European Borderline and Turkish Schizophrenia -

An analysis of Turkey’s orientation to the European Security Strategy and human security and its impact on the EU-Turkey relationship

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1. Introduction
In the European Commission’s (EC) enlargement strategy from November 2010 (EC 2010a:20, 69), Turkey’s more dynamic and high-profiled foreign policy of late is acknowledged and appreciated as a value for the EU, provided it is developed and designed in coordination with the EU. In December, The EU’s General Affairs Council endorsed this approach in the annual conclusions on the EU enlargement policy. It is welcomed in paragraph 11 of the conclusions and Turkey is encouraged to progressively align with European positions and policies. In this regard, the council stands ready to intensify its existing dialogue with Turkey within the frame of foreign policy questions of mutual concern. This is the first time that the enlargement conclusions bring foreign policy to the fore as a separate policy domain to develop and refine. Barysch (2010) as well as Grabbe & Ülgen (2010) argue that the EU and Turkey should deepen their strategic cooperation on this matter. This not at least to unlock the stalemate and looming dead end in the accession negotiations (with just three remaining chapters to be opened in the face of the 18 chapters currently frozen), but also as a way of recognising each other’s foreign policy importance, and to draw benefit from mutual interests in thematically adjacent areas.

The present report takes as a starting point the above strengthened pronunciation of a foreign policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU, analysing whether Turkey conforms to what can be deemed a European foreign and security policy view. Assuming Turkey’s ever-increasingly active foreign policy shall also, as a framing space of reflection to the main question, a discussion on whether the current foreign policy indicates rupture or continuity in Turkish politics be conducted.

Foreign policy analyses are in general very broad in their approach. Often there is a tendency to bundle together a wide spectrum of issues connected to an entity’s external relations. This provides interesting reading and conveys overviews, but it often constitutes imprecise, if not poor science - the choices of cases and analytical units do not always meets scientific standards. This deficiency is also illustrated in the Turkish case. Either one of two extremes is chosen: mainly descriptive accounts of temporal developments, or higgledy-piggledy assortments of empirics into on beforehand taken-for-granted theoretical models. It can be expressed in synthetic expositions, on a country by country basis, e.g. In “The future of Turkish foreign policy” (Martin 2004), or in separate country-based studies, covering countries/regions ever-present in studies of Turkish external relations.¹ In a critique of mentioned approaches, Aydin argues that our understanding of foreign policy would increase if we eschewed “looking at general forms of behaviour in international relations that could explain all the relationships between states and instead, attempt to locate each case in its specific conditionality within the international system” (Aydin 2004:8). Although various foreign policy analysis approaches

¹ For studies on Turkey’s foreign policy toward or relationships of recent with Israel, see Oğuzlu (2010), with the Middle East in general see Altunışık (2008), with Greece see Önış and Yilmaz (2008), with regard to the Kurdish question see Karlsson (2008); with Iran see Efegil & Stone (2003), with Cyprus see Theophanous (2009), with Russia see Yanik (2007).
can bring about partial explanations for state behaviour, almost all fail in explaining Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole (Aydin 2004:8).

Alternatively, the inclination is to, chronologically and exhaustively, browse through Turkish history, from the Ottoman Empire until the present, in which the domestic is interwoven with the external (e.g. Zürcher 2009, Findley 2010, Öktem 2011). A similar attempt has been to nail down the new characters of Turkish foreign policy based on domestic transformations (Aras & Karakaya 2007; Alessandri 2010).

The relationship to the EU has more or less completely been directed to the accession process (which constitutes a scholarly literature of its own). The membership prospect has been treated part and parcel of Turkey’s foreign policy aspirations. Alternatively, the EU-relationship has been synthetically treated from every and all possible aspects (Jörgensen & Lagro 2007). The positive and consistent exceptions within this literature are Emerson & Tocci (2004) with regard to foreign policy; Aykan (2005) with regard to security policy, as well as Barysch (2010) and Grabbe & Ülgen (2010) in the argumentation for an enhanced EU-Turkey dialogue on foreign and security policy. These contributions do, however, all suffer from lack of theoretical clarity. When such clarity is provided, framed in a commendable methodology treating impacts from Europeanisation on Turkish foreign policy, as in Aydin & Acikmese (2007) this is unfortunately done with a uni-directional top down-perspective. In the case of Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy (2010) it is done with a deficient operationalisation of how to measure europeanisation.

Another approach has been to analyse foreign policy from a beforehand taken-for-granted theoretical model (without elaborating on any potential causal correlations between ideology and foreign policy actions, making the accounts static), e.g. Özalism in the 1980s (Laciner 2009), Davutoğlu’s strategic depth thinking in the 2000s. A clear exception here is the study conducted on the kemalist heritage in Turkish foreign policy (bagdonas 2008). A final problematic type of foreign policy research is purely descriptive, in measuring compliance with EU declarations (EC 2010:96).

The present report seeks to avoid above-mentioned, in the Turkish case emblematic, foreign policy research problematic. The report contributes at two levels; partly with its orientation of the lens toward Turkish orientation to EU-agreed foreign and security policy (FSP) as well as the competing theory

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3 whose policy implications are accounted for by Walker 2007, and whose theoretical underpinnings are presented by e.g. Murinson (2006) or by Davutoğlu himself (2008). For positive accounts, see Walker (2007), Aras (2009), and for more sceptical views, see Öniş & Yilmaz (2009); Abramowitz, Barkey (2009); Öniş (2011).

4 In 2010, Turkey, when invited, did align with 54 out of 73 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions. This sort of content analysis cannot explain why the rate of compliance is at the level demonstrated. It is based on declarations and decisions where Turkey is invited by the EU, which raises questions regarding the representativity of the sample. Hereafter, the acronym FSP will be used. The concepts of foreign policy and security policy are used interchangeably in the report. Encyclopedian definitions of the two terms (in Oxford Reference and in Encyclopedia Britannica, as well as the definition provided by Biscop 2005:1) all suffer in regarding foreign policy as a part of the security policy’s broader scope. I argue that the two of them rather are co-constitutive where security-political considerations and foreign-political stances reciprocally affect each other. Hence the fusion of them here. There are also practical reasons behind the study’s choice to
human security (hereafter HS). Partly it takes a step further and considers EU-membership not only as a foreign policy goal but investigates how Turkish foreign political positioning, within the EU-agreed framework, eventually can affect the accession process. It argues that FSP will play a more important role in the EU-Turkey-relationship in the future, both within the accession process as well as above. The study highlights the potential problem of this, since the FSP area is driven and characterised by qualitatively different patterns and dynamics than the accession process.

The report leads off in chapter 2 with a broad perspective on why foreign and security policy has become such an emphasised policy domain recently. It treats the identified on-going merger between enlargement policy and FSP and discusses the possible problems with this development. Ch. 3 presents the two extremes, argued to constitute the European position against which to measure Turkish compliance: human security and the European Security Strategy. In ch. 4, the research design and the three explanatory frames to structure the analysis are advanced: the first treating a securitised/normative self-image in Turkey, the second the traditional military/civilian and secularist/religious cleavages in Turkish politics; and the third treating the current foreign policy regime based on Turkish foreign minister (FM) Davutoğlu’s principles. Ch. 5 discusses briefly some methodological aspects, fixating the eclecticism between document studies and interviews. Ch. 6 presents the empirical material and ch. 7 consists of the analysis and conclusions.

2. The relationship between the EU and Turkey: a merger of enlargement and foreign and security policies

The reasons behind the strengthened emphasis on FSP in recent years bring together both Turkey opponents and Turkey friends within the EU-27. For some, this development can be a substitute for the regular accession process, a possibility to veer away and lock up the relationship to Turkey on an alternative track, and for other it demonstrates a possible restart to an accession process which has been put on hold for some years.

I argue that the FSP is a policy area expected to gain even greater significance in the EU-Turkey relationship ahead. In addition, as we could see, analyses of Turkey’s FSP have rarely been connected to the accession process, and the accession process has not been steered toward FSP. This is to change, and this report is a contribution to this coming characterisation.

It is in the light of pronounced willingness to a strengthened FSP dialogue between the EU and Turkey, and the civilisatoric European orientation in Turkish history and politics, that this report finds its entry point. How do Turkish FSP positions and thinking conform with a European FSP view?

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merge foreign and security policy: these areas are treated simultaneously in the European Security Strategy, and in the EU acquis foreign and security and defense policies are all assembled under one and the same chapter (chapter 31).
Several possible questions might be chipped away from such a frame, but chosen question finds its motivation in that the EU’s acknowledgement and encouragement of Turkey’s strengthened FSP actorship is conditioned upon the normative criterion that it is Turkey’s FSP that shall be aligned and coordinated with EU’s position (normatively implying that EU’s positions are superior). This main question will be framed against the backdrop of whether the current FSP indicates rupture or continuity in Turkey.

The EU-Turkey-relationship has been formatted and assorted as part of the enlargement policy, and it is not until recently that the relationship has been cared with FSP relevance. However, as we will see, one should no longer advantageously view the FSP and the enlargement policy as distinctly separate spheres; it would be to overlook the merger of these two spheres which has recently taken place and which, I argue, will be ever more accentuated ahead.

Tocci (2009) argues that the enlargement policy is an exception when assessing the EU’s normative external power, since it stricto sensu is not foreign policy. This entails that the same possible quid pro quo-type bargaining between e.g. trade-related matters and conditionality on human rights-issues of the kind the EU has exercised towards Belarus, not in the same way can be carried through in the enlargement policy should the EU’s credibility be intact. Such an argument is, however, pilloried by its own ideal-typical Parochialism; Tocci is deriving, without exposing it, in her analytical refinement a view that the enlargement policy is a stricto sensu technical criterion-based process. But as Hilleon (2010:18-28) has demonstrated in the case of the enlargement policy’s development by and large, and as Missiroli (2004) argues in the specific case of Turkey; this policy area is bestowed an inherent potential to be politicised rather than directed by technical considerations.

The enlargement policy, being alloyed with the FSP policy domain, can be said to be - provided its asymmetry and character - in Tocci’s words an imperialistic process. In the moment norm-based arguments are transferred from a measurable criterion-based process such as the enlargement policy into a much more fragile, reactive, heterogeneous sphere such as FSP, we run the risk that these patterns of dominance are reproduced: the enlargement process characteristics making their way into the FSP area. Consequently, what happens is the reverse process to what Hilleon (2010) describes: a criterion-based process is not politicised as Hilleon argues, but a contrario; a political sphere, encrusted with an expectation to be assessed with the help of strict, measurable criteria.

It is in this fusion, in the intersection where military-strategic and socio-cultural, securitised and normative thinking have been alloyed with each other, and where the political sphere of FSP has been allowed to merge with the enlargement process’ criterion-based ditto – where Turkey’s FSP fulfilment shall be examined. The reader must keep in mind these domain-specific conditions for the remainder of the report.
We are, however, not yet completely ready to move on. In Leonard’s comparison between the EU’s and the US’ FSP doctrines, the previous seems radically more modern, sustainable, progressive, effective, balanced (Leonard 2005:68-71). Leonard suggests, p. 13, that the EU’s FSP contributes by being a transformative power. However, the mistake Leonard (and many with him) makes is to take the EU’s FSP view for granted as uniform. Strömvik (2009) points to the divergence among EU-27; no uniform definition exists for a common notion of security and not even an interest for visionary thinking. FSP wants an institution which like the Commission can act for the common interest. Rather, it is the member states which must take on this double role, causing FSP to be dominated by countries more proactive and strategic considerate beyond the every-day positioning. Thus, the FSP is not an area primarily ruled by broadly agreed and strategic visions, but in an abnormally great degree is defined by a few active parties (Strömvik 2009:56-7). In addition, when these magnitudes – the enlargement and the FSP processes – are fused together, the enlargement policy’s advantages risk dilution. It is precisely in this vacuum - this Sisyphusian task to normatively commence from positions that A) not always exist, B) not are underpinned by a political vision of whether one is stepping in the right direction and what one wants to do with the individual positions, and C) to a great degree are affected by external developments, to which Turkey according to the EU shall align - where this report finds its entry. How the study treats this intrinsic problem of defining what a European FSP view is deemed to be, is the subject of the next chapter.

My epistemological position is inspired by Johannisson (13/03/2011), who argues that parsimonious and heady theories/conclusions are not the apposite ones for studies of human agents and societies. We should allow scope for the complexity in our understanding and outlook, Johannisson writes: perhaps can individuals be both victims and actors, societies both humanitarian and power-exercising, and languages both ambiguous and clearcut. The torn down dichotomy between securitised and normative values, an ontology this report draws upon, has also implications for the choice of theoretical variable. In order to attain sufficient coverage, it has to be wide and the definition of European FSP priorities will rely on partly EU-agreed positions and partly on a broader approach, for which HS is used as an ideal-typical extreme.5

3. The EU-side: Human security and the European Security Strategy
This chapter will depict the investigation’s EU-side, i.e. presenting HS and European Security Strategy (ESS). Provided the great heterogeneity within the EU-27 on FSP, there are limited amounts of material which represent a European FSP list of priorities. However, one document, the ESS from 2003 and its implementation report from 2008, constitutes an updated view of the views among the

5 For a thorough account of the epistemological and ontological positions – consisting of thoughts of temporal and spatial continuities and drawing on a scientific eclecticism - reinforcing this report, see Ahlmark (2011:10-16). This report is a redacted and abridged version of Ahlmark (2011).
EU countries on the security political extern-relational problem of today. As we will see in ch. 4, Turkish politics is dual in several regards, oscillating between extremes, positions which I argue can be present in an actor at one and the same time. Hence, the choice of theoretical perspectives has to demonstrate a width in its range correspondent to the continuum which the object of study of the empirical analysis likewise demonstrates. In this sense, the ESS represents the strictly security-oriented, reactive, realistic, hard endpoint of the continuum, whilst HS represents the more civil, proactive, normative, soft endpoint.

Beyond the commensurability between theoretical perspectives and the object of study at the explanatory level, there are also other reasons why the broad span between EU-agreed positions in the ESS and the theoretical refinement HS has been sought. Provided the EU’s feature as an ever evolving negotiation machinery, requested are criteria from other than merely EU-documents; also additional layers of European FSP can be expected to influence and ideas on how Europe shall further its FSP. FSP is in addition a policy area evolving over time, affectable in a great degree by surrounding factors- another argument for a broader approach; it is today impossible to predict which future eventualities that might impact the EU’s FSP. Moreover, the fact that Turkey is part of an accession process expected to take long time, gives that every-day criteria of today not necessarily represent the EU’s position at a future date. This explains also the need to take as a reference point the ESS rather than operationalised policy documents designed for specific events (only the first kind of material has positions and orientations guaranteed to be preserved over time). Fourthly, FSP (even heeding the Lisbon treaty) is to a large extent an intergovernmental affair with decision-making based on consensus and a patchwork of different models. This, argues Narbone (2009:86), makes it more difficult to establish clear-cut and unambiguous guidelines of how reforms shall be carried out in a candidate country. Restricting the establishment of European FSP criteria by the means of yielding to the instrument of conditionality (used in the enlargement policy) brings with it problems as different FSP-models are represented in the EU; such a putatively technical method tends to be politicised. Such a technical approach is more or less only attainable, as Tocci demonstrates, with regard to the most elementary freedoms and rights where a uniform ground for legislation, judicial systems and practises exist (Tocci 2009:11-5). This is not valid when it comes to FSP. Fifthly, it is not expected that coordinations and consultations of Turkish and European FSP are expressed in precise units of measure, why a broader visionary approach to the criterion-design is required.

Why human security?
With above said, why HS? The EU is promoting itself as a normative power. The ESS 2008, p. 2 and p. 10, makes explicit HS as a complementary approach to the classical security-concept. Even if this paradigm has been discussed but less practised, it is likely that this approach gains ever-increasing
future importance, not at least rhetorically and conditionally. The Barcelona report of 2004 (―A Human security Doctrine for Europe‖) favours a HS base for the ESDP for three reasons: 1) human rights are becoming ever more prominent in international politics, 2) the EU has a legal obligation to do so (provided its treaties), 3) it is in the EU’s enlightened self-interest to advance a sustainable security policy (2004:10).

A sixth, and perhaps most important, argument for a wide span in the theoretical approach: when in a situation where the FSP area wants measurable units, there is highly likely that precisely HS, in its extremity, is chosen to constitute a political condition towards EU-candidates; it may pose the hardest test for a would-be member to stand and a new qualifier possible to concur on. Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy are acknowledging the problem of measuring europeanisation of a candidate country’s FSP, and end up devising two propositions for this endeavour, based on commonly agreed norms on part of the EU: 1) democratic institutions’ role in decision-making, operationalised as civilian lead over unelected bureaucracies or military establishments. 2) The use of economic and diplomatic tools to achieve FSP objectives (2010:409-10). They find that Turkish FSP has been Europeanised along these lines. However, they do not explain from where such possible norms emanate on the EU side, which makes such an assessment at worst speculative (and they miss out in recognising that both would-be and EU member states in fact can align with these norms but still be considered as breaching the EU’s FSP acquis).

**Human security**

In an ambition to uncover and disrupt the continuous use and perception of security over time, Kaldor & Beebe define HS as comprising three features: 1) “[…] It is about the everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live rather than the security of states and borders”, 2) “[…] it is about different sorts of security, not just protection from the threat of foreign enemies. […] it is about both freedom from fear and freedom from want.” 3) it “recognizes the interrelatedness of security in different places” (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:5).

This notion is grounded on a rationale of the interconnectedness of the world: insecurities (violence, illness, poverty, resentment), seemingly geographically insulated, impact on the safety in other parts of the world. The UN’s Human development report (HDR) in its establishment of the term aimed at expanding the traditional (hard) security concept beyond its mere focus on borders and states, by establishing seven HS elements: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (HDR 1994:ch 2).

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6 With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) changed name to CSDP, Common Security and Defense Policy, which hereafter will be the acronym used.
The HS approach aims to prevent eruptions of violence by addressing the factors behind it. During on-going conflicts the focus is on dampening the violence rather than narrowly focusing on how to win or escape. In the post-violent phase, it focuses not only on reconstruction but on how to prevent new outbreaks of violence (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:7). The notion and use of hard security is not refuted completely, but it has to be deployed in collaboration with civilian-led operations and be subordinated to the aims of securing the HS end-goals. The Barcelona report (2004) established seven HS principles for the CSDP: 1) the primacy of human rights. In HS operations, protecting civilians, not defeating an adversary, is the end goal. Methods, military or not, must be appropriate. 2) Clear and Legitimate Political Authority. “The job of outside forces is to create safe spaces where people can freely engage in a political process that can establish legitimate authorities” (Kaldor & Beebe 2009:8). There must be a close linkage between policy-makers and the people on the ground, and the success of military means, if used, has to be subject to local consent. 3) Effective Multilateralism, i.e. a commitment to work through and in respect of the procedures of international institutions and law, norms and rules, and in structures which enhance coordination and reduce duplicity and rivalry. 4) A Bottom-up Approach, i.e. taking account of the most basic needs identified by people affected. This requires a continuous dialogue and consultation with and involvement of the locals. 5) Regional Focus. Human insecurity and new conflict-patterns have no clear boundaries. 6) Use of legal instruments, i.e. a focus on and investment in law enforcement. Parties have to act in a legal framework applicable to individuals, with legal accountability mechanisms in force. Kaldor & Beebe (2009:9) call this Clear Civilian Command. Civilians are in command, and the military has to work under rules of engagements and laws more close to civilian and police work. 7) Appropriate use of force. The lives of the personnel deployed cannot be privileged. The aim is to protect people and minimise all casualties (Barcelona report 2004:14-20; Kaldor et al 2007:283-86; Kaldor & Beebe 2009:7-10).

HS is more than mere crisis management, it offers a perspective on crisis itself. From a HS perspective, the aim is not just political stability; it encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability (Kaldor et al 2007:279). The tasks in a HS approach can be said to be fourfold: 1) Sustainable Security - the establishment of sustainable perceptions of safety and stability. “If people fear for their immediate survival, they will mortgage their tomorrows for survival today - abandoning livelihoods, destroying land on which they depend, turning to unsavory strong-men for protection” (Kaldor & Beebe 2010:90). In contrast to the focus in traditional peace-keeping on separation of combating parties, the key is to protect civilians from violence. Tools and means must aim to reinstate monopoly of force and law and order, in contrast to traditional counter-insurgency. Rules of engagements are under jurisdiction of domestic laws rather than under laws of war/conflict. Soldiers have to act more as civilian actors, carrying out what traditionally is regarded as non-military or civilian tasks (2010:90-7). 2) Sustainable Livelihoods. This task focuses on economic, environmental and social rights. It is about targeting the fact that in many zones, the grey and black economies may be the only way for people to
subsist, and is about securing basic everyday needs to these people. Moreover, it is about ensuring investment and maintenance of social services, education, health et cetera (2010: 97-101). 3) Sustainable Governance. In order to ensure the sustainability of security and livelihood, legitimate and functioning governance is key. Legal mechanisms are required, but capacity-building is particularly necessary, not at least via a bottom up-approach to decreasing the gap between rulers and the ruled (2010:101-05). 4) Sustainable Development - the end state uniting the three sustainable tasks above. Primary is the dignity of the individual (2010:101-06).

The Madrid report (2007) suggested paths for the institutionalisation of the concept within the CSDP, e.g. via a public declaration, providing clear guidance, operating procedures and rules of engagement on how to act collectively and effectively. This would have the added benefit of clarifying to the EU’s partners the defining characteristics of its FSP (2007:23-25). Martin (2009) proposes a HS base for the set-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Elite contacts would give way for multilevel channels allowing ordinary people access to the EU and civil society actors would be regarded on par with governments in the external relations. Openness and communication are key means, and addressing substate actors as well as abiding with international norms rather than pushing the member states’ interests are imperative in establishing legitimate political authority (2009:10). These recommendations have, however, not led to further and furthered clarity, but merely an insertion of the HS notion to the 2008 implementation report of the by then already established ESS. So, rather than rewriting, the EU has decided to add a new layer of thinking to an already established security view, generating more fuzz.

The involvement of HS in policy-making has been a main problem, partly because of a want of precision and conceptualisation. A possible factor behind this failure is to be found in Roberts (2009). He argues that the HS concept has mainly been theorised in the abstract but rarely attuned to the factualities of security (2009:152-7). Moreover, there is the problem that the governance is the systemic machinery which also is causing the problems it is supposed to cure. From a Foucauldian thinking of the biopolitical, this has produced criticism saying that HS is but a new form of control over individuals rather than control by individuals (Roberts 2009:47).

Martin & Owen (2010) distinguish between the UN-type and the EU-type of HS. They argue that the latter has better chances of being successful in the 21st century, in being more attuned to the policy dimension. They call the UN-type the first generation and the EU-type the second (2010:212). Early on in the UN process, it was clear that the original HS conceptualisation of 1994 did not find its operationalisation and workability. Martin & Owen argue that three factors explain this failure or lack of expected success: 1) ambiguity around the use and development of HS; 2) a deficient distinction

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7 For a description of how a HS approach to the Libya crisis of the spring 2011 would differ in comparison with the one chosen, see Wallis (2011) and Kaldor (2011): “The current attacks on Libya … are intended for humanitarian ends, the protection of civilians but the means are those of war.”
between human rights and HS; and 3) a possible conceptual overstretch in the UN’s use of it (2010:213). The first problem relates to the lacking consistency between the nearly insipid definition and the policy-oriented use of it. This creates disconnects and misunderstandings (2010:214-16). The conceptual overstretch refers to the tendency, because of lacking clarity, to include all and sundry threats to the individual in the UN conceptualisation, discouraging its use. This can create “false priorities and hopes, create causal confusion and encourage military solutions to non-military problems and non-military solutions to military problems” (2010:216). Still is a disconnect between what Martin & Owen call the doctrinal and the institutional development of the CSDP (2010:218). Therefore, one should not over-estimate the emphasis put on HS in the ESS 2008 report. An underconceptualisation of it even on this side of the Atlantic shows the lack of one single European way of thinking around FSP and HS. However, the EC has played an active role in holding forth and clarifying the concept of HS, and this differs from the UN-type – combining physical protection and material security and located firmly in a crisis management as well as a conflict resolution policy frame. This EU-type stresses less underdevelopment per se but more the integration of a development perspective into the EU’s FSP toolkit (2010:219). This conferred a greater potential for usability than in the UN.9

However, a key EU-particular aspect Martin & Owen overlook is that it is not the Commission which sits alone in the driving seat when it comes to FSP. Even heeding the Lisbon treaty, FSP is still very much subject to an intergovernmentalistic logic. The EU’s articulation, which Martin & Owen refer to, does not equal its implementation. In addition, even if this is accounted for, HS implementation is not sufficient were it not backed up by quick, coherent and efficient measures. This makes it more pertinent to underline my aim not to distil a HS-internal ideal-type (e.g. contrasting the EU- with the UN-type). HS is here rather seen ipso facto, as an extreme to the state-centric view prevalent in traditional security thinking and to the blur characterising the EU thinking.

Even if this disconnect goes a long way in arguing for the wide span in the theoretical perspective, is it really a valid representation of the actually pursued EU-policies? In other words, does this constitute a validity problem for me? In fact not; such an interpretation would be a misreading of my purpose. It is - provided the asymmetry characterising the relationship between the EU and a would-be member - precisely this unity as represented in the ESS and the ideal-typical features of HS that probably will be

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9 The reader should here notice the similarities between the term conceptual overstretch and the impreciseness of foreign policy research in general and towards Turkey that this report took as a point of departure. False priorities (the tendency to a priori take for granted certain countries or relationship of value to study when it comes to Turkey), causal confusion (the problem in isolating independent factors and trustworthy claim a clear and present causal arrow going from e.g. the EU enlargement conditionality to the foreign policy actions on the part of a candidate country), and the disconnect between solutions and problems (the tendency to reduce the relationship between the EU and Turkey to purely the accession process, overlooking the ever increasing importance of the foreign policy dimension).

9 Matlary argues, however, that HS’s contribution to the EU is only in giving a name to a security paradigm based on the human rights of the individual, useful at the rhetorical level, but does not add anything to existing EU policies and principles. HS operations may require campaigns just as tough as traditional state security operations in order to succeed. In reality, therefore, HS is not a softer or less warlike concept than state security (Matlary 2008:142).
used on part of the EU as a yardstick and a stick (sic) towards the candidate in order to measure compliance. This as the individual subject occupies a centre position in the EU’s legislation and spirit. Consequently, even if this representation of the EU’s policies will not exactly reflect the actual actions and stances on part of the EU in a crisis situation, the refinement will still be used in the EU’s relation with the candidate.\footnote{One can speak of double standards and criticize the EU for not holding firm to its principles when it acts, but this report is not the right forum for such a criticism. This report accepts the crude reality of EU politics as a realistic entry point.}

This division between the lexis (what is said and written) and praxis (what it means in terms of everyday actions, from policies to tactics on the ground) is perhaps as most accentuated in Kaldor et al (2007:273-86). However, such a distinction is taken for granted within by and large the whole HS-literature, both among supporters of the concept (e.g. Kaldor et al 2007; Kaldor & Beebe 2010), among its critics (e.g. Matlary 2008) or among the ones who in general are positive to it but criticize its conceptualisation (e.g. Martin & Owen 2010; Roberts 2009). My approach can be seen as a criticism of this all-embracing epistemological ground within the HS literature, a deficiency which presumably may be traced to a lack of knowledge among these authors about how the EU functions. To the extent they are familiar with the EU, it boils down to CSDP. But as I have argued, the enlargement politics is characterised by different dynamics and features than the FSP domain. Provided this area’s asymmetrical patterns, the distinction between lexis and praxis does not hold full relevance when it comes to the conduct of EU politics.

**The European Security Strategy**

The ESS was initiated and agreed upon in 2003. It was the first-ever single strategic framework to guide the EU’s CFSP and CSDP – approaches, positions and policies had earlier been advanced piecemeal). 9/11 and The Iraq war with its EU-internal divisions were external stimuli and catalysts in provoking agreement. Also two internal developments interplayed in laying the critical contextual patchwork behind the adoption of the ESS; the enlargement process forcing the EU to re-configure its relationship to the outer world, and simultaneously a growing recognition among the countries that a limit had been reached; the bottom up approach designed did no longer suffice for effectively agreeing on emergent threats post-9/11. The ESS was by more or less all commentators considered as an extraordinary achievement. However, it was made possible thanks to a significant emphasis on the transatlantic link as the EU’s most important partnership. The ESS demonstrates a strong consensus on the basic direction of the EU’s FSP (Biscop 2008:7, 12; Menotti, Vencato 2008:103). The ESS serves two functions: it provides an EU-wide “frame of reference for both long-term strategies and for current political problems […] and provides a common base for negotiations with other countries/organisations on issues of strategic importance” (Andersson 2008:136).
Fears (or, on part of some, hopes [!?]) that the ESS would turn into a paper tiger have been refuted. The reader who, by way of its name, may have got the impression that the ESS is merely a security policy document, should also be called to second thought: to the contrary, the ESS is omnipresent in EU-external discourse, it has reached a status of invaluable reference for documents and day-to-day policy-making within the broader field of the EU’s FSP (Biscop 2008:1-3). The strategy nails down the long term overall objectives, the instruments and the way of achieving these objectives, in parallel to broad guidelines for development of means and capabilities (Biscop 2008:129).

The ESS was adopted in the midst of the war on terror spirit, causing a tilt toward the politico-military dimension and to defense (Biscop 2005:14-15). Here, the ESS is used as a refinement of the state-centric and politico-military view of security, as a counter-position to the HS.\textsuperscript{11} This approach is based on a two-fold recognition, one ESS-internal and one connected to its practise. In the first part, the ESS-lexis, even Biscop admits that the ESS suffers from a politico-military bias, and does not offer clarities beyond it. The ESS is mentioning a wide range of public goods important to generate international security, but does not prioritise between them nor specify objectives and instruments for this, nor does it specify how the current system of international governance may be improved (2005:130). There is an imbalance in favour of the politico-military dimension of this effective multilateralism - reinforced if considering policy practises and other EU-related documents (2005:131). Since this is acknowledged by one of the strategy’s most ardent and optimistic supporters, this can be taken as a convincing reading.

For the first time in the EU’s history, the ESS contains a list of identified threats, it establishes principles and sets objective for advancing the EU’s FSP interests based on the union’s core values. After stating that large-scale aggression against an EU member state is today improbable, five new major - more diverse, less visible and less predictable - threats are identified: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime (ESS 2003:4-6). It makes not explicit the internal ordering between these threats; but qualifying the reading, international terrorism and WMD proliferation are considered as the greatest – the rest of the threats are phrased in such a way that they may be even more threatening if/since they can lead to the activation of the two first threats, i.e. organised crime, state failure and regional conflicts can be as most threatening would they provide the breeding ground for terrorism and provide the contextual conditions for WMD proliferation.

Three strategic objectives are spelt out. On the first, addressing the threats, the “hard” and terrorism-centric way of thinking reverberate when enumerating the ways and measures with which the EU has

\textsuperscript{11} This is not to invalidate or belittle other possible readings of the ESS, which for certain can be possible – for example Biscop (2005; 2008) views it in a much more positive light.
combated terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the state-centric view preserves its dominance when addressing state failure, organised crime and conflicts (ESS 2003:7). The second object reverts to a thinking where geography still is vital, building security in the neighbourhood, where integration and deepened relationships aim to form a ring of well-governed countries. The third objective is an international order based on effective multilateralism (ESS 2003:11). This latter still, however, grounds its ontological claim on the sustainability and prime referent of the state system. This is perhaps at its utmost expressed under this heading as: “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (2003:12.) In contrast to HS, this section is not endowed with goals set to prevent duplicity and rivalry or to enhance coordination.

Menotti & Vencato (2008) argue that behind the rather abstract principle of effective multilateralism lies a well-established practise of the transatlantic alliance, cast as it is in the ESS as an ordering principle, holding forth the transatlantic relationship as one of the core pillars of the international system. It goes on clarifying that NATO is an important expression of this relationship (2008:114). Consequently, what in essence was a normative ambition is conflated with an already taken-for-granted, prioritised relationship. Menotti & Vencato describe this as an unresolved tension between two visions: “on the one hand, an explicitly discriminatory concert of great powers (with the two variants, capability based and democratically oriented); on the other, the horizontal, non-discriminatory multilateral philosophy of ‘one government, one vote’” (2008:118).

The aim of building security in the EU neighbourhood is one of the two pillars, alongside contributing to an international system based on effective multilateralism. Implicitly, the ESS recognises that the EU is only partially a global actor, but this ambition can have meaning through its engagement in/with its neighbourhood; thus constituting a testing ground for the EU’s transformational power (Dannreuther 2008:62-3). This power - representing the second part in my two-fold recognition of using the ESS as a counter-position to HS (but is also the non-refined way of viewing what European FSP actually is, the praxis) - is though compromised and often negated by more narrow security-driven interests supporting a more reactive, status quo-oriented approach. According to Dannreuther (2008), the ESS itself is partly to blame for this: it is mainly focused on the security threats posed by the EU’s neighbours rather than identifying the potentials for transformation (2008:65, 72). The conservative interests with their counter-balancing impact revolve around matters such as immigration, energy security, terrorism and international crime (2008:74-6). The problem is that these push toward a geopolitical securitised view on the uncertainties and vulnerabilities that the EU face in these policy areas rather than the needs and the transformative potential in these countries.

In the ESS implementation report from 2008, HS is advanced as one of the pillars in EU’s work for making the world more secure. The achievements are said to be the results of a distinct European
approach to FSP (ESS 2008:2). Opinions influenced by the R2P-principle are recognisable. Paradigm shifts should though be treated carefully - the respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are stated as non-negotiable, and the ESS 2003 is said to be “comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant” (ESS 2008:3). The ESS of 2008 is argued not to replace the ESS 2003 but to reinforce it. The need for a renewal of the multilateral system is more strongly emphasised – exemplified with the UN and NATO - but the transatlantic partnership is still an irreplaceable foundation (2008:11).

The threats identified as of 2003 are not said to have gone away, rather, some of them have been more significant and all more complex. As the ESS 2008 is an implementation report, enumerating what has been done since 2003 and less spells out new challenges or objectives but rather take them a step further and deepen them, it will be treated parsimoniously. The still wanting dimension, in the problematisations of status quo interests delineated by Dannreuther, is a joint security concern approach with migratory countries to the issue of migration; a recognition of the energy-exporting countries needs and dependence on the EU; a more long-term approach to nearby not very democratic regimes rather than accepting stability as an argued buffer to figments of imaginations such as the only alternatives being Islamism/chaos (2008:74ff); and a jointly shared burden on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Hence, there are valid grounds to discuss the basic assumptions of the ESS, despite its still partial improvements. Striking too is the lack of socio-economic threats, given the financial crisis eruption of 2008.  

Recognised should be that the ESS stresses HS as a key ground for missions: there must be a continuous mainstreaming of human rights issues in all activities, through a people-based approach coherent with HS (ESS 2008:10). The ESS 2008 is, moreover, more explicit on tackling the root causes of conflicts and on qualifying the military- and state-only-centred orientation. However, the risk is that this approach does not translate into the threat-based approach, nor the partnership approach which the ESS is organised around. In the first case these threats are the epistemological base whereon the EU views the world, and in the case of partnership, rather terrorism-combating and the prosperity and stability of the countries involved (in order to enhance the EU’s own security) are highlighted, reminiscent of the interpretation Dannreuther made in relation to the ESS 2003. This leaves a wide scope of manoeuvre for interpretation of the essential goals, which Menotti & Vencato (2008) showed poses problem in practise.  

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12 A new threat recognised is cyber security. Threats further expounded on, now merited a place of their own in the enumerated list of threats are energy security and climate change.
13 Instructive here is the distinction that Nye (2005) makes between traditional military security issues which are more often collective shared, and respectively economic and social issues, which are more “often less broadly shared; there are more differences of interest” (Nye 2005:226). Thus, security as a unifier and socio-economic issues as a divider illustrate how and why the ESS may be seen as more politico-military to its very nature and spirit.
14 I. Noteworthy is that the ESS here explicitly singles out Turkey as a partner in its region: “There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations” (ESS 2008:11). One can here reiterate the early
4. Explanatory framework for the analysis

This chapter will in three subsequent sections devise the three continua used for the analysis. The purpose with this exercise is to structure the analysis. In addition it offers a frame of reflection for elaborating on continuity vs. rupture.

Studying the Europeanisation of Turkish FSP, Aydin & Acikmese (2007) recall the difficulties in and demand caution when isolating and saying that the independent variable, determining a member state’s or would-be members’ FSP course of action, is the EU’s conditionality (either funneled via the CFSP acquis, via the political Copenhagen criteria or via the emphasis put on peaceful settlements of bilateral disputes). They call on the need for also covering domestic and international factors in such an exercise (Aydin & Acikmese 2007:266-8, 274). Still, they end up assessing the EU-impact from a top down- unidirectional vantage point, omitting the possibility of a co-constitutive approach. Aras & Karakaya single out explicitly domestic issues for the understanding of Turkish FSP of today: the domestic reforms of the last decade have contributed to a new geographical imagination. They treat 1) national security; 2) the bureaucratic/authoritarian culture (giving way for a civilian/society lead role in FSP); and 3) economic liberalisation and stability (2007:472-7). Although these dimensions roughly resemble this report’s two first continua, they omit the importance of the international dimension that Aydin & Acikmese highlight, as well as the eventuality of an EU-related impact. Even more methodologically problematic; Aras’ & Karakaya’s first and third areas of study are handled tautologically: the process of de-securitisation and re-politisation (the main feature of the re-ordered national security understanding) are exactly the variable illustrating the shift in the second area in the direction of a more civilian, societal FSP debate and making. This runs the criteria for conclusion askew. My three analytical continua below are an attempt to bridge the gap between and the inferential deficiencies on part of these scholarly contributions.

Continuum no. 1: The socio-cultural, dual self-image

It can in both the EU and in Turkey be argued that it is security policy considerations being Leitmotivs in shaping the foreign policy leeway. In the EU-case, in absentia of formalised foreign policy unity, it is the ESS that underpins the foreign policy beyond reactive every-day actions. In Turkey, it is security as concept, which has been the linchpin of the politics. The Turkish mentioned figures on Turkish alignment, when invited, with 54 out of 73 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (EC 2010b:96). This represents an alignment rate of 74 %. In comparison with the other candidate countries in the same year (2010), Iceland had a 92 % alignment rate, whereas Croatia and FYROM demonstrated 100 % alignment (see the EC’s enlargement webpages for further clarity). II. It is important, however, for reasons of operationalisation, not only to treat the ESS as an idealotypical position representing the state-centric end of a continuum on which HS represents the opposite endpoint, but also accept it as the European position ipso facto. This methodological problem is mainly solved by looking also at in what way Turkey in its FSP formulation and manifestation actually refers to EU positions, policies, values (regardless of what these constitute of).
republic has, given its geographically and strategically exposed location, historically sought accession to political and military alliances in order to reach collective security (Soysal 2004:44-5), in a recognition that she, internationally, is not autarchic. Here we find the Turkish Exertion for westward orientation. During the late-ottoman period, the focus in Turkey’s FSP was exclusively on preserving as much as possible from the collapsing empire. That impacted on the thinking and made the foreign policy defensive and security-oriented. When much of this thinking, in contrast to what often is believed, was preserved into the Turkish republic, the concept security policy became, according to Çanda, synonymous with foreign policy and Turkey’s foreign policy priorities became dictated by securitised obsessions (Çandar 2004:55). Aydin recalls that Turkey in the post Cold War era is located at the intersection of this epoch’s most insecure areas, whereby security matters are expected to dominate its foreign policy formulation ahead (Aydin 2004:42, 112-13). Geopolitical location provides for continuity in a surrounding world ever-increasingly in flux. Aydin (2004) distinguishes between structural and conjunctural factors determining an actor’s FSP. While the previous ones (e.g. geographical position, historical experiences, cultural background, national stereotypes and images of other nations) and the latter (e.g. changes in the international system, shifts in the world’s balance of power, domestic political changes, daily scarcities of economic factors and the personalities of specific decision-makers) do interplay (2004:9-10), this provides for a parallel evolution of change and continuity in tandem and not in mutual exclusion.

In the transition from empire to republic during the 1920s, domestic conflict-lines were converted into the FSP (Findley 2010: 256). But also in Atatürk’s ideology lied a notion that domestic and foreign policy were two sides of the same coin: his motto: “Peace at home, peace abroad” has guided Turkish foreign policy since. The internal organisation of the state impacted on the foreign policy and a peaceful foreign policy was a prerequisite for the internal reforms (Aydin 2004:31). This followed logically - what earlier was domestic was now outside the new nation-state’s borders, but speaking of this change merely in terms of a changed social and physical geography overlooks the more long-term implication from this time: the Sèvres-syndrome mentality. As Aydin writes on this transformational continuity (sic):

The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of her people. [...]Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system. (Aydin 2004:12)

Göçek (2011), in her exposé over the permanence of the Sèvres syndrome, notes a post-Cold War re-emergence of the syndrome. This despite the favourable environment; hoped to be conducive for neutralising it. Three factors have co-produced this permanence: the staunch anti-EU-stand on part of
the Turkish military; the inability of political parties to generate and inject popular confidence in visions for the future; and a lack of popular deliberation on Turkey’s history (2011:181ff). Although the military has been all the more curtailed thanks to a democratisation of the public sphere, the military is still accused of interventions in the political and civilian life. Underlying Göçek’s exposé is still a wind of optimism on the possibility for the syndrome to subside, thanks to the changing international environment and its emphasis on human rights rather than state security. However, such a conclusion is conditioned on a positive development in the relations to the EU, which evidently has not been the case. The EU cannot therefore easily act as a catalyst for this development.

The WW1 victors forced the Ottomans to sign the Sèvres treaty 1920, according to which Turkey would be partitioned into pieces. Atatürk was the only leader among the war’s four crumbling empires that successfully resisted this externally imposed carve-up, and he reinstated Turkey within today’s boundaries with the Lausanne-treaty from 1923. From this convulsive birth was begotten a schizophrenic Turkish self-image and outlook, combining 1) a short of paranoid fear that foreign powers wish her ill with 2) a pride, sometimes tilting into an arrogant sense of superiority. This latter part of the syndrome is rarely discussed, but is an as important feature, I argue. The blend in expressing one’s power but simultaneously implying that small European countries in pure self-interest hold up Turkey’s accession process; the blend of demonstrating one’s proactive multi-dimensional foreign policy simultaneously as almost jerkily clinging to the accession route, are emblematically showing the schizophrenic historical continuity from Sèvres and beyond.

Bagdonas (2008) in his study of how Kemalist policies over time, by different actors, have been used to justify seemingly contrary policies, calls this divide defensive and integrationist (2008:170-6, 206-7). Meriting in his approach is its acceptance of the possibility that one and the same ideology can be multifariously interpreted, reconceived and used. The problem, however, is that he does not infer from this epistemological point of departure an ontological viewpoint enabling the same actor to comprise this rupture (see continuum no. 2). This is shown in his divide which is based on the defensive’s and the integrationist’s identity and rationalist grounds respectively. The problem (despite the merits of his constitutive approach to the relationship between ideology and FSP actions and his rejection of the taken-for-granted dividing line between matters and ideas) is that this implies a divide also between identity and rationalist criterion grounds of motivations, implying that the integrationist approach, regardless by whom it is pursued, is more rationalist, while the defensive approach is more identity-driven. Although Bagdonas deserves commendation in that he not a priori confers the attributes of identity or rationality onto the actors not earlier than in the analysis (2008:231), the problem remains since these analytical templates require an empirical separation of the inherent

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15 Such accusations are directed at Turkey from Cyprus and Greece. Göçek’s argumentation about the military can be updated to fit today’s domestic realities, by converting its problem dimension into a majoritarian view of democracy, goading AKP to turn more nationalistic in order to preserve its absolute parliamentary majority.
duality of the Turkish subject. I intend to overcome this deficiency with my eclectic way of thinking around actorship.

Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 1 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces from a securitised defensive thinking, connected to a historical continuity, or are there traces of a disconnect from this and the turn into a more ideational, normative foreign policy outlook? Are there traces of a reactive and proactive stance, are there discernible traces of a sèvresque sense of minority and superiority respectively?

**Continuum no. 2: The political cleavages**

Mufti (1998) describes above continuum not as much as a schizophrenia but rather as positions that different actors take. (This contrasts with my position that one and the same actor in one and the same act and thinking can express both of these two extremes.) Hence, some actors represent defensivity and status quo, whilst others represent intrepidity, proactive and normative thinking. Öktem (2011) depicts in the same dialectical way Turkey’s history, where these two poles - reformatory, civilian, political, and on the other hand bureaucratic, status quo, military – have been involved in a struggle forming the unfolding of history.16

A study of a country like Turkey, characterised by a continuous turf-war between ideological actors, cannot overlook political cleavages. However, these cleavages may not be as pronounced in the FSP, have the above continuum’s two complexes – the defensive, security-oriented thinking and the Sèvres-schizophrenic Janus face - transcended the classical cleavages and become dominant. An explanation to Turkey’s willingness to establish itself as a major FSP-actor may be found in Cook’s observation: despite the polarised nature in Turkish politics there is generally quite a unity along the political spectrum on the country’s external security policy (Cook 2010).17 This report, though, believes that such a unity is applicable more within the political sphere, where features of continuity and consistence exist from PM Menderes in the 1950s, PM and president Özial in the 1980s, FM Cem around the millennium, and president Gül, PM Erdoğan and FM Davutoğlu in the 2000s (Öktem 2011:43, 75-8, 170-81; Murinson 2006). Alternatively, the consistency is understood in terms of the Kemalist base for legitimisation for contradictory FSP actions over time (Bagdonas 2008:233, 238).

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16 However, mentioned shall be that one of Öktem’s points is that this distinction is not as clear in every single epoch as many are prone to think. In fact, rather often the politically driven and generals-led foreign policies have respectively converged, alternatively the civil foreign policy has allowed the generals to decide the direction (Öktem 2011:58).

17 Exemplified for instance, in the leader of the main opposition party CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s, rare backing of PM Erdoğan’s critical stance against France during president Sarkozy’s visit to Ankara on February 25 (Today’s Zaman 26/02/2011), or in his consent of the government’s position on Libya (today’s Zaman 21/03/2011).
Kirisçi (2009) argues that Turkish FSP of late has increasingly been determined by economics. FSP has turned domestic, “not just for reasons of democratisation, identity and civil society involvement, but also because of employment and wealth generation” (2009:39). Öniş argues similarly that the FSP has been a political asset for AKP domestically. It has helped AKP to maintain its popularity during times of economic crises - its independent character has transcended the party’s core constituency and appealed also to nationalistic sediments. AKP has been particularly adept in making use of this (thanks also to a weak and introvert political opposition). Öniş writes: “[h]ence, what we observe … is that domestic politics has become heavily inter-twined with foreign policy, and foreign policy has emerged as a major instrument for gaining a competitive edge in domestic politics” (Öniş 2011:57-8).

However, there is a reverse force making consistence more difficult to maintain, why, Berlinski (2010) recalls, consistent policies not necessarily are to be expected from this unity. This consistence exists as above shown, on the internal plane, but Düzgit & Tocci (2009) throw also light on the risk for what can be called an extern inconsistence (but provide no analysis of wherefrom this potential FSP inconsistence emanates). Berlinski thinks of the internal inconsistence in terms of the divide civilian-military – this is also one of the recent domestic transformations that Aras & Karakyapolat (2007) are treating. They argue that there has occurred a break-up of the bureaucratic insulation of Turkey’s foreign policy-making thanks to a re-politisation and de-securitisation. Traditionally, governments had obediently to stick to the red lines of the secular, bureaucratic FSP establishment. Securitisation of external relations hamstrung a lively public debate, and it was not earlier than via the EU-related reforms that the civil society was politically strengthened, this in turn leading to a “widening of normal politics and the narrowing of the boundaries of security dominated realms” (2007:474-5). Slowly but steadily this transformed the public landscape, transferred taboos to public debate, and opposition began be tolerated. In the end these processes, in parallel to a socio-economic liberalisation, has transformed the geographical understanding. However, as was seen above: this distinction - that Berlinski and Aras/Karakyapolat as well as the vast majority of other pundits base their assessments on - should not ontologically be taken for granted. Rather, I suggest that this inconsistence stems from a ”struggle” at the sèvresque schizophrenic Turkish identity, with the potential to outdo the cleavage secular-Islamic or civilian-military continua, and which enables a study with a snapshot character, where an actor in a still moment can display a double nature. Thus, this ontological premise brings with it direct implications for the study’s design. If Mufti’s (1998) premises were accepted, that the Turkish schizophrenia is to be found in different actors, it would demand a temporal interval in the empirical analysis more outstretched than now required (as it is but

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18 It is in this regard that Bagdonas (2008) provides inspiration for the study’s notion of the concept continuity. As Bagdonas demonstrates, the kemalist-doctrine can, over time, be multifariously reconceived, used and interpreted and thus be made to constitute a justificatory, equal ground for what intuitively are contradictory foreign policy activities (in Bagdonas’ case, the Turkish foreign policy’s Western orientation and its Cyprus politics).
first in the temporal dimension that actors’ positions can display internal variation). My premise that this is not the case offers possibilities for a spatial analysis.

Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 2 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces of the political cleavage civilian-military, secular-religious? Or can these cleavages be detected as outdone?

**Continuum no. 3: The geographical direction**

Düzgit & Tocci (2009) observe, in connection to the question of consistency, that the Turkish FSP in order to be efficient has to be perceived, by its addressees, as universalist rather than ethno-religious. From this observation stems a final continuum. In which external direction is Turkey turning? This continuum serves to be a challenger to continuum no. 1 and 2. Turkey has under Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prof. in international relations, previously the PM’s advisor and since 2009 FM, entered a new phase. Turkey’s security concept had earlier been primarily treated as an internal matter, FSP was viewed as an extension to domestic considerations, accompanied by a tendency to externalise domestic problems. One of Davutoğlu’s goals is to transfer these attitudes to the past. Aras (2009:130) argues that this has been a method to disconnect FSP from its domestic shackles and establish it as a policy area in its own right.

Davutoğlu has presented a new geographical world of ideas, based on a new recognition of Turkey’s historic and cultural roots. What were territorial and attitudial borders are opened up in a recall of Turkey’s ottoman wealth (Aras 2009:132). The FSP is being integrated in a framework for coherent policy formulation, beyond the hierarchical priority-order characterising the Cold War. For Davutoğlu, this fluid, procedural version of FSP refutes allegations that the current policy is a shift of axis (Aras 2009:134). Formulating sustainable strategic perspectives in such a context, one must take stock of the historic depth, based on a realistic account of the linkages between the past, the present and the future, as well as the geographic depth, penetrating the dynamic between the regional and the global. The geocultural, geopolitical and the geoeconomic factors shaping a country’s strategic depth can only be interpreted adequately at the intersection between these historic and geographic paradigms (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009:8-9). The basis is that a state’s value in world politics is based on its geostrategic location and historic depth (Walker 2007:26).

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19 It can be argued that other cleavages are to be found in the Turkish society. One that easily comes to mind is the ethnic cleavage. However, as the Turkish republic’s history is a history of out-and-out unitary politics, ethnic minorities have not been forming the governmental layers of the society, and since the report is limited to the governmental actorship, this cleavage makes less point in this kind of study. It is rather around the above mentioned cleavages the governmental regimes have formed; consequently my identification of precisely those.
Davutoğlu develops five principles constituting the core of his philosophy: 1) balance between security and democracy. A country is disabled from influence abroad unless honouring this balance; it must offer its citizens security, though not on the expense of democracy and human rights. 2) The relations to neighbours shall be imbued with a zero problem policy. This ambition is an ideal, concretised in the quest for minimal problems by first eliminating more acute problems. 3) Establish relations to the neighbourhood and beyond. A Turkish perspective should be present wherever conflicts erupt. 4) Multidimensionality. Turkey’s relations to other global actors shall be complementary, not competitive. The multi-dimensionality should be characterised by equidistance to all involved – the FSP execution should be careful, without entering alliances with regional groupings on the expense of others. 5) A rhythmic diplomacy. The means are mobility and proactivity in mediation and attainableness in international fora. Domestically, a total-performance aims to include civilian-society organisations in the formulation and mobilise them in the phase of initiation (Aras 2009:134-35; Davutoğlu 2007:79-84).

These five operative principles are trussed by three methodological pillars: 1) a visionary rather than crisis-oriented approach; 2) consistence and coherence; 3) a new diplomatic style and discourse by which to spread soft power (Davutoğlu 2009). Öniş & Yılmaz (2009) argue that the new FSP rhetoric hides continuity in much of its system of beliefs and practises. Both the European and the Eurasian elements have co-existed previously, and striking is the turn toward the Eurasian in times of disappointment and debilitation in the European ties. They call the discernible shift post-2005”loose Europeanisation” or “soft Eurosianism”. This is not necessarily an exclusive shift, but the multidirectionality is stressed without any clear European anchorage (Öniş & Yılmaz 2009:12, 15-6). However, they omit explaining this by answering the question: does the Euro-asian orientation occur as a consequence of the deterioration in the European ties, or is it the Euro-asian turn that has led to the European deterioration? Traub (2010) attempts a tentative answer: Turkey, as an emerging international actor, but still a harbourer of a history to represent, is aspiring for quite a few too many things - aspirations contradicting each other. Forced to choose, the neighbouring area tends to be prioritised, on the expense of the international (read: the European/American) diplomatic course. Required for Turkey is a new balance between competing identities in order to be something more than a semi-influential actor (Traub 2010). Once again, such an interpretation is conditioned on a denial of the ontological duality of the Turkish actorship; contingent on the premise that one and the same actor at one and the same moment not only can carry multiple identities but also show what intuitively seem as mutually contrary ideas.
Turkey and the Arab spring

Walker writes in an early analysis of the Arab spring that the focus on grassroots movements has led people overlooking the side-lining of traditional powers of the region and the remarkable re-emergence of a great power - Turkey, which not since the height of the Ottoman Empire has been that diplomatically active as now, touting for being the region’s self-appointed kingmaker (Walker 2011a). Turkey’s popularity in the region must also be highlighted, enabling AKP to draw benefits from its common history with the Middle East; in Turkish history earlier something handicapping. AKP has aimed to ameliorate the relations to every neighbour and to privilege the formerly “Ottoman space”. This has led to a reorientation, attempting to thwart revisionist and securitisation trends, simultaneously acting as an economic powerhouse (Walker 2011). Walker (2007:35) notes that visceral in the strategic depth is a need to cultivate good relations with all relevant poles of the world – this anchors the ideology in a pragmatism. However, he concludes, it is truly a sophisticated treading of a tightrope, balancing American, European, and Middle Eastern perspectives on the same scale.

The new FSP does not only entail possibilities but also challenges. In a latter analysis, taking account of Turkey’s way of tackling Libya deviating from how was done with Egypt, Walker (2011b) is significantly more cautious about Turkey’s possibilities to be an ideational actor: Libya revealed Turkey’s realpolitik footing as Preponderant. Krastev (2011) is even more sceptical, speaking of a window of vulnerabilities. Not at least as its economic development is quite an economy on loose ground, but also because Turkey has been one of the key beneficiaries of regional status quo. Turkey’s difficulties in sticking to its declared principles when addressing Libya (and later Syria), is succinctly explicated by Krastev as: “Turkey’s huge investments in Libya make it reluctant to embrace any anti-Gaddafi actions or forces; siding with Gaddafi would hurt Turkey’s claim to speak for the aspirations of democratic publics in the region; yet for Turkey’s ambitious and self-confident leaders to remain on the sidelines would be to accept their country’s marginalisation in the very area they have so assiduously cultivated” (Krastev 2011). Barkey takes the same approach: Turkey, provided its economic ties in the region, has to be mindful of its commercial interests when formulating its FSP (Barkey 2011). When Turkey eventually, after some initial wavering, declared its patience with Syria, in light of the Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown on its own citizens, had run thin and sent the FM to Damascus, he was rebuffed by Syria which continued its lethal business. So, the improving relationship between Turkey and Syria under Erdoğan’s time in office, however, did not translate into actual leverage, at least not in the short term.

Walker argues that a Turkey not anchored in the west has a plethora of other alternatives to pick - the strategic depth produces a self-understanding that Turkey is not purely a dependent appendage to the West -, options not guaranteed as fully desirable for Europe (Walker 2007:35). Thus, even if it is far too simplistic to characterise Turkey’s identity and orientation as either Western or Eastern, likewise the question about west or east has to be put.
Consequently, we have distilled continuum no. 3 through which to explain Turkey’s FSP orientation to a European view. Are there discernible features in the Turkish FSP, manifested in chosen material, bearing traces of an orientation away from the west and the EU, or can this orientation be put into harmony with European priorities? Thus, are east and west valid concepts, are they compatible or incommensurable in the case of Turkish FSP?

5. Material and methodology
Speeches and articles on part of Turkey’s FM, PM and president will be used. This material displays the official Turkish line. In order to maintain credibility for an actor aspiring to be a democratic big player internationally, alongside Western powers, the positions expressed cannot, no matter how, be violated.

An eclecticism in the scientific approach underlines the methodology, combining text-analysis and complementary interviews. Primary qualitative interviews will be employed for the analysis, to take stock of the off-surface layers. The semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face with Turkish academics and journalists. This material will not be used in an exhaustive manner, but aims to support the analysis; hence not presented as primary empirics. It will feature, with parts of it corresponding to the overarching purpose, in the analysis.

6. Presentation of the empirics
This chapter will present illustrative and representative excerpts from the chosen speeches, lectures and articles. The discussion will appear in ch. 9. The presentation is of no particular order other than chronological, commencing with FM Davutoğlu’s speeches, after which PM Erdoğan’s and president Gül’s contributions appear. That means that the order of the empirics does not impact on the way in which one should read this chapter.

In a speech delivered 28/02/2011 within the UN’s Human Rights Council, FM Davutoğlu stresses that the world has entered a new era, based on the supremacy of human rights: “Let us build a new order that crowns human dignity based on universal values. […] The new human rights order to be established must carry the respect of all. This order must be all encompassing and in [it] there can be no room for exceptions or privileged states […] Individuals are in the lead. [O]rdinary people are able to make a difference. Systems which disregard the right to life are no longer tenable. A way of life that wholly embraces human rights has become essential.” Citing the Mavi marmara crisis between Israel and Turkey 2010, he states, with a clear reference to the Quran: “[H]umanity was the victim, regardless of citizenship […] if one kills an innocent person, it is as if he had killed the whole
of humanity!” He does not shy away from that Turkey itself has a lot to do in the field of human rights, referring to the constitutional reform package adopted in a referendum in September 2010, testifying to the government’s determination: “However, this naturally does not constitute an end in itself. We are aware that Turkey must continue to progress in many fields.”

Addressing the Ministerial Meeting “Harnessing the Positive Contribution of South-South Cooperation for the Development of LDCs” (18/02/2011), Davutoğlu points out the key problem for the LDCs’ (Least Developed Countries) as: “It is regrettable that … many LDCs are yet to provide their people with safe drinking water, water for sanitation, electricity, access to health facilities and education, which are essential human needs. They are caught in the vicious trap of poverty and hunger.” What needs to be done? “[O]ur efforts must be focused on increasing LDCs’ resilience by enhancing their human, institutional and productive capacities through strengthened international support measures. […] The international community cannot remain indifferent and continue with a ‘business as usual’ attitude.” The Quran again: “In fact, the message has always been very simple and continuous throughout human history; “Help the needy and defend their rights”. It's in the Koran; it is in the Torah; it is in the Gospels; it is in the Rig Veda, it is in the Upanishads and other holy texts of humanity.” A broad approach to the work needed is sketched out: “[B]road support from all stakeholders, including the civil society, along with parliamentarians and the private sector, is essential in effectively implementing development strategies and monitoring the delivery of commitments on the ground.” For the fourth LDC high-level meeting hosted by Turkey in May, Davutoğlu has “instructed my colleagues to organize, as a special event, an Intellectuals/Academicians Forum […] to deliberate on the moral philosophy, which I believe will add an intellectual depth and dimension to our undertakings.” The historical, cultural imperatives are stressed: “[T]he least economically developed countries … possess the most cultural, civilizational, historical and traditional depth puts them in a special category that few ‘developed countries’ can hope to attain for centuries. […] We should be proud of our cultural identity and legacy. This will guide us in our development efforts.”

In Davutoğlu’s aim to re-establish Turkey as a player in its geographical and strategic depth, he consistently stresses the shared and common legacies, bonds and history with countries addressed. In an article in China Daily (02/11/2010) this emphasis overshadows the imperative to bring up problems with human rights: “Our historical experiences expose striking parallelisms: both countries generated their own solutions with their home grown leaders and they raised the welfare level of their people. They both assumed their rightful place in the international community as beacons of stability and modernity.” Stability is rather the key message conveyed. “With our friendship rooted in respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, we share similar approaches in global and regional issues.” The wish to deepen the cooperation is not qualified with any assistive measurements, but becomes a goal per se: “Sharing same goals, Turkey is ready to work more closely with China.”
Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) (24/1/2011), Davutoğlu joins in with the CoE’s position on the development in certain non-EU countries in Europe and encourages their way toward the EU fold. However, he stresses the universality of the principle lying beneath: “We are here not only because we share a common geography and our nation states are linked together by our borders … We are here also because we have shared together a common history, from which we have drawn conclusions. On these conclusions we have established ideals and values that have become our common duty to defend and take further. Today, these are in no way under the hegemony of “Europe”, but are to be shared by the entire mankind.” Moreover, he paints these principles as being extra-EU, not the least as he brings up the accession of the EU to the ECHR: “We strongly believe that this accession will offer the whole of Europe a coherent and credible system for the protection of fundamental rights by creating a single and binding legal space in our continent.”

Pertinent to mention too is the section where he enumerates the international partners the CoE has, naming only the UN and the OSCE.

When addressing the 19th Economic Cooperation Organization Council of Ministers Meeting (23/12/2010), Davutoğlu treats the economic pillars in the organisation’s and in Turkey’s external cooperation patterns. He emphasises the equi-distant as well as the door-opener characteristics of the Turkish role as: “that of a “facilitator” where we provide a secure place for parties to meet … We are only trying to bring together the key players for important regional problems to enable an exchange of views on how these problems can be solved.” He stresses the cruciality of private sector involvement “as a driving force behind economic cooperation schemes” beside the pivotal role of free trade agreements. Still, in a separate section, he brings up the necessity of stepping up the work in the field of human resources development and poverty alleviation: "…reducing poverty and hunger as well as child and maternal mortality rates” also need robust action on the part of member countries.” In a region historically marred with conflicts and violence, Turkey is now actively aiming to “contribute to the improvement of security, stability and welfare both in our close neighborhood and beyond”. “In line with our aim of establishing a beltway of peace, security and stability in our neighborhood, we are actively working towards facilitating the opening of channels of dialogue between countries in our region.”

At the United Nations Security Council’s High Level Meeting on Iraq (15/12/2010) Turkey does not deviate from the UN and EU positions, but noteworthy is that Davutoğlu is not referring or adhering explicitly to these organisations when formulating Turkey’s position, implying an independent position-making. Despite the context’s of the speech focus on Iraq, his opening lines are noticeable: “There are strong undercurrents of change and a new dynamism can be felt in international affairs. As the prevailing realities of this new era emerge slowly but surely, the need to promote and bring about a restoration of regional and international order becomes ever more evident.” Stating “[t]his is the future for Iraq and it is the future of our region” indicates a flat approach, as its justification does not lie with
Turkish self-interest but with the stability for the region as a whole. “[F]undamental political concepts like inclusiveness, national reconciliation and partnership will continue to be crucial building blocks for ensuring a political framework within which democracy, human rights and the rule of law irreversibly take root.” […] Gradually altering both the perception and language of politics in Iraq from that based on ethnicity and sectarianism to one defined by political parties and blocs is also vital.”

On 11/12/2010 Davutoğlu expresses the view on the Central Asian region, in an address on a conference on the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. Neutrality in the region, ridden by the big players’ geopolitical games, is depicted not merely as a legal status, but as:

In the case of Turkmenistan, being neutral should not, and does not mean maintaining a passive and indifferent stance in the face of critical events that merit close attention. Being proactive and neutral does not contradict each other. […] This is an active position, full-scale involvement in international processes through building peace, providing assistance in developing effective models of economic cooperation. This is the provision of a political platform for tackling problems existing in the region and beyond in order to establish lasting peace, security and facilitate sustainable development and progress.

This augurs the position on Afghanistan: “… Turkey … deems it absolutely necessary to address the humanitarian needs of the Afghan people as much as possible. It does so by building social infrastructure, supplying electricity and fuel. […] Most crucially, the Project, when implemented, will contribute concretely to the economic development of Afghanistan and assist interdependency among these crucial regional countries.”

Despite the potential, stability in Central Asia still faces challenges, thus it is “our common task, as members of the international community, to coordinate and combine our efforts for an effective and result-oriented engagement with the region to assist these countries … to become stable and fully-integrated into the international system”. After citing but a few examples on the variety of cooperative relations to this region, he relates to the rhythmic character of Turkish diplomacy: “We must establish robust relations and networks in a wide spectrum of fields to unleash the outstanding potentials and capabilities the region already possesses. Efforts must be conducted simultaneously in a great variety of fields that will include politics, economics, science and technology, good governance, education and human rights.”

At a Regional Security Summit of the Manama Dialogue (04/12/2010), Davutoğlu treats Turkey’s security policy perceptions. On regional security, he criticises the still recurrent tendency to refer solely to hard, military-centred security-thinking: “But in our region, a substance of security based on hard power will not bring us to a sustainable peace. There should be a much more comprehensive understanding of security. Security in the sense of economic cooperation, security in the sense of
cultural and political dimensions. [...] If we do not have economic, political, cultural and energy substance of regional security, there cannot be military or hard security.” To achieve this, he refers to preventive security “to prevent any crisis, any tension, any war in our region. [...] To prevent crises before crises emerge, not just to respond and react to a crisis, but more; trying to be proactive in securing the crisis.”

A second pillar of this methodology is a visionary security: “If we respond to the crisis, we cannot establish a sustainable security.” The visionary security approach is said to comprise four blocks; A) Security for all: “If we want to achieve security in our region, there should not be discrimination regarding any group of people or any country; it must be inclusive for all.” B) Political dialogue: “There should be more high-level cultural dialogue.” C) Economic interdependency; “the best means of security”. D) Preservation of and respect for the multitude and multicultural character of the region and its civilisations.

In the opening statement at the Fourth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (03/11/2010), Davutoğlu emphasises the promotion of regional cooperation by removing barriers to trade and movement. Noticeable is what he brings to the fore as the challenges of the Afghan people: “unemployment, inadequate health services and energy shortages remain among the foremost real-life challenges …” The aim is not only development of the local economy but capacity-building. Besides this meeting, he is keen in stressing the parallel business forum, as well as an academic gathering elucidating this dimension to security: “The Academic Platform for Afghanistan was a significant step toward adding an intellectual perspective in support of enhanced regional cooperation without which enduring peace and stability cannot be attained.”

PM Erdoğan, holding a major lecture at the International Strategic Research Organization, USAK (26/02/2010), stresses the great reserve of unleashed capability in Turkey: “Although the great majority of the population is Muslim, as a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law, we are aiming to integrate with European organizations. We are a European country but at the same time, we can understand the policy, sociology and psychology of the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans, Africa and the Near East very well.” He raises the stakes for the role that Turkey should and could play in today’s world: “Our accumulation of history, our cultural prosperity, human potential and geographical position provide us with inimitable opportunities and attribute to us very important missions. […] Turkey's features make it an effective actor, not an ordinary one.” Although it is not spelt out from whom expectations emanate; Turkey has to shoulder the responsibilities which like a sword of Damocles are hanging above its head: “Even if Turkey wants to be a country that is autistic, passive, uninterested and takes no notice of the developments in the world, it cannot behave as such.” However, a shift in perspective is also demonstrated when delineating not only the expectations on Turkey, but also the expectations Turkey places on other actors to consider Turkish action: “The
initiatives that Turkey will take … must be taken into consideration.” In a world in flux, Turkey has, however, risen to the occasion: “Today, … this vicious circle has been broken. Frankly speaking, Turkey is rising to a point where it can use and produce knowledge at maximum, and Turkey is not a country that is introverted and wastes its energy with interminable discussions.” Today’s problems are highly different from yesterday’s ditto, necessitating new tools, methods and perspectives: “The problems that have been moved to the global level bring a need for global cooperation. A local problem that exists in one part of the world is going to affect the whole world, and an illness that affects one part of the world threatens the entire world. […] We, as Turkey, have to accommodate such a world, make positive contributions for the earth and humanity. Turkey, with its historical and cultural accumulation, has the potential both to orient this change, and to undertake constructive and active roles in the new order.” Turkey’s new role follows from a strengthened confidence: “In parallel to the economy, we let others know about our power both in foreign policies and global problems. The roles we have undertaken in the international organizations indicate the growing importance of our country.”

Required is a mentality-change: “The actual threats are ignorance, wrong perceptions, prejudice and insistence on the mistakes. […] The creation of imaginary threats domestically or abroad in order to be able to design the public policy and the perception of neighbors as enemies came to an end with the Cold War period. […] Nobody has a chance to gain success while producing fear, threatening, and consternating such a world where the flow of information and the news are so fast through the channels of the Internet and the media.” This though is still said to be made through continuity in the principles: “That’s why we act in a manner to gain friends -not to generate enemies- and we try to implement Atatürk’s principle of ‘peace at home, peace abroad’.” The anti-status quo-approach is returned to, and practised as of: “We believe that this approach encompassing the Cyprus issue, the relations with the European Union, the relations with the Armenia and Syria, the Kurdish and minority problems is not right.” What is needed is a merger of normative and realistic elements to the foreign policy positions: “Not only turning back on real politics detach us from the realities of life and make us unsuccessful, but also standing away normative politics eliminate the thing what makes us who we are, alienate ourselves and cause us to be scattered to a different point.” However, the roots need be firm, familiar: “The conjuncture, current situation, and real policy could not be the main determining factors of the foreign policy. Such an understanding, which is disconnected from our culture, morality, and conscience, cannot produce a humanitarian policy.”

On the EU relationship finally, after up to this point not even having mentioned the EU in the lecture: “However, it should not be forgotten that the process of full membership requires some obligations not only for us, but also for the European Union. We are expecting the Union to stick to its obligations. We are requesting from the European Union not to forget that they would also obtain major advantages from our membership in the Union and they would become a much more active
power in the global dimension. […] However, it should not be forgotten that no accession process could last forever. If the existing window opportunity were to close, no one knows when it would open again.”

In a Newsweek op-ed (17/01/2011/) Erdoğan paints the current socio-economic situation in much gloomy colours: “At the end of this century’s first decade, we can observe how the locus of power has shifted in world politics. […] The [EU] cannot be the one sphere that is immune to these changes in the balance of power.” Turkey is touted as the ultimate contrast: “Turkey has been putting its imprint on the global stage with its impressive economic development and political stability. […] Turkey is bursting with the vigor that the EU so badly needs. […] Turkey is becoming a global and regional player with its soft power. […] Turkey has been an active player in all the major areas of global politics and we do not intend to surrender this momentum.” Arguments like these provide markers for the new Turkish vigor and expressed self-confidence, but Turkey still clings to the EU track in a short of desperate tone:

[T]he case for Turkey’s membership of the EU is self-evident and requires little explanation. […] [The negotiations] are blocked on political grounds. This is turning into the sort of byzantine political intrigue that no candidate country has experienced previously. In this treatment, Turkey is unique. Our European friends should realize that Turkey-EU relations are fast approaching a turning point. In the recent waves of enlargement, the EU smoothly welcomed relatively small countries and weak economies in order to boost their economic growth, consolidate their democracies, and provide them with shelter. Not letting them in would have meant leaving those countries at the mercy of political turmoil that might emerge in the region. No such consideration has ever been extended to Turkey. […] Sometimes I wonder if Turkey’s power is an impediment to its accession to the Union. […] We are no more a country that would wait at the EU’s door like a docile supplicant.

Some claim that Turkey has no real alternative to Europe. This argument might be fair enough when taking into account the level of economic integration between Turkey and the EU—and, in particular, the fact that a liberal and democratic Europe has always been an anchor for reform in Turkey. However, the opposite is just as valid. Europe has no real alternative to Turkey. Especially in a global order where the balance of power is shifting, the EU needs Turkey to become an ever stronger, richer, more inclusive, and more secure Union. I hope it will not be too late before our European friends discover this fact.

Addressing the parliamentary committee of the Council of Europe (CoE, 13/04/2011) Erdoğan elaborates on the religious-cultural factor, saying while the Christian and Muslim world previously were situated in an adversarial relationship with each other, while the encounters over time have “provided an opportunity for these two differing civilizations to get to know each other, to mutually understand and influence one another. […] History is not only made of war and conflict. But it also involves cultural interaction and convergence as well as an experience of getting to know one another.” History has to be renewed and renew itself as to meet today’s challenges: “We have to stop reading history through wars, conflicts and polarization. Those who read history only through conflict cannot help build a future based on peace.” The CoE is said to represent universal values key for
universal peace. Even if it is not obviously related to FSP, Erdoğan views the harsh reactions on part of the EU against press freedom in Turkey as: “[T]he allegations in recent weeks concerning censorship and oppression against the media and freedom of expression do not reflect the realities on the ground.”

On the EU position, he repeats Turkey’s good record, its strength in economy, fulfilment of EU criteria and Turkey’s dynamic, key role in having an impact in an ever widened geography. Following from this, he reiterates the lack of leadership in the EU: “I therefore find it hard to grasp how, despite all these facts, Turkey’s negotiations with the EU can be hampered on false pretexts and for populist purposes, how new impediments can be invented along the negotiation process. Turkey is a country with considerable power. […] Let me be very clear with you: Membership is a process of mutual commitment. The EU and Turkey need to cooperate on this process.” On the Arab spring, he states: “We have to start focusing on the human tragedies in the Middle East and North Africa, without being fixated on the oil wells. The emergence of ethnic, sectarian and religious divisions and violation of territorial integrity of states would run against the spirit of these events as well as the will of the people. […] [W]e need to avoid external military intervention, except for humanitarian purposes, to assure the legitimacy of these democratic movements. We do not want the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq to repeat themselves in the Middle East and North Africa.”

In an address to the Chatham House (08/11/2010) Gül elaborates on the core elements of a well-functioning international order in today’s new strategic environment. He delineates three systemic problems: “[T]he current international system is at the state of a three dimensional “imperfect equilibrium”. This … emanates from deficits in the political, economic and socio-humanitarian domains … [T]his “imperfect equilibrium” emerged … mainly because of the absence of a new international order following the end of the Cold War.” The problems in these domains are: “the world does not revolve around the two super powers anymore. […] [T]he global economic crisis has deeply exposed the weaknesses of international economic governance. […] Today, the road to peace, stability and welfare passes through democratic values and the enhancement of human rights standards. […] It is also depressing that only a small portion of the world’s population is benefiting properly from these social and humanitarian values.”

An effective international order paving the way for a prosperous future must, Gül argues, embrace a range of nine interplaying elements: 1) an order able to address the three above-mentioned problems in the existing order; 2) countries should not be categorised in an obsolete manner as being 1st, 2nd or 3rd world countries; 3) an order based on universal values, rejecting Euro-centrism; 4) an order where “principles and goals prevail[s] over club membership reflexes”; 5) an order enabling us to win the hearts and minds of the defeated, replacing an order where actors are purely rewarded or punished; 6) a participatory and just order embracing all, having also the capacity and means to confront threats.
whenever necessary; 7) “a multi-cultural, multi-dimensional, heterogeneous but harmonized order”; 8) an order refusing a single hegemon but renders the multitude of powers interdependent; and finally 9) Turkey aspires “to an order where people distinguish themselves not by bearing symbols but qualifications, and express themselves not with rhetoric but with their deeds”.

The international order is changing, but Turkey takes its place in it, preserves its main, traditional features, deserving its place thanks to its consistency: “Benefiting from thousands of years of state tradition, and having inherited the experience, memories and reflexes of great empires, contemporary Turkey certainly will take its rightful place in this new and normal international order. Our rich human resources, developing economic power, deep-rooted culture and the virtue of our democracy will be the fundamental driving forces in this process.”

7. Concluding analysis
“The well-being of citizens must be the priority of every political leader.” These words were uttered by Davutoğlu to a group of journalists on the way back from a failed mediation attempt in the internal political crisis in Lebanon January 2011, cited in today’s Zaman (23/01/2011). In its succinctness, the sentence encapsulates the various dimensions in which this text appears, and is a useful elucidation framing the analysis. The gist of the view expressed in the sentence corresponds firstly to the HS perspective, with the well-being of citizens as front and centre, secondly to the ESS in which this approach is coming in. On the continua devised, it strikes concordance with the observation of an absence (at least a loosening) of a securitised thinking within FSP domain (continuum no. 1), with the religious and parallel civilian justificatory grounds for the policy legitimisation (no. 2), and it conjoins with the East/West-reconcilableness (in the recognition Turkey does: it admits having reached its limits and withdraws, handing the responsibility over to the international community, even when the example in question relates to a predominantly Muslim brother country).

Initially remarking on the context[s]
Before proceeding, first some required remarks on the contexts in and audiences for which some of the aforementioned speeches are held.

The UN’s Human Rights Council, to which Davutoğlu turns 28/02/2011, has been scathed because of member countries with not very solid or convincing democratic credentials. It should, however, not be ruled out as a forum disincentivising obligations for the speaker. The case to make from the context here would kick in by cutting slack these fillips for taking a firm stand, but in this case we see the reverse demonstration; the speaker takes a firm position contradicting such countries within the very
same frame. As argued, for Turkey, in contrast to other less democratic countries (e.g. China, Iran, Russia), it matters what she says officially.

However, the way China is addressed indicates how relationships to these sorts of countries on a bilateral footing still may chip away such powers. Stability was shown in the China daily article, by all accounts, as the over-riding interest. Emphasising too the emerging strength of Turkey - “As the 15th largest economy in the world, 6th in Europe, with a continuously growing market for investment, Turkey is on its way to joining the ranks of major global actors by most parameters” – it seems this is perceived as conferring upon her a sovereign right to decide which countries she shall have relations with, and what kind of relationships. Given China’s status as a big country and a crucial international player, such statements and orientations to a human rights-violator may not provoke the same anger on part of Turkish Western allies as has been the case with Turkey’s somewhat Infatuation with Iran and Sudan of recent years, since these latter countries not belong to the crucial international game-players. This points to a problem of consistency and contingency. For a would-be member to the EU and a country espousing with the West, this may pose bigger problems than for a country without such aspirations.

**Human security, international governance and the [mis]-conceptualisation of FSP praxis and enlargement lexis**

Important to keep in mind for the remaining reading is that, provided the material’s limitations, I can mainly speak about representations, not the factual policy conducted.

In his Manama address, Davutoğlu challenges sharply the hard security regime and thinking as unviable. Cultural, economic and political security-dimensions are rather the preconditions for all security. Such a qualification is in line with the HS approach, and goes some steps along the way of reaching co-existence with the ESS of 2008. However, in the same address, he goes against the pure HS approach when labelling the territorial sovereignty and national security principles as the key principle of international law.

Allow me a paragraphical deviation expounding on a possible criticism toward this reasoning. One could on this score argue that, should Turkey’s position be expected to adhere to a principle considered as a well-recognised tenet in international politics, it may not be Turkey posing the constitutive problem but instead the HS, if this HS intrinsically possess elements contradicting the incumbent hegemony. This is also a view expressed by several academics rejecting outright, or being slightly suspicious of, this kind of claim, arguing that such a measurement is less relevant since countries and regimes across the whole world do not respect the HS principles, hence it should not rest upon solely Turkey to comply with it (e.g. Turan 14/03/2011; Doğan 15/03/2011; Aktar 22/03/2011;
Kirisçi 01/04/2011). However, this view expressed is premature. It fails on either one of two points: 1) it confuses idealism with realism, saying that such a criterion should not be directed solely at Turkey when so many other actors are defaulting on it. Such an instinctive statement does, however, not heed – or it lacks knowledge about - the clear development in the direction of HS which has taken place within the EU. 2) Alternatively, and more importantly, it fails in realising the context-specific and asymmetric characteristics of the EU’s enlargement policy area, differing in quality from the FSP, and the emerging conflation of these two domains. Such a claim expressed would not lack in logic were these two domains still separate from each other: in a world where everything is categorised in non-interplaying policy spheres, the distinction between lexis and praxis preserves its greater validity. However, as I have argued, this is no longer the case, and will be even less so in the future. Particularly the traits of the enlargement policy area cut up the thematically relevant separation, but provided this area’s asymmetric character, this does no longer hold true. To get stuck in this trap is – despite the spurious inferences it may create – excusable. This is because the below-the-surface and slowly but steadily changing reality not easily, without an effort, captures the casual glimpse-catcher’s attention, but is only discovered through a critical and careful perusal. This report aims to provide a contribution to such an understanding. Of course, such an understanding is still to be spread and corroborated further, and this initial step, will have bearings for both the research into the EU enlargement policy and for the FSP praxis.

The fact that there are both HS-conforming and HS-deflecting signs discernible in the above-mentioned address, goes actually quite far in conforming to the position held by the EU; lumping together hard and comprehensive security. However, mentioned should be that Davutoğlu in fact never does resort to an argumentation in favour of military usage, nor does refer to it as a means. In the ESS, although it is likely to be prioritised even more in the proposed renewal as of 2013, the HS approach is still phrased in a way possible to interpret as an appendage, whilst it in the expressed FSP-positions on part of all the leading Turkish actors, is upped qualitatively differently. This is additionally reflected in the emphasis recurrently put on renewal of the current international system of governance, to a various degree present in all the speeches (and also present in contexts where such reasoning is not expected), universality and all-embraciveness are the guiding principles. Focus is primarily on the institutional set-up of the world order, particularly when it comes to post WW2-institutions, entailed as Western ones and ill-suited for today’s multi- or non-polar world, as stressed by Turan (14/03/2011). Turan argues that this goes a certain extent in explaining Turkey’s stances on the one hand on the Arab spring’s developments in Tunisia and Egypt, and on the other hand, its divergent, more boggling actions toward Libya (and later, Syria): Egypt and Tunisia are both part of the Western hemisphere, its interest sphere, whereas Gaddafi and Assad are rebellions against the international order. Therefore, in the wish to reform the international system of governance, it is less costly to take a firm anti-regime
stance in these two cases than was with Tunisia and Egypt. (This goes also with the way Turkey has approached other rebellion regimes such as Iran and Sudan; see further below.)

The speeches also reveal wherefrom these principles are brought: the world is new, undergoing thorough changes, and its institutions and principles have to be adapted accordingly, but Turkey’s role in this new world and its values are continuous: a continuous flow stemming from the history, culture, civilisation of Turkey. A contradiction in terms? Not necessarily. I rather argue that this aims to represent and legitimise the rightful place among the leading actors in the international game, a privilege and right Turkey had been denied for too long. Seen in this light of the history, overcoming suspicious minds, both domestic and foreign ones, is a daunting and not-so-easy task to accomplish. An example of the complexity of the current and wished-for change of the current state of international affairs is displayed in Turkey’s approach to the Libya and Syria parts of the Arab spring. What is hidden beneath on the surface conveyed criticism against Turkey’s soi-disant hesitation and selectiveness, are arguments that Turkey’s actions have been firmly guided by a clearly humanitarian perspective (as emphasised by Alpay 25/03/2011; Demirtas 04/04/2011). Turkey has clearly taken a critical stance against the usage of military means, which of course was not obvious: Turkey, with the second largest military in the NATO, could have chosen another path, using it, but did not. Instead, after some initial turbulence it chose to face fait accompli before France’s and the UK’s readiness to go on it alone, and Turkey began arguing in favour of a broad, political backing within the NATO frame in order to secure international legitimacy for and national control of the operation. Turkey, however, continuously stuck to the humanitarian-first approach, and provided evacuation facilities along with offers to provide the oppositional forces with food and medicine, disregarding the fact that the rebels rejected these provisions and did not defer to the rebels when they demanded weaponry supplies instead. It would be difficult to find a stronger indication for a HS approach to such a situation (irrespective of its sustainability). Behind this HS approach exists a context, in which Turkey has been acting as a role model, and specific measures of this posture can be argued to have provided catalysts for the popular mood behind the Arab spring; for example the lifting of visa requirements that Turkey has extended to a number of nationals of the region.

However, on the other hand, this can also be construed as a window of opportunity conducive for the pursuit of exactly such a perspective. The leeway is conferred when other actors (NATO in the Libyan case) are fending for the military, hard security responsibility. The scope is thus widened and the cost is reduced for others to take on a more critical, in this case a humanitarian profile. Turkey has in this matter woven this stance together with its criticism of the current system of international governance. Still Turkey has a clear conviction that global challenges have to be solved at international and not solely at regional level. It attaches great importance to the UN system, as manifested, although this is running alongside the reformist stance to the international system of governance. On this score, it is noticeable that the EU does not take such a firm and consistent stance toward the need for UN reforms
- most likely due to internal divisions on how such reforms should look. The EU positions on UN reforms rather boil down to an ambition to boost its own clout in it – represented by the “super observer” status it finally, in May, after many long wrangles, was given in the UN’s general Assembly. If the differing positions on international governance is a given and seen as a variable in the EU-Turkey relationship, it may cause spaces for conflict, at a general level but also in concrete situations (be mindful of the cases of Libya, Syria and Iran).

**How does Turkey’s behaviour play into its EU relationship?**

Enlightening here would be to delineate the main distinctnesses between the EU and Turkey as entities with regards to FSP. I argue that Turkey’s limitations in this area are structural and policy-related, whereas the EU’s are institutional and political. To explicate: the EU system is marred with divisions on the main FSP outlooks and on how the EEAS should function. The preferences of the community actors (leading in promoting the set-up of the EEAS in order to streamline and enhance the EU’s FSP clout) could cohabit with brakers’ preferences, held by many EU member states. The ongoing tussle between these various actors can continue, opponents and advocates are satisfied, the EEAS can be set up, while the member states can or at least attempt to maintain the privilege to control the process. The lack of a common ground on FSP within the EU creates a propensity to reactivity on part of the EU in its external relations. Turkey does not suffer from this institutional contingency. This provides a greater possibility for Turkish proactiveness. In comparison with the EU, this has also provided an enhanced possibility for Turkey to, in a more coherent and straightforward way, continue with its ambitions in the FSP area. However, its limitations are structural: other actors need to be acknowledging Turkey’s positions in order to allow it to have international clout (conditioned the Turkish positions do not only correspond to international needs of today but also to the main game-players’ preferences). Thus, even if Turkey’s ability in strengthening its FSP position is consolidated, from this does not automatically follow that Turkey will profit from it internationally or in its relation to the EU. The EU does not suffer from this latter limitation, thanks to its sheer size: if the EU’s institutional and political deficiencies be overcome, had the institutionalisation, strengthening, coordination, consolidation and implementation of its FSP been successfully carried out, this will by all likelihood rapidly reach a globally relevant role, notwithstanding the behaviour of other international actors.

So how does the HS approach, partial or thorough, on part of Turkey, play into Turkey’s EU orientations? Unless it is not corresponding to EU-positions, a refined HS approach does not necessarily play to Turkey’s advantage in its EU accession process. One can be as upset as possibly is over this (as indicated by many Turkish actors when referring to double standards), but the problem is that the decision-power lies with the EU, and is mainly a political, not a legal one. Therefore, in what
way the Turkish activity during the Arab spring is considered as true to its high-minded principles, with a HS approach to be found under the surface or if it raises doubts of its consistency and actual capacity to live up to its ambitions and foreign policy potential, this, I argue, given how it is handled, may be a problem both in the long and in the short term. If the HS principles are not conformed with, as some argue, this should pose a problem for Turkey in the longer run, as the Copenhagen political criterion is the decisive one, and as the HS by all likelihood will play a more front and centre role within the EU’s FSP and enlargement policy doctrines ahead (there are as of today no clear criteria set for the FSP when this is getting closer to and partially subsumed within the enlargement policy area). On the other hand, provided Turkey will be considered as a strategically key country for the EU and as a realpolitik asset in the region, such values may be side-lined. However, it is crucial to be mindful that such a possible latter development would not count toward Turkey’s EU membership prospects, but rather Turkey would be taking the place as a privileged ally to the EU in this domain. This prospect might sound negative, and for ideally devoted Turkophiles, it certainly is – construed as a victory for all Turkey naysayers. In comparison to full EU membership, each alternative format is of course seen as something denigrating. Unless we have an alternative line-up among the European leaders, possessing true leadership - and viewed from the vantage point of how EU politics works rather than captured by and compared with one’s ideal state - the talk of phased membership for Turkey with FSP as a door-opener, does perhaps not, lest the accession process is resumed, sound as such a calamitous option. It should, however, be admitted that such a phased integration may act to the detriment of Turkey’s possibilities for acting proactively and independently formulating FSP positions and solutions when it has to be subsumed into the EU arrangements, unless the format of the European way of cooperating on FSP matters is reformed.

Tracing the continua
Relating to the above are frequent references to religion and Islam. As shown in ch. 8, Islam is not the sole justificatory ground; when possible, these references extend to include other faiths, probably in order to enhance the reach of the legitimisation. When considering the cleavage religious-secular in continuum no. 2, there is an unambiguous propensity of referring to religion when justifying a message of humanity and morality in foreign relations. This is not to deny problems and fuzz that have appeared in Turkish selective relationships with certain countries, on part of many in the international community perceived as non gratae, such as Iran and Sudan, where the relationships among the leaders sometimes seem more than courteous, if not affable. However, making conclusions from symbolic politics may create misjudgements. As several of the interviewees note, the relationships with these countries would perhaps not have differed substantially had we another government in Turkey (Turan 14/03/2011; Kirisci 01/04/2011; Demirtas 04/04/2011). Economic interests and wish for stabilisation have been important in shaping better relationships. Some of these initiatives preceded AKP. Much of
it carries a symbolic, less substantial, stamp, and a different government would perhaps be less intimate with these foreign leaders than AKP leaders have been, but not deviate from the general direction. However, cultural issues may play a role, as the leaders feel more comfortable in the company of Arab-Muslim brothers than in the company of European diplomacy and politics, something which Kirisci mentions. However, how much out of 100 these matters kick in is impossible to say, but it may be just enough to tip the balance. Dogan (15/03/2011) points to the alternative perception on part of the incumbent government on how religious beliefs should play and do play into interpersonal relationships, as different to oppositional actors in Turkey, implying too this less substantial difference. This would go some way in tilting towards the religious end along continuum no. 2.

However, religion is not the sole ground for policy legitimisation. One may believe that politics spearheaded by religion would not have the same sorts of self-imposed limitations to its remits as a reasoned one would have. The assistive role that Turkey can play in its region, in the Western perception, has been ever increasingly acknowledged. Dogan stresses the populist nature of Turkey’s government: if they find an area fruitful, they polish it and convert it into an award. But it is guided by self-awareness – he cites the latest internal Lebanese crisis of the winter 2010/11 where Turkey first attempted to play a mediating role, but when realising the futility of these attempts, it withdrew, acknowledging also its own limitations (Dogan 15/03/2011). This implies a greater degree of awareness and self-mediated populism on part of Turkey than argued by commentators who are stuck in a mere focus on the religious dimension to it and who consider it as something intrinsically problematic. The limitations to Turkey’s clout is, moreover, acknowledged by the government itself and the politics adapted accordingly – Turkey is not a superpower, but still a very important international player. In order to boost its leverage internationally, Turkey has accordingly, also along with Davutoglu’s recognition of the key importance of multilateralism, consciously made use of the language of international law, garnering a mechanism for legitimisation vis-à-vis the international community. This goes also for enhancing its legitimisation domestically. In the midst of the Ship to Gaza-crisis between Turkey and Israel, Turkey was rocked into turmoil, but very soon, argues Dogan, the FM began using the language of international law, in order to pull all anger and nationalist discourse onto the level of international law. This pattern is in addition discernible in the speeches treated. On this score, the civilian component dominates.

The civilian and religious components have thus gained an increased role. These two components do, however, neither contradict nor harmonise completely with each other. They rather complement one and another. The religious dimension is evidently a driving force, providing the intellectual and moral backbone for the civilian-led formulations. The civilian trajectory is thus a consistently enforced way of enhancing its legitimisation, by embracing other interests, parties and stakeholders to a certain issue area than would have been possible with a narrow follow-through on purely one’s own
principles. Therefore, populism and principles interplay in a systematic way. This interplay does not always chime. The ambitions of multi-dimensionality and equi-distance, often translated into neutrality, have sometimes led Turkey astray, wobbling between neutral stands and taking sides in a seemingly not very coherent manner. This character differs from the EU, which rather is a dominant actor promoting clearchcut norms and therefore more easily takes sides.

Regarding the securitised continuity, believed to be displayed alongside its opposite forces such as proactive, normative stances, comprised by the same actor at the same time, a belief which I entitled the ontological duality of the Turkish actorship; such a securitised thinking does not represent itself in the manifested empirics. However, I argue, such an inference needs to be qualified: this sort of securitised thinking is actually less prevalent in the FSP. It seems that the qualitative leap into a new paradigm on this score, Alpay (25/03/2011) argues, has been carried through and pulled off. Not on a single occasion is hard security opted for, and when mentioned, it is to problematise the concept of security, making the hard core of it expanding, reaching a comprehensive understanding. The objective in the FSP seems to be universalism. Of course, it is not successful at every occasion – think of the Libya and Syria cases (although these can and have been argued to be espoused by a clear humanitarian position), and of the Iran nuclear crisis of 2010 when Turkey turned against the entire international community by alongside Brazil striking the uranium swap deal. But which country does succeed to 100%? As a relative new-beginner, extremely active and proactive on the international scene, but still on a testing ground, it is but natural that Turkey sometimes hits snags in the minefield of international politics – it is part of the process of daring, acting grandiloquently and being in the grabbing-at-phase. In addition, as Doğan noted, the government is still aware of its limitations. Importantly, regardless of whether one considers Turkey’s stance toward the internal crises of Libya and Syria during the Arab spring as reactive, misguided by its own economic and stability interests, or if one considers it as representing a humanitarian-first position; the behaviour was not indicative of a fearful Sèvres-mentality but, if so, by traditional liberal intergovernmental interests. Thus, Turkey is not deviating from international politics in general, but would be quite an ordinary player in this Western family of state actors. The problem is, however, that in the asymmetric accession process, such espousal may not be enough for boosting a candidate country’s accession prospects.

So, the Sèvres-syndrome mentality does not display itself in the assessed FSP positions. The ontological duality of the Turkish actorship could therefore not be proved right or wrong. However, turning to the domestic sphere and to the formalised EU-accession negotiation process, I argue, traits of a Sèvresque continuity are still discernible. This was also believed to be the case by Özdoğan (15/03/2011) and Kirisci (01/04/2011). Just to mention but a few examples; think of the harsh rhetorical character of the general election campaign. Think of the polarised political climate where criticism is regarded as threats and attacks. And think of the very emotional, fierce reactions on part of Turkey’s government toward the European parliament progress report published in March 2011.
criticising the situation for press freedom in Turkey, calling the report unbalanced, produced by unbalanced people. Moreover, demonstrated most clearly in Erdoğan’s Newsweek op-ed but also a general undercurrent in the speeches highlighting Turkey’s own pride in being a country, now able to serve for itself and with a potency making it able to handle its own affairs. Turkey is said to be unique among the candidate countries. However, at the same time, the sting is consistently directed at the EU, and in a short of desperate tone it clings to the EU track - indicating something substantially civilisatoric for Turkey, manifesting something much more important in this relation than in other relationships.

With regard to the traits of this securitised thinking in the domestic sphere and the detected lack of it in the FSP sphere, it is interesting to ponder the possibility of the FSP sphere consciously used for enacting a normative and ideational actorship. From a vote support-maximisation perspective, this may appeal to a certain constituency of electoral support whereas a quite more nationalistic or reactive stand in the domestic and the EU-membership spheres may appeal to other societal groups. Thus, these different spheres have various functions and purposes for the governmental party, offering it a possibility to expand its support; and create, in the eyes of the onlooker, patchy representations.

These sides of the coin have not been investigated in this report, but are seeds for future research, from the view-point of my ontological belief of a duality in the Turkish actorship on securitisation. Future studies can moreover take account of the degree to which such thinking would be prevalent in the domestic sphere, something that has been impossible for me here.

On the East-West ends, not one interviewee thinks that the Turkish government pays heed to specifically the EU when formulating FSP positions. Nor is the EU, in the speeches, displayed as a decisive factor. The way the positions are phrased is rather indicating an independent positioning, driven by a wish to let Turkey reclaim the rightful place and to activate the strategic depth-grounded principles in the international arena. This forges a leeway for Davutoğlu, in the LDC summit in Istanbul May 9-13 2011, to criticise the developed North for an innate propensity on their part to deny any impact at all from the colonial past on the development of the poorest countries of the world and the attendant lost possibility for these to undergo the successive transition into the global economy as has been the feature of the Northern economies. At the same time, he does not shy away from dismissing the tendency in LDC countries to shut their eyes for bad economic management and in blame avoidance put all the culpa on history and the formerly colonial powers. East and West are not perceived as mutually exclusive; rather, the spirit is one of perceiving Turkey as a Western country (not the least shown in the EU attachment), but a country re-discovering its old bonds also in other directions. Such a reflection is corroborated when pondering Turkey’s activity under the Arab spring. Critics who are suggesting that Turkey is turning Islamist and turning its back to the West because its visible rapport with Muslim/Arabic regimes holding not democratically lustre credentials, should in
this respect be forced to qualify their inferences. Turkey has been caught as off guard as anyone else before the unfolding of the Arab spring, and rather, Turkey’s leverage with these countries, mainly Libya and Syria, Ottoman dominions as they were, has been revealed as not as strong as believed (and hoped for). Allowing space for the complexity, as Johannison (12/03/2011) exhorted us to do, enables such a mutually double-edged direction in the outlook and orientation.

The current seems to be a mix of old and new, or, rather that the new is dressed in old guises. The new is usurped and ushered by old, timeless principles. Hence, there is something qualitatively new to this, but that does not mean – as never in Turkish history, regardless of the rhetoric – a complete discharge of what once was. Paradoxically, the new impulse, although it partially builds on previous Islamic-leaning political parties, is that it obviously is based on references to and principles formulated on a religious basis. Probably the greatest change is to be found in the civilian-military dimension; nothing left of militarily-emanated argumentation or influence stemming from this is observed (Turan 14/03/2011; Doğan 15/03/2011; Alpay 25/03/2011). The FSP formulation process has been opened up, becoming susceptible also for a broader spectrum of societal opinions.

To summarise, the securitised character is not prevalent in the foreign policy formulation on part of Turkey (but may still reverberate in its domestic sphere and in its relationship to the EU, suggested to constitute a quid pro quo between these policy spheres). On the second continuum, the civilian and religious dimensions are strengthened, lumped together in a systemic and populist approach, and on the third continuum, the East-West outlook has been transformed but is not mutually exclusive. There are partial but at the same time clear Turkish orientation to the European principles of the HS and the ESS, as the case is also in EU’s position itself. At the same time, the references to the EU in the formulation of positions are infrequent, if scarcely traceable. However, this does not in itself play to Turkey’s advantage in the EU accession negotiations. At the end of the day, the European assessment of Turkey’s compliance and FSP behaviour in general is not legal, but political. Neither the ESS nor the HS are legally binding documents/perspectives, something that opens up for interpretations and re-interpretations.

**The questions of limitation and generalisability: a forward-look and a call for realism and leadership**

Some may be inclined to dismiss the empirical claims in this report as nonsense. However, nolens volens, language matters, as well as representations and brands within the international politics. How a country is perceived matters. If these representations for a country with ambitions to turn its back to isolation and dictatorial legacies are violated in practise, it would ruin the country’s credibility, particularly for a country like Turkey. The analytical claims made are in addition assisted by primary interviews in order partly to corroborate the results from other sources and partly to look into
discussions on the practical execution of the representations. Moreover, even the least knowledgeable about Turkish history should know that the qualitative leap in rhetoric and practise which has taken place of late is not nonsense. Turkey, becoming even more securitised and threat-exposed post the Cold War was not predestined to go in this direction. Of course, nor anything for the future is predestined, but being aware of the security-consciousness in Turkey and the historical disinterest for its Eastern and Arabic connections, one has to consider this development as unique, warts and all. Yet, real challenges lie ahead if Turkey wants to be successful in the ambitions of playing a continuously growing role internationally.

I do not claim that my three-folded continua are exhaustive. However, I believe they are both pertinent and useful when treating the Turkish case. The reader may recall Beck’s methodological nationalism, running the risk of making the social sciences blind and creating blindness for Europe (Beck & Grande 2006:34). However, the continua are devised in such a way that they address both country-specific characteristics and are left to be applied also to other countries. True, much of the findings and discussions are Turkey-specific, but that does not exclude the use of the methodological skeleton devised for studies of other countries and for further studies of Turkish politics. It is even theoretically and epistemologically desirable. The continua, motivated as they are for their embraciveness, are easily converted to other countries, thus circumventing the methodological nationalism trap. I am also content that the methodological model is applicable in other policy areas than purely FSP, which made me unwilling to exclusively call it a foreign policy analysis. This report has moreover been mainly based on an ideal-typic or refined view of the politics, polity and policies. Therefore, instructive for further research would be to bring this methodology a step forward and take a more rigorous look into the practical conduct of politics.

I am, as repeatedly stressed, well aware that at the end of the day it is a political assessment from the EU’s side which will be decisive in deciding whether Turkey’s FSP action and compliance will improve its EU accession prospects. The fact that the process is contingent on a political, and not a legal or a moral, opinion, is too often overlooked by pundits commenting on the process. Even politicians themselves, particularly Turkey-advocates, tend to forget this when raising their voices. The compliance rate ipso facto will not tell much about this process or the prospects. However, I would like to show that the Turkish actions and positions do not deflect in a significant way from the norms and ideals which influence the EU FSP position, and do in fact bear clear traits of the principles which will play an even greater importance ahead in the EU’s FSP as it is subsumed into the EU’s enlargement policy. The Turkish behaviour bears traits of partly a HS approach but also partly the state-centric view and particularly the comprehensive perspective and the flexibility along which the ESS, as first in its implementation report of 2008 and even more in the future revisions will steer toward. Such a contribution provided by this report should be a value per se. It is also a call for both realism and leadership on part of politicians, scientists and pundits dealing with EU-Turkey relations.
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