the partner to play with. And, reversely, it is probably a good strategy to invest in a reputation for trustworthiness. How one builds a reputation and accumulates trust is probably context dependent, but in general reciprocity and consistency might be assumed to be important parameters. Ridley (1996) uses the prisoner’s dilemma as a core element in his discussion of the “origins of virtue”.

There have also been few studies of what managers actually do when they work. Barnard (1938) and others have written about what they should do (a task gladly undertaken by academics as well as consultants and practitioners). Cameron (1997) has mapped to what extent it seems to be a good idea to follow the advice of outsiders (consultants). The three most popular techniques to gain organizational efficiency were investigated as to documented track record (TQM, down-sizing, BPR). It seems like BPR has the worst track record with a recorded 85% failure rate according to a large study made by the consultancy firm that launched the method. The others seem not to fare much better. Cameron & Quinn (1999) show that these techniques need to be implemented as embedded in a project to change the way managerial work is done in the organisation. In other words managers work with words also when managerial technologies are applied.

When it comes to mapping how managers actually work the first systematic study in all likelihood was done by Carlson (1951). His method was to use diaries prepared by 9 CEOs and complemented by registers of communication and meetings prepared by their assistants. Mintzberg (1973) added direct observation of 5 managers during 5 days each to the arsenal of data gathering methods, while Kotter (1982) used questionnaires and interviews as a complement. Tengblad (2000) extended the volume of observation data by combining the diary method of Carlson with the direct observation of Mintzberg in a study of 8 CEOs of large companies. On average they were found to use their time during a work week on the following activities:
Table 1. Modes of communication (based on Tengblad 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Hours per day</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail</td>
<td>0:26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>0:12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail/fax</td>
<td>0:23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports/Periodicals</td>
<td>0:49</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to face meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of these</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- with one person</td>
<td>1:35</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- with several people</td>
<td>5:45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12:22</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the Carlson study it was found that the most frequent activity was “Getting Information” (23 % of all activities) that, together with “Informing” and “Processing Information,” accounts for 51 % of the average work day for the average CEO, while the activity “Execution,” at 20 % of the activities, nowadays takes a large part in terms of ceremonies (“tell the history of the company”) and representation. Contacts with customers are rare. Decision making observed as choice between alternatives or initiation of action was not a frequent activity (7 % - about the same as 50 years ago in the Carlson (1951) study).

The main result of this kind of detailed mapping of managerial work seems to be that there are many ways to run a company. The styles and time use of CEOs varies and there is little basis for judging what approach is the more efficient. Probably the way-of-working of a CEO will be matched by the way-of-working of the subordinates. A consequence may be that a mentality of yes-saying emerges over time. The “team-spirit” is overdone. This may result in what Janis (1972) termed “group think”. The process of forming a group opinion on complex issues, through “group polarisation,” has been studied through experiments by Moscovici and associates (Moscovici and Doise 1994). The group think phenomenon has stimulated psychologists and others (e.g. Mason & Mitroff 1981, Mitroff 1982) to focus on programmed conflict as a method to improve the quality of decisions. Opposition to taken-for-granted assumption and introduction of alternative views could be assured by having somebody play the role of
“devil’s advocate” in the group, or one could have a procedure, “dialectical inquiry,” designed to introduce such views. Experiments (Schweitser et al 1989) have shown that the quality of decisions improved but on the other hand the willingness to continue working with the group and to accept its decisions were higher in the conventional consensus seeking groups. Even if the particular experimental design in the case of Schweitser et al included two rounds of problem solving in each group, and thus made measure of a certain amount of learning possible, experimental studies with individuals instructed to follow the rules cannot tell us very much about the structuring of ways of working in a team. Neither can an experiment be used fruitfully to study how groups and their managers cope with the complexities and dynamics of real time action in only partly understood situations. Granted that experiments within the human information processing school (Schroder et al 1967) have demonstrated convincingly the information overflow effect (the amount of integrated information (information made sense of) describes an inverted U-curve as the environmental complexity increases). The fact that the capacity to integrate information seems to go down when complexity has reached a certain level is interesting. One could assume that as complexity increases stereotyping will be used in coping - instead of making the effort to “analyse” the opposing person’s argument the individual will use a stereotype like “whatever I say he is against it!” to reduce the analytical burden. Personal conflict may be a consequence.

**Summing up**

It has been with us since the beginning of “modern” organisation theory that there are different and contradictory goals and interests in organisations as well as in other parts of our life. Common to the early treatment of this problem was that the solution was described as “negotiation” and/or sequential attention to goals or alternatives. “Satisficing” has been considered less than complete, i.e., “bounded,” rationality. One approach to the solution to the question of how rational decision makers go about their negotiation process has been game theory, which was illustrated by the history of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” game. The implicit assumption in such games is that the participants live by the rules specified in advance, but this is not of much help since managers in real life situations 1) do not know the rules, and 2) co-operate, make rules as they go.
We have also indicated that group loyalty may go too far for the good of the organisation (group think) and pointed to some studies of “programmed conflict” to improve the quality of decisions. While the former study, (Janis 1972), was built on case studies the latter (Schweitser et al 1989) usually involve students under game conditions imposed by the experimenter. Also Moscovici has done experiments but in the case of group polarisation he and his associates have been able to show how group members under non-limiting conditions arrive at consensus opinions that are not compromises (averages) of original opinions. Individual participants in group discussions on complex issues are moved toward extreme positions, probably because people holding extreme positions have good arguments or strong convictions the move the others. Managerial work is done – opinions are moved, and this requires some kind of energy. It is not enough to present facts (all pertinent facts were available before the discussion started). People are able to work with words. How do they do it? There are rhetorical devices that come to be used and these can be analysed if we can get access to the actual arguments. We cannot get access to what goes on in people’s minds, but we can get access to what they say. We are particularly interested in “knowledge workers” in these times of specialisation and increased knowledge content in the outputs of organizational outputs. The ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel 1967, Agar 1986) had as their program to improve the scientific base of sociology by focusing on what can be observed and on how competent people accomplish what they do in their area of competence. (Most academic management researchers are not very proficient in running big companies). In order to acquire the tools of analysis of managerial interaction we need to examine what linguists have to offer.

Speech acts and organising

Speech act theory originated with Austin’s wellknown book ”How to do Things with Words” (1962) based on his William James lectures at Harvard. There he showed how ”saying” becomes ”doing” and also introduced the famous classification of speech acts: locutionary (the act of saying something) illocutionary (the act performed in saying something) perlucotionary (the act performed by saying something, the effects)
There were precursors to this development. German phenomenologists in the spirit of Husserl and Brentano had developed the first theories oriented toward understanding language as act. It should also be noted that Wittgenstein, who has been the source of inspiration for the “linguistic turn” of many social sciences, was well known to Austin (Sibisà 1995). Wittgenstein’s first position (Tractatus) argued the correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that the criterion of truth is whether what is said represents correctly what exists in the real world. The second position (Investigations) was the study of what can be done through using language (in “language games”). Austin started out by making a distinction between utterances of describing states of affairs and utterances used to “do things”. Austin’s student Searle built the theory into a systematic one by introducing constitutive rules (“speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour” (Searle 1969, p. 16), and the “principle of expressability”. The constitutive rules establish the conventionality of speech, i.e., that it is not possible to produce speech acts if these rules are not respected. A promise is not recognised as a promise if not certain constitutive rules are followed. The principle of expressability, defined as “whatever can be meant can be said” (Searle 1969, p. 19), establishes the mutual implication, and thus equivalence, of the rules that govern the meaning of a sentence and those rules that govern the performance of a speech act. The speaker’s intention is compared to the conventional meaning of the speaker’s utterance, and this causes problems.

Both Austin and Searle reason from the assumption that central to the speech act is the intention of the speaker. The successful accomplishment of a speech act is determined by what the speaker means and how well she/he succeeds in formulating this inside the constitutive rules. However, there is then a problem of “uptake”, i.e., to what extent the hearer interprets what is said in the same way as the speaker intended. Searle claims that the solution to this problem - the speaker wants to produce an effect in the hearer by getting the hearer to recognise his intention of producing that effect – is that the constitutive rules for using the expression she/he in fact uses associate the utterance with that effect. This presupposes that there is (implicit) agreement on the constitutive rules, which might be a problem when people representing different “cultures” communicate. It also presupposes that the participants in the conversation follow the “Co-operative principle” (Grice 1967/1989 p. 26) “Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” The problem here is that participants in conversations are assumed to know the “direction” of the exchange. A first step in dealing with this is indirectness, or how hearers work out implications. Grice (1967/1989 p. 24 ff.) offers a solution that Searle accepts. He breaks down the cooperative principle into 4 “maxims”:

**Quantity**: make your contribution as informative as is required, not less and not more. **Quality**: do not say what you believe to be false, do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. **Relation**: be relevant **Manner**: Avoid obscurity, or ambiguity. Be brief and orderly.

These maxims support the cooperative character of the conversation in providing progress towards a common immediate aim, by ascertaining that contributions are “dovetailed” (mutually dependent), and maintaining attention to the conversation by participants. Breach of one of the maxims in such a cooperative conversation signals implicature. For example the following conversation implies that Charlie is engaged in criminal activities:

A: How is Charlie getting on in his new job?
B: Oh, quite well I think; he likes his colleagues and he hasn’t been to prison yet!

B is in breach of the quantity maxim, or rather A needs to and A work out the implication of what is said in order to keep the utterance within the cooperative principle. This might be accomplished in the following way:
- he said that p (“to prison”)
- he could not have said p unless he though q (criminal activities)
- he knows that I can see that the supposition q is required
- he intends me to think, or at least is willing to allow me to think that q
- he has implied q

In this way, Searle claims, orthodox speech act theory will cover also the case of indirectness. The hearer thus uses conventional tools to extract the speakers intended meaning, so conditions of success can be established starting from speaker intentions, and the speaker can design her/his utterance accordingly.
This is not enough, however. Derrida (1977/1988) claimed (a controversy, with Searle, over several exchanges ensued) that the intentions of the speaker are fundamentally undecidable from the text. If a speaker says, with an ironic wink, “I order you to come tomorrow,” the wink signals that the speaker is not serious. But it also “veils” what the speaker is really up to. This repeatable sign, the wink, is something that can be used to lie (Eco 1979). How can the hearer know that the speaker is sincere, and, on that basis, delimit the interpretation to that which was the intention of the speaker? A new development took off from this problem of privileging speaker intentions. The solution that Derrida recommended was to start from the text itself (deconstruction need not concern us here) since the text/utterance is in fact there. Bach and Harnish (1979) provided a Speech Act Schema describing the process of interpretation that the hearer applies to an utterance. Cooren (2000) takes this approach further to demonstrate the organising property of communication.

The organizing property of communication

The first thing to do once we abandon the speakers intention as the starting point (we do want to arrive at a scientific analysis and we agree that it is not possible to deduce unconditionally the speaker’s intention from the text) is to show that the text is “severed” from the speaker as soon as it is uttered. The act of uttering something in the presence of others creates a communicational situation. This means that the speaker goes “public” with his/her utterance, but at the same time assumes the risk of “misinterpretation,” because now the hearers go to work with the attribution of meaning to the utterance. Cooren (2000) points to the fact that utterances are actions in the sense that they have narrative form. He adopts the semio-narrative theory of Greimas (1987) to provide a canonical form of a narrative and he borrows the idea of “actant” from Callon (1986) and Latour (1996), applied to discursive objects, to demonstrate how communication has organising properties:

First Cooren shows how Greimas, inspired by Propp (1968), conceptualised the circulation of objects of value and transformations operated by agents as the core of the narrative process. The subject’s desire for an object of value translates into a quest or
project that introduces time and drives the narrative. Utterances of two kinds are required; utterances describing a state and those describing doing to arrive at a canonical form of a narrative schema (figure 1).

**Figure 1 Canonical form of a narrative schema**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manipulation</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Sanction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- wanting to do</td>
<td>- being able to do</td>
<td>- doing</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of</td>
<td>- knowing how to do</td>
<td></td>
<td>performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- having to do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Greimas points out that the Performance phase involves the subject and (an attractive or vice versa) object, while the manipulation phase and the sanction phase involve a sender and a receiver. In the manipulation phase that starts the narrative an actant communicates or convinces the mission to the receiver/subject (“having to do” and “wanting to do” respectively). In the Sanction phase an actant rewards the receiver/subject for the performance. In the Competence phase the subject mobilises “helper” actants or “opponent” actants in order to make the performance possible (including non-performance). The point with this schema is that it depicts speech acts as action cast in a narrative, project shape. When we understand each others’ speech acts in this way it is only natural that we shape our contributions to the exchange in alignment with, or in opposition to, that narrative.

So far Cooren (2000) has
- severed the text from the speaker who is no longer in complete control of the meaning of an utterance
- chosen to start from the text itself rather than from speaker intention
- chosen a narrative schema as the canonical form of interpreter understanding of a text.

What we need now is a model of how the interpreter works out an understanding, which also indicates how the speaker produces the utterance (the speaker being one of the interpreters). First, an utterance produces a communicative situation, it links people
together, via an object (the text). i.e., somebody is addressing somebody else. This link is formed when the text does something to the recipient (The sign “Beware of dog!” gives me a warning). The boss (Alice) is addressing the secretary (George) asking him to “Get me the Z files!” George can see that Alice is looking at him and there is nobody else in the room so obviously the boss is expressing a directive which confirms that she is the boss. In this way the recipient attributes what is given to her by the text by relating the text to other texts to form a reasonable interpretation (never certain). Given these production/attribution dimensions Cooren can give a description of the types of actions and objects of mediation that are implicated in a typology of illocutionary acts/transformations:

**Assertive and informative transformations** which imply that something like “a state of affairs” is held as true. They become assertions if the interpreter is able to instantiate what the subject of the utterance is. This is usually done by relation to other texts.

**Modal illocutionary transformations** are actions that involve the two types of “modal objects”: being able to do, and, having to do
- directives create a mediation between an agent, a recipient and an object. The recipient is discursively changed from not-doing X to having to do X, which is an example of attribution.
- accreditives give a “being able to do” to recipients, i.e., freedom of action.
- commissives commits the speaker to a future course of action (have to do) by giving the recipient a guarantee.

**Objective illocutionary transformation** are actions that mobilise objects of value;
- declaratives are transformations that imply a transfer of institutional objects (the meeting is opened, the child is baptised, the managers has resigned from his job). Usually these acts are given their meaning by the institutional context.
- expressives where the text gives more or less value to someone or something, and thus can be related to the sanction phase of narratives. One should note that there often is a moment of restoring a balance between participants in that somebody has performed well and the other party rewards the well-doer.
To each of these types of acts can be coupled ideal conditions of satisfaction (like sincerity).

Having defined the different speech act and their ideal conditions of satisfaction we take the further step of dealing with the conditions that govern their acceptance and the possibility of performance of the related forms of action. First Cooren turns to rhetoric to identify the strategies we use to make people accept our discursive objects. There are two rhetorical techniques to achieve the desired change, persuading the other; liaisons and dissociations. Liaison stands for the association, comparison or identification of a new piece of knowledge to a former one. Cooren uses the form of syllogism to demonstrate this type of argument:

**Major premise**: every Z has the right to do Y  
**Minor premise**: X is a Z  
**Conclusion**: So, X has the right to do Y

Dissociation in polemics is achieved by refuting the middle term Z. The attractiveness of Y is the factor that will induce acceptance of X to do Y.

Sometimes persuasive rhetoric is not required since there are procedures that render conventional what is normally not conventional (like contracts, differences in rank) - silent rhetoric.

Through rhetorical devices, or silent rhetoric, my narrative may get inserted in your narrative, I will give a contribution to your project, if the parties accept such an insertion. Such a mechanism is possible if we can mobilise the missing link, the instrument, that is used in accomplishing the narrative. Here Cooren has already laid the ground by separating the text from the speaker and point to the text as “actant.” The concept “actant” is taken from Latour (1996) where he presents a critique of traditional interactionism and points to the fact that objects play a prominent part in human interaction by channelling and framing interaction. (When I am digging a hole in my garden and I know my neighbour has the shovel I need our conversation across the fence, thank God, is not about his vacation plans or the improved grades of his sister’s son, but about whether he could lend me the shovel. Our interaction probably ends by his handing me the shovel and my thanking him for his kindness.) Latour deconstructs the narrative to make us see what is usually overlooked, the objects or non-human
actants. Latour also points out that when I act “others proceed to action” (he calls this an activity of delegation) (Cooren 2000, p. 179). Strictly speaking this means that when I am now writing this paper I am not actually writing it, I am pushing the keys on the keyboard and the text appears on the computer screen for me to check that I have spelled right etc. I am mobilising the computer in my quest to write a paper. We get a narrative schema:
Latour demonstrates that at each stage of the narrative schema there is a possibility to insert the help of an actant (and we all know that computers can deviate from the helping role sometimes!). I am associated with the computer in writing this, and when/if the computer fails me I get very emotional about it. “Action implies what I could call *interactoriality*, that is a discursive or physical association between several actors in a series of *delegations*” (Cooren 2000, p. 181). Remember the fact that some objects perform specific actions very well, they make sense under a single description. By attributing the role of helper to the computer I insert this actor into a specific schema, “writing a paper”.

We have now seen how non-human actants are mobilised in social processes. Next Cooren uses Callon (1986) to show how a network of interest and, thus, participation is created. Callon analyses how three French researchers mobilise fishermen (and scallops)
in the St.Brieuc Bay in scallop farming. By applying a four phase model to the actants (human and non-human) he explores how some actors come to translate others’ interests, and thereby provides a general model of the constitution of networks.

*The translation process has four phases:*

1. **Problematization phase**, where the researchers identify and define the actors that might become key allies in their quest. The actors are defined in terms of their long-term profit-seeking, the scallops are defined in terms of their desire to survive and proliferate. scientific colleagues are interested in scallop knowledge. The problem for the scientists is to define themselves as the “obligatory passage point” for the other actors. How can they show that their project is indispensable for the fulfilment of the others’ quests?

2. **Intressemant phase**, where a device of intressement is applied to prevent the actors from taking an interest in competing projects. The researchers try to dissociate the other actors from other projects by stabilising the identity of the others as defined in the problematization phase. This implies rhetorical devices, i.e., good reasons to participate.

3. **Enrollement phase** which emerges as a result of successful interessement. The actors accept the roles that the scientists assign to them as part of their narrative. (Even the scallops prove to be enrolling themselves by anchoring to the suitable material provided.) It is a matter of acceptance of the project and commitment to a roll in it.

4. **Mobilization phase** signifies the step to a wider participation. The earlier steps persuaded only a limited number of individuals, who may have been seen as representatives of the larger communities of St. Brieuc. (and the “scientific community”). The problem to overcome is the question if the representatives of these larger groups are really representative. When the scallops turn out to anchor themselves in large numbers to the material provided their behaviour can be translated into numbers and graphs for analysis. It so happens that the same kind of process unfolds with the fishermen and the scientific community. They are mobilised into the project.
We now see that X by creating a situation, using a discursive object, initiates a narrative structure into which Y can submit to (insert in) by committing to perform an action (speech acts or “physical” acts) that assists in the articulation of the narrative/project. This is the organising property of communication. Some texts (acts) have the “restance” property that makes them active long after the moment of production. This is why organisations remain even if they were only an emerging narrative to start with.

**Conclusion**

Managerial work is organising work, to pattern the action of organisational members (and others) in such a way that the articulation of its mission is supported. Most of the time the sub-missions of organisational members (and others) are not completely in line with what would be described as a perfect fit with the organisational mission, which is seldom that precise in defining action anyway. Therefore organising is emergent by nature and should be seen as a co-produced narrative. The stimulus of participating in a good story to a great extent comes from being able to re-tell it and insert parts of it as sub-missions in other narratives (experience). In this way social networks emerge and relations are maintained.

The “work” part of managerial work is the changes in the state of the world that the utterances of the manager causes. Doing things with words is changing the state of the world by speech acts (directives, comissives, expressives etc). The utterance gives something to the hearer (a warning) and the state of the world has changed. The submission that the acceptance of the attributed meaning of the utterance causes from the hearer is an effect of the managerial work and could with a generous definition be called the fruits of managerial work. The co-production of the organising narrative is an exciting experience that may generate what Csíkszentmihályi (Csíkszentmihályi & Csíkszentmihályi, 1988) calls flow. This is the positive part.

The risk is one takes by “going public” with an utterance is that the communicative situation it generates may attribute an unfavourable sanction to the speaker. One might lose face. Your identity, as it appears by inclusion (insertion) in other peoples’ narratives, may take damage. We all need to be confirmed in our identities and the only way to initiate such confirmation is by opening up communicative situations. Situation
that will attribute favourable sanctions by acceptance in others’ narratives. Such narratives may include an image of myself that deviates from what I expect or wish for. I would not like that, so I have an urge to try to control the reactions of others and steer it toward positive sanctions. The problem is that I will not get an opportunity for such steering without opening communicative situations and by doing that I expose myself to the risk of losing face... ... The only human way out of the dilemma is “Courage!” (Arendt 1978)
References


