Institutions, Corruption and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. and Violeta Piculescu
CEFOS and Department of Economics, Göteborg University

Abstract
In this paper we propose a model of how institutional benefits, taxation and government regulations affect the productive activity of private enterprises. We consider an environment in which public officials enforcing tax and regulatory obligations are potentially corruptible, and markets for corruption may therefore arise that give firms the option of producing unofficially and evading taxes and regulations. By contrast to some previous studies that view corruption and bribery as forces driving firms out of official production into the underground economy, our model features the idea that the ‘grabbing hands’ of corrupt bureaucrats may alternatively serve as ‘helping hands’ allowing firms to exploit profitable opportunities in the unofficial sector. And contrary to a traditional view maintaining that high tax rates are intrinsically a major cause of large shadow economies, our model implies that incentives to evade taxation and produce underground depend on statutory tax rates relative to firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration. Tax toleration is determined, among other things, by firm-specific institutional benefits available to official producers and the costs of corruption required to produce unofficially. Some core predictions of the model concerning the determinants of tax toleration and the relative size of unofficial activity and tax evasion receive broad support from empirical analyses based on firm-level data from the World Business Environment Surveys sponsored by the World Bank.

JEL Codes: D21, H26, K42, O17

Key Words: institutions, corruption, tax evasion, tax toleration, unofficial economy, underground economy, black economy, WEBS

Corresponding Author: Douglas Hibbs, CEFOS, Göteborg University, Box 720, 40530 Göteborg Sweden, douglas@douglas-hibbs.com.
1 Introduction

Academic research and writing on the sources of economic growth and development now routinely feature the fundamental importance of honest governance and well functioning institutions. Indeed the World Bank recently identified “corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development”\(^1\) and the Bank has become an important source of quantitative ‘Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality.’\(^2\) The lion’s share of research on the interplay between corruption, governance, institutions, policies and the underground investigates cross-national patterns among aggregate political and economic variables. The microeconomic mechanisms by which institutions, policies and so forth influence the productive behavior of firms, workers and households are much less well documented and understood, though empirical studies based on national aggregates sometimes make informed inferences about the microeconomic processes underlying macroeconomic relationships uncovered.\(^3\)

In this paper we propose a model specifying how institutional benefits, taxation and various government regulations affect the productive activity of private enterprises in settings in which enforcement officials are potentially corruptible, and a market for corruption may therefore arise giving firms the possibility of producing unofficially and evading taxation.\(^4\) By contrast to some previous studies that view corruption and bribery as forces driving firms out of official production into the underground economy,\(^5\) our

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1 Asserted at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm

Important reviews of the extensive corruption literature include Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Jain (2001).


4 The unofficial economy includes economic activities that evade official registration and taxation. Such activities are undertaken either by firms that are not registered officially, or by firms that are registered officially but produce and sell at least part of their output unofficially. Dallago (1990) provides a detailed discussion of various definitions of the concept. Common labels used in place of ‘unofficial’ are hidden, parallel, underground, shadow, clandestine, black, and unobserved.

5 For example Choi and Thum (2005), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) and Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000).
model is based on the idea that the ‘grabbing hands’ of corrupt bureaucrats function alternatively as essential ‘helping hands’ giving firms the capacity to exploit profitable opportunities in the unofficial economy. And unlike models that have firms making ‘all or nothing’ choices about producing officially or unofficially, a central feature of our approach is the prospect that profit maximizing firms may operate simultaneously in both the official and unofficial sectors. Moreover, contrary to a traditional view that high tax rates are intrinsically a major cause of large shadow economies, our model implies that the incentive of firms to produce underground and evade taxation depends on statutory tax rates relative to firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration which are determined, among other things, by firm-specific institutional benefits available when producing officially, and the costs of corruption required to produce unofficially. The concept of firm-specific tax toleration thresholds may help explain why tax evasion and underground production varies so greatly across enterprises operating in the same national institutional environment and facing the same regulations and tax rates.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the production setting of profit maximizing firms that optimally allocate labor and capital to official production, unofficial production, or both. Official production is subject to taxes and regulations, but it benefits from institutional services unavailable to underground producers. Unofficial production on the other hand escapes regulations and taxation of profits and labor, but it requires firms to bribe enforcement authorities who aim to maximize their own income from public employment and bribes, subject to the likelihood of being discovered selling corruption and suffering the penalties associated therewith. Given firms’ optimal demand for corruption and enforcement bureaucrats’ optimal supply, we then derive the conditions necessary for a corruption market to exist. A central condition is that statutory tax rates exceed firm-specific thresholds of tax toleration. The remainder of section 2 illustrates graphically some implications of the model for the responses of a

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6 In Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), for example, the quality of institutions and governance drive firms into an activity equilibrium allowing only one of two stable states: totally official and totally unofficial.

7 Firm-level interview data indicate that firms commonly are active both officially and unofficially. See, for example the World Bank’s WBES (2000) data, which we use for empirical analyses in section 3.

8 See the comprehensive survey of Schneider and Enste (2000).
firm’s official, unofficial and total output to changes in tax rates and levels of tax toleration induced by shifts in exogenous demand- and supply-side variables.

In section 3 we test some key predcitions of the model concerning the determinants of tax toleration and the share of official output in total output. Test regressions are based on firm-level data obtained from interviews of enterprise managers in a large number of countries by the World Business Environment Surveys (WBES) sponsored by the World Bank. Both structural and reduced form regression experiments yield broad support of the model’s testable implications. In section 4 we present some concluding observations about the policy implications of our theory and evidence.

2 The Setting

We consider private firms with given, fixed endowments of capital, $K$, and variable labor requirements in two sectors of production: $L_o$, denoting labor employed in official production, and $L_u$, denoting labor employed in unofficial production. We assume that the wage, $w$, is identical in the two sectors, but that labor cost in the official sector is $(1 + t_w) \cdot w$, where the labor tax rate $t_w$ subsumes the formal payroll tax rate, $t^L$, and regulations on officially employed labor, $R^L$, imposing costs that are functionally equivalent to conventional labor taxes. $k$ denotes the fraction of its capital that the firm allocates to official production, and $(1 - k)$ is the fraction allocated to unofficial production. A firm’s official output, $y_o$, which is legally declared and subject to taxation, is determined by the following technology:

$$y_o = B^\delta (kK)^\alpha L_o^\beta, \quad \alpha + \beta + \delta = 1 \quad \alpha, \beta, \delta > 0$$

where $B$ denotes the productive value of institutional services available only to official activity, such as contract enforcement by courts, custom services, access to credit from financial institutions, and police protection of property.\(^9\) We assume that $B$ depends on firm-specific attributes (for example, size, area of activity, complexity of legal organization, managerial sophisti-

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\(^9\)Note that our concept of institutional services supporting official production excludes government financed infrastructure and other public goods available to both official and unofficial productive activity. For simplicity we assume there are no ‘user costs’ attached to $B$; providing for them would add little to the formal analysis.
The assumption that firms differ with respect to their need for and use of institutional services is consistent with some existing firm-level empirical evidence. For example, in their analysis of enterprises in transition economies Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) found that court enforcement of contracts is more important to firms establishing new business relationships than to established firms, and is more important to industries with a relatively low specificity of investments. Data presented in Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002) indicate that small firms by comparison to medium and large firms are less constrained by custom procedures, whereas small- and medium-sized firms are more constrained than large ones by access to external financing from official banking institutions.

The productive activity we model is not “criminal” in the sense that it would be legal if undertaken in the official, taxed economy. In other words, we are not dealing with activities generally treated as criminally illegal (and frequently controlled by criminal organizations), such as the drug trade, smuggling, prostitution and the like.

We assume firms may allocate labor freely between official and unofficial activity. Obviously treating labor as a passive resource is an abstraction from the real world in which workers as well as firms face incentives and disincentives to participate in the underground economy.

Firms producing officially may also pay bribes to obtain or to speed up delivery of
problem

\[
\max_{k,L_o,L_u,C} \pi = (1 - t) [y_o - (1 + t_C) wL_o] + [y_u - wL_u - mC]
\]

s.t. \(0 \leq k \leq 1; \quad C, L_o, L_u \geq 0\)

where \(m\) denotes the unit price of \(C\), and the tax rate \(t\) subsumes the formal profit tax rate, \(t^F\), and regulatory burdens on official activity, \(R^F\), that are analogous to taxes.

\[2.1\] The Bureaucrat’s Problem

Corruption is priced by a representative public official (a ‘bureaucrat’) who is responsible for enforcing the tax code and other regulations. We assume the enforcement bureaucrat is able to accurately detect a firm’s unofficial activity, but is willing to overlook it if compensated sufficiently by illegal payments.\textsuperscript{14} The bureaucrat receives a salary equal to \(S\). If involved in corrupt transactions and not caught, the bureaucrat enjoys additional income from bribes equal to \(m \cdot C\). If discovered to be selling corruption, the bureaucrat loses employment and pays a fixed penalty \(P\). The bureaucrat’s expected income, \(E(y_B)\), then is:

\[
E(y_B) = \theta (S + mC) - (1 - \theta) P
\]

where \((1 - \theta)\) is the probability that the bureaucrat is discovered to be selling \(C\).

The probability \(\theta\) is determined by an exogenous mechanism exposing corruption

\[
\theta = e^{-\mu C}, \quad \mu > 0
\]

where \(\mu\) indexes the effectiveness of exposure procedures at given \(C\) which is assumed to vary with firm-specific characteristics affecting the ‘visibility’

\[B\text{ from recalcitrant government authorities. (See Shleifer and Vishny (1993).)}\text{ In this paper, however, we confine attention to the corruption and bribery necessary for a firm to produce in the underground economy. The pathbreaking study of Peru by De Soto (1989) found that bribe payments by unofficial businesses vastly exceeded those by official businesses.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{14}The setup below has elements in common with the rich, more complex model of Mookherjee and Png (1995) which is oriented to firms that pay bribes in order to evade pollution regulations.}\]
of transactions in the corruption market. Note that \( \frac{\partial \theta}{\partial C} = -\mu e^{-\mu C} < 0 \), so that the more units of corruption sold by the bureaucrat, the higher the chances \((1 - \theta)\) of being caught and penalized. However if the exposure mechanism is weak (\(\mu\) is small), the probability of being caught tends to be small, even when \(C\) is big.

The bureaucrat’s problem is to set a price \(m\) per unit of corruption that maximizes expected income (4), subject to (5) and taking the firm’s demand for corruption as given. The optimal solution to the bureaucrat’s problem yields the supply relation

\[
m = \frac{\mu (S + P)}{1 - \mu C}.
\]

Equation (6) implies that enforcement bureaucrats will supply corruption and overlook tax evasion only if firms accept a unit price \(m\) higher than a minimum defined by \(m = \mu (S + P)\). The minimum price \(m\) rises as the bureaucrat’s salary \(S\) increases, as the mechanism for exposing corruption becomes more effective (as \(\mu\) increases), and as punishment becomes more stringent (as \(P\) increases). In other words, the higher are \(\mu\), \(S\), and \(P\), the more costly it is to induce bureaucrats to supply corruption. And the greater is the demand for corruption, the higher is the unit price of \(C\) set by bureaucrats at given risks of exposure and punishment. Equation (6) also implies that a finite positive equilibrium price for corruption can exist only when \(C < \frac{1}{\mu}\), reinforcing the point that the less effective are procedures for detecting corruption, the less constrained is its supply from the bureaucracy, and the higher is the likelihood that a market for corruption will exist.

15 The most important characteristics affecting visibility are likely to be aspects of firm size – for example, the magnitudes of the firm’s capital stock \(K\) and its labor force \(L\).

16 Proofs of all results asserted in the paper are given in an Appendix of Proofs available from the authors by request to the authors or at Hibbs’ website: www.douglas-hibbs.com.

17 Complicit firms are not directly punished if enforcement authorities are discovered selling corruption because profit from unofficial production in (3) is not affected directly by the exposure probability \((1 - \theta)\). Modifying the profit function to include penalties levied on buyers as well as sellers of corruption yields analytical results qualitatively similar to those discussed, but the comparative statics are enormously more complicated. Exposure effectiveness, however, indirectly depresses unofficial profit via the positive effect of \(\mu\) on the price of corruption \(m\).
2.2 Tax Evasion and the Existence of a Corruption Market

Assume that the firm has perfect information about the bureaucrat’s supply schedule in (6). For given positive values $B$, $t$, $t_w$, $\mu$, $S$, and $P$, the firm’s maximization program in eq.(3) admits two solutions: (1) an interior solution where the firm allocates capital and labor to both official and unofficial production, and (2) a corner solution where labor and capital are allocated wholly to official production. In the first case the firm enters into corrupt transactions with bureaucrats in order to protect its unofficial output, whereas in the second the firm has no incentive to evade taxes and produce unofficially, and thus has no need of $C$.\textsuperscript{18} We consider the two cases sequentially.

When the firm finds it optimal to produce in both sectors simultaneously, the profit maximizing levels of output are:

\begin{equation}
 y_o = \left( \frac{Bm}{\delta} \right) (1 - t)^{\frac{\alpha}{\delta}} \left( \frac{1}{1 + t_w} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
 y_u = \left( \frac{\delta}{m} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}} (1 - k)K
\end{equation}

where the share of capital allocated to official production is

\[ k = \frac{(1 - t)^{\frac{\alpha + 1}{\alpha}} B \left( \frac{1}{1 + t_w} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}}}{\left( \frac{\delta}{m} \right)^{\frac{\alpha + \beta}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}} K}. \]

Intuitively, equations (7)-(8) can be interpreted as saying that the firm decides how much output to produce in the two sectors by first determining the maximum output it could produce in the unofficial sector where it avoids taxes on profits and labor. Setting $k = 0$ on the right-side of (8) gives notional maximum unofficial output as $y_u \text{max} = \left( \frac{\delta}{m} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha}} K$. The firm then implicitly trades off part of $y_u \text{max}$ for taxable output $y_o$ up to

\textsuperscript{18}The third hypothetical possibility in which the firm operates wholly in the unofficial sector emerges only in the fanciful case of confiscatory taxation ($t = 1$), or more realistically when institutional services are either not needed by the firm or are not provided to any meaningful extent by government ($B = 0$).
the point where institutional benefits to official production compensate the firm for the tax liabilities incurred by producing officially. It follows that the firm will find it profitable to operate unofficially \((k < 1 \text{ and } y_u > 0)\) only if

\[
\left( \frac{\delta}{m} \right)^{\alpha + \delta} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{\alpha + \delta}} K > (1 - t)^{\frac{\alpha + \delta}{\alpha + \delta}} \left( \frac{1}{1 + t_w} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \delta}} B.
\]

For a given capital stock \(K\), condition (9) indicates that the firm engages in tax evasion when cheap corruption and a low wage level in the underground sector combine with high profit taxation, high non-wage costs on officially employed labor and deficient institutional services in the official sector.

Recall from the analysis of the bureaucrat’s problem that a positive supply of corruption requires \(m\) to be above the minimum price \(m_0 = \mu(S + P)\). The firm, on the other hand, will be willing to pay bribes and purchase \(C\) only if it is active in the unofficial sector \((y_u > 0)\), which by (9) requires that

\[
m < \delta \left( \frac{K}{B} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \delta}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{(\alpha + \delta)}} (1 - t)^{-\frac{\delta}{\alpha + \delta}} (1 + t_w)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha + \delta}}.
\]

The right-side of (10) therefore defines the upper bound of \(C\)’s unit price, \(m\). Corrupt transactions between firms and bureaucrats will exist only if \(m < \overline{m}\), that is only if

\[
\mu(S + P) < \delta \left( \frac{K}{B} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \delta}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{(\alpha + \delta)}} (1 - t)^{-\frac{\delta}{\alpha + \delta}} (1 + t_w)^{\frac{\beta}{\alpha + \delta}}.
\]

When (11) holds, firms and enforcement bureaucrats will agree on a unique price for units of \(C\), and an active corruption market will exist.

The firm’s demand for corruption, implied by the first order condition for \(C\) in (3), is

\[
C = \left( \frac{\delta}{m} \right)^{\frac{\alpha + \delta}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\beta}{w} \right)^{\frac{\delta}{n}} (1 - k)K
\]

where recall that \(k\) is a positive function of \(m\) and \(w\) and a negative function of \(t, t_w\) and \(K\) (see eq. 8). Figure 1 uses sensible calibrations of terms in the corruption demand and supply functions (eqs. 12 and 6) to illustrate that
a unique equilibrium \((m^*, C^*)\) exists in the admissible range \((\bar{m}, \bar{m})\).

![Figure 1: Equilibrium Price of Corruption. When the firm is willing to pay a price per unit of \(C\) exceeding the minimum price \(\bar{m}\) acceptable to enforcement bureaucrats, a market for corruption will exist with equilibrium \((m^*, C^*)\).](image)

### 2.3 Tax Toleration and Tax Evasion

In addition to defining conditions for the existence of a corruption market, (11) has important implications for the impact of profit taxation on the scale of the underground economy and tax evasion. Solving (11) for the profit tax rate on the left-side shows that unofficial production emerges when

\[ C_S(m) = \frac{m - \mu(S + P)}{\mu} \]

Eq. (6) gives demand as

\[ C_D(m) = \delta m ^ {\alpha} + \delta \alpha ^ {\beta} (1 - k) \]

As illustrated in Figure 1, at \(C_S(m) = 0\), \(C_S(m) < C_D(m)\), and at \(C_D(\bar{m}) = 0\), \(C_D(\bar{m}) < C_S(\bar{m})\). Since \(C_S(m)\) is monotonically increasing in \(m\) and \(C_D(m)\) is monotonically decreasing in \(m\), it follows that there exists a unique value \(m^*\) in the interval \((\bar{m}, \bar{m})\) such that \(C_S(m^*) = C_D(m^*)\). Therefore, when the maximum unit price the firm is willing to pay for \(C\) is higher than the minimum unit price the bureaucrat is willing to accept, they will always find a price \(m^*\) they can agree upon. When condition (11) does not hold, then \(\bar{m} > m^*\) and the firm will not purchase corruption enabling unofficial production and tax evasion. Consequently, there will be no transactions for \(C\) and a corruption market will not exist. The conventional price-quantity axes in Figure 1 are interchanged because the forgoing argument is somewhat easier to interpret from the graph lines when \(C\) is on vertical axis and \(m\) on the horizontal.

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\(^{19}\)A more formal demonstration runs as follows. The optimal relation (6) implies the supply function \(C_S(m) = \frac{m - \mu(S + P)}{\mu}\). Eq. (12) gives demand as \(C_D(m) = \delta m ^ {\alpha} + \delta \alpha ^ {\beta} (1 - k)\). As illustrated in Figure 1, at \(C_S(m) = 0\), \(C_S(m) < C_D(m)\), and at \(C_D(\bar{m}) = 0\), \(C_D(\bar{m}) < C_S(\bar{m})\). Since \(C_S(m)\) is monotonically increasing in \(m\) and \(C_D(m)\) is monotonically decreasing in \(m\), it follows that there exists a unique value \(m^*\) in the interval \((\bar{m}, \bar{m})\) such that \(C_S(m^*) = C_D(m^*)\). Therefore, when the maximum unit price the firm is willing to pay for \(C\) is higher than the minimum unit price the bureaucrat is willing to accept, they will always find a price \(m^*\) they can agree upon. When condition (11) does not hold, then \(\bar{m} > m^*\) and the firm will not purchase corruption enabling unofficial production and tax evasion. Consequently, there will be no transactions for \(C\) and a corruption market will not exist. The conventional price-quantity axes in Figure 1 are interchanged because the forgoing argument is somewhat easier to interpret from the graph lines when \(C\) is on vertical axis and \(m\) on the horizontal.
We interpret \( t \) as identifying the firm’s threshold of tax toleration. What matters for a firm’s optimal production strategy is not the absolute rate of profit taxation, but instead the magnitude of \( t \) relative to the rate that firms’ perceive to be “worth paying” in light of the institutional benefits enjoyed in the official sector and the cost of corruption required to produce unofficially. In terms of variables amenable to policy influence, (13) says that tax toleration increases with firm-specific institutional benefits \( B \), and with corruption prices \( m \), which in turn are determined by firm-specific effectiveness of corruption exposure \( \mu \) and nation-specific bureaucratic salaries plus penalties \( S + P \). On the other hand, toleration of taxation falls as the relative price of labor facing firms producing officially \( (1 + t_w) \) rises.

When the profit tax rate experienced by a firm is below its toleration threshold, the benefits of tax evasion in the underground economy are outweighed by a combination of the cost of corruption necessary to produce unofficial output, and profitable opportunities in the taxable sector where production takes benefit of official institutional services. Consequently when \( t \leq \underline{t} \), unofficial production and corruption are nil, and all production is official. Formally, this case represents a corner solution to the firm’s problem in (3) with \( k = 1, y_u = 0 \) and \( C = 0 \). Total output at the corner is

\[
y_o = B \frac{\delta}{\alpha} K^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \sigma}} \left( \frac{\beta}{(1 + t_w) w} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\alpha + \sigma}}.
\]

An implication of the equilibrium results is that it is possible for government to impose high rates of profit tax without triggering large diversions of resources to underground production and large scale tax evasion if the authorities are able to raise \( B, \mu, S \) and \( P \) enough to create even higher thresholds of tax toleration.

Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of firms’ production choices as the profit tax rate \( t \) varies around a fixed threshold of tax toleration \( \underline{t} \). The constituents of \( t \) (the profit tax rate proper, \( t_F \), and regulations on official producers,
are of course core policy instruments in any national political economy. Total output \( y_{total} \) in the Figure cumulates production in the official and unofficial sectors.

\[
\begin{align*}
R^F \quad &
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 2: Optimal Output Levels as the Profit Tax Rate Varies. Official output \( y_o \) decreases and unofficial output \( y_u \) increases monotonically as the tax rate \( t \) rises above the firm’s tax toleration threshold \( t^* \). Consequently the official output share \( y_o / (y_o + y_u) \) decreases, but the firm’s total output \( y_{total} = (y_o + y_u) \) may expand or contract, depending on the initial condition of \( t \). At \( t < t^* \) all production is official, and at \( t = 1 \) all production is unofficial.

In the graph region where \( t < t^* \) (to the left of \( t^* \) on the horizontal axis), all production is official. As implied by (13) \( y_{total} = y_o \). As \( t \) rises above the threshold \( t^* \), firms begin to find activity in the underground sector profitable and they produce \( y_o \) and \( y_u \) simultaneously. The response of production decisions to increases of the profit tax rate among firms perceiving \( t > t^* \) and consequently already evading taxes to some degree, is composed of direct and indirect effects. Tax rate hikes directly depress marginal returns on labor and capital in the official sector, which by itself prompts firms to shift resources to the unofficial sector – \( k \) falls and so \( y_u \) rises (eq. 8). Higher production in the underground economy, however, requires bigger inputs of corruption, and the associated upward shift in demand for \( C \) creates an upward adjustment of the price \( m \) (eq. 6) muting the increase in unofficial activity ultimately induced by a higher \( t \) (eqs. 7-8). Nonetheless, in the

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\(^{20}\)In other words, the impact of tax rate changes on firm’s output decisions would
range \( t > \delta \), higher tax rates unambiguously lead to equilibrium increases of \( y_u \) and decreases of \( y_o \) and, therefore, to decreases in the share of official output in total production.\(^\text{21}\)

The effect of changes to profit tax rates on total output, \( y_{total} = y_o + y_u \), depends on \( t \)'s initial condition. As suggested by Figure 2, in the range \( t >> \delta \), an increase in \( t \) induces a decline in official output that more than offsets the corresponding rise of unofficial output, thereby contracting the firm’s aggregate production.\(^\text{22}\) The underlying reason is that when profit tax rates are relatively high, firms tend to be heavily engaged in unofficial production and to be paying high prices for the big quantities of corruption required to sustain the large scale of underground operations. As a result, increases to already high tax rates yield only modest expansions of unofficial activity, and these are more than offset by contractions of official output. Total output consequently declines. At lower initial tax rates, however, the firm’s aggregate output may well increase due to increases of profit taxation because the tax-induced expansion of unofficial production exceeds the associated tax-induced contraction of official production. The implications of those patterns among firms for international patterns in macroeconomic performance depend on how firms are distributed across countries vis-à-vis rates of profit tax \( t \) in relation to firm-specific levels of tax toleration \( \delta \).\(^\text{23}\)

### 2.4 Demand- and Supply-Side Determinants of Toleration and Evasion

We next evaluate how movements in tax toleration affect firms’ output decisions. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effects of changes in tax toleration originating with an increase to institutional services, \( B \), and with an increase to the effectiveness of corruption exposure, \( \mu \), respectively. Recall that \( B \) is a principal determinant of the demand for corruption, whereas \( \mu \) is a key variable affecting the supply side of the corruption market. Along be stronger, and the equilibrium level of corruption would be higher, in the absence of interactions in the corruption market between firms and bureaucrats over the price of \( C \) that yield adjustments of \( m \) to shifts in the demand for corruption.\(^\text{21}\)

Formally, for any \( t > \delta \), it can be shown that \( \frac{\partial \ln m}{\partial \ln t} > 0 \), \( \frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln t} > 0 \), \( \frac{\partial \ln y_o}{\partial \ln t} < 0 \), \( \frac{\partial \ln y_u}{\partial \ln t} > 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial \ln (y_o + y_u)}{\partial \ln t} < 0 \). More detailed analysis of the comparative statics appears in the Appendix of Proofs.\(^\text{22}\)

Specifically, \( \frac{\partial \ln (y_o + y_u)}{\partial \ln t} < 0 \) if \( t > \frac{\delta}{1 - C\mu} \).\(^\text{23}\)

For international evidence on the relative sizes of aggregate shadow economies see Schneider (2005) and Schneider and Enste (2000).
with the demand-side variable $t_w$ and the supply-side variables $S$ and $P$, the availability and quality of institutional services and the effectiveness of corruption detection are potential policy instruments that could be used by national authorities to influence tax toleration, and through that route the scale of tax evasion and underground production.

Figure 3 illustrates how firms’ profitable production possibilities shift owing to an exogenous increase in $B$ raising tax toleration from $t_0$ to $t_1$. The enhancement of $B$ induces all firms to increase official output (eqs. 7 and 14). Moreover, firms initially operating to some degree in the underground economy whose tax toleration threshold is pushed above the profit tax rate by improvement to institutional services (firms with $t_0 < t < t_1$) will cease producing in the shadow economy. Firms active from the start in the unofficial sector whose new toleration threshold remains below the profit tax rate (firms with $t_0 < t < t_1$) will continue operating unofficially, but will reallocate some resources out of underground production to official production. Hence both official output $y_o$ and the share of official output in total output $\frac{y_o}{y_o + y_u}$ increase as $B$ rises. And although corruption prices $m$ will adjust downward in response to the across-the-board decline in demand for corruption, in equilibrium both the level and the price of corruption will be lower in the wake of the expansion among all firms of both official and total production.\(^{24}\)

Figure 4 illustrates the output effects of an exogenous increase in the effectiveness of the corruption exposure mechanism $\mu$ that raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from $t_0$ to $t_1$. An increase in $\mu$ contracts the supply of corruption, which induces higher official production and lower unofficial production among all firms with initial condition $t > t_1$. By contrast to $B$, however, $\mu$ is not a factor of production, and it therefore exerts no influence on the output decisions of firms with initial condition $t < t_1$ that is firms initially active wholly in the official economy. In this sense the carrot of improved institutions has wider impact than the stick of improved detection of corruption because the former affects the behavior of all firms.

\(^{24}\)Formally, it can be shown that $\frac{\partial \ln C}{\partial \ln B} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \ln m}{\partial \ln B} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \ln y_o}{\partial \ln B} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \ln y_u}{\partial \ln B} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \ln (y_o + y_u)}{\partial \ln B} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \ln \left(\frac{y_o}{y_o + y_u}\right)}{\partial \ln B} > 0$. Changes to $t_w$ yield the same pattern of effects but with opposite signs.
Figure 3: Output Effects of an Improvement to Institutional Benefits $B$. An increase in $B$ raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from $t_0$ to $t_1$. Optimal production decisions under $t_1$ are shown by the black graph lines and under $t_0$ by the grey graph lines. At any given tax rate $t$, the rise in $t_1$ prompts the firm to produce more official output $y_o$, and less unofficial output $y_u$. The increase of $y_o$ always exceeds the decrease of $y_u$, and so total output $y_{total}$ rises along with the official output share $y_o/(y_o + y_u)$.

Moreover, unlike the case of improvements to institutional benefits which always raise total as well as official production, improved detection of corruption does not yield higher total output because the ensuing decline of the firm’s unofficial output exceeds the growth of its official output. Intuitively, the explanation of this result may be described by the following sequence of events. The heightened probability of being caught and punished for selling corruption brought about by an increase to $\mu$ leads income-maximizing enforcement bureaucrats to require higher unit prices $m$ to supply given quantities of corruption. More expensive corruption reduces firms’ demand for inputs of $C$ necessary to produce unofficially without affecting the marginal products of inputs to official production. With lower unofficial production and higher exposure probability, the equilibrium level of corruption decreases and its equilibrium price increases. In the new environment firms will tend to transfer some of their resources to the official sector, but only to the extent that additional official profits compensate for the unofficial profits forgone due to higher costs of corruption. Firms that in the first instance were evading taxes will sometimes even find it profitable to exit the underground economy completely (firms with $t_0 < t < t_1$). Yet like firms
that remain to some degree in the underground economy under $t_1$, the expansion of official production among exiting firms will not fully compensate for loss of unofficial output. Consequently, among firms initially located in the range $t > t_2$ increases to $\mu$ yield rises in the official share of output but declines in aggregate output.\footnote{More precisely, it can be shown that despite the fact that an increase in $\mu$ has positive effect on official production, $\frac{\partial \ln y_o}{\partial \ln \mu} > 0$, and on the official share of total production, $\frac{\partial \ln y_o}{\partial \ln \mu} > 0$, the effect on total output of tax-evading firms is negative, $\frac{\partial \ln (y_o + y_u)}{\partial \ln \mu} < 0$. The effects of changes in $S$ and $P$ are qualitatively the same.}

![Figure 4: Output Effects of an Increase in Corruption Exposure Effectiveness $\mu$. An increase in $\mu$ raises the firm’s threshold of tax toleration from $t_0$ to $t_1$. Optimal production decisions under $t_1$ are shown by the black graph lines and under $t_0$ by the grey graph lines. The increase of tax toleration induced by higher $\mu$ prompts less unofficial and more official production among firms with $t > t_2$. However the decline of $y_u$ is bigger than the rise of $y_o$, and so although the official output share $y_o/(y_o + y_u)$ rises, total output $y_{\text{total}}$ falls. The productive activity of firms with $t < t_2$ is unaffected by changes in $\mu$.]

In the next section we take the model to data and test some of its main implications concerning determinants of tax toleration and the relative scale of tax evasion and unofficial production.

## 3 Some Empirical Evidence

From late 1998 to mid-2000 the World Bank sponsored personal interviews with managers of more than 10,000 enterprises in 80 countries covering...
the main regions of the world — The World Business Environment Surveys (“WBES 2000”). The interviews dealt, among other things, with managers’ perceptions of the operational difficulties posed by taxation, government regulations, corruption of public officials, functioning of the judiciary, and access to financial services. The surveys also obtained reports about the degree of tax evasion among firms. These WBES data make possible rough empirical tests of key implications of our model concerning (i) direct determinants of firm-level toleration of taxation, and (ii) direct and indirect determinants of the relative scale of unofficial production and tax evasion.

Empirical analyses were undertaken for a subset of the enterprises sampled. First, because the model pertains to the behavior of private firms, we excluded the public sector firms surveyed. Second, we excluded enterprises in African countries because in that region the data were obtained predominantly from mail surveys, rather than from in-person interviews which were undertaken everywhere else. We regard the postal survey data as far less reliable than the personal interview data. Finally, the usable sample was reduced further due to missing data for one or more variables in our multivariate analyses. Sample attrition from this source included all Middle Eastern countries. All tolled, the regression experiments presented ahead are based on a common sample of interview responses from managers of 3818 firms distributed over 54 countries.

3.1 Tolerance of Taxation

The main message of our model is that the existence of markets for corruption and the scale of unofficial production and tax evasion are driven by the gap between a firm’s profit tax rate $t$ and threshold of tax toleration $t^*$. Let $i$ be an index for firms and $j$ an index for countries. Because the profit tax rate subsumes conventional country-level profit rates, $t^F_j$, and regulations on official activity which generally impact individual firms in different ways, $R^F_{ij}$, we have firm-specific profit tax rates $t_{ij} = t \left[ t^F_j, R^F_{ij} \right]$. Similarly, because the labor tax rate subsumes conventional national payroll rates, $t^L_j$, and labor regulations which generally affect firms in different ways, $R^L_{ij}$, we have firm-specific labor tax rates $t_{wj} = t_w \left[ t^L_j, R^L_{ij} \right]$.

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26 For detailed information about the surveys see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002).
27 Among other problems, the African postal surveys yielded very low response rates and implausibly low reports of tax evasion.
The definition of $t_{ij}$ in (13) shows that tax toleration is affected positively by institutional benefits, $B_{ij}$, which vary over firms in every country, negatively by payroll tax rates, $t_{wij}$, which vary over firms in every country, and positively by corruption price minima $m_{ij} = \mu_{ij} (S_j + P_j)$, which vary over firms (owing to firm-specific visibility effects embodied in the detection parameter $\mu_{ij}$) in various countries (owing to national salary levels $S_j$ and malfeasance penalties $P_j$). The model also implies that a firm’s capital stock $K_{ij}$ directly decreases $t_{ij}$. At the same time $K_{ij}$ most likely increases $t_{ij}$ indirectly by affecting positively the visibility of corruption (operating through $\mu_{ij}$) and wage levels $w$ – particularly since our calibration of corruption prices is weak and we are unable to measure wage levels at all.\(^{28}\) (See ahead.) The model therefore implies

\begin{equation}
(15) \\
t_{ij} = F \left[ B_{ij}, t_{wij}, \mu_{ij}, S_j, P_j, K_{ij} \right]
\end{equation}

where the expected sign of $F'$ appears above right-side each term.

We measure thresholds of tax toleration, $t_{ij}$, by answers to the following WBES question: “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are high taxes for the operation and growth of your business” with ordered response categories 1 = ‘major obstacle’, 2 = ‘moderate obstacle’, 3 = ‘minor obstacle’, and 4 = ‘no obstacle’.\(^{29}\) We assume these data yield ordinal measurement of an underlying continuum running from low to high values of tax toleration.

Institutional benefits available to firms producing officially, $B_{ij}$, are measured by responses to the WBES question “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic are these different regulatory areas for the operation and growth of your business” for items pertaining to access to financial services, functioning of the judicial system, and customs procedures. The surveys supplied four response options for each item, which again run from 1 = ‘major obstacle’ to 4 = ‘no obstacle’. We constructed a composite index of $B_{ij}$ by taking the arithmetic average of the rating codes across the three items.\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) Positive influence of $K$ on $w$ would represent so-called efficiency wage effects associated with large, capital rich firms.

\(^{29}\) The percentage of responses falling in each category 1 to 4 were 59%, 21%, 11% and 9%, respectively.

\(^{30}\) We also generated a composite score for $B$ using the first principal component of the
A composite measure of regulatory burdens imposed on firms’ official activities, $R^{F}_{ij}$, which are analogous to conventional profit taxes, was constructed in the same way as the variable for institutional benefits by using responses to the above question for items dealing with problems concerning business licensing, environmental regulations, fire and safety regulations, and foreign exchange regulations. And regulations of officially employed labor, $R^{L}_{ij}$, which are akin to conventional payroll taxes, were measured by responses to the same question pertaining to problems with government labor regulations.

The capital endowment of firms, $\overline{K}_{ij}$, is measured by responses to the WBES question that asked managers to “estimate your firm’s fixed assets (land, buildings, equipment)”. The surveys provided eleven response categories ranging from less than 250,000 USD to 500,000,000 or more USD. Though truncated at the upper end, these data supply good calibration of capital stocks.

The WBES data provide much weaker empirical referents for $m_{ij} = \mu_{ij}(S_j + P_j)$ – the minimum price of corruption necessary to induce tax officials to overlook unofficial production and tax evasion among firms in various countries. The best proxy of that concept available in the WBES are reports about the frequency of bribery. Specifically, enterprise managers were asked “Thinking about government officials, is it common for firms in your line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ to get things done?” with ordered response categories ranging from 1 = ‘always’ to 6 = ‘never’. We take the minimum price of corruption faced by firms to be proportional to the response codes for this question. In other words we assume that the bribe frequency data reflect underlying firm-specific prices determining enforcement officials’ willingness to engage in corrupt transactions.

Our indirect calibration of the forces underlying corruption prices from the irregular ‘additional payments’ responses has obvious deficiencies. First, we do not observe any of the direct determinants specified by the model –

\[ \overline{K}_{ij}, m_{ij}, \mu_{ij}, S_j, P_j \]
namely, firm-specific effectiveness of corruption detection in various countries, \( \mu_{ij} \), or the salaries received by and penalties imposed upon enforcement bureaucrats in various countries, \( S_j \) and \( P_j \). Second, the available survey question pertains to illegal payments associated with all corrupt deals between firms and government officials, not only to bribes paid to make possible production in the unofficial economy, which is the object of our model. Firms of course may pay bribes not only to engage in unofficial production and avoid taxation, but also to circumvent compliance with all manner of regulations when producing officially. Finally, although the bribery question was worded with reference to “firms in your line of business,” we assume along with others\(^{33}\) that responses mainly supply information about bribery at the own-firm level, rather than bribery among comparable firms in various areas of activity.\(^{34}\) As noted earlier, in view of the weak indirect measurement of effects from \( \mu_{ij}, S_j \) and \( P_j \), we expect that some corruption price effects will be picked up by \( K_{ij} \) because the visibility and detection of corrupt transactions are likely to increase with firm size.

Measurement of remaining variables in (15) is more straightforward. The profit tax rate, \( t^F_j \), is measured by the top marginal tax rate on corporate profits in each country for year 2000,\(^{35}\) and the payroll taxation, \( t^L_j \), is measured by social security contribution rates for year 1999.\(^{36}\) Descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that among variables varying by \( i \) and \( j \), within-country standard deviations are nearly twice the magnitude of the between-country standard deviations, implying that firm-specific characteristics affecting those variables are considerably more variable than country-specific attributes.


\(^{34}\)Interviewers of course could not expect managers to go on record about having engaged in criminal behavior. At least some respondents, however, most likely were in fact reporting common practice in their area of activity rather than own-firm behavior per se, and this is a source of measurement error that will tend to depress the magnitudes of coefficient estimates of regressors based on these data.

\(^{35}\)Data are from the World Tax Database maintained by the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan and are available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm.

\(^{36}\)We added up contributions pertaining to old age, disability and death, sickness and maternity, work injury, and unemployment. The data mix contributions from employers and employees in the various payroll systems. The constituent data are from “Social Security Programs Throughout the World” available at the US Social Security Administration web site http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/1999/index.html.
### Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis Level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax Toleration Firms (3818) overall</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle), $\mu_{ij}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Services Firms (3818) overall</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=Major Obstacle Countries (54) between 0.48 to 4=No Obstacle), $B_{ij}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Regulations Firms (3818) overall</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle), $R_{ij}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations on Official Activity (1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle), $R_{ij}$</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequency of Bribes (1=Always to 6=Never), ($\mu$, $S$, $P$)_{ij}</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Assets (1000s USD), $K_{ij}$</td>
<td>115,315</td>
<td>201,544</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Reported Sales (1=&lt;60% to 3=100%), $y_{ij}$</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Corporate Tax Rate, $t^F_j$</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Payroll Tax Rate, $t^L_j$</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Index $i$ denotes firms and $j$ denotes countries. Theoretical model variables appear after text labels.
### 3.2 Tax Evasion

The WBES data also allow us to test the model’s implications about determinants of the share of output in the official/unofficial economy and tax evasion. Figure 2 and the associated theoretical analysis implied that the share of taxed, official output in total output, $\left(\frac{y_o}{y_o + y_u}\right)_{ij}$, declines as the gap between the tax rate $t_{ij}$ and the level of tax toleration $t_{ij}$ increases, where $t_{ij}$ is in turn a function of the exogenous variables on the right-side of (15). The measurement metrics of $t_{ij}$ and $t_{ij}$ are incompatible, so direct computation of tax gaps by $(t_{ij} - t_{ij})$ or $t_{ij}/t_{ij}$ is infeasible. The model nonetheless implies the following pattern of empirical relations:37

\[
\begin{align*}
B_{ij} + t_w \left( -t_{jL}^L, R_{ij}^L \right) + \left( \mu_{ij}, S_{ij}, P_j, \frac{1}{K_{ij}} \right) & \Rightarrow L_{ij} \\
t_{F}^F, R_{ij}^F & \Rightarrow \left( \frac{y_o}{y_o + y_u} \right)_{ij}
\end{align*}
\]

We measure the relative scale of official production, $\left(\frac{y_o}{y_o + y_u}\right)_{ij}$, with responses to the WBES question “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”38 The response options included eight ‘percentage of total sales’ categories with irregular intervals ranging from ‘0-25%’ sales reported up to ‘100%’ sales reported. We collapsed the responses into three categories, $1=\leq 60\%$, $2=60-99\%$ and $3=100\%$, containing fairly equal relative frequencies – 28%, 34% and 38% for codes 1, 2 and 3 respectively.39 Descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that standard deviations around the mean value of 2.1 are almost twice as high within countries as between – a pattern similar to the dispersions of other variables varying across firms and firms.

---

37 The expected signs given for the ‘analogous-to-tax’, regulation variables $R_{ij}^L$ and $R_{ij}^F$ are opposite to those of the conventional tax variables $t_{ij}^L$ and $t_{ij}^F$ because the response codes run from 1=Major Obstacle to 4=No Obstacle, implying that regulatory costs decline with higher code values.

38 As with the irregular ‘additional payments’ (bribery) question discussed above, the WBES naturally did not ask managers directly to acknowledge criminal behavior, and for this reason the tax evasion question was phrased with reference to “the typical firm in your area of activity”. As pointed out before, such questions are commonly interpreted as revealing firms’ own-behavior.

39 The empirical results discussed ahead however were not at all sensitive to this and other ways of organizing the raw tax evasion data.
countries. More important, since all firms sampled are legally registered, the data imply that simultaneous activity in the official and unofficial economy is a relatively common state of affairs.

3.3 Regression Experiments

Table 2 reports four ordered logit regression experiments relevant to the testable implications of the model. All independent variables are in logarithms and so regression coefficients estimate the impact of proportional movements in each variable on the ordered response variables.\textsuperscript{40}

Model (1) investigates the determinants of tax toleration summarized by equation (15). All determinants of our survey-based measure of \( t_{ij} \) are highly significant statistically and have the signs predicted by the underlying theoretical model, with the exception of log Payroll Tax Rate which is correctly signed but has a p-value of 0.07.\textsuperscript{41} More important, the probability effects implied by the ordered logit regression coefficients are substantively sizeable. The biggest effects are generated by the log Institutional Services variable. Consider, for example, a representative firm experiencing an improvement of institutional services spanning the full range of \( \ln B \) (that is from log 1.0 to log 4.0) when all other variables are equal to their sample means. Standard computations based on the ordered logit coefficient estimates show that this maximal improvement in measured \( \ln B_{ij} \) decreases the probability that the firm will have the lowest tax toleration score \( (t_{ij} = 1) \) by 0.53 (from 0.90 to 0.37), and increases the probability that the firm will move into the higher tax toleration categories \( t_{ij} = 2, t_{ij} = 3, \) and \( t_{ij} = 4 \) by probabilities 0.22, 0.16 and 0.14, respectively. The response of tax toleration to equivalent movements in other variables in model (1) are smaller than the changes induced by shifts in \( \ln B \) and stand in monotonic relation to the relative magnitudes of the ordered logit coefficient estimates.

Regression experiments (2)-(4) investigate the determinants of the relative scale of tax evasion — where as noted earlier tax evasion is measured

\textsuperscript{40}Regressions based on independent variables expressed in original metrics yield the same pattern of results, although the semi-elasticity log setups reported in Table 2 delivered slightly better chi square significance statistics for the models entertained.

\textsuperscript{41}Recall, however, that the model did not make an unambiguous prediction of the sign of a firm’s capital stock, \( K_{ij} \). The significant positive coefficient implies that the indirect effects of \( K_{ij} \) dominate the direct effects, but this cannot be taken as evidence one way or the other of the model’s validity.
Table 2: Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Tax Toleration</th>
<th>Tax Evasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model:</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Firms</td>
<td>1.973</td>
<td>0.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms with $t &lt; 4$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Institutional Services, ln$B_{ij}$</td>
<td>(0.247</td>
<td>0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Payroll Tax Rate, ln$t_{ij}^{L}$</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Labor Regulations, ln$R_{ij}^{L}$</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Top Corporate Tax Rate, ln$t_{ij}^{F}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Regulations on Official Activity, ln$R_{ij}^{F}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Infrequency of Bribes, ln{$\mu, S, P$}_{ij}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log Fixed Assets, ln$K_{ij}$</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$ (p-value)</td>
<td>79.58</td>
<td>79.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Firms</td>
<td>3818</td>
<td>3818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Countries</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Index $i$ denotes firms and $j$ denotes countries. Estimation Method is Ordered Logit with Robust Standard Errors. In models (3) and (4) independent variables are interacted with a “lower tax tolerance” dummy variable $LT$, where $LT=1$ if $t < 4$ and $LT=0$ if $t=4$. In parentheses (standard error|p-value).
by interview data on the share of total sales reported to tax authorities. Models (2) and (3) correspond to the reduced form of the causal relations sketched in (16). Model (4) is the structural form. In models (3) and (4) independent variables are interacted with a binary variable $LT$ that isolates firms in which taxes pose at least some obstacle to business operations.\footnote{As indicated in the notes to Table 2, $LT$ is a binary value that equals 1 for firms whose managers gave responses $1='major obstacle', 2='moderate obstacle' or 3='minor obstacle' to the "taxes as an obstacle" survey question that we use to measure $t_{ij}$. Recall that 91\% of the firms in our sample have scores $t_{ij} < 4$ and hence have $LT = 1$.} We take these firms to be ones in which tax toleration $t_{ij}$ potentially plays a significant role in sectoral production decisions, and among these firms we therefore anticipate that tax rates and the determinants of tax toleration will exhibit comparatively robust effects on the share of output declared officially and subject to taxation.

In reduced form Models (2) and (3) the institutional services regressor, $\ln B_{ij}$, and our crude proxy for effects of $\mu_{ij}$, $S_j$ and $P_j$ are significant and substantively sizeable. However, the capital stock term $\ln K_{ij}$ and the labor tax variables $\ln R_{ij}$ and $\ln t_j$ are insignificantly different from zero in these test regressions. The results for $\ln K_{ij}$, however, say little about the applicability of the model in data because the direct negative and indirect positive effects of capital endowments on the firm’s incentive to produce officially might tend to offset one another in reduced form.

As expected, Model (3) delivers results most consistent with the underlying theoretical model. The regressors $\ln B_{ij}$, $\ln t_j$ and $\ln \{\mu_{ij}, S_j, P_j\}$ are all highly significant, correctly signed and exert sizeable impact on the relative scale of tax evasion. For example, the ordered logit coefficient estimates imply that the probability a firm will be active exclusively in the official sector – declaring all sales as taxable – would decline by 0.51 in the wake of a shift in the log corporate tax rate from the lowest to highest sample values (from log 15 to log 45.5) when other variables equal their sample means. The estimates imply that this big shift out of official production into tax evasion would be distributed as increases of 0.20 and 0.31 in the probabilities that firms would migrate to the remaining activity categories – declaring officially ‘60-99%’ and ‘<60%’ of total sales, respectively.

The theoretical structure summarized in (16) asserts that a firm’s threshold of tax toleration $t_{ij}$ encapsulates the effects of the institutional environment, bureaucratic incentives to engage in corruption, and other indepen-
dent variables in Model (1) on a firm’s incentive to remain in the taxed official economy, as opposed to entering the underground economy. Model (4) estimates directly this structure when the dependent variable is again the share of total sales reported officially and subject to taxation. As implied by the model, the estimates show that when both \( \ln t_{ij} \) and the profit tax variables \( \ln t_j^F \) and \( \ln R_{ij}^F \) are included in the ordered logit regression experiment, upward movements in log tax toleration increase the official share, and movements in the log tax variables imposing higher costs on the firm decrease the official share. Taken together, we interpret the results in Table 2 as broadly supporting our theoretical model, particularly in view of the substantial errors of measurement in variables used to calibrate the underlying theoretical concepts.

4 Concluding Observations

The central implication of theoretical and empirical results in this paper is that markets for corruption arise and big migrations out of legal production into the underground economy take place when large numbers of firms perceive taxes as not “worth paying” – an unfortunate circumstance that we summarized in terms of profit taxes imposed on producers in the official economy relative to firms’ thresholds of ‘tax toleration’. Tax toleration is driven by firm-specific appraisals of the availability, quality and usefulness of institutional services supporting official activities, taxes and regulations on officially employed labor, the compensation of enforcement authorities, and the detection effectiveness and punishment of bureaucratic malfeasance. Because these determinants differ across firms, tax toleration and tax evasion vary among producers facing the same rates of conventional profit taxation and operating in the national institutional environment.

Firms without much intrinsic need of formal institutional services will likely always be tempted to produce unofficially and evade taxation, unless taxes are negligible, or corruption prices are extremely high, which would tend to be the case when enforcement authorities are handsomely compensated, stand high chances of being caught selling corruption, and are stringently penalized for any malfeasance discovered. Though government policy clearly can affect such supply-of-corruption variables, it can do little to influence the appetite for tax evasion when firms inherently have
little or no interest in official institutional services, no matter how well tuned and accessible those services might be. Yet such firms are likely to be small (and in many cases single-person operations, like the home cleaning help engaged informally by many readers of this paper) and at the margins of many economies.

Most big players in an economy potentially take great productive benefit of formal institutional services, and their propensity to remain in the official, tax-paying sector can therefore be influenced by government efforts to build and sustain institutions of quality. Firms with substantial intrinsic need of services will tend to develop high tax toleration, if appropriate institutions are in place. Government tax policy is then less constrained – with high tax toleration, relatively high taxes on official productive activity may be imposed without great fear of inducing a mass exodus of tax-paying producers into the shadow economy.

Heterogeneity of tax toleration among firms has implications for the aggregate effects of policies targeted on the scale of the shadow economy and tax evasion. Depending on how many and to what extent firms within a country have incentive to produce underground and evade taxation, policies regarding profit taxation and employment conditions of enforcement bureaucrats may create trade-offs between containment of tax evasion and the overall level of economic activity. For instance, strengthening incentives of enforcement officials to remain honest reduces the equilibrium level of corruption and tax evasion in the unofficial sector at the cost of lower total output among evading firms, without affecting the productive activity of non-evading firms. If the economy is dominated by firms with low thresholds of tax toleration, then higher bureaucratic salaries and better corruption detection mechanisms will yield only modest expansion of the official production and a contraction of aggregate output.

The likely effects of policies addressing tax evasion by lowering profit tax rates are more ambiguous. In developing countries, where many firms are likely to be small and heavily involved in the unofficial sector, reduction of profit tax rates will help reduce underground production and increase national output. Profit taxation policy, however, exerts less impact in countries where many firms operate on the ‘border’ of their tax tolerance, in the sense that their tax toleration threshold is lower than but close to the statutory tax rate. In such cases reductions of profit tax rates will tend to
depress aggregate output.

Our model implies, however, that the trade-off of a smaller underground economy at the cost of lower aggregate output does not arise with policies that affect institutional services and taxes and regulations on officially employed labor. These policies influence all firms in the economy because they enhance the productivity and profitability of factors deployed in official production. Improved institutional benefits, for example, have the advantage of giving evading firms incentive to reduce their unofficial operations, while also inducing higher levels of output among all firms in the economy, regardless of their location on the continuum of tax evasion. This theoretical implication may help explain the strong positive correlation between indicators of institutional quality and levels of aggregate national output reported in empirical studies cited in the introduction.

Our analysis treated institutional benefits and taxes as unconnected exogenous variables. In the real world they of course may be intimately connected, if only because public institutions of high quality require commensurately large investments of public revenues raised by taxation. In principle, a virtuous circle is possible in which high taxes and low tax evasion coexist amicably because important producers are anchored firmly in the official economy, supplying the tax revenues required to sustain well functioning institutions that underpin high toleration of taxation.

References


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43 Important papers by Loayza (1996) and Friedman et al. (2000) take note of the endogenous linkage between taxation and institutional quality.


