

WAR AND UNREASON

Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration

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Distribution

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Puzzle at Hand

How good bad music and bad reasons sound when we march against an enemy.
(Friedrich Nietzsche)

Why are some wars longer than others? The subject of the duration of wars has not received as wide coverage as the study of the causes of war as scholars perhaps fear that they might confer legitimacy on limited wars (Fox 1970). However, understanding the causes of war duration should not be less important considering the often high costs of especially long military confrontations. The puzzle at hand in the current study is that, even in the modern era when ever more efficient weapons of offensive warfare are created, long wars occur. The trend is clear in both grand systemic conflicts such as WWII and regional territorial disputes such as the Iran-Iraq War. Neither does the presence of offense dominant weapons systems always result in a swift collapse of one of the belligerents nor can the belligerents always quickly agree on terms of peace.

In his seminal article *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*, which is regarded as one of the most influential articles on international relations, Jervis (1978) makes far-reaching claims about both war duration and the nature of the security dilemma¹ when offense has the advantage. In brief, he argues that wars are shorter and it is impossible to create security without threatening others when attacking is easier than defending. I believe Jervis is wrong on both accounts. A more complete analysis of war duration and the security dilemma requires taking into account the limitations to offense dominance, which make a fast victory less probable. Also variables such as ideas and asymmetric information that can make the finding of a mutually acceptable negotiation solution a long process must be considered.

¹ The essence of the security dilemma is that “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Jervis 1978: 169).

The first aim of this study is to empirically test whether various measures of the systemic offense-defense balance² are statistically associated with the length of interstate wars. After this empirical critique of Jervis, the second aim is a theoretical refinement of our understanding of war duration with a focus on learning, or lack of learning, from the combatants' battlefield performance and especially their ability to use offensive military technology and tactics. The results of the statistical testing and the theoretical refinement also make it possible to logically draw different conclusions about the security dilemma when offense is dominant: if wars are not shorter in offense dominant eras than when defense has the advantage, the expected utility of warfare should not be higher and the security dilemma and the risk of war ought not to be as great as Jervis (1978) claims.

This study contributes to the study of war duration in two ways. First, against the background of common but seldom systematized knowledge about the limitations to the use of military force, I define the factors that make offense dominance often far from absolute. This means that a swift victory cannot always be taken for granted by relying merely on offensive military factors such as offensive tactics and weapons systems. Second, when a swift victory is not in sight, I argue that not even an early negotiated outcome can always be expected to materialize. In order to better understand the length of the process of finding a mutually acceptable negotiation solution, I develop the bounded learning theory.

Much of the work on understanding war duration has been based on a rational choice approach, which has neglected the role of ideas and offensive expectations in the negotiation processes. The bounded learning theory in turn argues that both asymmetric information about offensive expectations and expansive ideology (offensive stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs) have an impact on the length of interstate wars. According to the theory, these two factors account for deviations from a rational choice baseline expectation of how states should negotiate in times of war, namely, lower their aims when battlefield events are not favorable and vice versa. Thus, agreeing on the terms of peace becomes an increasingly protracted process.

² Jervis defines offense-defense balance as whether it is easier to attack or to defend territory (Jervis 1978: 178). The essence of the offense-defense theory is the assumption that some weapons systems make attacking easier and others make defending easier. Levy (1984:225) argues that that tactical mobility is the primary determinant of offense dominance whereas protection contributes to the defense. Tactical mobility was a characteristic of, for example, German Blitzkrieg with tanks and aircraft during WWII.

The title of the study, *War and Unreason*, and the initial words of Nietzsche refer to two things. First, this study aims to contribute to the realist discourse, where there has been tendency in political realism (Morgenthau 1948/85), especially offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), to proscribe war as a rational tool in the hands of decision-makers without considering the often limited nature of offense dominance and the effect of expansive ideology and asymmetric information on the length of wars. Offense-defense theorists (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999), by exaggerating the prevalence of short and decisive wars when offense has the advantage, also contribute to creating a window of perceived offensive opportunities to be exploited by rational state leaders. Second, as the bounded learning theory will argue, the length of wars is not always decided by fully informed rational calculations unaffected by the beliefs and expectations created by offense dominance and expansive ideology. Thus, the central policy implications of the study are twofold: if one seeks to avoid long wars, the level of offense dominance should not be exaggerated and the effect of expansive ideology and asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity should not be neglected. In other words, seldom will offense dominance guarantee a swift victory and, when reaching an end to the war calls for negotiations, not always do battlefield events lead to the same expectations and compatible war aims so that the combatants can swiftly agree on a mutually acceptable bargaining solution. One side's estimated probability of winning is simply not the mirror image of the other side's estimated probability.

In the 6th century, BC Sun Tzu famously argued in *The Art of War* that "it is best to win without fighting" (Sun Tzu 2002: Planning a Siege). For Sun Tzu, winning without fighting meant that wars are won by preparing and calculating in advance so that one goes to war only when there is a certainty of victory. Yet today there is widespread and exaggerated faith that the power of offense can lead to fast and decisively defeating the enemy. Both the Vietnam War and the Iraq War of 2003 are good examples of recent cases of overly optimistic perceptions about the expected course of events when it is believed that offensive weapons systems dominate battlefield events. This admonition is important, I believe, in a world where man's destructive potential has considerably increased. The math is easy to do: increased destructive potential plus an increase in the length of wars equal a great misfortune. The average length of wars increased from 351 days in the 19th century to 473 days in the 20th century.³ Suspecting that the

³ Correlates of War interstate war data in appendix C.

world wars are outliers raising the average, we can also calculate the average length of wars since 1947. This average, 479 days, is however an even more considerable increase compared to the 19th century.

While the destructiveness of wars was at first curbed by technological limitations, a lack of modern densely populated areas, and sometimes by somewhat ritualistic warfare, the trend throughout history has progressed in the opposite direction. In earlier times, weapons were an extension of a soldier's body and their effectiveness was mainly a function of physical strength. The introduction of horses and fortifications called for new weapons systems for both attacking and defending. A major development was the advent of combustion based weapons, but it was not until the industrial age that man's lethal potential was significantly felt among the civilian population, further raising the cost of warfare.

Alexander the Great showed with his relentless pursuit of the enemy with fast cavalry after the battle of Gaugamela that offensive weapons technology and tactics could make wars decisive (Adcock 1966: 49). Yet, despite further improvements in offensive weapons technology and tactics in modern times, the increased average war duration in the 20th century gives reason to suspect that offensive campaigns have not become fully decisive. Notwithstanding the reality of ever longer wars and increasing destructive potential, which from a rational choice perspective should decrease the average expected utility of warfare, some political realists have offered both a descriptive and prescriptive analysis of world politics where the use of force is part and parcel of successful statecraft.

There have been efforts to counter the realist, particularly offensive realist, view of warfare as a rational tool for decision-makers. These endeavors started with the international 1932 conference seeking to place limitations on offensive weapons and reached their theoretical culmination with Jervis's seminal article *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma* (1978), where he argued that the security dilemma, which increases the risk of war, would not be so severe if weapons systems were defense dominant. Jervis's article sparked a heated debate about how to increase security in the aftermath of the traumatic failure of the Vietnam War and within the context of the NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979⁴. The debate has not reached a

⁴ In the case that arms control negotiations with the USSR should fail, NATO decided that its intermediate nuclear forces ought to be modernized in order to create a counterweight to the new Soviet SS-20 missiles. The Soviets however perceived NATO's new Pershing II missile as an offensive first-strike weapon that could be used for

conclusive outcome. History however has shown that states have not been able to develop norms that would give rise to qualitative arms reduction so that a state of defense dominance could be perpetuated. Quite the contrary, the self-help logic of the anarchical state system and various foreign policy ambitions still prompt states to acquire and develop offensive weapons of war. It is therefore questionable whether Jervis's defensive realism, which focuses on the stability that defensive weapons and posture can create, suffices to explain how the risk of war – as it is embodied in the security dilemma – can be adequately diminished in an anarchical state system without overarching authoritative structures.

This study contributes to the analysis of the security dilemma by modifying Jervis's analysis of the severity of the security dilemma when offense has the advantage. I will argue that long and costly wars occur both when defense and offense are dominant – against the expectations of Jervis's defensive realism – because offense dominance is seldom absolute or close to absolute and finding a mutually agreeable negotiation solution is often difficult. This means, from a realist perspective, that the scourge of war can be alleviated in the name of state interest rather than on the basis of normative urging: it becomes increasingly irrational to start wars when offense has the advantage, *ceteris paribus*, unless offense dominance is close to absolute, because the risk of long war duration decreases the expected utility of warfare.

The promise of being able to identify the conditions under which cooperation becomes more likely, thereby countering the pessimism of realists such as Morgenthau (1948/85) or Mearsheimer (2001), is appealing and has been the guiding light for offense-defense theory (Lynn-Jones 2001: 14). But when the conditions, i.e. defense dominance, are not present, we must look for other reasons within the realist framework, such as national interest in not getting entangled in long and costly wars, for states not to exacerbate the security dilemma and increase the risk of war. Long wars are costly to the initiator not only in terms of casualties or the increased economic burden of mobilization. The longer the war lasts, the higher the probability that the initiator will not win (Slantchev 2004). Therefore, if long wars also occur in offense dominant eras, the rationale for starting a war should then not be greater than when defense has the advantage, and

trying to win a war in Europe. This marked a move from the earlier détente toward a period of increased confrontation in East-West relations during the Cold War (Young and Kent 2004: 484).

the security dilemma is not as severe as Jervis (1978) claims. Furthermore, the price of portraying defense dominance as the primary condition for increased peaceful interstate relations is the worsening of the security dilemma in offense dominant eras by suggesting that wars are then shorter. This merely lowers the threshold to mistakenly considering aggression more likely to succeed and creates misleading incentives for warfare.

This study focuses on conventional symmetric wars that result in a negotiated outcome. Only during WWII have nuclear weapons been used in war and even then in a limited fashion. How a nuclear war between two states would unfold is beyond the wildest imagination of the author. However, unless the use of nuclear weapons is very limited, there would not be much time to negotiate in the midst of potentially mutual assured destruction. Since Japan had no similar weapons technology during WWII, the USA could use nuclear weapons as the offensive weapon par excellence that probably considerably hastened the Japanese surrender. As such, the end of WWII is reminiscent of other asymmetric wars. For example, during the 1968 Arab-Israeli War and the Iraq War of 2003, the victors enjoyed such qualitative advantages that the opposing armed forces were swiftly run over. Thus, the losers were either defeated without negotiation or they found themselves quickly on the verge of a collapse that made negotiations a mere formality. Under such significant qualitative differences, a swift victory becomes possible even when offense dominance is limited. Also under significant quantitative differences in the belligerents' war-making potential, we seldom have a negotiation process to analyze.

To set the stage for theory development and testing in the subsequent chapters, I now proceed to test whether Jervis and other offense-defense theorists are correct in arguing that offense dominance shortens war duration. If their argument is empirically wrong, there is a need to further study the variables and processes that can impact war duration.

1.2. Does Systemic Offense Dominance Shorten War Duration?

The main prediction of the offense-defense theory concerns the frequency of war. The general expectation is that more wars are started when offense is perceived to dominate and conquest is thought to be easy. Either aggression for some national interest, such as profit, is the underlying reason for war, or the fear of another state taking advantage of the offensive ad-

vantage prompts a preemptive strike. Yet, in support of the logic behind this main hypothesis, the offense-defense theorists also present an auxiliary hypothesis that relates to the duration of the armed conflict: wars are assumed to be shorter when attacking is easier than defending. If wars cannot be expected to be shorter when offense has the advantage, the rationale for initiating more wars would diminish.

Thus, Jervis argues that “[w]hen there are incentives to strike first, a successful attack will usually so weaken the other side that victory will be relatively quick, bloodless, and decisive” (Ibid. 189). Van Evera, in turn, holds that “aggression brings larger rewards at lower cost” when offense is dominant (1999: 123). In same manner, Glaser and Kauffman argue that “war will be quick and decisive and therefore profitable” (1998: 48). Similar hypotheses are also suggested by Bloch (1899: xxx-xxxi), Liddell Hart (1932: 72-73), Wright (1965: 673), Gilpin (1981: 61-62) and Quester (1977: 9).

Offense-defense theorists have also made arguments about the nature of the offense-defense balance in recent history. Therefore, we can empirically test whether Jervis (1978) and the others are correct in arguing that offense dominance is associated with shorter war duration than defense dominance. I will use hazard analysis to evaluate the effect of offense-defense balance on war duration. Hazard analysis has also been referred to in the literature as survival, transition, duration, failure time or reliability analysis. Many social science research questions have an interest in the duration of events and lead to the consideration of hazards models. For example, if something such as a war persists, what variables are associated with the risk of it subsequently ending (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 3-4)? The strength of hazards models for an analysis of war duration is that they can analyze variables that assume different values across the span of the observed time period (Ibid. 95) The variable of interest here is the offense-defense balance. The inherent problem troubling offense-defense theorists has clearly been their varying classification schemes in their search to characterize some periods in the international state system as offense or defense dominant (Levy 1984: 234; Mearsheimer 1983: 25). I will thus use four different codifications of the offense-defense balance since 1815 (Adams 2003-2004; Quester 1977; Van Evera 1998; Jervis 1978) in order to test the offense-defense theorists’ “common sense” assumption, which suggests that offense dominance makes wars quick.

The most complete work on war duration thus far is that of Bennett and Stam (1996). Thus, to perform an adequate test of the offense-defense balance’s potential impact on how long wars last, the best way is to use

Bennett and Stam's variables as statistical controls.⁵ I use the same hazard analysis technique with time-varying covariates, as the data include variables with annually measured values, and the Weibull specification, which parameterizes the hazard rate as not constant and allows for both positive and negative duration dependence. The model is fitted in accelerated failure time metric. The data include the same interstate wars started between 1817 and 1992 as in the updated model by Bennett and Stam (2006) and is given in appendix B. War duration is measured in months. The data generally follow Small and Singer's (1982: 65–66) procedures, which identify the starting and ending dates of war by a combination of when actual continued fighting began and ended and information about declarations of war and signed armistices. If there is a considerable difference between actual fighting and the legal dates of declarations and treaties, priority is given to when actual battle occurred.

The hazard analysis is made with data on the systemic concept of offense-defense balance that is advocated by, for example, Jervis (1978), Quester (1977) and Lynn-Jones (1995). I estimate four separate models with explanatory variables from Adams (2003–2004), Quester (1977), Jervis (1978) and Van Evera (1998), which are given in appendix A.⁶ Adams classifies various time periods from the 19th to the 20th century as offense, defense or deterrent dominant. For the sake of comparison and following the analysis of the frequency of wars by Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeney (2005), offense dominance is coded as 1 and defense and deterrence dominance as 2. Van Evera uses three categories to characterize the offense-defense balance (military factors)⁷ among great powers in Europe. To increase the number of wars in the analysis in accordance with Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeney (2005), all applicable interstate wars are considered. The offense-defense balance is codified as follows: offense dominance 1, intermediate values 2 and defense dominance 3. Quester uses two categories, and some years are indeterminate. Offense dominance is coded as 1, indeterminate offense-

⁵ Other offense-defense theorists have also classified different time periods but for much fewer years and with less variation in the explanatory variable over the years – Levy (1984) 1850–1945 and Lieber (2000) 1946–1992.

⁶ Bennett and Stam's (2006) data are available at <http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/d/s/dsb10/datasets.htm>.

⁷ Van Evera differs from other offense-defense theorists by not only analyzing whether the weapons systems but also the tactics make attacking or defending easier.

defense balance is coded as 2 and defense dominance as 3. Jervis's offense dominance is coded as 1 and defense dominance as 2.⁸

Table 1 lists the control variables used in the hazard analyses. Bennett and Stam (1996, 2006, 2009) include in their analysis four dummy variables codifying combinations of the strategy of both the attacker (offensive) and the defender (defensive), which they observe historically. Possible strategies are "maneuver" if *Blitzkrieg* is used, "attrition" if states fight meeting engagements against each other, and "punishment" if civilians are the principle target and guerilla warfare is used. Terrain is a dummy variable, where 0 stands for open terrain and 1 for impassable terrain. To measure the interaction of terrain and strategy, Bennett and Stam (1996) multiply a single ordinal scaled strategy variable by terrain. Balance of capabilities is the ratio of the largest side's total capability to all the belligerents' total capability. Correlates of War (COW) capability scores are discounted according to the distance from a state to the battlefield. Total military capabilities use COW national capabilities measures of both sides' total military personnel in millions. Total population measures the states' total population as indicated in the same data set. Bennett and Stam also calculate the population ratio of the larger side to that of the smaller side.

The difference in the quality of the military forces is estimated by dividing a state's military expenditure by the number of military personnel and then creating a ratio of the superior side's quality to that of the inferior side. Surprise is a measure of strategic surprise during any time of the war. It ranges from 0 (no or symmetrical surprise) to 1 (large and asymmetrical surprise). Issue salience is coded as 0 (salient to neither side), 1 (salient one side) or 2 (salient to both sides) by using Holsti's (1991) categorization. A measure of the repressiveness of the governments is obtained by summing the repressiveness measures of each side using Polity II data set's competitiveness of participation variable, which varies from -5 (significant and regular political competition) to -1 (no significant opposition activity permitted). Bennett and Stam also construct a democracy variable by summing the democracy value of each side using Polity II data set's institutionalized democracy variable, which ranges from 0 (high level of democracy) to 10 (low level of democracy).

⁸ Jervis (1978) is not precise about the periodization of the offense-defense balance. However, I use Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeney's (2005) interpretation of Jervis's text as the data.

TABLE 1. Control Variables and Their Hypothesized Effects on War Duration⁹

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Strategy: OADM | Offensive attrition, defensive maneuver (maneuver strategy leads to shorter wars) |
| Strategy: OADA | Offensive attrition, defensive attrition (attrition strategy leads to longer wars) |
| Strategy: OADP | Offensive attrition, defensive punishment (punishment strategies lead to longer wars) |
| Strategy: OPDA | Offensive punishment, defensive attrition (punishment strategies lead to longer wars) |
| Terrain | Open terrain will shorten war duration |
| Terrain X Strategy | Strategy suiting the terrain shortens war duration |
| Balance of forces | Imbalance of forces shortens war duration |
| Military personnel (millions) | The more forces involved, the longer the war |
| Population (billions) | The greater the total populations, the longer the war |
| Population ratio | Disparity in the belligerents' population sizes shortens war duration |
| Quality ratio | Difference in the belligerents' military quality shortens war duration |
| Surprise | Strategic surprise shortens war duration |
| Saliency | Low issue saliency shortens war duration |
| Repression | Repressive states fight risky wars that are short |
| Democracy | Total level of democracy among the belligerents shortens the war. |
| Previous disputes | Previous disputes prolong the war |
| Number of states | The more states involved, the longer the war |

Previous disputes are measured with the help of the COW militarized interstate disputes data set by counting the average number of disputes lasting at least 30 days in the ten years before each war between all pairs of states on the opposing sides. The total number of disputes is then divided by the number of states in each war. The number of actors indicates how many states were involved in the war based on the COW interstate war data set.

⁹ A more complete explanation of the variables and their hypothesized effects is available in Bennett and Stam (1996).

There is no single best measure of fit in hazards models. Still, in accordance with Bennett and Stam (2009), I estimate PRE % (a proportional reduction in error as a proportion of actual war duration) as a measure of how well the different models fit the data. This provides an intuitively appealing measure of model fit. PRE% is calculated by first estimating a constant-only model and summing the absolute prediction error across all wars. I then estimate the complete models with control variables and different measures of offense-defense balance and sum the absolute prediction errors across all wars. PRE is obtained by subtracting a complete model's prediction error from the constant-only model's prediction error and dividing the results by the constant-only model's prediction error. Finally, PRE% is arrived at by dividing the sum of prediction error by the actual war duration.¹⁰

The main result of the analysis, written in bold in table 2, indicates that there is no statistically significant association between systemic offense-defense balance and war duration. Positive coefficients indicate longer war duration and negative ones shorter war duration. There are some changes if we compare the full models including the four measures of systemic offense-defense balance to Bennett and Stam's (2006) analysis. The models including Quester and Jarvis's measures of the offense-defense balance indicate that strategic surprise is significantly associated with shorter war duration. The impact of terrain also gained statistical significance in both models, whereas issue salience and the number of states lost statistical significance in Quester's model. In Adams's model, terrain times strategy and population ratio lost statistical significance, while the same happened in Van Evera's model with repression and the number of states.

As for the three measures of systemic offense-defense balance, only Quester's shows a modestly statistically significant effect at the 0.10 level. Yet the effect is in the opposite direction than what is hypothesized by the offense-defense theorists (Jarvis 1978; Van Evera 1999). If we exponentiate the coefficient -0.335, we get a hazard ratio of 1.410, which means that the hazard of war termination increases by 41 percent when we move from offense dominance to middle values, or from middle values to defense dominance. Thus, Quester's model seems to indicate that defense dominant wars are considerably shorter than offense dominant wars.

¹⁰See Bennett and Stam (2009) for more details on the calculations.

TABLE 2. Hazard Analysis, the Effect of Offense-Defense Balance on War Duration

| Variable | Adams | | Quester | | Van Evera | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Strateg. OADM | 2.175 | (0.566)*** | 3.292 | (0.609)*** | 2.277 | (0.566)*** |
| Strateg. OADA | 2.491 | (0.492)*** | 4.054 | (0.780)*** | 2.459 | (0.450)*** |
| Strateg. OADP | 4.668 | (0.978)*** | 8.694 | (2.631)*** | 4.557 | (1.144)*** |
| Strateg. OPDA | 8.382 | (2.021)*** | 14.709 | (3.775)*** | 8.538 | (2.072)*** |
| Terrain | 1.817 | (2.492) | 9.452 | (4.299)** | 1.740 | (2.681) |
| Terrain X strategy | -0.910 | (0.644) | -2.781 | (1.157)*** | -0.930 | (0.677)* |
| Balance of forces | -4.490 | (1.211)*** | -4.505 | (1.360)*** | -4.351 | (1.204)*** |
| Military personnel | 0.105 | (0.050)*** | 0.112 | (0.041)*** | 1.110 | (0.046)*** |
| Total population | 0.925 | (0.567)* | -0.676 | (0.646) | 1.045 | (0.651)* |
| Population ratio | 0.008 | (0.012) | -0.002 | (0.011) | 0.007 | (0.012) |
| Quality ratio | 0.007 | (0.006) | 0.022 | (0.020) | 0.007 | (0.012) |
| Surprise | -0.137 | (0.565) | -1.597 | (0.659)*** | -0.099 | (0.582) |
| Salience | 0.392 | (0.205)** | 0.246 | (0.192) | 0.338 | (0.222)* |
| Repression | -0.220 | (0.114)** | -0.173 | (0.102)** | -0.259 | (0.122) |
| Democracy | -0.105 | (0.053)** | -0.077 | (0.048)* | -0.119 | (0.057)** |
| Previous disputes | -0.008 | (0.056) | 0.065 | (0.049) | -0.014 | (0.057) |
| Number of states | -0.175 | (0.103)** | -0.050 | (0.109) | -0.159 | (0.117) |
| Offense-defense balance | -0.253 | (0.349) | -0.335 | (0.197)* | -0.173 | (0.233) |
| Constant | 3.139 | (1.443) | 2.011 | (1.456) | 3.004 | (1.351) |
| Log-likelihood | -132.5 | | -111.4 | | -132.2 | |
| <i>p</i> (duration parameter) | 0.924 | | 1.026 | | 0.926 | |
| SD of <i>p</i> | 0.083 | | 0.099 | | 0.082 | |
| Mean error (months) | -4.3 | | 0.5 | | -4.0 | |
| SD of mean error | 18.1 | | 28.9 | | 19.2 | |
| Mean absolute error | 10.6 | | 12.8 | | 10.7 | |
| SD of absolute error | 15.2 | | 25.8 | | 16.5 | |
| Median error | -0.3 | | -0.1 | | -0.3 | |
| Median absolute error | 4.1 | | 4.2 | | 4.5 | |
| PRE (abs. error) | 0.219 | | 0.139 | | 0.213 | |
| PRE% (abs. error as % of length) | 0.460 | | 0.724 | | 0.501 | |
| Number of wars | 80 | | 73 | | 80 | |
| Data points (war years) | 171 | | 150 | | 171 | |

Note: Coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests one-tailed. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. Calculations made with STATA 10.1.

TABLE 2. Continued

| Variable | Jervis ¹¹ | | Bennett and Stam (2006) | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------|
| Strateg. OADM | 3.232 | (0.848)*** | 2.287 | (0.539)*** |
| Strateg. OADA | 3.629 | (0.911)*** | 2.489 | (0.489)*** |
| Strateg. OADP | 8.106 | (2.747)*** | 4.857 | (1.084)*** |
| Strateg. OPDA | 13.788 | (4.011)*** | 8.495 | (2.063)*** |
| Terrain | 8.404 | (4.395)* | 2.323 | (2.571) |
| Terrain X strategy | -2.528 | (1.213)** | -1.002 | (0.669)* |
| Balance of forces | -6.355 | (1.658)*** | -4.470 | (1.226)*** |
| Military personnel | 0.126 | (0.040)*** | 0.123 | (0.039)*** |
| Total population | -0.753 | (0.706) | 0.825 | (0.552)* |
| Population ratio | 0.007 | (0.017) | 0.008 | (0.012) |
| Quality ratio | 0.018 | (0.019) | 0.007 | (0.006) |
| Surprise | -1.234 | (0.555)** | -0.176 | (0.559) |
| Saliency | 0.608 | (0.290)** | 0.387 | (0.207)** |
| Repression | -0.290 | (0.160)* | -0.223 | (0.113)** |
| Democracy | -0.094 | (0.059) | -0.104 | (0.055)** |
| Previous disputes | 0.023 | (0.062) | -0.006 | (0.057) |
| Number of states | -0.160 | (0.129)* | -0.193 | (0.092)** |
| Offense-defense balance | 0.265 | (0.322) | | |
| Constant | 1.792 | (1.538) | 2.641 | (1.233) |
| Log-likelihood | -96.2 | | -132.5 | |
| <i>p</i> (duration parameter) | 0.993 | | 0.923 | |
| SD of <i>p</i> | 0.101 | | 0.083 | |
| Mean error (months) | -0.5 | | -4.2 | |
| SD of mean error | 25.5 | | 18.0 | |
| Mean absolute error | 12.7 | | 10.5 | |
| SD of absolute error | 22.0 | | 15.2 | |
| Median error | -0.2 | | -0.5 | |
| Median absolute error | 3.4 | | 4.5 | |
| PRE (abs. error) | 0.276 | | 0.228 | |
| PRE% (abs. error as % of length) | 0.665 | | 0.453 | |
| Number of wars | 63 | | 80 | |
| Data points (war years) | 132 | | 171 | |

Note: Coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests one-tailed. **p*<.10; ***p*<.05; ****p*<.01. Calculations made with STATA 10.1.

¹¹Data from Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeney's (2005) interpretation of Jervis (1978).

While Van Evera and Adams's measures of the offense-defense balance were not statistically significant, they point in the same direction as Quester's measure. Jervis's measure points in the direction hypothesized by the offense-defense theorists but is far from being statistically significant ($p=0.41$) at an adequate level. If we look at the PRE%, rather than merely PRE, Quester's model further seems to fit best to the data as its reduction of prediction error relative to the constant-only model, as a proportion of actual war duration, is 72 percent as compared to the 45 percent in Bennett and Stam's (1996) model. Yet, lacking statistical significance, the results confirm the null hypothesis: taken together, systemic offense-defense balance is not associated with war duration.¹² None of the measures reached a significance level of 0.05. And when the data were tested with a Cox proportional hazards model, not even Quester's measure of the offense-defense balance reached a significance level of 0.10.

The fact that we cannot find a statistically significant association between systemic offense-defense balance and war duration suggests that long wars can occur not only when defending is easier but also within the context of offense dominance. This possibility that wars can often be long when offense is dominant as well or, conversely, short when defense has the advantage is an alternative neglected by offense-defense theory. It runs counter to the offense-defense theorists' "common sense" assumption of swift and decisive warfare enabled by offensive weapons technology.

The results of the hazard analyses call for a theoretical refinement of the offense-defense theory and our understanding of war duration. First, if offense-defense theorists are correct in arguing that offense dominance is associated with a higher risk of war, many wars must have been started with a misperception of the expected length and costs of war by the decision-makers. From a rational choice perspective, initiating a war that one knows will become long and costly is clearly irrational unless the expected benefits of a long war outweigh the costs.

Second, I believe that in order to better understand war duration, we must leave the systemic level and proceed to the dyad level in an effort to formulate a theory of war duration with better explanatory power. On the dyad level we can better see how even long wars occur when offense is

¹²In case George and Bennett's strategy variables could be argued to measure the offense-defense balance, I also ran the analysis after dropping them. Yet, the results did not change significantly.

dominant by analyzing both the limitations to offense dominance and the negotiation process toward war termination. The limitations to offense dominance have been neglected by offense-defense theorists such as Jervis (1978) and Van Evera (1999) and the negotiation process is absent in both the hazard analyses (Bennet and Stam 1996, 1998) and offense-defense theory. Yet, clearly, most wars end in a negotiated outcome and are not characterized by absolute or even close to absolute offense dominance that would almost always guarantee that the aggressor will swiftly subdue the defender.¹³

As I address some of the most imperative questions relating to Jervis's (1978) defensive realism, such as the length of wars and the severity of the security dilemma when offense is dominant, the theoretical backdrop of this study is realism. In the next chapter I will first shed some light on the realist discourse where the security dilemma has been an important analytical tool for analyzing how states act in anarchy and perceive the risk of war. I will then argue, with the help of realist theoretical assumptions and a historical example, that qualitative arms reduction is hard to bring about in order to alleviate the security dilemma.

In chapter three I will present the bounded learning theory, which explains better than the systemic offense-defense theory why some wars are longer than others. This theory of war duration specifies the conditions under which we can expect wars to be long. Even if the results of the hazard analysis were challenged by a future study indicating an association between war duration and some new way of classifying the offense-defense balance, I believe that the bounded learning theory with its focus on asymmetric information and expansive ideology still remains a valuable development of rational choice analysis for the purpose of studying war duration. Chapter four discusses the comparative method used in the subsequent empirical chapters, and chapters five to nine consist of four case studies that test the bounded learning theory. The study culminates in chapter ten with an analysis of the implications of the empirical results for Jervis's (Ibid.) security dilemma: since wars are not shorter and long wars occur when offense has the advantage, the security dilemma should not then be as severe as Jervis holds.

¹³ Absolute offense dominance means that attacking is always easier than defending, even when facing a much larger army. Mere offense dominance means that attacking is easier than defending, *ceteris paribus*. Thus, when two otherwise equally strong states meet in a war, the attacker will be in a stronger position.

2. REALISM, SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE

The nuclear bomb, does that bother you?...I just want you to think big, Henry, for Christsakes.

(President Nixon conversing with Henry Kissinger during the Vietnam War. Reported by Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers)

You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

(Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War: Melian Dialogue)

2.1. Introduction

Snyder (1991: 11-12) formulated a theoretical dividing line that is known as the debate between offensive and defensive realism. The central moot point between the two brands of realism is how states seek survival and security in anarchy. Those who argue that states seek to maximize their power for the sake of survival and security logically draw the conclusion that states are prone to pursue aggressive policies. The tendency is viewed as widespread by offensive realists (Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1998; Schweller 1998; Huntington 1993; Labs 1997). On the other hand, defensive realists hold that the international system does not always provide incentives for expansion and aggressive policies do not always increase state security (Walt 1987; Posen 1984; Waltz 1979; Grieco 1990). This leaves an opening for less conflictual interstate relations.

Yet, there are also significant differences within the group of defensive realists. While Waltz (1979) and balance of power theorists emphasize how anarchy has a uniform effect on states, offense-defense balance theorists have sought to describe how to further increase the prospects of peaceful relations among nations in the face of the security dilemma that anarchy gives rise to. In short, Jervis (1978) argues that, when defending is easier than attacking and it is possible to differentiate an offensive posture from a defensive one, the war causing security dilemma is alleviated. Yet, defense

dominance is not always present and an ability to discern a defensive posture is not always possible. Under the circumstances, one remaining option would be multilateral qualitative arms reduction ensuring that states only have defensive weapons systems that do not trigger insecurity among other states.

The policy conclusion that offense-defense theory offers is that the risk of arms racing and war can be diminished through qualitative arms control agreements shifting the offense-defense balance toward defense or by correcting misperceptions of the balance (Jervis 1978: 199-201; Glaser and Kauffman 1998: 44; Van Evera 1998: 40). Against this backdrop, I will argue two things in this chapter. First, for the realists the prospects of widespread cooperation among states for the sake of qualitative arms reduction are limited because anarchy creates mistrust. Second, I will show that historical efforts to bring about such cooperation have failed, as some states want to preserve the option of projecting their power abroad. Thus, from a realist perspective, we must find some other way based on national interest to increase state security, which in turn can ameliorate the security dilemma.

This study seeks to go beyond Jervis's (1978) defensive realism in analyzing the conditions under which the risk of war, as it is embodied in the security dilemma, can be diminished. I believe that if defense dominance, which according to Jervis sets the stage for the most peaceful interstate relations and security, cannot be purposefully created by coordinated state action in an anarchical state system, a better understanding of the risk of long and costly wars will make the security dilemma less severe than he claims when offense is dominant. While defensive realists have often argued that the ability to protect one's territory is almost always stronger than offense (Snyder 1984; Walt 1987, Van Evera 1999), which makes aggressive policies likely to fail, the *Economist* famously proclaimed that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) will strengthen the offense (March 8, 1997). Instead of relying on the doubtful prevalence of defense dominance to ease the security dilemma, this study focuses on the limitations to offense dominance and the risk of long wars even when offense has the advantage. Thus, the efforts of defensive realism to specify the conditions for increased international security will not come to naught in a world where national interest still prompts states to continue to develop offensive weapons systems.

Apart from being aimed to be a contribution to defensive realism, this study is inspired by neoclassical realism in emphasizing how the actors' perceptions filter the material reality and guide state behavior. Neoclassi-

cal realism increasingly highlights the impact of decision-makers' personal beliefs and errors on outcomes (Byman and Pollack 2001). Thus, while there is an objective reality of relative power, states do not necessarily apprehend that reality accurately (Dueck 2006). Actual state behavior is contingent on how the decision-makers perceive and calculate their position, power, prestige and external threats (Schweller 2003; Walt 1985; Brown 1995; Wolforth 1993, 2003; Hagan 2001). In a similar fashion, I will argue in the theory chapter that it is not always the belligerents' relative power, as it is reflected in the actual battlefield events, but also expansive ideology and asymmetric information that guide states' expected utility calculations and behavior in times of war. While Waltz's (1979) argument that all states can be treated as like units acting merely on the basis of the balance of power has been criticized, for example, in the questions of whether to start hostilities and how alliances form (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Schweller 1996), we can perceive differences in state behavior also in the question of whether to continue hostilities.

2.2. Anarchy and Trust Deficit

Realism is a political theory, or paradigm, consisting of several interrelated theories, that seeks to both explain and prescribe state behavior in its external relations. In doing so, classical realism (Carr 1939; Niebuhr 1960; Morgenthau 1948) can trace its origins to philosophical conservatism, such as the arguments offered by Hobbes (1651/1955) in *Leviathan*. A major theme in the book is the assumption that man's nature is not benign and that power and competition are characteristic features of men's coexistence. Toward the end of the 20th century realism tended to focus more on the structural imperatives of the anarchical state system (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1986). Yet the Hobbesian problem of how humans can trust each other in an anarchical world, where no overarching power beyond states exists, remains crucial to the realist analysis of international politics.

Even if some realists have recognized the inadequacy of Hobbes's domestic analogy (Bull 1977), his description of the state of nature has influenced the realist view of the anarchical international system as naturally creating distrust and hostility among states:

Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. [I]f there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men (Hobbes 1651/1955: 83, 109).

Realism also views states as rational actors or prescribes them rationality (Morgenthau 1948: 7; Waltz 1979: 40).¹⁴ Yet the rationality assumption does not entail that the trust problem would be alleviated in anarchy. Quite the contrary, the limitations in states' ability to rationally calculate are prone to lead to disproportionate increases of power. Morgenthau argues that rational calculation of the relative strength of several states, which is the foundation of the balance of power, "becomes a series of guesses the correctness of which can be ascertained only in retrospect" (1948: 224). This inability to calculate forces nations to strive for "a margin of safety", which for Morgenthau means seeking "the maximum of power obtainable" (Ibid. 227-228). Thus, multilateral cooperation in reducing offensive capacity for the sake of making the states seem less threatening to each other runs counter to the realist tendency to emphasize the rationality in seeking survival by increasing state power when anarchy creates mistrust.

Not even a progressive thinker of the Enlightenment like Rousseau could avoid agreeing how difficult it is to induce cooperation among self-interested actors living in anarchy, as was evident in his story of the Stag Hunt in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. In this "trust dilemma", where the total cooperation of a group of hunters is needed to catch a stag, there is the ever-present risk of a single hunter defecting from the group if he sees a hare that he believes he can catch on his own. Certainly the benefits of catching a stag (qualitative arms reduction) would be greater than those deriving from a small hare that a single hunter can catch (arms racing); but can one take the risk of the other hunters going-it alone? If there is such a suspicion, would it be better for all hunters (states) to merely trust themselves and not cooperate so that they can secure their daily meal (survival) in the face of potentially untrustworthy hunters (states)?

Were it a matter of catching a deer, everyone was quite aware that he must faithfully keep to his post in order to achieve this purpose; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, no doubt he would have pursued it without giving it a second thought... (Rousseau 1755/1987: 62).

¹⁴Realism views decision-makers as rational problem solvers reacting to the international environment (Kegley 1996: 4). Yet it does not mean that their calculating ability would not be curtailed by cognitive or other limitations. Neoclassical and defensive realists, for example, often focus on perceptions. It also deserves to be noted that Waltz (1979), with his focus on the logic of the state system, regards the state as a rather irrelevant agent of policy and choice. Instead, for him, it is the system that has its own rationality that the states follow. Still, since Waltz uses microeconomic analogies to explain how states act in anarchy, critics have argued that he is not a structuralist but an ontological individualist (Guzzini 1998: 125-141).

This limited ability to trust other actors in the anarchical state system, due to states' security seeking (Waltz 1979: 91-92) or to the power seeking of human nature (Morgenthau 1948: 4-5), has clear consequences for the prospects of cooperation and conflict among nations: "realists argue that states are preoccupied with their security and power; by consequence states are predisposed toward conflict and competition" (Grieco 1990: 4). Thus, in an anarchical state system, it is seen as more rational to increase state power for the sake of security than to cooperate through qualitative arms reductions for that same purpose. This is the driving force behind the security dilemma that increases the risk of war among states.

The term was coined by Hertz (1950), who focused on how efforts by one state to increase its security in a self-help system are bound to create a sense of decrease in other states' security so that a risk of security competition and arms races becomes acute. The crux of the security dilemma and a focal point in the efforts to alleviate it has been that it is often hard to distinguish aggressive and harmless intent on the part of a state that has large aggressive capacities or seeks to increase its military potential. In an effort to change the rigidity of the security dilemma, Jervis introduces the offense-defense balance as a new variable. He argues that "when the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have..." (1978: 211).¹⁵ In such a world the security dilemma is clearly exacerbated. Yet, Jervis goes so far as to argue that a situation in which the defense has the advantage and it is possible to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons "permits a way out of the security dilemma" (Ibid. 213).

However, a situation where defense dominates and a distinction between offensive and defensive posture can be made does not always arise if states

¹⁵The core of the offense-defense theory addresses the relative ease of conquest and how it affects the risk of war among nations. For example, Van Evera (1998, 1999) finds ten war causing effects of offense dominance and consequently views offense dominance as the master cause of war. Among the other issues where the security dilemma and the offense-defense balance have been used are the effectiveness of deterrence and reassurance (Stein 1992), sources of moderation in Soviet policy (Evangelista 1990), alliance behavior such as balancing and bandwagoning (Walt 1987) and the tightness of alliances (Christensen and Snyder 1990), military doctrine (Posen 1984; Snyder 1984), imperial expansion (Snyder 1991), revolution and war (Walt 1996), ethnic conflict (Posen 1993; Kauffman 1996), conventional arms control (Snyder 1988), U.S. nuclear policy and arms control (Glaser 1990), nuclear proliferation (Feldman 1982), the escalatory dangers of conventional war (Posen 1982, 1992), U.S. grand strategy (Walt 1989) and the prospects for peace in Europe and policies for preserving it (Van Evera 1991; Hopf 1992; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Glaser 1993).

have an interest in increasing their power. From the realist perspective, chances for cooperation in the form of multilateral qualitative arms reduction are not only limited due to a theoretical analysis of the trust deficit created by anarchy but can also be exemplified with historical evidence. For example, a protorealist like Thucydides (1866) saw in the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta eternal principles of international politics at work: states' unending search for power and their use of it against weaker actors, states' widespread distrust and fear of others' power, and the conflict that ensues when states react to the rising power of another state. But how has qualitative arms reduction for the sake of creating defense dominance and increased security fared during the recent century?

2.3. Offense-Defense Balance and Qualitative Arms Reduction?

As military technology became increasingly efficient in the industrial age, efforts were made to govern states' conduct in war with the help of international law, *jus in bello*. The apparent reason was that the plight of the victims of war was slowly entering the conscience of the modern public due to the increasing efficiency of newspapers to report to a wider audience. During the Crimean War of 1853-56, reports of the horrific conditions of the wounded shook the British public. The American Civil War of 1861-65 further elucidated the human suffering that increasing firepower could bring about to the dismay of both the American public and foreign observers.

Starting with the Declaration of Paris (1856) and the Geneva Convention of 1864, the status of combatants and wounded were gradually being regulated. The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) prohibited the use of small explosive and flammable projectiles, whereas later Hague Conventions dealt with, for example, expanding (dumdum) bullets and automatic submarine contact mines. The horrendous casualties and wounds caused by chemical weapons during WWI led the states to sign the Protocol of 1925 on the Use in War of Poison Gases (Lauterpach 1952: 227-230). More recently, most states have signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Nevertheless, is a multilateral reduction of offense dominant weapons systems possible so that defense dominance can be created and the security dilemma remodeled in the way Jervis (1978) suggested? Historical evidence suggests that it is not likely to happen.

The most interesting developments took place during the 1932 World Disarmament Conference, at which qualitative reductions in arms were

discussed. During the time before the Conference, military technology had taken impressive leaps forward. Liddell Hart, a British military historian, led the way to increasing the power of the offense in military campaigns in an effort to avoid the stagnated trench warfare that the belligerents encountered during WWI. While Liddell Hart had an impact on the development of armored warfare and strategic theory in the UK, Tuchachevsky in the Soviet Union developed deep strike paratrooper tactics, von Seeckt in Germany worked on faster attack techniques, and the French experimented with both technology and tactics that favored mobility and offense (ter Borg 1992: 148-149).

In the face of the greater destructive potential of modern weapons systems and the lessons of WWI fresh in mind, the delegates of the World Disarmament Conference took up qualitative disarmament, i.e. reductions in the new offensive armaments, as an urgent issue. As a result, the General Commission of the Conference presaged Jervis's (1978) analysis of the security dilemma by agreeing that, if states only had defensive weapons, the risk of war would significantly diminish. The delegates reasoned that,

...with no existing cannon capable of reducing modern fortifications, with no tanks capable of destroying trench defences, with no gas to terrorise armies, invasion would demand such staggering sacrifices in human life as to make it far too costly (ter Borg 1992: 152).

However, in the special commission consisting of national military experts, the national leaders' proposal of qualitative arms reduction keeled over when the details were discussed. The American, British, Japanese and French experts either refused to recognize the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons or considered their own weapons as defensive and considered the other states' weapons to be offensive. A further major obstacle was the French refusal to grant Germany equal rights to armaments (Ibid. 150).

As the expert commission was sinking the plan to put limitations on offensive weapons, US president Hoover sought to rescue the day and proposed an abolishment of tanks, heavy mobile artillery, chemical warfare and all bombers. Not all states lent their support to the US proposal, however. A complete prohibition of tanks, for example, which was supported by the US, Germany, Italy and the USSR, was sunk by the UK and France. The French delegates were of the opinion that "while abolition might secure the frontiers of France, she wanted such [offensive] weapons in order to be

able to take the offensive in aid of her allies” (Liddell Hart 1965: 193). The British also argued that aircraft carrier “serves solely as an aerodrome from which aircraft can be operated, and therefore cannot itself be utilized for offensive purposes” (ter Borg 1992: 155-156).

Thus, it was clear that some states were unwilling to give up their ability to project military power beyond their own borders, be it with tanks or aircraft carriers. The natural result was a failure by the Conference to achieve agreement on the question of qualitative disarmament of offensive weapons. The logic of the French and English was akin to Rousseau’s stag hunt: where it is difficult to trust all other actors to cooperate, defection becomes a tempting policy option. Nevertheless, despite the widespread antipathy to reducing offensive weapons, especially in France and the UK, their development would progress the most in Germany. After Hitler came into power, he started to mass produce those weapons that would make him confident in his ability to prevail in the planned future war of aggression. Germany used tanks as its offensive weapon par excellence in an effort to revenge the humiliation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and without the aircraft carrier Japan would not have been able to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The world was ablaze again.

Whether a universal reduction in offensive weapons would have made Germany feel more secure or content with the *status quo* and refrain from developing offensive weapons is unknown. What we know is that, while it would be beneficial to place limits on offensive weapons systems in an effort to avoid the risk of military aggression, history and even present day political realities clearly show that such developments are very unlikely. Thus, the defense dominance that, according to Jervis (1978), would ameliorate the security dilemma is unlikely to materialize in an anarchical world, where several states facing a trust deficit want to keep the offensive policy option open.

The leading nation in offensive weapons technology today is the United States with its immense military budget and recent strategy of preemption,¹⁶ which calls for efficient aggressive capabilities. The Russian efforts to modernize its military in an effort to pursue more active policies in its sphere of interest, for example in Georgia, are not likely to lead

¹⁶References to the National Security Strategy of 2002 on preemption were made during the Iraq War of 2003. How the US doctrine will develop during the Obama administration remains to be seen. Ellis (2009: 374), for example, suggests that the US should adopt a more defensive grand strategy.

developments in an opposite direction. Without efficient offensive capacity, Russia would not be on a par with other great powers and, without the military option, its international influence would be limited to that of other primarily economic powers such as Japan.

If multilateral agreements to ban offensive weapons have been impossible and continue to be unlikely in the foreseeable future, where does it leave us? Have Jervis's efforts to alleviate the security dilemma come to naught when offensive weapons systems continue to be developed by the major actors in world politics? Will the security dilemma continue to be as rigid as before (Herz 1950) in predicting that states will always sense a decrease in their security as a result of others increasing their military power? I believe that the results of the hazard analyses point our attention toward a possible theoretical opening.

The analyses indicated that, despite Jervis's (1978) and other offense-defense theorists' optimistic expectations, war does not seem to pay more in terms of war duration when offense is dominant. Quite the contrary, wars often become long and merely promise the continuation of human plight and consume vital state resources that are needed for guaranteeing state security. Long wars also decrease the chances that the aggressor will emerge victorious (Slantchev 2004). Thus, from a rational choice perspective that focuses on the expected utility of warfare, starting a war should be less beneficial than expected by the offense-defense theorists when offense has the advantage. The dominance of offensive weapons should caution rather than encourage decision-makers who are contemplating offensive action. Since states strive to be rational problem solvers, in accordance with the assumptions of realism, it lies in their most rudimentary national interest to do so.

As both historical experience and political realism indicate that defense dominance, which according to Jervis (1978) can ease the security dilemma, is difficult to reach through coordinated state action in an anarchical state system, I will next turn to laying forth the bounded learning theory. The bounded learning theory can explain why offense dominance in the state system is not associated with shorter wars on average by focusing on the limitations to offense dominance and the negotiation process that ensues when neither side succeeds in quickly overrunning the enemy. It takes its starting point in the expected utility theory and considers not only military factors but also expansive ideology and asymmetric information, which can impact decision-makers' expected utility of continued warfare.

If these variables' hypothesized impact on war duration is empirically corroborated in the later chapters, the bounded learning theory can explain the lack of association between offense-defense balance and war duration that makes the security dilemma less severe than Jervis assumes when offense is dominant. Although states are located in a rather invariable international anarchy, as realism assumes, we can perceive clear improvements in the attractiveness of cooperation and a smaller risk of war not only when defending is easier but also when offense has the advantage. It may be common knowledge that wars are not short on average when defending is easier and thus there are no pressing windows of opportunity increasing the perceived utility of aggression. But with an awareness of wars not being particularly short when offense is dominant as well, the incentive to arms race and make war would also be weak then.

In effect, the efforts of defensive realism to specify the conditions for less conflicting interstate relations in an anarchical world have not come to naught in an era when offensive weapons systems continue to be developed. This logic not only alleviates the security dilemma in a world of pure security seekers characteristic of Waltz's (1979) structural realism. As the general utility of warfare decreases with increases in war duration, it applies also when the goal of states is something other than security. In this world states may be greedy or "acquire more arms not because they misperceive the security efforts of other benign states but because aggressive states truly wish to harm them" (Schweller 1996: 104).

3. BOUNDED LEARNING THEORY

3.1. Introduction

Both Jervis (1978) and Van Evera (1999) have argued that offense dominance is associated with shorter war duration. The hypothesis is based on the offense-defense theorists' general assumption that offense dominance, which makes attacking easier than defending, also makes one side defeat the other faster than when defense is dominant. This hypothesis was not corroborated in the hazard analyses, however. The possibility that wars can be long when offense has the advantage is an alternative neglected by the offense-defense theory. It runs counter to offense-defense theorists' "common sense" assumption of swift and decisive warfare enabled by offensive weapons technology.

This assumption does not, however, take into account the limitations to offense dominance and the problems of finding a mutually acceptable negotiation solution. In this chapter I proceed to a theoretic examination of the possibility of long wars especially when offense is dominant by considering these limitations and problems. As both realism and history indicate that purposefully creating defense dominance is bound to fail, we must explore a new theoretical approach for understanding how the risk of war can be diminished. I believe that a better understanding of war duration, provided by the bounded learning theory, and its consequences for state security is a fruitful approach.

Many offense-defense theorists categorize different time periods in the state system as offense or defense dominant. Inevitably, many cases of war are coded incorrectly if such a system level measure is used. Even if military technology and tactics spread in the international state system, states have in practice both varying access to them and ability to use them. In contrast, dyad level theory and analysis enables us to study the warring states' actual battlefield performance and interactions. It allows us to analyze how actual ability to use offensive military factors, together with other variables, affects states' expected offensive ability and expected utility calculations.

Logically, the prerequisite for long wars is that neither side of the conflict succeeds in swiftly breaking the opponent's military capabilities. Beyond this hanging-on power, there must also be something that prevents

the conclusion of a peace treaty in the absence of a complete military victory. In effect, both sides must feel that they are entitled to a better deal than the opponent is willing to agree to, and thus their war aims do not match. When these two conditions coexist, we are faced with a higher probability of increased war duration.

Rational choice can be used to clarify this process. Rational choice continues to be one of the most intriguing analytical approaches used by students of international relations and has dominated the analysis of war duration. It consists of two basic elements. In the initial normative assumption, the actors' goals are specified and the cost efficient road to realizing them is spelled out. By relying on such a rational choice foundation, I view states as expected utility maximizers. In the context of war initiation, it means that a state will calculate its expected utility of warfare by weighing its utility for each possible outcome by the probability of that outcome occurring and then subtracting the expected costs of war (Morrow 1988: 88). All actors have desires, such as winning a war, and resources that can be used for realizing the desires. Thus, they "are engaging in rational behavior by choosing a strategy that maximizes their expected utility, weighing the costs, the benefits and the risks involved" (Laver 1997: 22).

In my application of the rational choice perspective, decision-makers are expected to seek to emerge from war with the largest gains and smallest costs possible. Thus, decisions about war and peace are made based on the prospects of accruing benefits and the prospect of accepting more costs (Stam 1996: 28). For example, an expectation of a long war with an uncertain outcome entails the costs of the loss of human lives and the economic burden. Perhaps even the moral burden of making war will weigh more heavily and increase the costs if a long militarized conflict is expected. Under these circumstances, considering a negotiated solution can be rational. An expected, swift victory in turn often entails more gains as compared to the often high costs of a long war: the nation does not need to be mobilized for a long time, valuable territory can be acquired and the enemy can be forced to pay war reparations and become weakened.

In the second descriptive or explanatory assumption of rational choice, actors are expected to be rational such that they choose the most rational way to reach their goal. Still, critics have argued that rational choice has not succeeded in providing a compelling explanation of reality (Tversky and Kahneman 1990): people simply do not always seem to formulate rational goals or follow the most rational way of pursuing their preferred goal. Nevertheless, expected utility calculations are always made on the basis of

available information and cognitive abilities rather than on some abstract perfect rationality, as the theory of bounded rationality holds (Simon 1957). Also, if new variables are incorporated into the analysis, as I will do in this chapter by formulating the bounded learning theory, deviations from perfect rationality can be explained. Nevertheless, decision-makers are rational in the sense that they make deliberate choices and prefer fewer costs to greater costs and greater benefits to fewer benefits (Stam 1996: 28).

Rational models have highlighted the role of cost-benefit calculations (Wright 1965b; Porsholt 1966; Fox 1970; Wittman 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Pillar 1983; Iklé 1991). As stated by an ideal rational choice approach, the answer to the problem of creating peace is clear. According to what Goemans (2000: 27) calls the strategic learning theory, events on the battlefield reveal information about the belligerents' strength and resolve that changes the expected costs and results of war, which in turn opens up a bargaining space as the minimum demands (war aims) of both sides start to converge.¹⁷ This can also be called the theory of endogenous war duration, as events endogenous to the war (battlefield events) cause states to update their beliefs (Slantchev 2004: 815).¹⁸ Fearon argues that, while a mutually agreeable bargaining solution always exists, private information about relative capabilities and resolve and incentives to misrepresent it lead to a mismatch of demands that gives rise to war (1995: 393). The strategic learning theory however predicts that, over time, combatants must reach an agreement on their relative strength and resolve because "the mechanisms that prevent such agreement before war cannot survive prolonged fighting. Indeed, war may be the only way to credibly reveal private information" (Goemans 2000: 30).

Deviating from the rational choice approach that assumes easy information flow and processing, Slantchev argues that uncertainty about the enemy's strength and resolve makes the informational problem more se-

¹⁷We assume that decision-makers are rational as they can rank preferences over outcomes. War is ex-post inefficient, i.e. states are better off avoiding war since fighting entails costs. Thus, if the enemy is not quickly overrun, bargaining is used in order to reach a peace treaty with higher utility than fighting. Decision-makers are strategic and therefore realize that they cannot always reach their most preferred outcome. Instead, they try to obtain the best outcome possible. Thus, minimum demands, rather than maximum wishes, determine the bargaining space.

¹⁸See also Wagner (2000) and Filson and Werner (2002) for recent formal models where war itself provides the information necessary for the combatants to reach a settlement.

vere and therefore prolongs the process of finding a mutually acceptable negotiation solution. He uses parity in the combatants' capabilities as a proxy for uncertainty. Still, he admits the weakness of this operational definition, as when forces are evenly matched, war can be long simply because neither side can defeat the other (2004: 816). Thus, uncertainty is difficult to measure and its effect on war duration hard to test. Assuming that the information flow works fast during wars, Goemans explains long war duration by arguing that semi-repressive leaders do not care whether they lose moderately or disastrously, even in the face of a looming defeat. Wars can therefore continue even when negative battlefield information ought to prompt a state to lower its war aims so that peace becomes possible (2000: 37).

I will also seek to solve the puzzle of long war duration by arguing that battlefield events is not the only factor that affects the decision-makers' expected utility calculations. However, rather than directing attention to uncertainty measured by parity in capabilities (Slantchev 2004) or the type of government (Goemans 2000), I will consider how expansive ideology and asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity prolong the process of the creation of a bargaining space. Thus the combatants do not learn about the expected utility of continuing the war based merely on their observations of the current battlefield events. In analyzing who wins wars, Stam (1996: 44) criticized earlier researchers (Blainey 1973; Bueno de Mesquita 1981) for specifying a state's probability of winning as one minus the probability of the enemy's probability of winning. In this study the incorporation of factors, such as ideas and asymmetric information, delaying combatants' ability to draw vital lessons about relative strength and resolve from battlefield events and making them over-appreciate their probability of winning, is a theoretical improvement of such simple rational choice approaches. Thus, the sum of the combatants' expected probabilities of winning often amounts to more than one.

The offense-defense balance can be defined as whether it is easier to attack or to defend territory (Jervis 1978: 178), or as the cost ratio of the forces required to take territory to the cost of the defender's forces (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998: 46). The implications of both definitions are the same: if attacking is easier, the defender must invest more in defensive forces to offset the attacker's investment in offensive forces. Military factors are offense dominant if technology and tactics make attacking relatively easier than defending, other things being equal. Yet, it is beliefs and expectations that affect state behavior, such as decisions to end or continue

fighting. Therefore, I will focus on expected ability to use offensive military factors.

High expected ability can prompt a state to continue a war even if current successes on the battlefield are scant. Expected ability can be the result of current ability, but other factors such as expansive ideology and information about future offensive capacity can also affect it. It can thus often be based on a misperception. Even if they may sometimes overlap, expected ability is not the same as what some offense-defense theorists call the perceived offense-defense balance, which often refers to system-wide beliefs during some time period (Van Evera 1999), but is a state's expectations of future ability during a specific war. An emphasis on the dyad level helps to focus on specific wars rather than system-wide technological innovations whose effect on many wars can often be disputed. It makes it not only easier to analyze whether the states actually have access to offense dominant weapons technology and can use it without limitations, but also reveals what expectations the states have when deciding to end or continue a war.

Expected utility calculations are central to an analysis of a decision to end or continue a war. The expected value of an action equals the sum of the products of the probabilities (p) and values for each possible outcome (u) minus the cost of action (c): $[p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c]$. Bargaining space refers to any agreement that the belligerents prefer to fighting. For example, we can simply assume that the spoils of war that the belligerents vie for amount to \$100. We set the cost of warfare for a state at \$10. If the probability of winning is 0.5, the utility of winning \$100, the probability of losing 0.5 and the utility of losing \$ 0, then the expected utility of continued warfare is $(0.5 \cdot \$100 + 0.5 \cdot \$0 - \$10) = \40 . Thus, a combatant should be willing to accept any bargain that promises to pay over \$40. If also the other state calculates its expected utility of continuing the war so that it can accept a share that is less than \$60, the hundred dollar bill can be shared and a bargaining space has been created. Since fighting is costly, a bargaining space should always exist as Fearon argues (1995). However, delayed learning from the battlefield events can create such high expected utilities of continued warfare that the bargaining space does not come into being.

The bounded learning theory expects learning from battlefield events to be quick when no factors interrupt the process predicted by the strategic learning theory. As a bargaining space is then swiftly created, wars are short because the expected utility of continued warfare is lower than that of

accepting a bargaining solution. Long wars are the result of slower learning about relative strength and resolve from the belligerents' battlefield performance. The term "bounded" not only suggests here that there are cognitive limitations to making expected utility calculations as in "bounded rationality" (Simon 1957). The term refers to how both asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information on expected offensive capacity can hamper the process of learning from the current battlefield events, thus diminishing the prospects of reaching a negotiated solution. In short, as the combatants neglect or misinterpret the battlefield events, they can create calculations of future battlefield performance and prospects of victory that do not reflect the current offensive capacity and are not reasonable to or known by the enemy.

The concept of learning has recently been used to explain the end of the Cold War. For example, Bennett (2005) argues that the Soviet leaders had learned from previous military interventions that the use of force entails high costs. Thus, the unification of Germany was not prevented with a threat of force. Nye (1987: 380) distinguishes "simple learning" from "complex learning" which resemble Haas's (1990: 23-34) "adaptation" and "learning". Complex learning and learning entail the formulation of new goals, priorities and interests as a result of new information about reality. Simple learning and adaptation suggest that new information is merely used to adapt the means for reaching the old goals. The analytical perspective used in this study is "simple learning" or "adaptation". Scholars have argued that as decision-makers learn from history, such as previous crises, they have a tendency to use analogical reasoning and overgeneralize, which leads to deviations from rational decision-making when new circumstances emerge (Jervis 1976: 228). However, the focus of this study is on a more narrow time perspective, as decision-makers observe battlefield events and seek to evaluate their own and the enemy's ability to use offensive military factors in an effort to adjust their war aims so that they reflect the belligerents' relative strength and resolve.

The depth of change as a result of learning from battlefield events is not as profound as in complex learning because the states hold on to their basic aim of emerging from war with the largest gains and smallest costs possible. Beliefs about the appropriateness of ends of action do not change. Only the bargaining tactics, as they are reflected in the size of the minimum demands (war aims), change. This is not to say that complex learning is impossible. For example, Nye (1987) finds that changes in the beliefs about the usability of nuclear weapons allowed cooperation in strategic

arms control and nuclear non-proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, belligerents could change their beliefs about the appropriateness of the use of some weapons and military tactics during a war. Such learning is however beyond the scope of this study.

I will now analyze four theoretical cases with the expected utility perspective: short and long war duration when offense and defense are dominant. The bounded learning theory does not expect that the systemic offense-defense balance has an effect on war duration, as what matters more is the combatants' actual ability to use offensive military factors on the battlefield and possible stronger beliefs about expected offensive capacity due to asymmetric causal beliefs and information. Yet, because of the offense-defense theorists' opposite expectations, I will structure the rest of the chapter so that I can explain war duration when both offense and defense have the advantage. Long war duration when the balance favors offensive operations will take up most of the text for the simple reason that it is the most interesting and controversial case, as it runs counter to the assumptions of the systemic offense-defense theorists (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999).

3.2. Short War Duration when Offense is Dominant

Classically, offensive military technology and tactics are associated with images of *Blitzkrieg* – mobility and armor allowing the aggressor to quickly overrun the defenses. To the credit of the offense-defense theorists, these images are sometimes true, as is shown by the Germans overrunning the French defenses during WWII, the Israelis overpowering neighboring Arab states during the Six Day War, or the USA with allies ousting Saddam Hussein from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. Yet many of the extremely short wars are asymmetric cases, where one side is much larger or has had a remarkable superiority in access to and ability to make use of offensive military factors, resulting in a swift military collapse of the opponent.

Offense dominant wars can be short even in symmetric cases. Then, either offense dominance is so total that the ease of attacking ensures a swift victory or the battlefield events soon reveal information about relative strength so that a mutually acceptable bargaining solution is reached. In the latter case, the expected utility of continuing the war, $[p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c]$, becomes low enough if the combatants adjust their war aims so that they reflect their actual probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, and/or have a low utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, because of low

stakes. Since war is costly, a mutually acceptable solution that the belligerents prefer to fighting, i.e. bargaining space, should always exist and, assuming swift learning from the battlefield events, not take a long time to discover when the alternative is bearing the costs of continued warfare, as indicated by (c). As the combatants' actual battlefield performance helps them to find out their relative strength and resolve, they adjust their war aims accordingly. If the enemy is perceived to be stronger, the war aims are lowered, and vice versa. Soon, the expected utility of continuing the war becomes lower than the expected utility of agreeing to the enemy's minimum demands, and peace can be made.

A greater puzzle is to explain deviations from the expectations of the offense-defense theorists (that the enemy is quickly overrun) and the strategic learning theory (that both sides quickly learn from battlefield events): how can wars be long when offense has the advantage? According to the bounded learning theory, the answer lies in the often limited nature of offense dominance and fact that warfare does not always follow the baseline rationality of simple rational choice theorizing. It often involves other factors such as expansive ideology and offensive expectations that contribute to the miscalculations and wishful thinking that easily arise in the mist of war, where man's cognitive resources often prove to be limited or are overrun.

3.3. Long War Duration when Offense is Dominant

Rapid troop movements and forces quickly driving wedges through enemy lines may create a picture of a short and decisive military campaigns. But, on average, wars are longer than expected by the offense-defense theorists when offense is dominant, as was shown by the hazard analyses in chapter one. Explaining long war duration when offensive military factors dominate is a major challenge since it seems not only to run counter to the offense-defense theorists' (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999) hypothesis but also to violate common sense: why are wars not shorter when attacking is easier than defending? Should not a swift victory be possible with the help of offense dominant weapons? If a swift victory does not materialize, should not the belligerents at least use the battlefield information to swiftly agree on their relative strength and the terms of peace, as the strategic learning theory predicts?

There are two preconditions for long war duration when offensive military factors dominate. First, the offensive potential must be constrained such that a swift decisive breakthrough is less likely. Offense dominance

is never absolute in the sense that offensive weapons systems and tactics would always incapacitate the enemy and guarantee a swift victory.¹⁹ Second, we will understand the difficulty of the ensuing peace negotiations if we consider how expansive ideology (asymmetric information and offensive stakes) and asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity can raise the expected utility of continuing the war even when offensive capacity is currently lacking. I will first discuss limitations to offensive potential because, without them, there would be no negotiations to analyze: if offense dominance is absolute, initiating a war would always result in the aggressor swiftly defeating the enemy.

3.3.1. Limitations to Offensive Potential

Offensive advantage has never been absolute and is often overrated. Incorrectly expecting that offense dominance would on average lead to swifter wars, Jervis (1978) and other offense-defense theorists overestimate its impact on the course of wars, as shown by the hazard analyses in chapter one. It is seldom as awe-inspiring as some of the most striking blitz campaigns of modern times would indicate. For example, during the Six Day War of 1967 and the Kuwait War of 1991, the efficiency of the victorious offensives was not only a result of the use of offense dominant weapons systems such as tanks and aircraft. It was also largely aided by the inferior military ability and motivation of the opponents or by asymmetries in the size of the fighting forces. Neither Iraq nor the other Arab states could equal the military proficiency of the Israeli and US military forces. Thus, it would be misleading to infer that offensive weapons and tactics *per se* had been developed to a level where they would always, irrespective of the enemy, guarantee absolute offense dominance and swift victories.

Asymmetric cases notwithstanding, some states have an interest in pursuing aggressive foreign policies and developments in military technology and doctrine that continue to push toward increased offense dominance.

¹⁹Unless offense dominance is so strong that the enemy is swiftly overrun before it can react militarily, mobile offensive weapons can also be used for strategic defense in a tactical counter offensive. This is an additional reason why the enemy is not easily defeated and the length of many wars is decided at the bargaining table even when offense is dominant. I believed that the offense-defense balance (the relative ease of attack and defense) is best understood as a tactical rather than strategic variable even if offense defense theorists concentrate on its effect at the strategic level (decisions to start wars). The relative ease of offensive maneuvers does not always guarantee the success of an offensive strategy and offensive tactics can be part of a successful defensive strategy in the form of active defense.

For example, during WWI, the stalemate in the trench warfare was alleviated by the introduction of chemical weapons and tanks. Similarly, during WWII, the tanks' armor, firepower, mobility and tactics were considerably improved to enable swift operation across the lines of defense. Aircraft with more speed and firepower and nuclear weapons were also introduced to hasten the process of incapacitating the enemy. However, while human ingenuity often seems to place fewer limits on the development of offensive weapons systems, international law and morality often raise states' threshold for using the most destructive ones. And weather, seasons and terrain place limits on the use of mobile armored vehicles, which are often essential to offense dominant warfare. For example, in Vietnam, armored vehicles had to be replaced by foot soldiers to be able to gain and hold on to territory. Similarly, in Iraq, armored vehicles cannot secure urban areas as efficiently as foot soldiers.

Mobile offensive warfare also often encounters technological limitations, overstretched supply lines and other logistical problems. The most striking example is the failure of the German *Blitzkrieg* during operation Barbarossa to deliver a decisive blow to the Red Army. Instead, the Soviets could absorb *Wehrmacht's* attack with strategic depth made possible by their large territory and caused the German supply lines to be overstretched. During the Korean War, the US even simulated a nuclear attack against North Korea but found that it was arduous to discover troop concentrations in time for the nuclear option to be efficient (Schnabel et al. 1979: v, 614).

These limitations clearly increase the opponent's hanging-on power and make long war duration possible. They mostly hamper offensive campaigns more than defensive ones because mobility calls for better technology and a lack of hindrances if the offensive is to proceed quickly. The impact of these limitations has sometimes been underestimated by both the decision-makers and the offense-defense theorists. In reality, terrain, climate, weather, technology and even norms pose different challenges in different places.

To better understand these limitations to offensive potential, even when attacking is still relatively easier than defending, I will use three categories: permanent, temporary and institutional factors. Permanent factors refer to the technological developments and training of troops, temporary factors to weather and climate, and institutional factors to norms and state structures. The idea that military capacity is limited by various factors is not new. For example, Bennett and Stam (1996) hypothesize that terrain


affects the length of wars. Keegan (2003) also mentions in *The History of Warfare* how, for example, climate and technology have impacted the location and course of many wars.

Yet, how the factors limiting offensive potential relate to each other is analytically significant. If permanent factors decrease the offensive capacity, temporary factors can neutralize this effect and still increase the offensive capacity, and vice versa. For example, in open terrain lacking fortifications, no advanced technology or training is usually needed for armies to be able to swiftly gain ground. Rivers in turn have throughout the ages provided great obstacles to advancing armies. In the present day of modern amphibious armor and temporary bridges, however, technological developments have made *Blitzkrieg* over rivers possible. But even advanced technology can meet its match. Even if the development of modern warships can today bring naval battles to even the most desolate parts of the oceans, bad weather can still hamper the effectiveness of such military operations.

If under favorable circumstances both permanent and temporary factors work to increase offense dominance, institutional factors can cancel out the effect. Even if the enemy terrain is welcoming, the weather hospitable and the offensive military technology enables a fast incapacitation of the enemy forces, international law forbidding some modes of warfare, for example, may hinder the attacker from succeeding. The effect of institutional factors in turn cannot be overrun by the permanent and temporary factors. No matter what the terrain or the weather, the use of some weapons or tactics will be limited by the laws of war or by the state's institutional structures. If new weapons and tactics are developed, it is not a question of overcoming old institutional limitations but a matter of making a whole new analysis related to whether or how the new weapons and tactics can be used.

As figure 1 indicates, temporary and permanent factors together lay out the baseline for offensive potential created by the current technological, geographic and climatic conditions. Nevertheless, in any case, all three factors must be considered before the limitations to offensive potential can be assessed, institutional factors being the final arbiter. It does not help that the weather is good if there is not appropriate technology; technology does not help if the troops are poorly trained to use it; and good training is of no use if the technology is not available. And nothing helps if the use of some technology and methods to defeat the enemy is seen as morally wrong. Because of their analytically subordinate place in limiting states' offensive potential, I will begin with permanent and temporary factors.

FIGURE 1. Limitations to Offensive Potential



A. Permanent and Temporary Factors

Well trained soldiers know that wet snow is slippery and treacherous, while colder weather increases snow's traction, as long as deep, powdery snow does not prove to be an obstacle to mobility. Throughout military history, it has been clear that weather and climate have played a crucial role for the course of military campaigns. Weather can sometimes increase the offensive capacity of an army, but weather conditions most often diminish offense dominance. Examples of occasional increasing capacity often include smart military leadership that takes advantage of changes in the weather or private information that can tilt the balance to the attacker's advantage.

Japan's attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was in part enabled by the winter storm that made the detection of the large Japanese fleet arduous. Fortunately for Japan, the weather cleared as soon as the aircraft carriers had reached the waters around Hawaii. Thus, the aircraft had good visibility to drop their bombs on Pearl Harbor and sink a significant part of the US Navy in the Pacific. If these changes in weather increased Japans offensive potential, private information would do the same for the United States on D Day in Normandy. The Germans expected the weather

to be inhospitable for an amphibious landing over the English Channel in early June 1944. Thus, the military preparedness of the defender was relatively low. The British, in turn, had a weather ship positioned in the mid Atlantic giving access to weather information, which indicated that a short break in the depression would permit the invasion of France on June 6. As the Allied invasion fleet set off to France, German commander Rommel was celebrating his wife's birthday in Germany in the belief that the bad weather would make any offensive action impossible (Morison 2001: 84-7; Harrison 1991: 275-6).

The Allies' private information increased the offensive capacity of the invading army, as both aircraft and vessels could operate with clear visibility and without the full resistance expected from the German defenders of the coastline. Without the German unpreparedness, WWII might have taken a different course. Failing to take advantage of the latest weather conditions, the German army was unable to fend off the Allied invasion, which was not running as smoothly as expected. Total offense dominance was lacking, but the defender's lack of information about the weather conditions contributed to the attackers ultimately succeeding in their amphibious operation.

Throughout Western military history, there has been a preference for conducting military operations on open ground. The Greek phalange warfare with heavily armored soldiers called for avoiding the mostly mountainous terrain of Greece (Keegan 2003: 274). Mutual agreement on the site of the battle is often impossible, but open terrain still generally makes offensive warfare more efficient when there are technological limitations to mobility. Similarly, the defender usually prefers a battleground that provides natural hindrance or fortifications. A comparison between the US Army operations in the jungles of Vietnam and in the open deserts of Iraq is illustrative of the great variation that terrain poses to armies' offensive capacity, even in modern warfare.

A significant part of the terrain on our planet is inhospitable to military activity, and fighting wars there often calls for preparedness for extreme vegetation, cold or altitude and severe limitations to mobility. For example, Saddam Hussein did not succeed in subduing the Kurds in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq. During the 1962 war between China and India, radical differences in preparedness for the terrain and weather also impacted the outcome. First, the mountain operations forced the combatants to use tactics on only the battalion and company levels, which makes the use of overwhelming offensive force difficult. Second, the Chinese

People's Army had much more experience and training in mountainous conditions and was better prepared for the cold weather operations than the Indian army, which ultimately granted a victory to Beijing. While the Chinese often outnumbered the Indian troops, this ability to mobilize larger numbers was to a great extent the result of being better prepared for the extreme conditions (Calvin 1984). This Chinese ability to overcome the problems of weather and climate with a better preparedness that improved mobility and logistical support indicates that the effect of permanent factors can be alleviated by temporary factors.

Climate, weather and terrain are permanent factors that affect armies' offensive capacities differently depending on the time and location, making some offense-defense theorists' systemic evaluations of the offense-defense balance prone to fault. Temporary factors that relate to technological development and training are also unevenly distributed among states, and even the most advanced industrial states cannot avoid the limitations they pose. For example, despite the ability to use a change in weather for increased offensive capacity, the Allies' attack on D Day did not proceed as well as planned. While the Allies made good use of their private weather information to find a suitable date for the attack, supplying soldiers with the necessary logistics proved to be such a difficult undertaking that the offensive success depended heavily on the Germans' unpreparedness:

For operations on 7 June five divisions were ashore and operational (although one, the 29th, lacked one of its regiments until later in the day). All of these divisions were seriously deficient in transport, tank support, artillery, and above all supplies. The worst situation was in the V Corps zone where, of 2,400 tons of supplies planned to be unloaded during D Day, only about 100 tons actually came in. Ammunition shortage was grave (Harrison 1993: 336).

Nevertheless, the level of technological development, such as the efficiency of logistical support, and the training of troops are more susceptible to change than are the permanent factors. If the weather continues to pose an obstacle to an army's offensive capacity, technological developments and training can alleviate these problems. Overy writes that "[i]t was Germany's misfortune to be allied in the Second World War with two states whose ability to produce and deploy the new technologies of war was limited in the extreme" (1995: 220). Similarly, "[o]nce the United States brought the weight of its new technology to bear in the Pacific war the contest became very one-sided" (Ibid. 222).

It is no news to recount how the Americans' better command and control structure, precision-guided munitions and night sights made it impossible for the Iraqi defenders to win the war in 2003. Still, it is worth mentioning that even the most advanced army today cannot use its military technology and training and keep up its offensive capacity without oil. Both Germany and Japan strove to conquer strategically important oilfields in an effort to sustain their war efforts during WWII. Hitler sought to take over the Ukrainian oil fields and failed, whereas the Japanese succeeded in taking over the oilfields in Southeast Asia but had a difficult time transporting fuel (Ibid. 228-229).

The German army overextended its supply lines during the 1941 Barbarossa operation into the Soviet Union. Oil supplies were limited and the weather made the logistical tasks a nightmare. With few vehicles capable of forcing their way through the Russian roads in the fall of 1941, the German army soon found itself stuck in the mud. As the very cold winter weather with powdery snow arrived, the combatants' offensive ability remained equally constrained. Chew writes that the "snow cover greatly restricted German mobility" and even constituted "a major obstacle" to any Soviet counter offensive (1981: ch. 3). Both the Germans and the Russians had limited logistical abilities and had to rely on horse-drawn transport in order to survive the winter. Yet the Red Army could keep its soldiers more mobile as it had more ski troops that could move in the snow covered terrain. In addition, the "Russian tanks, especially the T34, KV1, and KV2 were effective even in deep snow because of the wide tracks and good ground clearance. These features gave them a marked advantage..." (Ibid. ch. 3).

On the basis of three case studies of winter warfare, Chew draws the conclusion that only armies that can find appropriate weapons, transport and clothing can sustain the offensive advantage (Ibid. ch. 4). The task is not an easy one even for the most technologically advanced states today. Well trained specialized troops often find it possible to operate in very inhospitable terrain and weather without logistical support. But mobilizing larger contingents, which are necessary for achieving swift and decisive victories, and resupplying them remains a major logistical problem despite today's technological advances.

Thus, even if temporary factors (technology and training) hold the potential to neutralize permanent factors (weather, climate, terrain), they do not always do so today. Further, not all battles are fought in open terrain where even modest technology and training can keep up the momentum of

an attack. This means that, despite the expectations of the offense-defense theorists (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999), many offensives do not end in a quick collapse of the enemy. Even though it can be argued that technological advances increasingly alleviate the problems posed by weather, climate and terrain, a third factor beyond technology and material conditions remains with the capacity to reduce offense dominance.

B. Institutional Factors

During WWII, the US successfully used nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in an effort to hasten the surrender of Japan. Their use brought Japan to its knees and most likely shortened the war duration. Why have nuclear weapons not been used as the most obvious and efficient offensive weapon since the last World War?²⁰ A widely accepted answer is deterrence, but it does not suffice to explain non-use in dyads, where only one side has nuclear weapons. Also, why have chemical and biological weapons not been widely used since WWI? The answer to these questions can be looked for in institutional factors that include international law, norms and the institutional structures of states. Even when the permanent and temporary factors increase an army's offensive potential, institutional factors can diminish or neutralize it.

If there are no normative limitations to the use of nuclear weapons and the enemy has no counterstrike potential, nuclear weapons would then be very efficient military hardware of offensive warfare. A good way to analyze the impact of norms on this offensive potential is to briefly discuss the general deterrence theory. The general deterrence theory holds that a state should refrain from starting a war against a nuclear adversary due to the fear of nuclear retaliation (Huth and Russett 1993: 61-73). It is the massive destructive potential of the nuclear weapons and the inability of the defender to limit the damage that lay the foundation for this fear. The fear is further strengthened when states leave the possibility of nuclear retaliation to chance and thus assume that they do not have full collective control over the turn of events (Schelling 1980: 187-203).

²⁰Lebovic argues that “the superiority of the offense seems clear when nuclear weapons are involved” and many analysts believed that the Soviet Union could use its offensive nuclear capabilities to “preempt even if its survival was not imperiled” (2009: 398). While the Soviets talked of “nuclear fighting”, in 1977 the US Presidential Directive, PD-18, also represented a major step toward prescribing a nuclear war-waging capability (Young and Kent 2004: 477).

Thus, the general deterrence theory assumes that there are no normative limitations to the use of nuclear weapons. Several critics have questioned the validity of this assumption, however. Organski and Kugler (1980: 158-161) argue that the expectation that states will be more cautious because of the existence of nuclear weapons is still unproven. In a study of 393 crises, Geller (1990) discovered that non-nuclear states were not deterred by nuclear states and Huth and Russett (1988: 38) argue that in many cases the massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons has restrained states from using them owing to normative inhibitions. This normative inhibition – viewing the use of nuclear weapons as morally wrong – has been called the “nuclear taboo” (Tannenwald 1999; Paul 1995). The existence of these inhibitions has also been recognized by some deterrence theorists (Schelling 1994; Quester 1991).

Tannenwald finds two normative²¹ effects that contribute to limiting the possibility of states using their nuclear weapons in times of war. “The regulative effect of the taboo is the injunction against using nuclear weapons first” (1999: 437). The constitutive effect is part of the centuries old discourse about the identity of a civilized state. “One of the requirements for being a civilized state is participation in the regulation of warfare” (Ibid. 437) including the non-use of nuclear weapons.

This nuclear taboo is a significant limitation to offensive potential, especially in conflicts where only one side has nuclear capabilities. According to the general deterrence theory, there should be nothing to prevent the nuclear state from using its nuclear weapons to swiftly win a war if conventional weapons do not suffice. And yet there have been several cases of non-nuclear states overlooking this expectation of fear and initiating hostilities against nuclear states. China intervened in the Korean War against the US in 1950. Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973. Argentina occupied the British Falkland Islands in 1982, and Iraq attacked Israel in 1991.

Similarly, nuclear states that attack non-nuclear states should be able to blackmail them to unconditional surrender without the non-nuclear states being able to resist. This has not been the case, however. For example, the US waged a long war against North Vietnam, where this non-nuclear party offered heavy resistance without a fear of the US nuclear arsenal. During WWII, the US opted for the nuclear alternative in an effort to inflict such horrific civilian casualties that the occupation of Japan would not require more American casualties. Since then we have not had such cases

²¹Norms refer here to shared expectations about proper behavior.

of stretching moral limitations, however, even when the use of nuclear weapons could have guaranteed a victory in both Korea and Vietnam.

In effect, it is possible that moral confines place the least amount of restrictions on leaders during world wars, where the future leadership of the new world order is at stake. We can also expect that conflicts in which state existence is at stake can cause moral restrictions to wane. Yet a nuclear state that engages in a military offensive seldom does so for the sake of survival. Thus, unless we have an extreme case of preemptive strike that calls for the use of weapons of mass destruction, the survival logic does not apply and normative restrictions still diminish the offensive potential.

Chemical weapons can also be used as an efficient offensive weapon, as was shown by their ability to at times break the defense dominant trench warfare during WWI. Yet the use of chemical weapons has been limited by norms codified in international law. The list of weapons that have been banned by international law has increased since the 19th century when the age of industrial production gave rise to ever more efficient weapons of offensive war. Even if international law limits the use of most cruel weapons, the codification of the various legal paragraphs is always contested by some parties. For example, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT). The Convention on Cluster Munitions has also been opposed by the United States, Israel, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Brazil. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, international law functions to limit the offensive potential of some of the weapons systems by codifying and spreading normative inhibitions to their use.

Chemical weapons have been easier to manufacture than nuclear weapons and have therefore been available to a wider variety of international actors since WWI. Still, we can observe that the use of chemical weapons since WWI has mainly been limited to non-democratic states. Kant argued in *The Perpetual Peace* (1795/1981) that if citizens were presented with the option of choosing between making war or staying at peace, they would choose the latter due to the immense costs of warfare. While Kant wrote of republics, his institutional logic is the precursor of the democratic peace theory. Democratic controls of the executive branch's actions in times of war can allow both possible normative sentiments and cost-benefit calculations among the wider domestic public to restrain the leadership from using chemical weapons.

The United Kingdom did use chemical weapons against Germany during WWI, but only after Germany initiated the attacks and neglected

or accepted the risk of British retaliation in kind. Yet several cases of the use of chemical weapons by non-democracies have been reported since WWI. In 1925 Spain allegedly used mustard gas in Morocco during the War of the Rif. During the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-36, Italy also used the same substance in an effort to subdue the Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie. In the mid 1960s, the United Arab Republic (UAR) intervened in the Yemeni Civil War. The UAR allegedly used mustard gas against the republican factions of the Yemen Arab Republic in North Yemen. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq sought to gain an offensive advantage with the help of chemical weapons when the initial offensive had come to a halt. Lacking audience costs, Saddam Hussein also thought that chemical weapons were a handy tool for suppressing a domestic uprising among the Kurds. Thus, it seems that lack of democracy, which alleviates the normative constraints, is an important factor if we are to expect that chemical weapons can be used as offensive weapons.

In sum, permanent, temporary and institutional factors have limited the offensive capacity of states in a manner that explains why the systemic classification of offense-defense balance (Van Evera 1998; Quester 1977; Adams 2003-2004; Jervis 1978) failed the test of hazard analysis. Offense dominance is simply seldom so absolute that it would always result in an attacker swiftly overrunning the defender. While permanent factors such as terrain, weather and climatic conditions often limit states' offensive capacity, temporary factors such as technological development and training have not been able to completely neutralize their effect. And, even if technology in the form of nuclear and chemical weapons, for example, were able to do so, institutional factors remain to place limitations on their use for offensive purposes. Unless offense dominance is so strong that the enemy is swiftly overrun before it can react militarily, mobile offensive weapons can also be used for strategic defense in a tactical counter offensive. However, lacking fortifications, holding newly acquired territory becomes increasingly difficult when attacking is relatively easier than defending.

Since these limitations to offensive potential continue to make it unlikely that offense dominance is so strong that an aggression would often result in a swift collapse of the defender, other things being equal, we are better off looking for the causes of war duration in the ensuing process of negotiations. Still, the question remains: if warfare is costly and neither side seems likely to win swiftly, why do not battlefield events always prompt the belligerents to adjust their war aims so that they become mutually acceptable? I argue that the states' ability to reach a swift negotiated

solution is affected by the expectations and war aims created by expansive ideology (offensive stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs) and asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity.

3.3.2. Expected Ability to Use Offensive Military Factors and Stakes

I have argued that offense dominance cannot be absolute if a war is to last long: there must be some limitations to the offensive potential such that a swift and decisive breakthrough becomes less likely as the aggressor launches its military campaign. I divided the factors limiting offense dominance into permanent, temporary and institutional categories. However, these limitations are merely a precondition for prolonged military contestations. Despite the limitations, the decision-makers should still be able to observe their and the enemy's battlefield performance and, with simple rational choice logic, adjust their war aims so that they reflect their relative strength and a bargaining space (a mutually acceptable bargaining solution) can be created. Nevertheless, the bounded learning theory holds that this is not always the case.

Since warfare is costly, a mutually acceptable negotiated solution should always exist from a simple rational choice perspective. Fearon (1995) argues that the expected utility of coming to an agreement on the terms of peace should be higher than that of starting a war. The same logic can be applied to continuing fighting during a war. While Fearon holds that wars start because of disagreements caused by private information about strength and resolve, Goemans (2000: 30) argues that, once wars are started, battlefield events will credibly reveal such information. This revelation of information ought to make agreement on the terms of peace increasingly likely. Poor ability to use offensive military technology and tactics should lead decision-makers to lower their war aims, and improved ability should give rise to higher aims. Thus, the warring parties should be able to agree on the expected outcome of the war and adjust their war aims so that a mutually agreeable bargaining solution is reached.

Since Goemans believes that battlefield events reveal private information, he suggests that we should look at the type of government in order to understand its expected utility calculations and explain long war duration (2000: 37). He argues that the utility of losing is low for semi-repressive regimes because of the decision-makers' risk of imprisonment and even death. Thus, when losing, and aware of the lower probability of winning, they raise their war aims in order to cover the cost of warfare (2000: 52). Contrary to Goemans, I argue that warfare does not always reveal infor-

mation, as something must hamper the process of learning from battlefield events. In other words, if a war is to continue for a long period of time, decision-makers must have higher expectations of their own future offensive ability than the enemy knows of or agrees with by looking at the battlefield events. There is thus asymmetric information or asymmetric causal beliefs. High stakes can also play an important role for states' expected utility calculations, further making peacemaking a more protracted process.

Asymmetric information and causal beliefs relating to expectations of defensive ability can also make the finding of a bargaining space difficult, especially if the attacker has simultaneously overestimated its expected offensive ability. However, I will concentrate the analysis on expectations of offensive capacity because long war duration contradicts the offense-defense theorists' (Jervis 1978 and Van Evera 1999) expectations when offense is dominant. And at least one combatant must have a high expected ability to attack for the war to continue. If both are on the defense, the war will *de facto* end in the absence of battles. Further, if one state has overestimated its expectations of defensive ability, despite opposing evidence on the battlefield, the war is likely to end not in a negotiated solution but in the state being overrun.

In relative terms, the offensive capacity of the attacker should be the mirror image of the defender's defensive capacity. With high expectations of future offensive capacity, however, the war aims are not likely to match. If the "sum" of both sides' war aims is higher than the "sum" of their battlefield performance, at least one side in the war has high expectations and war aims that are not justified by its current battlefield performance. In effect, a bargaining space is not created and a peace treaty will be out of reach until at least one side lowers its war aims. According to the bounded learning theory, these increases in expected offensive ability, beyond the effect of current battlefield performance, depend mainly on two factors: asymmetric information and asymmetric causal beliefs. In addition to the expected offensive ability, the expected utility of the outcome (stakes) plays an important role in states' expected utility calculations of whether to continue fighting.

A. Asymmetric Information

It is straightforward that a state exhibiting high military prowess in attacking believes that it will ultimately prevail in the war and thus raises its war aims. For example, it is understandable that Hitler had high war aims during WWII when the battlefield events were extremely favorable

to Germany during the early stages of the war. In calculating the expected utility of continuing the war, we consider the probability (p) and utility (u) of winning and losing and subtract the cost of fighting (c). A high expected yield of emerging victorious increases the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, and current offensive successes, which justify high future expectations of victory, raise the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, and lower the probability of losing, $p(\text{loss})$. In effect, if a state has high offensive capacity, it will raise its war aims and is likely to have a high expected utility of continuing the war [$p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c$].

Yet, whether the expected utility of continuing the war is higher than the expected utility for making peace ultimately depends on whether the combatants adjust their war aims so that a bargaining space – a mutually acceptable negotiation solution – emerges. If the decision-makers on both sides of the war adjust their offensive and defensive expectations based on their current battlefield performance, the stronger side's high war aims would not be seen as unrealistic by the weaker opponent. Thus both sides change their war aims to a mutually acceptable level, and a bargaining space will soon emerge, as the strategic learning theory predicts. Both sides then have a higher expected utility of accepting the enemy's demands than of continuing the war. Still, a problem emerges when quick learning does not materialize and at least one side in the conflict does not adjust its expectations of $p(\text{win})$ and $p(\text{loss})$ according to the states' current battlefield performance.

Higher offensive expectations and concomitant high war aims that do not reflect current battlefield performance can be the result of expected reinforcements or an introduction of new offense dominant military technology and tactics on the battlefield. During WWII, both sides put their hopes in the creation of critical weapons technology that would tilt the balance in their favor. In addition, after the United States joined the war, the Allies had reason to expect that their superior economic production would prove decisive for the outcome. Thus, the Allies kept their war aims high and acquiescing to the control of Hitler over Europe was out of the question despite Hitler's initial offensive successes. Ultimately, the Allies were more correct in their expectations of high future technological and economic performance, which decided the outcome of the war (Overy 1995).

The inherent problem with these expectations of increasing offensive capacity is that they are often asymmetric – either private or not credible in the eyes of the enemy. If both sides could agree on how their offensive capacity would improve during the course of the war, they would also be able to arrive at a mutually acceptable bargaining solution that considers these

expected improvements and their effect on the expected outcome of the war. However, for the most part, a state has no interest in revealing what offensive technology or tactics it expects to use in future battles. Without secrecy, the prospects of succeeding in offensive operations dramatically diminish. While the enemy also seeks to evaluate both sides' future offensive capacity, it often lacks this private information and has to base its estimates on current battlefield performance and other intelligence sources.

Expectations of future increases in offensive capacity are sometimes not private information. Yet there is no certainty that the enemy will agree that these expectations are realistic, especially if it suspects that they are mere wishful thinking or a bluff for the sake of getting a better deal at the negotiation table. There are clearly incentives to misrepresent information about relative capabilities in bargaining situations (Fearon 1995: 381). If a state expects its offensive tactics to improve and new offensive weapons to be introduced, it will have war aims that are higher than the battlefield events would justify. If these war aims are based on asymmetric information – unknown or contested by the enemy – it will result in disagreement over whether the war aims are justified. In effect, a mutually agreeable bargaining solution cannot be reached. As at least the decision-making elite in one state raises its war aims to a level deemed unrealistic by the enemy, both sides have a higher expected utility of continuing the war than of accepting the enemy's demands, and a bargaining space is not created. Thus, it is not the actual material capacity but beliefs and perceptions of the future that impact states' behavior and calculations of the probability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, and the expected utility of continuing the war.

Sometimes the expectations of increasing offensive potential are realistic. Sometimes they are mere wishful thinking. When the new troops or technology finally become available, a common ground for judging the combatants' relative strength emerges anew and the war aims should soon again reflect their current battlefield performance. If they do not, something else beyond the asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive capacity has delayed learning from the current battlefield events. For example, during WWII, Hitler did not learn as quickly from battlefield events as the strategic learning theory predicts. He did not lower his war aims as the war started to go awry, even after new offensive technology was introduced. Instead the war would have to end through a long process of subduing Germany's military and economic potential. I believe that the missing variable capable of explaining such delays in learning is expansive ideology. Simple rational choice models, such as the strategic

learning theory, assume that battlefield events swiftly reveal information about relative capabilities but do not take into account that the belligerents can have asymmetric causal beliefs. The impact of high offensive stakes can also be crucial to states' expected utility calculations.

B. Expansive Ideology

Since the emergence of Napoleon's citizens' army in the late 18th century, few states have afforded to fight wars without increasing the military's fighting potential and the nation's endurance with the factor of nationalism (Posen 1993). Similarly, religious sentiments throughout the ages have often played a crucial role in protracted military contestations such as the Thirty Years' War of 1618-48. Several of the enduring conflicts that we have observed in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka have been boosted by both religious and nationalist sentiments. And, during the Cold War, even political ideology became a factor to be considered when the superpowers fought several proxy wars.

It would therefore be unwise to dismiss the potential effect of ideology on war duration. Ideologies are sets of beliefs and ideas applied to public matters. This definition of ideology is so broad that it encompasses not only common political ideologies, such as socialism or conservatism, but also nationalism (Breuilly 1993: 2) and even some aspects of religion that relate to the public sphere. Geller (1995: 2) argues that "[n]ationalism feeds on cultural differences... [and] turns them into a principle of political loyalty..." Religion can also be seen as an ideology when it leaves the private sphere and starts to guide domestic politics or foreign policy goals and interests. While religion is often regarded as relating to the private sphere in Western democracies, religious ideas can also influence states' foreign policies indirectly through morality or directly by advocating, for example, territorial goals.

The subject has attracted researchers' interest. Against the materialist understanding, Ikenberry (1993) and Jackson (1993) have shown that ideas sometimes shape interests. Destler (1972: 56) also argues that "goals are based on value preferences as well as rational analysis." Thus, it is not only factors such as geopolitical position or economic growth that determine the foreign policy goals of states but also ideas (Holsti 1988, 1970; Hunt 1988; Jönsson 1984: 42-43; Little and Smith 1988). Especially the role of ideas for the ending of the Cold War has recently been much studied (Checkel 1997; English 2000; Tannenwald and Wohlforth 2005).

Nevertheless, one area of study has received less attention: how do ideas or ideologies affect state goals and behavior in times of militarized conflict? Goldstein and Keohane (1993) divide ideas into three categories that can help us to conceptualize the role of ideas during wars. While ideas as *principled beliefs* often impact the appropriateness of the means for striving for a foreign policy goal, ideas also appear as *causal beliefs*, relating to beliefs about cause and effect, or as *world views*, which touch upon cosmology and ontology. Nevertheless, there is not always a clear-cut line between a world view, which is a rather all-encompassing cultural complex, and causal beliefs. For example, a religious world view often assumes both the existence of a divinity and ascribes it agency (causal powers) so that it can be believed to interfere with the outcome of any event in the material world. Furthermore, the causal effects of world views are difficult to ascertain (Tannenwald 2005: 17).

In the following account, ideas affect the state goals (war aims) and increase the expected utility of continuing warfare and war duration in two ways: through causal beliefs and value estimates (stakes). First, causal beliefs increase the perceived chances of victory (or coming to a draw if merely maintaining the *status quo* is the goal). For example, if a decision-maker has a causal belief that a divine presence or national destiny will ultimately grant victory to the state in a war, it is rational to rely on these premises and allow these ideas to affect the state's war aims and decisions in wartime policy.²² Ideas also increase the expected utility of continuing warfare by raising the stakes, for example by increasing the value of the enemy territory. Thus, the range of categories of ideas needed for understanding war duration is broader than Goldstein and Keohane (1993) specify.

The analysis here concentrates on offensive expectations, and it is important to make a distinction between ideology and expansive ideology. For example, nationalism can become more aggressive and strive to incorporate other territories when there are irredentist claims. This type of nationalism not only raises the probability of a militarized conflict but also

²²Goldstein and Keohane further argue that ideas can serve as roadmaps that limit choice because they exclude other explanations of reality (1993: 12). As such they seem to hold the capacity to limit the scope of rational foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the analysis becomes irrational, per se. For example, nationalism is commonly viewed as "inherently irrational" (Hardin 1995: 15) Yet, as Hardin argues, "you act rationally if you do what you believe serves your interest" (1995: 15). Thus, while the impact of ideas on state behavior may be against or complement any materialist explanations, we can still view human behavior as rational.

increases the expected length of a war by increasing the expected utility of continued warfare. As political ideology, nationalism and religion in their expansive manifestations serve the same function for war duration, I will henceforth refer to them as expansive ideology.

Expansive ideology is an idea (political, religious or nationalistic) that raises war aims even when the material capabilities (balance of power), as they are reflected in the battlefield events, indicate a low probability of victory. It can manifest itself in two variables that increase the expected utility of continued warfare: causal beliefs affecting $p(\text{win})$ and stakes affecting $u(\text{win})$. Offensive stakes are always high on at least one side of the conflict when we encounter a long war because they serve as a justification for offensive action. Even with high offensive capacity, there is no war unless the value of the desired outcome in a war is so high that it can justify initiating a war that entails costs and has an uncertain outcome. Causal beliefs, in turn, are asymmetric if an expansive ideology includes a belief in victory with the help of God, national destiny or any other force that the enemy is likely to disagree on.

As ideas define a certain set of costs, benefits and interest (Jackson 1993) they can impact the belligerents' expected utility calculations involving estimates of costs of warfare, utility of winning and probability of winning, and their ability to swiftly reach a mutually acceptable negotiation solution. I will now go on to the final phase of the theoretical argumentation by explaining how expansive ideology can create a high expected utility of continuing the war and therefore also increases war duration. While the current ability to use offensive military factors explains how favorable battlefield events contribute to high offensive expectations, expansive ideology explains why, even in the absence of positive battlefield events, the expected ability to use offensive military factors and the expected utility of continuing the war can still be high. Expansive ideology can have this effect by including high stakes and causal beliefs that promise the realization of the war aims. Both variables make an early cessation of hostilities improbable.

B.1. Asymmetric Causal Beliefs

“Causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect...and provide guidelines or strategies for individuals on how to achieve their objectives” (Tannenwald 2005: 16), such as winning a war. Expansive ideology can consist of causal beliefs that promise the realization of territorial or other aims even when

the balance of power on the battlefield says the opposite. While these causal beliefs may be formulated with religious, political or nationalistic terminology, they all rely on the same principle: some force beyond the grasp of those who are outside the chosen religion, political party or nation will ultimately grant victory. In religion this force may be God, in nationalism the nation's natural superiority, and in political ideology immutable forces of history, such as the inevitable defeat of capitalism and capitalist states in Marxist historical materialism. In effect, the combatant asks questions that impact the expected utility of continued warfare: how will we be able to win the war?

Jervis argues that people have a tendency to assimilate information to their pre-existing beliefs (1976: 143). However, causal beliefs are stronger than mere prewar beliefs of, for example, expected costs of warfare. If decision-makers observe during the war that their previous beliefs about the costs were underestimated, they can still relatively easily be adjusted. In contrast, as causal beliefs promise the realization of territorial or other aims when the balance of power on the battlefield says the opposite, the expected ability to use offensive military factors remains high. The war aims are therefore not lowered to a level justified by battlefield events, and the expected utility of continuing the war remains high. The expected utility of continuing warfare, $[p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c]$, increases if offensive expectations increase the expected probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, and lower the expected probability of losing, $p(\text{loss})$, as a result of causal beliefs.

These causal beliefs do not need to be private information, but they must be asymmetric: the enemy is simply unlikely to agree that they are reasonable. If one state does not base its assessment of its expected offensive capacity on the current battlefield events, both sides are likely to have such high war aims that no bargaining space will be created.²³ The bargaining space will be inexistent until either side is overrun, or until the belligerent infatuated with asymmetric causal beliefs finally learns that the probability of victory is low when all material resources have been consumed and recruitment problems appear. Then, learning from the actual battlefield events again becomes possible: the war aims are lowered and the expected utility of agreeing to the enemy's demands finally becomes higher

²³The same logic applies to how defensive causal beliefs (e.g. God will help us defend our territory) can become asymmetric if there is disagreement on a state's expected defensive capacity.

than the expected utility of continuing the war. As a result, a bargaining space is created and the war will come to an end.

For example, it is straightforward that expanding German borders during the early phases of WWII was so valuable to Hitler and the probability of victory so high that a negotiated peace with lesser gains would not have created equally high expected utility as would continued warfare. But when the battlefield events later started to show signs of being less favorable to Germany, Hitler could still rely on his hypernationalist and mythological idea of the German race as ultimately being superior to the others. In other words, the realities of the battlefield events were interpreted as not being impossible for the Germans to overcome as a chosen race with a manifest destiny. While the Allies could rely on solid expectations of increasing offensive capacity to justify their high war aims, Hitler had in the end only his expansive ideology left to justify a continuation of the war.

Like asymmetric information, these causal beliefs must be found in the decision-making elite if they are to have an effect on war duration. Yet asymmetric causal beliefs do not wither away as easily as asymmetric information because there is no common understanding of causality that would create a shared picture of what the current battlefield events suggest about the states' balance of power and expected future offensive capacity. As for asymmetric information, the introduction of the new awaited military technology or tactics will finally reveal information about relative strength so that the belligerents can agree on a mutually acceptable bargaining solution. Asymmetries in causal beliefs are not easily changed by battlefield events if there is no mutual understanding of what counts as evidence of a future ability to emerge victorious.

B.2. Stakes

Apart from including asymmetric causal beliefs impacting $p(\text{win})$, expansive ideology can also consist of offensive stakes measuring the utility of the desired outcome of offensive action, $u(\text{win})$. Unlike causal beliefs and asymmetric information, stakes do not delay the process of learning from battlefield events although they do play an important role when the combatants formulate their war aims and calculate the expected utility of continuing a war. Just like causal beliefs, stakes are in essence ideas. The value of the issues at stake in any given war depends on the idea that what one is fighting for is worth the effort. It is the idea that a piece of land or weakening the enemy is important even in the face of possible high costs of warfare and an uncertain outcome. Tannenwald (2005: 17) argues that

ideas can impact how actors “describe the situation.” In the case of stakes, the combatant asks questions that impact the expected utility of continued warfare: what is the enemy, what does the enemy’s territory mean to us? Thus, it is not the relative material capabilities or some change in the balance of power but perceptions and ideas that impact the utility of winning.

In practice, offensive stakes are often first expressed in the justification for attacking, such as Hitler’s search for *Lebensraum*. But these ideas about the utility of warfare also continue to affect the belligerents’ war aims and utility calculations during the war. For example, Bennett and Stam (1996) and the hazard analysis in chapter one show that high issue salience is associated with long war duration. However, they do not differentiate between offensive and defensive stakes. Such a differentiation is important for understanding war duration because offensive and defensive stakes are not equally resilient. Furthermore, they measure different utilities in states’ calculations of whether to continue fighting.

Goemans (2000: 29) defines stakes (or resolve) as the total amount of resources one side is willing to expend on the issue. It is the practical manifestation of the expected utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, and losing, $u(\text{loss})$. Thus, in deciding the amount of force to be mobilized on the battlefield, it becomes a factor, along with the number and quality of the troops that can be spent, that determines a state’s battlefield performance. In consequence, when states adjust their war aims in accordance to the battlefield performance, which their and the enemy’s troop numbers and resolve give rise to, they will soon have compatible war aims and a bargaining space. The stakes are then considered indirectly as they, by deciding the scale of mobilization, affect the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$. Yet this means neglecting how stakes can impact war aims not only by increasing the $p(\text{win})$ but as independent factors, $u(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{loss})$.

Stakes can include non-material objectives, such as the leadership in the state system, which calls for weakening the enemy. For example, Blainey argues that Russian victories against Turkey during the Crimean War aroused fears that Russia might “penetrate at last into the Mediterranean and become more powerful than ever before” (1973: 23). Such an aim to weaken the enemy may necessitate incapacitating the enemy forces even when peacemaking on equitable terms would otherwise seem more profitable than continuing a costly fight. A bargaining space is then harder to create, as the high utility of victory, $u(\text{win})$, increases the expected utility of continuing the war.

Stakes can also include material objectives such as conquering valuable territory. For example, expansive nationalism, seeking to incorporate territories that are seen as belonging to the nation, increases the value of the enemy territory as compared to nationalism that merely serves to unite the state against an enemy in times of war. During the long Russo-Polish War of 1919-21, Lenin sought to secure control over Poland in order to contribute to the spreading of the political revolution in Western Europe (Norman 1972: 29), while Poland had expansive nationalist aims. Thus the value of the disputed territory increased the expected utility of continuing the war:

Pilsudski [Polish chief of state] hoped to build not merely a Polish nation state but a greater federation of peoples under the aegis of Poland which would replace Russia as the great power of Eastern Europe... a plan which excluded negotiations prior to military victory (Debo 1992: 59).

Also, during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), the Mexican government did not give up even when defeat had become obvious. A captain in the US Army remarked that,

[t]hey can do nothing and their continued defeats should convince them of it. They have lost six great battles; we have captured six hundred and eight cannons, nearly one hundred thousand stands of arms, made twenty thousand prisoners, have the greatest portion of their country and are fast advancing on their Capital which must be ours, – yet they refuse to treat [i.e. negotiate terms] (Eisenhower 1989: 295).

Poland had high offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, and Mexico high defensive stakes measuring the utility of the desired outcome of defensive action, $u(\text{loss})$.²⁴ Yet both wars are examples of how raised stakes increase war aims and make the utility of warfare high, even when the prospects of winning are plainly low as was the case in Mexico. The expected utility of continuing warfare, $[p(\text{win}) * u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) * u(\text{loss}) - c]$, increases if the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, increases because of high offensive stakes. Signing a peace treaty may be seen as the most beneficial course of action when the pro-

²⁴The desired outcome of defensive action is to fend off the enemy in order to maintain the status quo. I do not define maintaining the status quo as winning, but as a draw, and therefore neither do I define defensive stakes as measuring $u(\text{win})$.

bability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, starts to decrease as a result of waning expected offensive ability and as continued warfare would entail more costs (c). But if the expected utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, is high and the expected utility of losing, $u(\text{loss})$, is low due to high stakes, the overall expected utility of continuing the war can still be high. In other words, a belligerent is prepared to suffer a great deal for reaching its war aims, as not reaching them is worse than the pain of continued warfare and sometimes even worse than the possible consequences of losing. Thus, it will not lower its war aims in the face of battlefield defeats. It does not have a high expected offensive capacity, but it nevertheless has a high expected utility of continuing the war.

Offensive stakes can both raise the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, and lower the utility of losing, $u(\text{loss})$, because they not only increase the value of the enemy territory: by intensifying nationalist sentiments, they can also increase the value of the home territory if defensive efforts are required despite initial offensive expectations. Defensive stakes in turn only lower $u(\text{loss})$, as the enemy territory is not considered valuable if expansive ideology is absent. Defensive stakes also increase $u(\text{win})$ only when maintaining the *status quo* is defined as winning.

However, as an irredentist state has high offensive stakes, for example, why does not the other state then always lower its own expected utility of continuing the war so that a bargaining space can be created? The reason is that, even though the irredentist state's endurance might in the end lower the other's utility of continuing the war toward infinity by raising the costs of war, (c), the other state may also have high defensive stakes, i.e. a low utility of losing the defensive battles, $u(\text{loss})$. Stakes in defending the survival of the state are always high and are usually high in defending the state territory. They do not thus easily wither away, as was exemplified by the Mexican resistance to the end during the Mexican-American War when their $p(\text{win})$ approached zero.

Offensive stakes, in turn, are in general more easily weakened when the expected offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, is deemed too low to realize the territorial aims. One usually has loss aversion and values more what one already has than what one desires (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991) and the lack of offensive capacity easily leads one to become disillusioned with the expansive dreams that assigned a high value to winning, $u(\text{win})$. In effect, offensive stakes are not wholly independent of the factors that impact the expected ability to use offensive military factors: asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information, or the current offensive ability. Jervis ar-

gues that people who favor a course of action will usually overestimate the chances of success (1976: 130) as they seek cognitive consistency.²⁵ Several experiments indicate also that people “try to keep their beliefs, feelings, actions, and cognitions mutually consistent.” (Lebow 1981: 103). However, the same cognitive consistency can also lead to changes in the perceived utility or value of some policy: decision-makers lower their $u(\text{win})$ if $p(\text{win})$ decreases. If one cannot conquer the enemy territory, it is cognitively consistent not to believe that it is worth conquering.

Immaterial offensive stakes, such as fearing that Russia would shake the balance of power during the Crimean War or fighting over the leadership in the state system, also often increase the offensive stakes on both sides of the conflict in a zero sum game with seemingly indivisible goods. In consequence, the prospects of any state lowering the stakes enough for a bargaining space to quickly emerge decrease. Offensive stakes are usually high at the beginning of the war as they form the justification for the war. But if the expected offensive capacity is then lowered, the offensive stakes diminish and a bargaining space can then also more easily be reached.

3.4. Short War Duration when Defense is Dominant

The images of protracted trench warfare during WWI have been permanently etched into the collective memory of military tacticians and other decision-makers. While these images are real, a mere reference to the defensive potential of the existing weapons systems such as machine guns, horse-drawn field artillery and barbed wire does not suffice to explain long war duration. Logically, wars that offer scant potential for a decisive breakthrough, as there is a lack of armored and mobile firepower, should be short owing to the high cost of conquering enemy territory. The expected utility of continuing warfare, $[p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c]$, decreases if the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, decreases due to low offensive expectations when defense has the advantage. Thus, the war aims should be lowered as the inability to attack is realized by both sides.

When there is no hindrance for the battlefield events to reveal information about relative strength, it becomes easy to find a mutually acceptable

²⁵ While Jervis focuses on cognitive consistency, Janice and Mann (1977: 74-95) argue from that decision-makers can exaggerate the positive consequences of a course of action to ward off anxiety.

negotiation solution. Thus, as a result of quick learning, the war aims are increasingly likely to be adjusted to reflect actual battlefield performance and the minimum demands soon become acceptable to both warring parties. This process of swiftly finding a bargaining space is reminiscent of short war duration when offense dominates, which also relies on uninterrupted learning and an information flow from the actual battlefield events to expected battlefield performance and war aims. However, if we are to seek answers to long war duration when defending is easier than attacking, we are better off to incorporate the influence of expansive ideology and asymmetric information into the analysis.

3.5. Long War Duration when Defense is Dominant

Expansive ideology and asymmetric information about expected future offensive capacity hold the potential to change decision-makers' expected utility calculations and create disagreement also when defense is dominant. Even if the actual battlefield performance indicates that defending is easier than attacking, there can be an expansive ideology in the form of stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs. This prompts a state to accept the costs of continued warfare rather than to lower its war aims so that a mutually agreeable bargaining solution could be reached. It is also possible that private information or disagreement on future increases in offensive or defensive capacity raise the belligerents' expected utility of continuing the war. Also then the war aims are not adjusted to a mutually acceptable level, and a bargaining space becomes harder to create.

In other words, the expected utility of continuing warfare, $[p(\text{win}) \cdot u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) \cdot u(\text{loss}) - c]$, increases if the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, increases as a result of high stakes, such as the high value of enemy territory. Asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information in turn increase the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$. In effect, learning from battlefield events can be seriously hampered even when defense has the advantage and very long wars, such as WWI, become possible.

3.6. Conclusion

In sum, according to the bounded learning theory, asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity, asymmetric causal beliefs and stakes are important for explaining deviations from what the strategic learning theory would expect based only on battlefield events. Belligerents do not


always swiftly agree on their relative strength and resolve and adjust their war aims by quickly learning from the battlefield events. Thus, warfare does not always promptly reveal information, and finding mutually acceptable terms for ending the war will take a longer time than expected by the strategic learning theory. Figure 2 summarizes how these variables can change the expected utility of continuing the war and the causal path toward the creation of a bargaining space.

The strategic learning theory however merely expects a straight causal path, marked with italics, from the current ability to use offensive military factors to the bargaining space. This suggests that there is an empirical expectation of covariance between current offensive ability and war aims. Assessments of the expected offensive ability are solely based on the current ability to use offensive military factors. The current ability, in turn, is based on observations of both one's own and the enemy's battlefield performance. This means simply that, with offensive successes, as the enemy does not have enough resources or does not spend enough resources to win battles because of, for example, low resolve, the war aims are raised. Similarly, with defeats, the war aims are lowered.

Warfare then reveals information about both combatants' probability of winning so that they will lower their war aims when they meet an enemy with high current capabilities and resolve (Goemans 2000: 29-30). Thus, the strategic learning theory assumes the expected utility to be a function of the current ability so that belligerents' war aims closely follow the actual battlefield events. In effect, a mutually acceptable bargaining solution (bargaining space) is swiftly created. It expects quick learning from battlefield events without other sources of changes in the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, or losing, $p(\text{loss})$, and does not consider the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, or losing, $u(\text{loss})$,²⁶ when states formulate their war aims and calculate the expected utility of continuing a war. As the combatants' estimated probabilities of winning, $p(\text{win})$, are derived only from their battlefield performance, they amount to one as soon as private information is revealed by warfare.

²⁶In formulating the strategic learning theory, Goemans (2000) considers stakes indirectly because they are reflected in the battlefield events by deciding, for example, the level of mobilization.

FIGURE 2. Bounded Learning Theory and the Explanatory Model of Expected Utility



Note: While the model focuses on offensive military factors and capacity, a state's estimate of its expected ability to use defensive military factors can also have an effect on, especially, its $p(\text{loss})$.

According to the bounded learning theory, however, the sum of the combatants' $p(\text{win})$ can be more than one as there is not always fast learning from battlefield events because of asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity. Even when a state meets an enemy that has more troops and better military technology and therefore dominates the battlefield events, that state does not always lower its war aims. States may learn about their and the enemy's current strength on the battlefield, but they can also disagree on the expected offensive capacity due to asymmetric information and asymmetric causal beliefs. They thus have a bounded ability to learn from the battlefield events, which can lead to high and incompatible war aims and the absence of a bargaining space.

The bounded learning theory expects that asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information can impact $p(\text{win})$ and $p(\text{loss})$. Further, when there are offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$ is high and $u(\text{loss})$ is often even low. Thus, in the presence of expansive ideology (asymmetric causal beliefs and high stakes) and asymmetric information, there is no covariance between the current ability, the expected utility of continuing the war and the war aims. Despite potential defeats on the battlefield, the stakes and expectations of increasing offensive capacity are so high, and the causal beliefs about how to win the war are so detached from the battlefield events, that there will be high war aims to which the enemy cannot agree. Therefore, both expansive ideology and asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive military factors can in the end make it seem more profitable to continue fighting than to settle for a negotiated deal promising a smaller payoff.

In other words, after calculating its expected utility of continuing the war based on $p(\text{win})$, $p(\text{loss})$, $u(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{loss})$, a state will formulate its war aims accordingly. High expected utility of continuing the war gives rise to high war aims. It will then decide whether to continue the war by comparing its war aims with the enemy's war aims to see whether they form a bargaining space (a mutually acceptable bargaining solution). If they are incompatible, indicating a lack of a bargaining space, the expected utility of continuing the war is deemed higher than the expected utility of accepting the enemy's war aims. When $p(\text{win})$, $p(\text{loss})$, $u(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{loss})$ give rise to high war aims on both sides, continued warfare simply promises a higher payoff than opting for peace by compromising on the war aims. The result is that the war will be long. For the war to end and bargaining space to open up, at least one state must lower its expected utility of fighting and war aims (minimum demands, i.e. what it prefers to continued fighting).

The decision to either continue the war or to make peace is made after comparing the states' war aims. Since war aims are based on expected utility calculations, comparing war aims involves comparing the state's expected utility of continuing the war [$p(\text{win}) * u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) * u(\text{loss}) - c$] with the expected utility of making peace (accepting the enemy's war aims that are based on its expected utility calculations). For example, if the state seems to be losing with a $p(\text{win})$ of 0.1 and $p(\text{loss})$ of 0.9, but has high offensive stakes with a $u(\text{win})$ of \$100 and a $u(\text{loss})$ of \$10, and the cost of continued warfare is set at \$5, the expected utility of continuing the war is \$14. Thus, at the negotiation table, it can make an offer that ensures that it will get at least \$14 for itself. This is its minimum demand. If the enemy's expected utility calculations in turn lead to war aims that allow an offer that is more

than \$14, the state will have a higher expected utility of making peace than continuing the war. In effect, a bargaining space is created if both belligerents can accept each other's offers. However, war aims can be so high on both sides that the enemy will not make such an offer. As a result, there is no mutually acceptable bargaining solution, and the war will continue.

When there are high stakes, $u(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{loss})$, or disagreement on $p(\text{win})$ and $p(\text{loss})$, due to asymmetric information or causal beliefs, the belligerents do not lower their war aims to a mutually acceptable level and no bargaining space is created. In the case of asymmetric information about the enemy's expected offensive capacity, the decision-makers base their expectations on the enemy's current ability on the battlefield or other intelligence. Thus, they either do not know of the enemy's high expectations to use offensive military factors or, if they know of these expectations, they do not agree that they are correct. In the case of asymmetric causal beliefs, the decision-makers do not agree with the enemy's high expectations of its ability to use offensive military factors because they have different causal beliefs. Asymmetric causal beliefs do not wither away as easily as asymmetric information. Further, when a state has high stakes, its expected utility of continuing the war can be high even when the expected ability to use offensive military factors is low. If the enemy also has high stakes, both sides can have a high utility of continuing the war despite poor battlefield performance. Yet, offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, are more easily lowered than defensive stakes, $u(\text{loss})$, when the expected offensive capacity decreases.

In the cases of asymmetric information and causal beliefs, it is a matter of a bounded learning process where the current battlefield events are not directly reflected in mutually agreeable estimates of expected ability to use offensive military factors. When the expected ability to use offensive military factors is influenced only by the current ability to use military factors, the war will be short. The battlefield events then reveal information about relative strength and create expected utility calculations based on the events in the actual theater of war. If both states use the battlefield as their point of reference for formulating their war aims, a bargaining space is swiftly formed.

Yet, if at least one combatant calculates its $p(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{win})$ based on expansive ideology (asymmetric causal beliefs or offensive stakes) or asymmetric information on expected offensive capacity,²⁷ it is likely to have such

²⁷If the combatants agree on how their offensive capacity will change in the near future, the bargaining space can still emerge even if they do not have a common interpretation of the current battlefield events.

high war aims that they are not acceptable to the enemy, who uses the battlefield events or other intelligence as its point of reference. It is of course possible that both combatants have higher expectations of being able to use offensive military factors than are justified by the reality of the battlefield. Nevertheless, the war can then finally end when the belligerents run out of resources (human and material), the real offensive capacity of the expected technology and tactics is revealed, or the harsh realities of the battlefield make the causal belief less realistic to the decision-makers.

In reality, there is no total or pure warfare that is unaffected by other factors than battlefield events. Even von Clausewitz (1832/1989: 75-89), the father of modern military theory, knew that war is a trinity of passion, uncertainty and political purpose. Absolute or close to absolute offense dominance might take us closer to the realization of total warfare, where swift victories absent of moral or technological limitations would be commonplace. Yet the probability of reaching such a state should not be exaggerated. Not only do international law and morality place limitations on the activities of soldiers – nature and technology also do. In the end, offense dominance is seldom potent enough to guarantee a swift victory and the subsequent negotiation process will decide whether or not the war will end quickly. Therefore, understanding factors that influence the negotiation process through which the belligerents seek a solution to the war is crucial to understanding war duration. Incorporating variables such as expansive ideology and asymmetric information makes rational choice a usable approach for understanding this process. I will now turn to constructing a research design that can provide a preliminary test of the bounded learning theory. In the next chapter I discuss some methodological considerations.

4. METHOD

4.1. Introduction

King et al. correctly observe in their influential methodological treatise that “we will never know a causal inference for certain” (1994: 79). Yet, by giving priority to the causal effect, their view of explanation relies on correlations and fails to prompt the researcher to refine the theory to account for the more fine grained causal mechanism through which the theory works. The authors do argue that “in our view, identifying the mechanisms by which a cause has its effect often builds support for a theory” (1994: 86). But George and Bennett rightly criticize them for merely emphasizing cross-case inference on causal effects (2004: 140). The small-N research design used in this study seeks to maximize the strength of the causal inference by focusing on both cross-case inference that points our attention to the causal effect and process-tracing that seeks to uncover the causal mechanism.

A small-N research design can in its comparative form (cross-case inference) seek to approximate the controls that the large-N design is better suited to incorporate. Its strength, in the form of process-tracing, lies in its superior ability to account for the causal mechanism that eludes the large-N design. A small-N study with four cases, I believe, allows the study both to draw preliminary comparative and generalizable inferences and to analyze the hypothesized causal path. I will first discuss the comparative nature of the multiple case studies and then draw attention to the role of process-tracing in the cases under study.

4.2. Small-N Analysis: Case Selection for Comparative Analysis

4.2.1. Selection on the Dependent Variable and Logic of Comparison

The cases for the comparative study are selected on the dependent variable. The authors of *Designing Social Enquiry* (King et al. 1994) are opposed to such a method. Selection on the dependent variable can however be invaluable to a research design seeking to increase the validity of its infe-

rences. The authors' initial admonition against a research design in which the dependent variable does not vary at all is common sense to anyone seeking to use the comparative method to establish a causal relationship – if there is no variation, there is nothing to explain. The authors further argue that selection on the dependent variable can truncate the variation in the dependent variable and thus give rise to bias. In the context of the current study, this predicament implies that any selection rule correlated with war duration biases (possibly attenuates) the causal effects that may exist. Thus a causal effect found in a study is possibly stronger in reality.

Yet the argument holds only if one has a large-N data set, because only there would we expect to create bias on average. In the case of a small-N design, bias is possible if the selection on the dependent variable is made out of convenience, availability or funding. In consequence, we can intentionally select cases on the dependent variable so as to diminish the risk of biased inferences. King et al. (1994: 141) suggest that, if one has to select on the dependent variable, it is better to maximize its variation. In practice this would mean selecting both very long and short wars.

The necessity of seeking variation in the dependent variable is important not only for selection on the dependent variable but also for the general logic of comparative research design, where case selection will depend on the aim of, to some degree, holding constant other possible causal factors. John Stuart Mill, who pioneered the development of a comparative research design, was suspicious of the comparative method being appropriate for drawing secure inferences unless we have been able to exhaustively and correctly analyze all possible causal factors (Lieberson 1991: 314). This possibility of having failed to include a significant causal variable troubles both small-N and large-N analyses. Yet, in practice, we can alleviate the problem of unaccounted causal factors by selecting not only long and short wars but also comparable cases, where we can seek to hold constant as many potential causal variables, such as the size of the states, as possible. In two of the cases we can do this by holding constant the belligerents themselves. Nevertheless, with an awareness of the inferential limitations posed by this *ceteris paribus* condition, the test will at best be a preliminary one.

Mill's method of difference involves seeking cases that have different values in the dependent and independent variables but are otherwise similar. It seeks to approximate the logic of experimental research, where the impact of outside factors is controlled for and variation is created with the application of experimental treatment. In practice this means that the cases will be both long and short, and the empirical task is to find what differences in the cases can account for this variation. As we seek to empirically

identify independent variables associated with different outcomes, we must seek to hold other variables constant in an effort to uncover the possible causal effect between the explanatory variables in the bounded learning theory (expansive ideology and asymmetric information) and the dependent variable (war duration). To maximize the validity of our inferences when selecting on the dependent variable (King et al. 1994), and following the logic of Mill's method of difference, I select both long and short cases. I will now further explain what other criteria I use for case selection beyond the maximization of variation in the dependent variable.

4.2.2. Four Cases

The bounded learning theory focuses on the combatant's actual ability to use offense dominant military factors and raised beliefs as a result of expansive ideology and asymmetric information. I will therefore not select the cases on the basis of the systemic offense-defense balance.²⁸ What matters most is not whether the balance favored offense or defense but whether the battlefield events were reflected in the belligerents' war aims. Yet, a general criterion for case selection, based on the scope of the theory, is that the war did not end with one side swiftly running over the enemy without negotiations. Rather than elucidating the course of such totally offense dominant or asymmetric warfare, I seek to study the creation of the bargaining space that the bounded learning theory makes predictions of.

Another initial, although more practical than theoretical, criterion also guides the selection of cases. As I study the process of reaching a bargaining space, I will make the analysis simpler by selecting wars where each side consisted of only one state. When there are several actors with official alliance ties, the process of analyzing peace negotiations and battlefield performance becomes more complicated. There are potentially complicated interactions among the allies under such conditions, as treaty obligations can create complex internal processes of finding mutually acceptable war aims.

Two primary criteria, due to the logic of inference, guide the choice of cases. First, the cases must satisfy the *ceteris paribus* assumption of the method of difference: we must seek to hold constant as many variables as possible. Since states are different, the best way to do this is to select wars of different length with the same belligerents. The inherent risk in doing this is the dependence of cases: the possibility of some diffusion process

²⁸The fact that the offense-defense theorists do not agree on whether to categorize different time periods as offense or defense dominant would further make selection on that variable difficult.

rather than the hypothesized independent variables accounting for causality. Yet, any dependence among the cases does not disqualify the test unless the dependence is perfect so that we can perfectly predict the new case with the help of the old case (King et al. 1994: 222). Also, since I will select both long and short wars, the variation in the dependent variable suggests that we cannot explain the length of one war with the help of the other. In addition, the ability of process-tracing to account for the causal process further alleviates this problem (George and Bennett 2002: 33).

Second, the cases must be hard if we are to increase the strength of the inferences. Popper (1968) argued that theories should be falsifiable. The cases should be chosen so that we can subject the bounded learning theory to a thorough falsification attempt, rather than seeking confirming evidence. Yet it is unlikely that we could find two wars (long and short) that would both satisfy the *ceteris paribus* condition and be hard cases. Thus, I will select a total of four wars – one pair of wars for the sake of the belligerents' comparability and another for the sake of making theory testing more difficult.

Two cases are selected with the aim of holding constant other possible causal variables so that we can draw stronger and more valid causal inferences with the help of comparative research logic. The three month long Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Russo-Finnish Continuation War of 1941-1944 are appropriate for this purpose. Thus, we have a short war and a long war. Most importantly, however, the cases involve the same belligerents and are close in time, which allows us to keep constant several possible causal variables. Neither war resulted in a collapse of either state, but the negotiated solution took much longer to reach during the Continuation War. The task now becomes to examine what had changed between the two wars so that the latter turned out to be much longer.²⁹

²⁹Interestingly, the two wars also shed more light on Goemans's alternative theory of war termination. Goemans (2000, 2000b) argues that the domestic attributes of the belligerent regimes can impact the process of war duration. More specifically, semi-authoritarian states can have reasons to prolong warfare even when they are losing. He suggests that, in order to avoid being punished for losing, leaders in such states can rationally raise their war aims, thus making a peace deal less likely to be reached. Both during the Continuation War and the Winter War, Finland is coded as such a semi-authoritarian state in Goemans's data set. Thus especially the long Continuation War offers a chance to check with process-tracing the validity of Goemans's statistical analysis. Did the Finns actually prolong the Continuation War by raising or not lowering their war aims, when the war was not going well, or can the long war duration be better explained by the bounded learning theory?

The Correlates of War (COW) interstate war data set, which is used as a frame for case selection, does not classify the Continuation War as a separate war but seems to consider it a part of WWII. Yet, the COW project does not use the same logic with the Winter War, which also took place during WWII, as it is classified as a separate war. For the sake of consistency, both wars, where Finland fought without treaty obligations, should be considered separate from WWII. Bennett and Stam (1996) also see WWII as consisting of several separate wars. Thus, Finland fought two wars against the Soviet Union during WWII. Both were connected to world events, of course, but the timing of the wars does not disqualify them as officially separate contestations. Most importantly, the two wars were separated by a peace treaty and period of demobilization and, at the outset of the Continuation War, people in Finland regarded it as a new war (Sandström 1991: 8).

Of all the conventional wars between major sovereign states since 1823, with two combatants, the eight year long Iran-Iraq War of 1980-89 was the longest and the one month Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 among the shortest. However, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 provides a potentially hard case because, as strong religious sentiments rose in Pakistan prior to and during the war for the incorporation of Kashmir into Pakistan, the bounded learning theory would at a first look expect the war to have lasted longer. The theory expects expansive ideology to make the process of finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution more difficult. Thus, the short Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 seems to offer disconfirming evidence and makes theory testing harder.

While defining long and short wars is of course relative, we can use the average, minimum and maximum values as points of reference. According to the Correlates of War interstate war data, the average duration of interstate wars since Napoleon has been 427 days. The longest war was the Vietnam War (3 735 days) and the shortest one the Football War (five days). The Winter War (104 days) and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 (50 days) are closer to the lowest value than the average value and can therefore be classified as short wars. The Iran-Iraq War (2 890 days) is also closer to the maximum value than the average one.

The Continuation War (1 179 days) is closer to the average value than the maximum one. But if we consider the dispersion of cases, we notice that it was still approximately one standard deviation (696 days) longer than the average war. The length of wars is not normally distributed, as most wars are between five and about 1 000 days. And yet approximately

only 11 percent of the wars (ten) were longer than the Continuation War, and as many as 70 were shorter. Thus the Continuation War can be considered a long war. It was also 1 075 days longer than the Winter War, which further justifies the comparison.

4.3. Small-N Analysis: Process-Tracing

In addition to the comparative small-N component, this study makes use of process-tracing as a method of testing the existence of the hypothesized causal mechanism. The benefits of detailed small-N studies increase as the complexity of the event that we seek to analyze grows, and wars are very complex patterns of destructive social behavior. Four cases therefore allow one to go into adequate detail about the course of events so as to sort out the complexity of the events and answer the *How?* question in a manner that is not possible for a very large-N design.

Gerring fittingly writes that “causal arguments depend not only on measuring causal effects. They also presuppose the identification of a causal mechanism” (2004: 348). Indeed, identifying the causal mechanism, answering the *How?* question, seeking an answer to whether the actual sequence of events followed a theory’s expectations, is what process-tracing can achieve in a manner that is beyond large-N research designs. Traditionally, and logically, an extensive statistical manipulation of a large data set with the help of control variables is assumed to be the best guarantee for approximating experiments and overcoming what Holland (1986) calls the fundamental problem of causality – that we cannot rerun history and observe counterfactuals. Nevertheless, the statistical solution to this problem depends on the assumption that we can control for all the essential, many of them unknown, variables. In relatively simple and homogenous events, this assumption is not too problematic. But we can rightfully consider warfare a complex social pattern of activity, with not only some easily generalizable aspects that allow us to construct theories, but also with complex and potentially unknown variables, which can exert causal forces on the course of the war.

In addition to the doubt that the control variables used in extensive research designs are the only relevant ones, even those variables that the researcher may know of often create serious coding problems that give rise to poor internal validity. The subsequent causal inferences may therefore be limited. We cannot be certain that everything that is banished to the error term of the statistical model is mere meaningless noise when we are deal-

ing with complex events and our aim is to make generalizations. Therefore we often depend on small-N studies to uncover the causal mechanism with process-tracing and to control for variables that very large-N studies may miss. As I aim to test the bounded learning theory, I will next discuss problems with evidence and the logic of inference for both the comparative and process-tracing methods.

4.4. Problem of Evidence

Ragin (1997) writes that when an actor (in this case the policy elite during a war) argues that he or she did A in order to reach B we have internal evidence of causality that increases the internal validity of causal inference. Abell (2001: 67) holds that this internal evidence is logically prior to the generalizable evidence sought by comparative studies. Thus, if internal evidence of a causal mechanism is at odds with comparative evidence of a causal effect, we must first question the validity of the comparative evidence, suspecting that the cases create a picture of reality different from what was the actual causal path.

Even if such internal evidence in the form of statements from policy elites during a war would greatly aid the researcher in causal inference, the predicament plaguing any kind of research – the fundamental problem of causality, that we cannot rerun history with different values in our explanatory variable (Holland 1986) – is not solved by such evidence. Yet, self-avowed counterfactuals such as “if it had not been for C, I would not have done A” would fare much better because of the assumption that history can be hypothetically rerun. In fact, if we have only one case and cannot pretend that a large-N statistical manipulation with controls would somehow approximate rerunning history, self-avowed counterfactuals are the closest we can come to solving the fundamental problem of causality.

There are nevertheless practical limitations to both internal evidence and self-avowed counterfactuals because they do not overcome the problem of how much we can rely on explanations for actions taken or not taken. Especially dire events like wars, where sentiments run high and norms of right and wrong are strongly contested, may lead actors to rewrite history in an effort to justify costly decisions. *Ex post* statements in memoirs, for example, can paint reality in colors that deviate from the “real” causal effect. Even recorded justifications offered at the time of the decision cannot always be taken for granted to reflect the true motivations in the whirlwind of an intricate political game of life and death. Multiple statements

made by multiple actors would ease this problem. A motive analysis, an investigation of the actors' interests that might bias their statements, can also be appropriate if the researcher desires to increase our confidence in such statements. Yet these methods suffer from practical limitations of time and space. In addition, internal evidence and self-avowed counterfactuals are not always readily available.

If we cannot find self-avowed counterfactuals or other internal evidence for actions, how can we control for spuriousness and other variables? I believe that we can seek to identify and follow causal paths within cases with process-tracing. This strategy introduces the time element that makes it possible to find variation within a war such that an analysis of within-case correlations becomes possible. What I mean by within-case correlations is correlations between observable implications within a case that is on a much lower level of abstraction than comparative studies using multiple cases. In practice, we are adding new observations from a different level of analysis by introducing the time element that naturally exists in warfare. For example, in explaining war duration, not only do we seek to find textual evidence for the existence of expansive ideology and asymmetric information for the sake of comparing different wars. We also expect to find clear patterns of covariation during any war: the bounded learning theory expects that, during short wars, when there is an increase in the current ability to use offensive military factors, war aims are raised, and vice versa. If there is no covariation, we expect to find an expansive ideology and/or asymmetric information that can explain why belligerents do not change their war aims with changes on the battlefield. The role of such evidence in the form of covariation becomes increasingly prominent when there is a great deal of variation to explain, i.e. there are several changes in war aims and current ability to use offensive military factors.

The more covariation there is between war aims and the ability to use offensive military factors, the less likely it is that it would have been caused by accident or by other factors. Ideally we are looking for several precise oscillations. It seems that especially long wars offer a chance to observe more such within-case correlations, where both war aims and current ability to make use of offensive military factors wax and wane. To test the theory at hand, we need to be clear about what the theory points our attention to – the observable implications.

In all the cases, I will first analyze whether the belligerents' current ability to use offensive military factors covaries with their war aims. The strategic learning theory expects there always to be covariation. The bounded learning theory, in turn, expects that there is a lack of covariation during

long wars. If there is no covariation during a long war, we can suspect that expansive ideology or asymmetric information has impacted the belligerent's expected ability to use offensive military factors and created disagreement on a mutually acceptable bargaining solution. Current ability to use offensive military factors is quite easily observed through material events in the theater of war, and official war aims are easily found in textual evidence. I believe that public statements of war aims are quite reliable because they bind the actor to a course of action, thus entailing a cost that makes the statement less likely to be cheap talk.

The bounded learning theory posits the existence or inexistence of a bargaining space as crucial to peacemaking. Its observable implication is whether the belligerents' war aims are compatible so that a mutually acceptable bargaining solution is created and an end to fighting becomes possible. Peace is made when bargaining space exists. Bargaining space comes into being when the combatants' war aims are not discrepant, and the war aims are not discrepant when the battlefield events and both combatants' war aims converge. If bargaining space exists, the warring parties will have a higher expected utility of signing a peace agreement than continuing the war. We cannot observe the expected utility of continuing the war unless clear statements thereof are made. Therefore, it is mainly based on a rational choice assumption about human behavior. With the help of process-tracing, however, we can chart the discrepancy in war aims between the combatants (creation of a bargaining space) and the covariance of battlefield events and war aims for each combatant, which affects the possibility of creating a bargaining space. When at least one combatant exhibits no covariance, its war aims will be higher than the battlefield events would suggest, and as a result the combatants' war aims are likely to become discrepant. Thus, the process-tracing method focuses the case studies on theoretically important aspects of military history. The sequence of battlefield events and war aims are analyzed through "a series of points or curves plotted through time" (George and McKeown 1985: 36).

A lack of covariance between the current ability to use offensive military factors and the war aims directly suggests, based on the rational choice assumption of the bounded learning theory, that some other variable must be affecting the expected utility of continuing the war and the concomitant war aims. The bounded learning theory expects that we should then look at the decision-makers' statements to find out whether there was asymmetric information about offensive expectations and expansive ideology in the form of asymmetric causal beliefs and high stakes, all of which can have increased the expected utility of continuing the war.

Table 3 summarizes the variables under study and designates what values we can expect them to assume if we are to see evidence corroborating the bounded learning theory. The theory predicts that we should always expect to find a lack of covariation between the battlefield events and the war aims during long wars. Yet, of all the remaining variables that can explain the lack of covariation, only high offensive stakes need to be present, combined with either asymmetric causal beliefs or asymmetric information, for a war to be long. Offensive stakes increase $u(\text{win})$, without which there is no reason to continue attacking. Asymmetric information and causal beliefs, in turn, increase $p(\text{win})$, which makes the belligerent believe that attacking can lead to victory.

We could of course measure the size of the gap between the combatants' war aims that owes to multiple variables, but in practice multiple variables cannot "increase" the inexistence of the bargaining space. Either the combatants can arrive at a mutually agreeable bargaining solution or they cannot. On the other hand, the presence of multiple factors that complicate the creation of a bargaining space can make war termination more intricate as compared to the presence of just one factor. If a combatant's high war aims are based on both asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information, the disappearance of asymmetric information will not lead to such lowering of the war aims that a bargaining space would be created. As long as one variable that prolongs the war exists, a mutually acceptable bargaining solution is out of reach. The main variables are asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity and asymmetric causal beliefs, which are the most difficult to do away with and can be expected to give rise to the longest wars. Offensive stakes are expected to weaken when the two main variables weaken and no longer create high expected offensive capacity.

TABLE 3. Theoretical Expectations of the Bounded Learning Theory

| Lack of covariation | Asymmetric causal beliefs (expansive ideology) | High offensive stakes | Asymmetric information | War duration |
|---------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Long |
| No | No | No | No | Short |

Expansive ideology can have a nationalistic, religious or political basis and, if it is to have an impact on war duration, it must be found in a state's decision-making elite. There are several possible ways to classify nationalism. For the purpose of analyzing war duration, I will refer to two types of nationalism: offensive and defensive. Offensive nationalism is characterized as an expansive ideology. It may be irredentist if it is associated with a demographic situation in which the shared nation constitutes a minority of the population of another state. Yet it can also be based on imperialist sentiments and function as a mere justification for expansive foreign policy in the absence of actual national ties to any part of the enemy state. We can identify offensive nationalism with two indicators. First, it seeks to expand a state's territory or sphere of influence. The high value of the enemy territory therefore raises the offensive stakes, which usually serves as a justification for the war. Second, it can also include asymmetric causal beliefs if one state believes that forces beyond the grasp of those outside the nation will decide the outcome of the war. Defensive nationalism, in turn, is not characterized as an expansive ideology. Instead of creating asymmetric causal beliefs about the probability of victory or raising the utility of the desired outcome such as acquiring new territory, it is centered on raising a state's defensive potential by uniting the citizens against a common enemy.³⁰

There are also several possible ways of classifying political ideology and religion. For the purpose of analyzing war duration, I will refer to two types of political ideology and religion: offensive and defensive. Offensive ideology or religion is characterized as an expansive ideology and can function as a justification for expansive foreign policy that seeks to export the ideology or religion beyond state borders. It can also seek merely to create buffer zones against the perceived threat from other states that are hostile to the ideology. We can identify offensive political ideology or religion with two indicators. First, it seeks to expand a state's territory or sphere

³⁰As mentioned earlier, high expectations of being able to use defensive military factors due to, for example, defensive nationalism can also impact the probability of losing and prompt the defender to keep up the war aim of status quo, despite negative battlefield events. However, the analysis concentrates on expectations to use offensive military factors because of the offense-defense theorists' (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999) theoretical anticipation that offense dominance is associated with short war duration. In addition, at least one combatant must have a high expected ability to attack. If both are on the defense, the war will de facto end in the absence of battles. And, if one state overestimates its defensive ability and does not learn from the defensive setbacks and lower its war aims, the war will not end in a negotiated solution but the state being overrun.

of influence. The high value of the enemy territory therefore raises the offensive stakes, which usually serves as a justification for war. Second, it can also include asymmetric causal beliefs if one state believes that forces beyond the grasp of those outside the religion or political affiliation will decide the outcome of the war. Defensive political ideology or religion, in turn, is not characterized as an expansive ideology. Instead of creating asymmetric causal beliefs about the probability of victory or raising the utility of the desired outcome such as acquiring new territory, it is centered on providing an ideological or religious basis for domestic social action. In times of war, this can function to unite the nation for the defense of the state.

Offensive stakes, asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive capacity are best observed by studying the statements of the decision-making elite during a war. We have a potential case of asymmetric causal beliefs if a belligerent, when offensive capacity on the battlefield is lacking, expresses a belief that a force beyond the grasp of the enemy will grant a victory. If there is no indication that the enemy considers this belief reasonable, we have evidence of asymmetric causal beliefs. The same logic applies to asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity. If a belligerent, in a time when it lacks offensive capacity on the battlefield, expresses a belief that its offensive capacity will improve due to expected new technology or tactics, we have a potential case of asymmetric information. If there is no indication that the enemy considers these expectations reasonable or knows of them, we have evidence of asymmetric information. We also have evidence of high offensive stakes if there are statements indicating that the utility of winning is high, for example, when the enemy territory is of high value.

The actors under study consist of the belligerents' decision-making elites with the power to make decisions about war and peace and whether to raise or lower the war aims. Ideally, to comprehensively test the bounded learning theory, it would be necessary for me to have direct access to the decision-makers' war aims, utility of the desired outcome, information and ideology. However, this is practically impossible. Instead I have to use the decision-makers' communications about them, such as speeches and assessments, both public and private. In the case of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's public speeches are the only available sources, whereas the minutes of Stalin's private meetings are available.

The statements are more reliable if they are made during the time of the war and not afterwards. They are also more reliable if they are made

behind closed doors, such as during Stalin's private meetings. In the case of Khomeini's public statements, their reliability is greater if they are consistent with other statements made by the same person and are confirmed by other analysts. Also, if a leader acts on the basis of his statements, their reliability increases as they are not likely to be cheap talk. Empirical material disconfirming the bounded learning theory during long wars would consist of a lack of statements that point to high offensive stakes, asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity, or if there are statements contradicting the existence of offensive stakes, asymmetric causal beliefs and information.

I will also comprehensively use secondary literature to complete the historical picture. The purpose is not to rewrite history but to use standard descriptions of the wars in order to find out whether the war aims covaried with the battlefield events and to support the evidence for offensive stakes, asymmetric information and causal beliefs. For example, as there is always the risk that I select only speeches and statements that verify the existence of expansive ideology, the use of standard secondary literature increases the reliability of the analysis by making sure that it does not go against the historians' general understanding of the events. In order to further increase the reliability of the account, I will refer to several sources.

Vehviläinen's (2002) *Finland in the Second World War. Between Germany and Russia* is a superb outline summing up standard historical research on the Winter War and the Continuation War. Other works used in the study, such as Järvinen's (1949) *Finsk och rysk taktik under vinterkriget*, Polvinen's (1969) *Finland i stormaktspolitiken 1941-44: Bakgrunden till Fortsättningskriget*, and Kulkov's (2002) *Stalin and the Soviet Finnish War, 1939-1949*, do not differ on significant points from it. Cordesman and Wagner's (1990) *The Lessons of Modern War. Volume II.: The Iran-Iraq War* provides a basis for an account of the events during the Iran-Iraq War, from which other experts' works such as Karsh's (1987) *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis* and Hiro's (1990) *The Longest War. The Iran Iraq Conflict* do not drastically differ. As for the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Brines's (1968) *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict*, Blinkenberg's (1972) *India-Pakistan – The History of Unsolved Conflicts*, and Ziring's (1971) *The Ayub Khan Era – Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969* have a rather concurring picture of the main course of events. The number of works cited in the case studies may be limited for a historian seeking to recount all the contextual richness of warfare, and may even vary between the cases. Nevertheless, the selection and use of empirical material is justified by the study's focus on answering some

theoretically motivated questions relating to the covariation of battlefield events and war aims and to the presence of possible variables that can cause this covariation to end.

To sum up some of the key points in this chapter, purposeful case selection becomes increasingly important if we want to increase the inferential power of our analysis with the comparative method. Process-tracing, in turn, can increase our reliance on the theoretical explanation. In doing so, self-avowed counterfactuals would be theoretically best for overcoming the fundamental problem of causality, but they are not always reliable and are infrequent. Thus, I will focus on within-case correlations between current ability to use offensive military factors and war aims and expect to find a close correlation during short wars and low levels of correlation in long wars. Using both statements made by the decision-makers and secondary literature, I will expect to find an expansive ideology (high offensive stakes or asymmetric causal beliefs) and asymmetric information about increasing offensive expectations, as an explanation for possibly low correlations. In cases of a high correlation, I expect to find no expansive ideology or asymmetric information.

I will now proceed to testing the theory with four case studies. I will start with the Winter War of 1939-40 and the Continuation War of 1941-44. Not only are they placed chronologically prior to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, they are also the most comparable pair of short and long wars as the belligerents were the same. The question in the comparative perspective of the next two chapters is then what had changed. What made the Continuation War longer than the Winter War?

5. THE WINTER WAR

I start the chapter with a brief introduction to the background to the Winter War. After specifying the theoretical expectations, I proceed to analyzing how the current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the belligerents' war aims. I also examine the nature of the greatest potential factors that could affect the duration of the war according to the bounded learning theory: asymmetric information and possible expansive ideology in the form of Finnish nationalism and Soviet ideology.

5.1. The Road to War

Throughout the 1930s the international order centered in the League of Nations experienced ill-boding tremors. Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, but the League system functioned too slowly to effectively influence the Japanese policy of conquest. Four years later Italy decided to launch a military campaign against Abyssinia – present day Ethiopia – but the Western powers were keen not to anger Mussolini for the fate of a distant African nation as a potential confrontation with a rising Germany started to loom on the horizon. 1939 was the year of decision not only for Hitler but also Stalin. While the free nations of the West dreaded and were busy appeasing Hitler throughout the latter part of the 1930s, as the German troops marched into the demilitarized Rhineland and ultimately incorporated both Austria and Sudetenland into a Greater Germany, an expansionist Soviet policy was also forming.

The Soviet Union saw the rising power of Germany as an acute threat to its security. The German proposal to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union presented both countries the opportunity to postpone a military confrontation. Nevertheless, the secret additional protocol of the pact, signed on August 23, 1939, proved to be an immediate predicament for Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. According to the pact, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and parts of Poland would form the Soviet sphere of influence, where Germany would not oppose Soviet expansion (articles I and II). After the German assault on Poland, Stalin did not hesitate to send the Red Army to eastern Poland on September 17. Some 11 days later, Estonia gave in to Soviet demands to establish naval and air bases in Estonia and in

October both Latvia and Lithuania signed similar treaties with the Soviet Union. At the same time Finland also received an invitation to enter negotiations with Moscow.

Stalin feared that either Germany or the United Kingdom would be able to use the Finnish territory for an attack on Leningrad located by the Gulf of Finland. Referring to these security concerns, Stalin demanded a lease of the Hanko Peninsula in southwestern Finland and the moving of the border in the Karelian Isthmus further west away from Leningrad (Polvinen 1995: 24-31). The Finnish Government in turn was prepared to give away only some islands in the Gulf of Finland and make only small alterations to the border (Polvinen 1995: 31-39). The Finns feared that acceding to the Soviet demands would compromise Finland's future independence in the same manner as in Poland and the Baltic states. As the negotiations came to naught, the Red Army started to prepare for an offensive against Finland. The Finns did not believe that Stalin would attack as yet, while Stalin saw nothing to stand in his way to a swift occupation of Finland (Vehviläinen 2002: 39-43). During the Winter War, Finland's foreign policy would be controlled by an inner circle, in which President Kallio, Prime Minister Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim were the leading figures (Ibid. 46-47). In the Soviet Union, Stalin was in control of the foreign policy goals.

5.2. Theoretical Expectations

Any account of a historical event is deficient in many ways. If some aspects of a story are considered important, others as a result will easily be less highlighted or completely left out. In the following account of the Winter War, I will focus on the process whereby the belligerents first agreed to negotiate and finally created a bargaining space as the minimum demands from both sides became compatible. The key variables that I will investigate are the level of current ability to use offensive military factors and the war aims. Because of the shortness of the war, the bounded learning theory expects them to soon covary after the onset of hostilities.

I also expect that expansive ideology, creating high offensive stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs, and asymmetric information about future improvements in offensive tactics and technology were weak on both sides of the conflict. Thus, the belligerents could quickly draw lessons from their battlefield performance and adjust their war aims accordingly to a mutually acceptable level. Because the Soviet society was thoroughly permeated by

the communist ideology during the war, I will concentrate on analyzing Soviet ideology as a potential source of expansive ideology. And, since the Finnish war effort was characterized more by nationalism than some other political ideology or religion, I will also analyze Finnish nationalism. Because of the shortness of the war, I expect that neither the Soviet political ideology nor the Finnish nationalism can be characterized as an expansive ideology during the war.

5.3. The War

In the morning of November 30, 1939, the Soviet air force carried out sorties into the Finnish territory and the ground forces moved soon afterwards across the Finnish border. The prewar aim of partial territorial concession from the Finns was now abandoned. With about 400 000 men the Red Army aimed at a complete occupation of Finland within a month (Vehviläinen 2002: 50; Manninen 1994: 79-81) while Stalin expected that the operation ought not to take more than two weeks (Manninen 1987: 84-85). The Finns realized that a negotiated solution to the militarized conflict with its much larger neighbor would be preferable. To that end, a new government was formed so that Moscow might be more willing to resume the negotiations that had been broken (Vehviläinen 2002: 46-47). Finland's expected offensive potential was deemed low not only by the Soviets but also by the Finns themselves. Yet, because of geographic conditions, the Finns did not believe that the Red Army would be able to conquer Finland without a long war (Ibid. 41).

Due to the low expected military potential, the Finnish government sought to establish contacts with Moscow. However, peace feelers that worked through the USA and Sweden left Moscow unmoved as a complete occupation of the whole of Finland was expected to take only a couple of weeks. The Soviet Union relied on its high expected offensive potential and simply refused to talk with Helsinki (Manninen 1987: 84-85). The combatants' war aims did not match because of different perceptions of the future Soviet offensive potential. Moscow believed in its ability to force Finland to a swift and unconditional surrender, whereas the Finns doubted that the process would be so easy and believed in a negotiated solution. Thus, information on offensive capacity was asymmetric and the bargaining space was inexistent. Instead, Moscow recognized a "Finnish People's Government" consisting of expatriate Finnish communists in the Soviet Union (Vehviläinen 2002: 47; Pakaslahti 1970: 187). The main source of

the Soviet high expected offensive ability was the massive numbers of Soviet troops. Also, the forces sent to subdue the Finns were regarded as the best troops available in the Red Army, while the Finnish units consisted of a band of small farmers and lumberjacks (Vehviläinen 2002: 50).

In the early phases of the war, Finnish forces retreated toward their planned defense positions. After the Finnish line of defense was established by this so called Mannerheim Line, the subsequent Soviet efforts to overwhelm these positions failed. The reasons for this can be found in the qualities of the Red Army that starkly contradicted the initial expectations of the Soviet military and political leadership. A comparison of the Finnish and Soviet tactics indicates that, while the Finns were able to use the Finnish forests for their tactical benefit, these woodlands presented a serious obstacle to the Soviet mass tactics that would have been more efficient in the open landscapes of Central Europe. The Finns were more mobile on skis, able to use the dark of the northern winter nights as cover for operations and more flexible. The Red Army in turn lacked initiative and relied on the weight of its manpower and armored vehicles on open roads, mostly in broad daylight. The result was that the Finnish army could inflict heavy casualties on the enemy (Järvinen 1949; Mannerheim 1952: 138, 154, 158).

Yet, despite the active spirit among the Finnish troops that were proud to be able to hold on against the much larger Red Army, orders from headquarters favored a more defensive posture. On December 12, the headquarters denied a request for a counteroffensive by the troops in the Karelian Peninsula, the reason being that the expected offensive capacity of the Finnish army was low. These low expectations were created by the scarcity of skis for foot soldiers, the weakness of the anti-tank troops in offensive operations, and a lack of panzer mines, radio communications equipment and ammunition (Järvinen 1949: 96-97; Mannerheim 1952: 156).

The day before Christmas Eve, the Finns finally decided to deliver a blow to the Soviet forces with a large counter offensive in the Karelian Peninsula. The offensive nature of the counterattack was however limited by the decision to simultaneously hold the defensive positions (Järvinen 1949: 101). Consequently, the attack was not successful. From a tactical point of view, one of the reasons for the failure was the cautious use of the troops, which was the result of a lack of faith in the Finnish offensive capacity among many Finnish officers (Ibid. 132). While the more mobile Finns were on occasion capable of isolating and destroying several Soviet divisions, the offensive nature of these successful pincher maneuvers was limited. It was a matter of active defense with mobile forces using of the

cover of the forested terrain rather than active offense. In the end, the Finns lacked the capacity for and faith in their ability to force the Soviets back over the border.

The destruction of, for example, the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division in early January well depicts the limitations to the Soviet offensive potential and the Finns' ability to keep up an efficient defense. Some 22 000 Soviet troops were killed, primarily as a result of a much smaller Finnish contingent carrying out a pincher movement. Lacking the firepower to eliminate the Soviet troops, the Finns relied on starving the enemy by capturing all their field kitchens, firing on campfires and allowing the subzero temperatures to account for about half of the casualties. The Finns were sheltered in warm tents in the cover of the forest and kept up logistical support with the help of temporary ice roads and skis, but the Red Army was poorly equipped to deal with the cold climate or to move in the snow covered forest terrain beyond the open roads on which they were highly vulnerable. Both the severe climate and terrain proved to be major limitations to the Soviet offensive potential (Chew 1981).

Even if the Finns were unable to reclaim the territories that were now occupied by the Red Army, Stalin recognized that his army was "incompetent" (Montefiore 2004: 336). Thus, the battlefield events soon made Moscow realize that its offensive potential was limited as well. "The defensive victories of the Finns had a crucial impact on the course of the war... at some point, the Soviet leaders started to wonder whether it might not have been wiser to sit down at the negotiation table..." (Vehviläinen 2002: 54). The lowering of the Soviet expected offensive capacity, in accordance with the poor current battlefield performance, now offered a potential change in the Soviet war aims and a chance to create a bargaining space.

The lack of Soviet success in the war indeed coincided with a change in Moscow's war aims. During the early days of January, the Soviet Politburo abandoned the goal of a complete occupation of Finland and readopted the earlier prewar plan of merely moving the border further west to increase the security perimeter around Leningrad (Vladimirov 1995: 168-169, 215-216). In turn, the Finnish Commander in Chief, Mannerheim, made the assessment that Finland would be able to hold on through the winter if it received more troops and weapons (Vehviläinen 2002: 61; Manninen 1980: 261-272). The time was ripe for the belligerents to negotiate as the expected offensive potential was low on both sides. Neither side had information or expectations that would have given a reason to anticipate any significant increases in its offensive potential.

On January 14, 1940, a Finnish representative met with the Soviet ambassador to Sweden to inquire whether secret negotiations would be possible. Some two weeks later, on January 29, Moscow informed the Finns through the Swedish Foreign Minister that the Soviet Union could consider a negotiated solution to the war, but the terms of peace would not be as favorable as the ones offered prior to the initiation of hostilities (Vehviläinen 2002: 60). The Finnish government was ready to give up more than what the Soviets demanded prior to the war. However, since the situation was not as yet grave and the Finnish assessment of the Soviets' expected offensive ability not critically altered, the war aims and minimum demands on the two sides did not match. The Finns did not agree to lease the Hanko Peninsula as a Soviet military base. Instead, Finnish Prime Minister Tanner proposed giving up one island in the Gulf of Finland in return for territorial concessions elsewhere. His Soviet counterpart, Molotov, replied that a lease of the Hanko Peninsula and the nearby islands was essential to any peace agreement (Tanner 1957: 129-131; Vehviläinen 2002: 61). Thus, neither the Soviets nor the Finns had lowered their expected capacity enough for the minimum demands to match and the efforts to go further with negotiations came to a halt. On the basis of the current battlefield events, the Finns had reason to believe that they would be able to continue their active defense, while the Soviets had not sufficiently lowered their offensive expectations.

During the following five weeks, the Red Army prepared for another, more massive offensive that was initiated on February 1 and aimed at a decisive breakthrough to force the Finnish government to acquiesce to Moscow's demands. After two weeks of intensive fighting, especially in Summa, the Soviets succeeded in wearing down the Finnish defenders who finally withdrew westward toward the secondary defense line. The reason for the Soviet success was simple. The larger Red Army could keep up the attack for several days with 23 divisions, while the nine Finnish divisions had to fight fatigued without a chance to replace the defending troops on the front line. The offensive was now also better planned, relied on a better coordination of the different units and was backed up by a massive superiority in manpower and military material (Järvinen 1949: 172; Vehviläinen 2002: 61-62).

Observing an increase in the Soviet offensive capacity, the Finnish Government decided to ask Sweden for military assistance on February 12. The Swedish military industry had been supplying the Finns with arms and munitions throughout the war but, fearing a German intervention,

the Swedes were reluctant to become officially involved in the war against the Soviet Union. Swedish Prime Minister Hansson rejected the Finnish request and advised Helsinki to opt for a negotiated solution (Carlgren 1973: 100; Tanner 1957: 157-159). The situation was becoming increasingly critical.

As a result of the Soviet offensive success, the Finns found themselves forced to withdraw further west. After establishing themselves at the secondary defense line, the Finnish army continued their active defense. North of Lake Ladoga, roads were even scarcer and mobility even more restricted than in the southern region of the Karelian Peninsula. While the Finns continued their defense in the south from the secondary defense line, the wilderness in the north offered even better opportunity for lethal pincher movements and patrols behind enemy lines to wreak havoc amidst the Soviet forces. Yet, even here, the expected Finnish offensive potential was limited. The most successful pincher movements were carried out by special forces capable of operating efficiently without the support of roads or by regular troops after weeks of constructing roads that could be used for moving in supporting artillery and replenishing troops (Järvinen 1949: 234).

Finally, the prospects for a protracted war were even more clearly withering away with the Swedish refusal to become involved and the Finnish unwillingness to ask other Western powers for help. At the request of the Finnish Prime Minister, his Swedish colleague contacted Moscow anew in order to get information about the Soviet minimum demands. On February 21, Molotov replied that the Soviet Union required a lease of the Hanko Peninsula and territorial concessions in the southeast of Finland (Vehviläinen 2002: 64).

The Western powers were prepared to send 22 000 troops to Finland, but it was considered an inadequate gesture by the Finnish President Ryti and Prime Minister Tanner. The Finns had been forced to abandon their primary line of defense and were running out of well trained replacements and military material. Offensive expectations had been weak to start with and by this time expectations of a high capacity to keep up active defense were also clearly withering away. It was thought to be better to make peace now, when the army was still in fighting condition (Vehviläinen 2002: 64; Nevakivi 2000: 173-188).

In March, the Soviet Union had increased the number of divisions against Finland to 72, which amounted to about one million men in arms, supported by almost 3 000 tanks and 4 000 aircraft. Thus, on March 5,

1940, the Finns acquiesced to Soviet demands after having lost some 23 000 men. The Soviet losses amounted to about 100 000 men. However, Moscow had raised its peace conditions because of the increased expectations of offensive potential after the recent Soviet offensive successes on the battlefield. Moscow now demanded further territorial concessions in the north of Finland. Nevertheless, the peace treaty was signed by both sides on March 13. (Manninen 1994: 295-299; Vehviläinen 2002: 69). The Finnish expectations were reduced more than Soviet expectations had risen. Thus, the war aims finally matched to the extent that a bargaining space was opened.

5.4. Finnish Nationalism

It is clear from the previous account that both the current and expected offensive capacity among the belligerents was low. Despite the active spirit that was created by the pride in being able to hold against the Red Army and inflict heavy casualties, neither Finnish offensive expectations nor successes were particularly high. As the Finnish war aims were not high and covaried with the current offensive ability, we can observe learning from the battlefield events. An important factor for belligerents' willingness to negotiate and ability to create a bargaining space is the presence or absence of expansive ideology. As the Finnish society was neither saturated by religion nor by any specific political ideology, the best candidate for forming the basis for an expansive ideology, increasing the stakes and creating asymmetric causal beliefs, was nationalism.

The rise of nationalism is often associated with the French Revolution of 1789 and can be seen as a modern manifestation of collective identity in societies where other sources of identification were on the wane as a result of changing social structures. In general, nationalism served to change the location of group loyalties from local to higher regional levels (Habermas 1988). The birth of Finnish nationalism was no exception and can be traced to around the time of the Napoleonic Wars when Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy under the rule of Czarist Russia. Yet, during the early 19th century, the Finnish social landscape dictated that the primary objects of belonging were social class and local community (Jussila 1979: 17). In subsequent years, however, the rise of Finnish nationalism was advanced by the strategic interests of Russia, which held that a sense of loyalty among the subjects was best fostered through local elites and traditions (Klinge 1980; Kemiläinen 1989). Nonetheless, the result of the

rise in nationalistic sentiments during the 19th century was the creation of what Paasi calls “separation nationalism” (1996: 87) with the aim of creating Finland as an independent national entity.

The rising Finnish nationalism had two basic foundations: the emergence of Finland as a distinct political unit during its years of autonomy and the birth of a national romantic movement that promoted the Finnish language and culture (Kemiläinen 1989). Enthusiasts studied the roots of the Finnish language and collected folklore and poetry. This work culminated in the collection of the Finnish national epic *Kalevala* in 1835 by Elias Lönnroth in both Finnish and Russian Karelia. Against this background of a nascent political existence and emerging national romantic consciousness, the Russian nationalistic and political challenge to Finland’s cultural and political autonomy in the 1860s to 1880s helped the rise of nationalism in Finland (Paasi 1996: 95).

While the moderately liberal attitude of Czar Alexander II had been reflected in the rise of Finnish cultural life and the functioning of the Finnish Parliament, the last two Russian czars, Alexander III and Nicholas II, were hostile to Finnish nationalism. Yet, during the later years of Russian political and cultural oppression around the turn of the century, nationalism was very actively spread among the masses to counter the Russian activities, and the concept of the fatherland became clearer to the Finns (Jussila 1979: 18-21). The years of oppression, 1899-1905 and 1908-17, which included a heavy Russification program, also gave rise to a new military consciousness, as some 2 000 Finns secretly went to Germany for military training starting in 1915. Germany in turn considered an independent Finland an opportunity to further isolate Russia (Paasi 1996: 96).

In 1917, in the aftermath of the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin granted Finland independence. Nevertheless, the ideological struggle between the communists and bourgeois would not leave Finland untouched. In the spring of 1918, a civil war broke out between the socialist “reds” and the conservative “whites”. The couple of months of fighting utterly divided the collective consciousness of the new nation (Upton 1981: 459). The “whites” ultimately emerged victorious, but more than 40 percent of the population identified with the losing socialist side and became resentful. The official histories depicting the civil war as a war of freedom against the misguided workers further worsened the national divide (Upton 1965: 39). The new division was reflected in both the political and cultural spheres. The workers’ collective social action was limited and one could even detect

the new strains in Finnish literature (Paasivirta 1984: 283-284). As a result, the earlier rising national consciousness was now in dire straits because of the internal struggle for power within the nation.

The Finnish nationhood was slowly being repaired during the 1920s. Students and the intelligentsia took a leading role in strengthening Finnish nationalism, centered on the love of Finland and loathing of Russia (Upton 1965: 45-46). The nature of nationalism in Finland before and during the Winter War can be analyzed by looking into the activities of two central nationalistic organizations and the support they enjoyed. The Academic Karelia Society (AKS) was established in 1922 with the aim of increasing nationalistic sentiments and strengthening the will to defend the nation. AKS propagated the irredentist idea of unifying the Finnish speaking peoples in Finland and the Soviet Union. The initial step would have included the annexation of Eastern Karelia into Finland. Yet much of the political and social influence of AKS was on the wane during the 1930s. The movement suffered an internal break up after 1932 when many centrist members resigned due to the violent rebellion – “Lapua Movement” – of anti-communists, who claimed that the government had not done enough to check socialist activities in Finland. Not only was AKS split; other nationalist organizations also experienced a decrease in influence and opted for defense propaganda instead of propagating offensive irredentism (Manninen 1990: 11). While the dream of a greater Finland had imbued AKS’s agenda, especially during the last years of the 1930s, these ambitions were no longer as prominent as before (Klinge 1968: 205-208; Alapuro 1973: 143). Furthermore, if the young intelligentsia was more prone to adopt the ideological tones of fascism, these lines of thought were becoming increasingly alien to the Finns after the rise of Hitler into power (Alapuro 1973: 145-146, 157).

AKS was not the only nationalist organization formed after Finland had gained independence. The Finnish fascist party, the Patriotic Popular Movement (IKL), was established in 1932 as a response to communist activities in Finland. It was a continuation of the anti-communist “Lapua Movement” in western Finland and constructed on the mental images of antiquarian nationalism of the previous century (Fewster 2006: 318). Yet the social influence of IKL did not reach higher than that of the split AKS. IKL lost parliamentary influence toward the end of the 1930s and the government sought to abolish it in 1938 (Manninen 1990: 11). The nation had recently been split in the course of the civil war and the anti-communist

rebellion. Thus, Finnish nationalism was still largely based on the hate and fear of Russia and had not yet incorporated expansive territorial ambitions.

Despite the acute lack of national cohesion after the civil war and the limited political influence of AKS, the Soviet threat was becoming clear by the end of the 1930s and “the content of the social consciousness changed in favor of national defence” (Paasi 1996: 102). Consequently, as the war started in 1939, a process of national reconciliation across political divides took place in order to save the country from foreign occupation (Soikkanen 1984). As for the Finnish decision-makers, they had already sought to quell the influence of expansive nationalism by outlawing IKL prior to the war. The Finnish elite did not expect Russia to attack at all (Vehviläinen 2002: 46) and, unprepared for the war, they expressed nothing indicative of expansive nationalism. During the war, the nation, including its leaders, was merely caught up with the increasing sense of solidarity among the various social strata (Helanen 1940: 10).

This form of defensive nationalism centered on protecting the fatherland was less expansive than the form of nationalism that would imbue the nation after the Winter War. It was a form of nationalism that grew out of the fear of Russia of the past decenniums. Thus Helsinki had neither offensive stakes nor asymmetric causal beliefs, and emerging united with preserved independence was considered more important than occupying the enemy territory. Similarly, the form of defensive nationalism that characterized the Finnish war efforts did not increase the Finns’ faith in their offensive capacity. Instead, they soon sought a negotiated solution to the war and their war aims reflected learning from the battlefield events.

After the Winter War, Finnish nationalism became increasingly expansive by aiming at recovering the lost Finnish territories and more fully embracing AKS’s original irredentist dream of unifying Finnish speaking territories in Soviet Karelia with Finland. The change is clearly visible in the motto of AKS’s 1940 yearbook: through national reconciliation to national greatness (Ibid. 10). The name of a new national organization – Rising Finland – would also ominously reflect the increasingly expansionist nature of Finnish nationalism after the Winter War. Yet, during the Winter War, there was no expansive nationalism that would have contributed to overly optimistic interpretations of battlefield events by the Finnish decision-makers. In consequence, the expected ability to use offensive military factors was low and did not contribute to raising the Finnish war aims.

5.5. Soviet Ideology

Despite initial high expectations, Moscow soon realized that its offensive capacity was limited. An important factor for the belligerents' willingness to negotiate and ability to create a bargaining space is the presence or absence of expansive ideology. Communist ideology best characterized the Soviet society prior to and during the Winter War. Even if Stalin himself referred to "Soviet patriotism," it was not nationalism with the aim of aggrandizing some nationality. It rather referred to the "loyalty of citizens to Soviet socialist system and to a Soviet state" (Roberts 2006: 20). Thus the best candidate for forming the basis for expansive ideology, increasing the stakes and creating asymmetric causal beliefs, is political ideology. However, security concerns rather than spreading the revolution was the primary cause for Stalin's expansive Soviet ideology. The Soviet ideology was initially expansive toward Finland as the Finnish territory was valuable for the security of Leningrad, which served as a justification for the war.

Stalin did not rely on Finland's ability to remain militarily independent if a great power decided to attack the Soviet Union through Finland. The Soviet chief of staff also feared that Germany could attack the Soviet Union by using the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia (Manninen 1990: 10-12). Thus, once Molotov and Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939 and its secret clause assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere of influence, Moscow was swift to start negotiations with not only the Baltic states but also Finland. Facing a looming Nazi aggression against Leningrad through Finland, the value of the Finnish territory increased and gave rise to the war.

Even if Stalin argued after the Winter War that the *casus belli* was "the question of Leningrad's security" (Kulkov et al. 2002: 264), the role of ideology and a possible goal of exporting the revolution cannot be neglected. After the Soviet attack, Stalin set up a puppet government, headed by a Finnish communist, Kuusinen, in the Soviet Union. While this puppet government may have been a pawn in an international diplomatic game of chess, it had some ideological significance. In a private remark in January 1940, Stalin linked the Winter War to a worldwide political struggle: "[t]he Red Army's activities are also a matter of world revolution" (Roberts 2006: 48). However, Roberts argues that "Stalin was blinkered by his ideology, not blinded by it. As soon as it became clear that Finnish political developments were not moving according to the ideological blueprint the Kuusinen government disappeared from the view" (Ibid. 48). Thus, while

the Soviet attack had both security and ideological aspects, the ideological ones soon withered away. Rieber argues that Stalin “revised the official ideology in response to the changing circumstances...in order to avoid any hint of revolutionary aims” (2005: 148). The security concerns, in turn, could be addressed with limited territorial concessions.

The ideological concerns were relatively weak because Finland was not a considerable threat to the Soviet Union either before or during the Winter War. While German troops had aided the anti-communist troops to victory against the communists during the Finnish Civil War, the Finnish military and political relations with Nazi Germany were not very close before or during the Winter War. The Finnish-German relations had weakened since 1933 by the Finnish tradesmen’s efforts to establish commercial contacts with Great Britain, Foreign Minister Holsti’s antipathy to Hitler and his follower Erkko’s close contacts with Great Britain. In 1939 Finland also rejected a non-aggression pact with Germany (Manninen 1990: 10-11). All of these factors were likely to convince Moscow that Finland was not a Nazi state or an ally of Nazi Germany that posed a significant ideological or a military threat to the existence of the Soviet Union.

There had been anti-Russian sentiments in Finland since the years of oppression, 1899-1905 and 1908-1917, when Finland was a Grand Duchy under Russia, but they were based on Finnish nationalism and not on a national socialist, anti-communist ideology that would have evoked a response from the Soviet Union. Instead, Stalin was obsessed with security and attacked Finland mainly because he expected a future conflict with Nazi Germany (Rieber 2005: 141; Vehviläinen 2002: 31). Finland itself was not seen as an ideological threat to be conquered at any price. As Rieber writes about Stalin, “the external world represented not so much an opportunity to launch further revolutionary offensives as a potential threat to the territorial integrity, indeed the survival of the Soviet state” (2005: 141-142).

Thus two factors contributed to Stalin lowering his war aims. First, once the Red Army had conquered the Finnish territory surrounding Leningrad, which was most valuable in the face of a possible Nazi offensive through Finland, the value of the remaining Finnish territory was not high. Therefore the offensive stakes in continuing the war were low. The Soviet aim prior to the war had been to secure Leningrad and, facing difficulties in pursuing larger goals, the low stakes did not prevent the lowering of the war aims that had been raised during the war as a result of passing high offensive expectations. Second, Stalin was not blinded by the com-

munist ideology and did not have expansive causal beliefs that would have contributed to overly optimistic interpretations of the battlefield events or expectations of rising offensive capacity. As Stalin then learned that the battlefield events did not indicate a high ability to use offensive military factors, the war aims were soon lowered.

In consequence, the nature of the Soviet ideology during the Winter War soon became defensive: the stake were low, and as the Soviet war effort was not going well, the war aims were lowered since there were no asymmetric causal belief that would have raised Stalin's expected ability to use offensive military factors. As we will see in the next chapter, the Soviet ideological stance would become more expansive after the Winter War as Finland threw its lot with Germany, establishing strong economic, political and military contacts with the Nazi regime in Berlin.

5.6. Final Analysis

The hypothesis concerning the process of peacemaking and the reason for the length of the war are corroborated by the case of the Winter War. Thus the bounded learning theory gives a good explanation of the chain of events during the war: lacking expansive ideology or asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity, the battlefield events quite soon revealed information about the belligerents' relative strength. This in turn enabled learning from the battlefield events, as the combatants adjusted their war aims in accordance with their current offensive potential so that a bargaining space was created.

During this relatively short war, we can observe how low expected offensive capacity on both sides, $p(\text{win})$, and relatively low offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, created a low expected utility of continuing the war. The war aims followed the battlefield events and an early creation of a bargaining space was possible. Thus, as the minimum demands from both sides matched in quite a short period of time, a peace treaty was also quickly within reach. Even if the military material available to the states was becoming increasingly offense dominant compared to the First World War, for example, the actual military factors were far from total offense dominance. After the Soviet attack, the Finnish army was successful in mounting an active defense against the Red Army. In practice this meant that limited operational maneuvers to wreak havoc among the Soviet division were possible, but any decisive offensive capacity was lacking on both sides.

The Soviets pushed hard with their much larger material capacities and manpower but achieved only very limited goals. After three months, the Soviet Union amassed all the troops it could spare for a sizeable onslaught. As even this was dwarfed by Finland at a great cost to the attacker, Moscow quite soon lowered its war aims from a complete occupation of Finland to limited territorial concessions. Since Finland was not an ally of Germany, the value of the remaining Finnish territory was not as high as that of the occupied buffer zone surrounding Leningrad. Similarly, there were neither expansive causal beliefs nor expectations of improving tactics or access to offensive military material that would have increased the expected offensive capacity. Thus the belligerents did not have asymmetric causal beliefs or asymmetric information – private or otherwise contestable – which would have allowed them to have such high war aims that they would have been considered unjustifiable by the enemy.


The battle at which the Soviets failed to make efficient use of the offensive military factors was viewed in Finland as a Finnish failure as well and both sides lowered their expected offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$. The reason that the Soviets had a limited offensive success was the roughly one million men, 3 000 tanks and 4 000 aircraft placed against Finland, while material superiority alone was not enough to advance more than through the Karelian Isthmus. Thus, the expected utility of continuing war beyond that was not higher than agreeing to a peace treaty that was in any case harsher for the Finns than the original territorial demands presented before the start of the war.

The Finns in turn had preferred open negotiations already at the onset of the war. They had also lacked decisive offensive capacity during the war and were running out of resources. Therefore, the expected utility of continuing the war was lower than the expected utility of accepting some territorial losses. Lacking expansive nationalism that could have raised the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, by increasing value of the enemy territory or created asymmetric causal beliefs that could have contributed to overly optimistic interpretations of the battlefield events, $p(\text{win})$, the expected utility of continuing the war was not increased. Even if the Finns succeeded in destroying several Soviet divisions and the Red Army displayed an obvious lack of offensive ability, there were no expectations of beating the much larger enemy. The subsequent war aims were similarly low and permitted the early creation of a bargaining space.

I will use some simple figures to further illustrate the events during the war. The distances between the different points in time are not propor-

tional. Especially in the chapters that analyze longer wars, limitations in space make a proportional month by month account of a war infeasible. Yet the figures serve to complement the empirical material in the text and thus make the analysis more straightforward. Figure 3 illustrates the discrepancy in war aims as reflected in the demands to the enemy during the Winter War and the concomitant process toward the creation of the bargaining space. It thus shows how far the combatants were from making peace. The key to understanding the figure is the distance between the upper line, representing Finland's war aims, and the lower line, representing the Soviet war aims.

FIGURE 3. Discrepancy in War Aims during the Winter War (Bargaining Space)



Note: Non-proportional distances. Finland: ____ The Soviet Union:

Prior to the beginning of the war, the minimum demands from both sides were discrepant as the territorial concessions required by Moscow were larger than those agreed to by Helsinki. As the bargaining space was non-existent, Stalin decided to use the Red Army to solve the impasse. By the onset of hostilities in December 1939, the Soviet war aims had changed to a complete occupation of Finland, while the Finns wanted to continue negotiations without an outspoken change in their requirements: the much larger Soviet Union had high expectations of its offensive capacity and raised its war aims accordingly (the Soviet line moves away from the Finnish one), whereas the Finns perceived their weaker position, which called for

a negotiated solution to the conflict. Surrendering was out of the question because the perceived limitations in the Soviet offensive capacity in the forested winter terrain did not warrant it. Thus, there was some initial asymmetric information as Finland did not agree that the Soviet offensive expectations that gave rise to their initially high war aims were reasonable. This prevented the creation of the bargaining space.

By January 1940, the Red Army had shown its limited offensive capacity, and these lower offensive expectations were coupled with lower war aims that now included mere limited territorial demands (the Soviet line moves closer to the Finnish one), even though they were higher than the original demands that had been placed prior to the war. Even if Moscow had started to learn from the battlefield events, the Finns did not accept these demands as the Red Army had not yet shown offensive capacity that could pose an acute threat to the Finns. The final Soviet offensive in February gave the Finns a reason to acquiesce to the Soviet demands, however. The Soviets raised their demands a bit as a result of their offensive, even if it did not manage to break the Finnish defenses. The Soviet expectations of offensive capacity had been somewhat raised, but the battlefield events had shown the Finns the danger that the Red Army posed and they were by that time running out of resources. Thus Helsinki had to lower its expectations and war aims. In consequence, the war aims were no longer incompatible (the lines converge). The minimum demands finally matched, a bargaining space was created and a peace treaty was soon signed.


When there is neither clear offense dominance to allow one side to easily run over the other nor expansive ideology or asymmetric information to keep both sides' expected utility of continuing the war high, the battlefield events are interpreted correctly and a bargaining space is swiftly created. If the actual battlefield events are interpreted correctly without the confounding influence of expansive ideology and asymmetric information, the ability to make use of offensive military factors (battlefield events) and war aims should covary.

Figure 4 illustrates the covariance between such ability and war aims in Finland during the Winter War. The fact that the lines are parallel throughout the war and moved in the same direction when changes in battlefield events took place shows that the war aims covaried closely with the actual battlefield events. Throughout the war, the Finnish army was successful in resisting the Soviet invasion with an active defense. Only when the Soviet Union had increased its offensive capacity by amassing more soldiers against Finland in February did Helsinki have reason to lower its war aims.

Thus, based on the battlefield events, the Finnish war aims were not unrealistic and the expectation of the bounded learning theory is corroborated.

It is also interesting to note that Goemans’s (2000) statistical test of his theory of war duration is based on a data base, where Finland was coded as a semi-repressive regime. According to his theory, semi-repressive regimes contribute to increasing war duration by raising their war aims when battlefield events are not positive. Yet, the historical evidence does not indicate that this would have been the case. The battlefield events and Finland’s war aims covaried closely.

FIGURE 4. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of Finland



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: _____ Battlefield events: - - - -

Figure 5 illustrates the covariance between the Soviet ability to use offensive military factors and the Soviet war aims during the war. At the onset of the war, Moscow optimistically and dramatically raised its war aims to a complete occupation of Finland. The battlefield events did not match these positive expectations, however, and we can observe a change in the distance between the lines depicting the war aims and actual battlefield events. It is this gap that expresses the brief high expected utility of waging the war at the beginning of the conflict. Yet, quite soon, in January of the following year, the war aims became more realistic and better matched the actual battlefield events, where the Red Army had shown scarce offensive ability. During the final massive attack, the Soviets’ limited offensive success gave rise to a moderate increase in war aims but, since the very same

6. THE CONTINUATION WAR

I start the chapter with a brief introduction to the background to the Continuation War. After specifying the theoretical expectations, I proceed to analyze how current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the belligerents' war aims. Just as in the previous chapter, I also examine the nature of the greatest potential factors that could affect the duration of the war according to the bounded learning theory: asymmetric information and possible expansive ideology in the form of Finnish nationalism and Soviet ideology.

6.1. The Road to War

The Continuation War of 1941-44 started over a year after the Winter War – a failed attempt by the Soviet Union to subdue Finland. In the Moscow Peace Treaty, Finland lost a part of Karelia and the Hanko peninsula, and the 15 months between the wars were a tense period during which Finland sought to regain its strength for a potential second onslaught by the Soviets. Yet the road to war would be quite different in character, as the broader political developments in Europe played a crucial role in breaking the peace anew. In 1939 Germany ended up in war with Great Britain and France – later on also with the Soviet Union – and it was difficult for a tiny country like Finland not to get entangled in great power politics.

After the German conquest of Paris in mid June 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania received ultimatums from the Soviet Union requiring the placement of Soviet troops in these countries. The Baltic States promptly acquiesced and were soon occupied. On June 23, Finland also received demands, although they were not equally harsh. The Soviets sought to gain access to the nickel mines of Pechenga in northern Finland with a mining license. Finland was also to demolish fortifications in the Åland Islands and grant railroad access for Soviet troop transports to the Hanko peninsula. On August 8, Mannerheim, the Finnish head of the armed forces, asked the government to implement partial mobilization in the case of a Soviet attack, but his request was denied lest the Soviets would be provoked (Vehviläinen 2002: 81).

As Germany was delivering the final blows to France, the Soviet Union found itself as the sole great power on the European continent with Germany. Thus, its westward expansion and the demands on Finland can be seen as preparation for a looming showdown with Germany since Finland was seen as a possible ally of Germany (Manninen 1993: 115-119; Vehviläinen 2002: 81). At the same time, Finland, which had learned during the Winter War how arduous it is to fight a great power in the absence of outside assistance, saw in the rising power of Germany an opportunity to gain both political support and weapons that could ensure Finland's continued independence.

As on July 31, 1940, Germany started preparations for an attack against the Soviet Union and intelligence about an impending Soviet attack on Finland surfaced, Germany agreed to secretly sell weapons to Finland. Finnish Prime Minister Ryti also agreed to German troop transports through Finland to Norway (Jokipii 1987: 113-119). The Soviets were increasingly alerted to the developments, and the Soviet envoy to Finland, Zotov, wrote that the appearance of German troops in Finland created hope among the Finnish leaders (Vehviläinen 2002: 84). On November 27, an offensive plan to occupy all of Finland was drafted by the Soviet General Staff, but Hitler successfully rebuffed the Soviet desire to realize the plans (Manninen 1993: 121-124; Jokipii 1987: 143-147).

During the Continuation War, Finland's foreign policy would be controlled by an inner circle, where newly elected President Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim were the leading figures (Vehviläinen 2002: 85). Stalin was in control of the foreign policy goals in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union began to fear that the Finnish leaders were gliding toward Germany in the spring of 1941. It delivered 20 000 tons of grain to Finland as a gesture of conciliation, but the Soviet measures of good will came too late. In May the inner circle accepted a German invitation to send officers to Germany to discuss the coordination of the two countries' war efforts in the case of a militarized conflict with the Soviet Union (Jokipii 1987: 296-314).

No formal agreement was signed (Ibid. 546), but Finland had by that time thrown its lot with Germany in order to preserve its independence in the face of a looming military contestation with the Red Army: four German divisions were deployed in Finland to strengthen the Finnish defenses in the north. On June 25, 1941, three days after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Baltic Fleet announced the initiation of hostilities

and the Soviet Air Force raided targets in Finland (Vehviläinen 2002: 88). Despite the failed attempt of 1939, Moscow again regarded the expected utility of starting a war higher than refraining from military action. In addition, Helsinki believed that military resistance yielded higher expected utility than giving in to the Soviet demands. The task is then to explain why the expected utility of a negotiated solution was so low for such a long time.

6.2. Theoretical Expectations

In the following account of the Continuation War, I focus on the process during which the belligerents created a bargaining space as the war aims from both sides became compatible. From the perspective of the strategic learning theory, which focuses on the process in which events endogenous to the war (battlefield events) cause states to update their beliefs, the Continuation War was an anomaly due to its length. The task is to analyze this deviation from the theory's expectation that events on the battlefield should swiftly reveal information about skill, resolve and the expected costs of war so that the belligerents can agree on the terms of peace. Something must have made at least one side of the conflict neglect or misinterpret the battlefield events.

Because of the length of the war, the bounded learning suggests that we will find either an expansive ideology or asymmetric information about expected offensive potential, which increases the belligerents' expected ability to use offensive military factors and causes disagreement over what reasonable war aims should be. It is also possible that an expansive ideology raised the offensive stakes. Thus, the bargaining space is not created for a long time because the expected utility of continuing warfare, rather than accepting the enemy's demands, is high. Yet, I expect that the offensive stakes are lowered when the expected offensive capacity weakens, i.e. either asymmetric information or asymmetric causal beliefs disappear. As in the previous chapter treating the Winter War, I will examine the nature of nationalism in Finland and the role of ideology in the Soviet Union. However, I will start the analysis by examining how current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the war aims. On the strength of the length of the war, the bounded learning theory expects a low covariance.

6.3. Early Phases of the War

At the outset of the war, the forces were relatively balanced in terms of troop numbers. The Finns had 15 divisions, while the Red Army placed 18 divisions against Finland (Manninen 1987: 345-346). Germany had four divisions that operated independently in the north. Further, the fact that the Soviet Union simultaneously fought Germany in Eastern Europe explains the relative equality of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border. Still, Finland was not bound by any official agreement with Germany. Instead, Finland was a “co-belligerent” rather than an ally. The Finnish government had also publicly underlined on several occasions that Finland fought without treaty obligations. Thus Finland fought a separate war that could also end in a separate peace (Polvinen 1969: 45-46, 51; Vehviläinen 2002: 91; Mannerheim 1952: 292).

Apart from the rather equal number of divisions, there were also differences. On the Finnish side, “[t]here was only one tank battalion, and the lack of motorized transport restricted mobility, although this was to some extent alleviated by equipping some of the infantry with bicycles” (Vehviläinen 2002: 90). Nevertheless, the Finns were now better armed and the troops’ self-confidence was higher than during the Winter War. On the Soviet side, the Red Army had been reorganized, training had been intensified and new tank models had been developed (Vehviläinen 2002: 90-91; Mannerheim 1952: 277-278). In consequence, the conditions were ripe for both sides to have high expectations of their ability to make use of offensive military factors (tactics and technology) and to have a high expected utility of waging the war. I will start by analyzing the covariance between battlefield events and war aims and then turn to the possible impact of nationalism and ideology. Toward the end of the chapter I will also deal with asymmetric information.

At the outset of the war, Finland believed in a Soviet defeat (Vehviläinen 2002: 92) and the Soviet aim of conquering the whole of Finland thus left no bargaining space. There was no official declaration of the Finnish war aims. Still, it was considered self-evident that the minimum demand was to regain control over the Karelian territory that was lost to the Soviet Union during the Winter War (Polvinen 1969: 46). While Commander in Chief Mannerheim was invested with the power to decide the scope of the operations based on his strategic assessments, in practice there was frequent consultation with President Ryti (Manninen 1980: 195-213). On July 4, 1941, before the scope of the Finnish offensive ability had come to light,

Ryti told the US representative in Finland that he was willing to make a slight adjustment of the border in the Karelian peninsula so that the security of Leningrad would be better provided for in the future (Polvinen 1969: 66). Yet this willingness to compromise would soon diminish as the battlefield events would indicate a growing offensive capacity.

Mannerheim concentrated the main offensive east of Lake Ladoga. The Finnish forces took the tactical initiative and, despite the overall equality of forces, had in the main area of operations a “four-to-one superiority in infantry and a nine-to-one superiority in artillery. They also had the advantage of being mobile in roadless terrain, which allowed them to penetrate deep behind enemy lines and attack from the rear” (Vehviläinen 2002: 93). By the first days of September, Finland had succeeded in regaining all the territory lost during the Winter War and dug into defensive positions in the south only about 20 kilometers from Leningrad (Manninen 1987: 356-352; Mannerheim 1952: 290).

Finland had hoped for a short war. But as operations continued in Eastern Karelia, the Social Democratic members of the cabinet pleaded to the Commander in Chief that the offensive should come to an end so that agricultural and industrial production would not crumple. The fact that Finland had to use 16 percent of its total population in active duty was a serious limitation to a small nation’s offensive capacity, despite the initial operational successes. The offensive in Eastern Karelia was stopped on December 6, and older men were demobilized in order to sustain the home front. Without this strengthening of the home front, the Finns’ ability to continue to wage the war was thought to be seriously compromised (Vehviläinen 2002: 96).

As the Finnish troops had advanced beyond the old 1939 borders, the Soviet Union sought to get Great Britain and the United States to apply pressure on the Finnish leaders so that they would agree to make peace. On August 4, 1941, Stalin told the United States that the Soviet government could sign a peace treaty with Finland and even agree to territorial concession if the Finns would disengage themselves from Germany. It seems clear that Moscow had lowered its war aims due to the Red Army’s inability to make use of the offensive military factors, despite the new tank models and the troops’ improved training. The Germans were simultaneously pushing eastward in Central Europe and the Soviets could therefore not be expected to be able to increase their ability to make use of the offensive military factors against Finland. Neither was enough new material expected to be available nor did Soviet tactics hold the promise

of overpowering the Finns. Thus the Finns ignored Stalin's bid for peace as the Soviet Union was deemed to be prone to collapse and there were no guarantees that Stalin would be trusted to keep peace (Polvinen 1979: 100-106; 1969: 70-71).

Both Germany and Finland were on top of the events on the battlefield, and the Soviet defeat was thought to be only a matter of time. The Soviet proposal and the Finnish refusal coincided with a stage in the war where the Red Army had sought to make serious counterattacks but completely failed to impede the ongoing Finnish advance (Mannerheim 1952: 286-287). Thus the utility of continuing the war was still deemed higher than signing a peace treaty on Soviet terms, which were now lowered due to the Red Army's low offensive capacity. The Soviet terms were not lowered enough to reflect the battlefield dominance of the Finns, however.

Without stating their war aims in public, many Finns dreamed of a Greater Finland that would entail annexing the Finnish speaking Eastern Karelia. As the Social Democrat parliamentary group called for "freedom and self-determination and a place by our side in the community of nations" for the Eastern Karelians, only the Swedish People's Party was opposed to annexing new territory (Vehviläinen 2002: 104; Soikkanen 1987: 302). Such a plea would not have been likely to have been made without the Finnish battlefield successes and the concomitant high expected utility of continuing the war. Social Democratic minister Tanner sought to caution the public of stretching the borders of Finland too far. Nevertheless, on September 11, some two and a half months into the war, President Ryti told a German representative that Finland not only sought to regain the lost Eastern Karelia but also aimed to conquer the Kola Peninsula (Polvinen 1969: 47-48). I will now turn to an analysis of how rising Finnish nationalism raised the stakes by increasing the value of the enemy territory and how rising offensive ability made Finnish nationalism more expansive.

6.4. Finnish Offensive Nationalism

Finland had lost a large part of its eastern territories to the Soviet Union as a result of the Winter War. Thousands of refugees had been evacuated from these lands, which were considered part of the Finnish heart land. During the 19th century, Lönnroth, the compiler of the Finnish national epic Kalevala, had traveled these borderlands between Russia and Finland gathering oral traditions that related the Finnish nation to its mythical past. Once the Red Army had initiated hostilities, recovering the lost lands

was not only an exclusive policy opted by the political leadership but also a sentiment widely shared by the majority of the population. The Finnish novelist Väinö Linna wrote that “for over a year, many Finns had harboured thoughts of revenge, clenching their fists in their pockets” (Vehviläinen 2002: 89). During the Winter War, Finland had struggled for its national survival and the nationalist sentiments had contributed to healing the scars of the civil war for a common defense of Finland’s independence. However, the nature of nationalism would now be different from that of the Winter War.

Expansive ideology in the form nationalism would play a part in two processes that contributed to raising the Finnish war aims space during the Continuation War. First, nationalism was boosted by offense dominance to become increasingly offensive. Second, when nationalism became offensive, the offensive stakes were raised as the value of the enemy territory increased. The dream of a Greater Finland made the war increasingly a zero sum game as Moscow was not prepared to recognize the Finnish nationalist claim to that much of Soviet territory. Thus, the war aims were not lowered, and the demands presented to the enemy would be so harsh that a bargaining space could not be swiftly created.

As the Finnish war effort progressed well and the old borders were soon reached, the question of whether to proceed beyond them became acute. On the one hand, the decision entailed military considerations about what was strategically most beneficial. On the other hand, it was a question of national policy. Checkel (1997: 9) writes that decentralized states (e.g. Finland) present entrepreneurs, such as nationalists, a greater number of pathways and access points through which to influence policy. Ever since the Peace of Tartu, which established the borders between the young Soviet Union and the newly independent Finland, a dream of a Greater Finland had lived on among university students and the extreme right. This dream of annexing Eastern Karelia would now spread even to the agenda of the highest policy elite consisting of President Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim (Paasi 1996: 107).

With the increase in Soviet power during the 1930s, the dream of uniting the Finnish peoples was irrelevant. However, in the spring of 1941, as the threat of war rose, it “enjoyed a renaissance” and finally “[t]he national romantic ideal of a ‘Greater Finland’ came into bloom when the troops set off on their offensive, and the non-socialist Finnish-language press was caught up in the enthusiasm” (Vehviläinen 2002: 91). As the current and expected ability to make use of offensive military factors increased during

the early phases of the war, offensive nationalism also started to spread.

On July 10, 1941, Finnish Commander in Chief Mannerheim sought to boost the morale of the troops in the Order of the Day by promising to liberate Eastern Karelia, which was Soviet territory.

The freedom of Karelia and the Greater Finland shine before us in the mighty stream of events in world history. May the destiny of the people guide Finland's army toward fulfilling my promise to the Karelian tribe... Your victory will liberate Karelia (Ylipäällikön Päiväkäskey N:o 3).

At the outset of the war, this open declaration of a war of conquest was embarrassing to the government because it threatened to endanger the national unity that had been centered on the defense of the nation during the Winter War, not on territorial expansion. Consequently, the Social Democrats threatened with resignation (Vehviläinen 2002: 93). Nevertheless, the offensive stakes were high for the Commander in Chief from the start of the war.

When the troops were to cross the old 1939 border, masses of Finnish soldiers refused to do so (Paasi 1996: 108). However, after a successful occupation of Eastern Karelia, nationalist sentiments increased so much among the Finnish political elite that the territories were being prepared for a permanent annexation. Not even the previously skeptical Social Democrats in the Parliament, who had stressed the defense of the old borders with a cautious aim of national survival, were now opposed to incorporating Eastern Karelia into a Greater Finland (Vehviläinen 2002: 104; Soikkanen 1987: 302-303). Karelia now "played a distinct symbolic role in the ideological socialization of Finnishness and the Finnish territorial identity" (Paasi 1996: 106). Thus, the value of the desired territory increased, raising the offensive stakes for the majority of Finnish politicians, and kept the expected utility of continuing the war high despite the apparent material and human costs involved.

Eastern Karelia was primarily administered by members of the Academic Karelia Society (AKS) with romantic visions of the Karelia of the Kalevala Epic and the political goal of incorporating Eastern Karelia, the Kola Peninsula and perhaps even more of Soviet territory to Finland (Alapuro 1973: 169). The Fennicization of the region included replacing Russian place names with Finnish ones and segregating the Russian population on ethnic grounds in concentration camps. "[T]he area was to be purged of 'foreign' elements, in order that those who remained might be regarded beyond all doubt as Finns" (Vehviläinen 2002: 105). Before 1943, 110 ele-

mentary schools had been established in the occupied areas and teaching was characterized by Christian and patriotic ideology. Finnish values were to be strengthened among the adult population as well, especially through religious work, as a part of nationalist and anti-communist propaganda (Kulomaa 1989: 186-9; Laine 1982: 174-187, 205-218).

AKS and its ideology of territorial expansion were becoming increasingly influential during the Continuation War. Joining AKS was advocated in the war colleges that educated Finnish officers. The military vows made by the cadets mentioned Greater Finland and the offensive nationalism advocated by AKS. These ideas were soon visibly established among the officer corps and the educated part of the population. Many of those who had been critical of AKS in the 1930s now either praised its work or joined the organization. The ideology of Greater Finland, which “had for a while been set aside” and therefore had no strong impact on the Winter War, experienced a renaissance in AKS during the Continuation War, especially in 1942 after the Finnish offensive successes (Alapuro 1973: 160-161).

At the outset of the war, the Swedish speaking part of the population and the Social Democrats were strongly opposed to expansionist aims. Contrary to the promoters of offensive nationalism, Tanner, the Minister of Trade and Industry, saw the proper aim of the war as securing the nation’s independence as during the earlier Winter War. According to him, this goal would be endangered if territorial expansion were to be pursued beyond the 1939 frontier (Vehviläinen 2002: 92-93).

As the Finnish offenses were successful, offensive nationalist sentiments increased and contributed to the planned annexation of Eastern Karelia. This made the Finnish war aims drastically incompatible with the Soviet ones. Thus, on the Finnish side, we can observe two processes that contributed to an increased utility of continuing the war and the inexistence of a bargaining space as the war progressed. First, nationalism was boosted by the Finnish current offensive ability to become increasingly offensive. Second, offensive nationalism raised the offensive stakes by increasing the value of the desired territory that was perceived to belong to a Greater Finland. During the process, the war aims became so high that a negotiated solution with the Soviet Union was improbable for a long while.

Toward the end of the war, as Germany seemed less able to defeat the Soviet Union, the outcome of the war became less certain. Nationalistic rhetoric also waned, and the occupation of Eastern Karelia was defended because it might be used as an important asset in peace negotiations (Mannerheim 1952: 415-416). Nevertheless, the value of the desired terri-

tory (offensive stakes) diminished only gradually as the dream of a Greater Finland was not completely buried until the Soviet offensive in June 1944 compelled the Finnish troops to withdraw (Vehviläinen 2002: 108). This reduction in offensive ability was an event that dramatically altered the nature of Finnish nationalism and reduced the war aims. There were no more offensive successes to boost offensive nationalism or offensive stakes. The Finnish demands that had been high throughout the war, because of offensive successes and the dream of a Greater Finland, were finally lowered. Before continuing with these developments, I will first analyze how Soviet ideology impacted the stakes during the Continuation War.

6.5. Soviet Offensive Ideology

As long as Finland was war perceived to help Germany to threaten the very existence of the Soviet Union, the Soviet ideology was expansive toward Finland. The offensive nationalist sentiments in Finland were not centered on the masses but were advocated chiefly by the national elite and even by Finnish President Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim, who proposed the construction of a Greater Finland (Paasi 1996: 108). This official stance was also reflected in the relations between Finland and Germany. Finland and Germany agreed that a Greater Finland would form a buffer against northern Russia (Manninen 1980: 24). Thus, “Finland’s political and ideological connections with Germany became closer during spring 1941 and finally led to cooperation” (Paasi 1996: 107).

Finland had fought the Winter War alone, with some moral and material support from Sweden and other Western states. Yet, prior to the Continuation War, Finnish officers were sent to Germany to discuss the coordination of the two countries’ war efforts in the case of a militarized conflict with the Soviet Union. Later on, during the Continuation War, Finland and Nazi Germany cooperated to reach the common aim of defeating the Soviet Union. Finland received economic help and weapons, and German troops operated in northern Finland (Jokipii, 1987: 296-314; Mannerheim 1952: 278, 292). Even if no formal agreement was signed, a change in the Finnish stance between the two wars was clear to Moscow. In the eyes of the Soviets, Finland was now fighting for national socialism in a grand ideological struggle against communism, where a complete destruction of the enemy was the primary goal. Thus the offensive stakes, u(win), were high for the Soviet Union. Mere defense would not solve the security threat. Despite the Finnish view that the Finns had no alliance with

Germany, Stalin saw Finland as a close ally of Germany in an ideological coalition aiming at the destruction of the Soviet Union,

...that may be characterized by following points: race hatred; domination of the 'chosen' nations; subjugation of other nations and seizure of their territories; economic enslavement of the subjugated nations and spoliation of their national wealth; destruction of democratic liberties; universal institution of the Hitler regime (Stalin 1946: 73).

Rieber (2005: 141) writes that Stalin had an "obsession with vulnerability of the Soviet frontiers". In a speech given on November 6, 1941, however, Stalin stressed not only the defensive stakes (the utility of not losing when facing potential annihilation) but also the offensive stakes (the utility of winning) by stressing the total nature of the war and winning over Hitler and his allies: "[I]nvaders want a war of extermination...Very well then! If they want a war of extermination they shall have it" (Kuromiya 2005: 156). In a speech he gave in 1945 Stalin further rationalized the earlier decision to continue fighting, even when Finland had proven to control the battlefield events, with the high utility of winning over Finland as a member of Hitler's alliance threatening the very existence of the Soviet state:

We went through desperate times in 1941-1942, when our armies were retreating, abandoning our villages and cities of... the Karelo-Finnish Republic... Confidence of the Russian People in the Soviet Government proved to be that decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity – over fascism (Pravda, 25 May, quoted in Boobyer 2000: 133).

While the expansionist ideas of AKS were less prominent during the Winter War, they were increasingly spreading in the course of the Continuation War among the officer corps and academics. It was now also clear that AKS was oriented toward Germany, and the practical goal of realizing the expansion of Finnish borders required that "AKS places itself side by side with fascism" (Alapuro 1973: 161). Even if the Finns in general were more infatuated by offensive nationalism and the dream of a Greater Finland than being associated with national socialism, the practical implications were the same for the Soviets. Not surprisingly, Stalin said in a speech on November 6, 1941, that the Red Army was fighting "against the combined forces of the Germans, Finns, Rumanians, Italians and Hungarians" (Stalin 1946: 25). Thus, the Finnish-German connection prompted Moscow to associate the Continuation War with a larger ideological struggle between

Nazism and communism for the future control of Europe and for the survival of the Soviet Union.

In addition to Stalin's statements about the high offensive stakes, his peace offer in August 1941 also indicates that the offensive stakes toward Finland, u(win), were high as long as Finland was seen as Hitler's ally. The peace offer consisted of a suggested trade-off, where Soviet territorial concessions would be traded for Finland distancing itself from Nazi Germany (Polvinen 1969: 69). Thus, a major Soviet threshold to lowering its war aims was Finland's perceived ideological stance on the side of national socialism. As long as Finland did not dissociate itself from Nazi Germany, conquering the Finnish territory was important for weakening the axis powers' striving for the national socialist hegemony and destruction of the Soviet state. Yet the Finnish expansive ideology now aimed at annexing the occupied Soviet territory and expected the Soviet Union to collapse. After the Finns refused to succumb to the Soviet demand to disengage from Germany, no further efforts to make peace were made before 1943. However, Stalin's peace offer of August 1941 indicates that, because of Finland's connection to Germany, the offensive stakes were so great for Stalin that his war aims also remained high despite the soaring costs of war, (c). He was prepared to grant territory to Finland, which would have been a dramatic lowering of the war aims if Finland was not perceived to be under German influence. But he also felt it necessary to aim to conquer Finland as long as the Berlin connection was thought to be intact.

The Soviet Union had almost reached the point of collapse by the fall of 1941 (Von Hardesty 1982: 13-15; Zaloga and Grandsen 1984: 126-127). Nevertheless, Moscow would not lower its war aims without a severing of the connection between Helsinki and Berlin. Soviet ideology was expansive toward Finland because of the high value of the Finnish territory for the security of the Soviet Union. Even if there were no offensive successes on the Finnish front, continuing the war was necessary as long as Finland was helping Germany to destroy the Soviet Union. A compromise could be made for a Finland disengaged from Germany, but it was necessary for Finland as a potential Nazi satellite state to be completely occupied as the perceived utility of winning, the offensive stakes, was then high. The high Soviet offensive stakes would wane only at the end of the war when its offensive expectations against Finland weakened and the security concerns waned as Germany was less likely to win the war. A Rieber writes, Stalin was not an ideological fanatic seeking to spread the revolution at any price but "was willing to recognize the authority of any non-communist leader

in the borderlands who was willing and capable of implementing Stalin's minimal demands for a friendly regime" (2005: 153).

6.6. A War of Stagnation and Asymmetric Information

On 22 September, 1941, London threatened to declare war on Finland if it continued its offensive into the Soviet territory. At the request of Great Britain, the United States required the Finns to retreat to the 1939 borders and finally, on December 6, Great Britain declared war on Finland in order to satisfy the Soviet demands (Polvinen 1979: 106-107, 125-132; Vehviläinen 2002: 99). After the British declaration and despite continuous defeats on the battlefield, the Soviets still argued that the post Winter War border be regarded as the basis for a future peace agreement (Polvinen 1979: 131-132). Thus, preparing for a long war, the Finns asked Germany for food aid; the subsequent annual grain deliveries amounted to 200 000 tons. "In this way Germany subsidized the Finns' war" (Vehviläinen 2002: 101).

More than two years followed without a change in the Finnish war aims. During these years the general belief in Finland was that the Soviets would not be able to mount threatening offensive operations (Petramaa 1956: 185). Using for example mobile motti-tactics – a pincher movement – Soviet efforts to counterattack were successfully defeated and no abrupt increase in the Red Army's offensive capacity was expected by the Commander in Chief (Mannerheim 1952). And yet, ending the war on the Finnish terms was out of the question for Moscow. The Soviets still had enough faith in their ability to mount enough troops, aircraft and armored vehicles against Finland that a decisive offensive could be made. As compared to the Winter War, they now had better trained troops and better offensive technology that could be used as soon as more forces could be freed from the German front in the south. While the Finns did not believe that the Soviet offensive capacity would increase any time soon, Moscow still believed in its future ability to make use of offensive military factors and did not lower its war aims. In consequence, asymmetric information prevented the creation of a bargaining space.

An important reason for the high Soviet expectations of offensive capacity, even when the Finns were on top of the events on the battlefield, was the real and imagined improvement in the organization and training of the Red Army. The Red Army had permanently lost some 15 000 officers during Stalin's purges of the military in 1937. The main target of the purges was Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a prominent military thinker who

sought to prepare the Red Army for modern warfare. Thuckachevsky led the Army's Technology and Armament Department in the early 1930s and strove for a better execution of combined arms operations and a mechanization of the army (Kulkov et al. 2002: xxii). It is clear that the purges had significantly reduced the Red Army's offensive potential at the time it was to launch an attack on Finland in 1939.

After the failure to occupy Finland during the Winter War, the Red Army was under close scrutiny by Stalin. The urgency to analyze the Soviet failure is well expressed in the written records of the Meeting of Command Personnel at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) for the Collection of Experiences in the Military Operations against Finland of 14-17 April 1940. The aim of the meeting was to reveal what had gone awry and to improve the performance of the Red Army. During his final speech to his commanders in 1940, Stalin first blamed the failures of the Winter War on an outdated mentality of the Russian Civil War and then gave an assessment of what the desired modern performance of the Red Army is:

What is contemporary war? What are its requirements? It's a good question. It calls for a wide use of artillery... Second, aircraft, mass aircraft, not just hundreds, but thousands of aircraft... Then, tanks. This is the third and also the decisive element. Mortars are the fourth important thing. There can be no contemporary war without them, without a massive number of them. Further. We have to educate cultured, well-trained and knowledgeable commanding officers. So far we haven't got them; they are rare... Further. We need closely knit and skillfully working staffs... Contemporary war also demands well-trained disciplined soldiers who can show initiative. So far our soldiers lack initiative (Ibid. 269-271).

These goals set by Stalin would at least in the form of high offensive expectations, if not wholly in practice, guide the reformation of the Red Army prior to the onset of the Continuation War. There was an effort to implement the lessons learned from the Winter War both before the outbreak of the Continuation War and during the course of the long war. According to various archival sources, the modest outcome of the Winter War forced Stalin to take measures to raise the combat efficiency of his army and strengthen its command cadres. In effect, in late 1940 and early 1941, the Politburo passed several decisions on the manufacture of new types of weapons and military equipment to increase its offensive capacity (Ibid. xviii).

The process of reforming the army started after the Winter War, but its performance was not much improved during the early phases of the Continuation War. The determination that would be shown by the Red Army in the decisive stages of WWII seemed dormant in the early phases of the Finnish campaign (Ibid. xxiii). One of Stalin's most outspoken critics, Trotsky, "criticized Stalin for his conduct of the war as stupid and incompetent, and for exposing the Red Army to humiliating defeats" (Ibid. xxi). Nevertheless, already in April 1940, Stalin expressed his renewed faith in the success of the remodeling program: "There is no doubt that today our army is not the army it was last November" (Ibid. 273). Also in a speech delivered to the graduates of the Red Army staff academies on May 5, 1941, when the battlefield events were still showing no increases in the Soviet offensive capacity against Finland, Stalin clearly stated his offensive expectations:

And now, when our army has been reconstructed, has been amply supplied with equipment for modern battle, when we have become stronger, now it is necessary to go from defence to offense... The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army (Roberts 2006: 78).

These offensive expectations seemed to be based on the cult of attack permeating the Soviet military leadership (Ibid. 80). General Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that "at that time our military-theoretical science generally did not consider the profound problems of strategic defense, mistakenly considering it not so important" (Ibid. 80). The larger size of the Soviet Union and the tactical and technological reforms underway also played an important role. On November 6, 1941, Stalin said in a speech delivered on the 24th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution that the Soviet Union's reserves "are only just beginning to come into full play" (Stalin 1946: 20). Furthermore, in the fall of 1941, a thorough reform of the Red Army was started in an effort to redress the lack of offensive capacity on the battlefield. Stalin himself believed that a focus on strengthening the armored forces and airpower would improve the Soviet offensive performance. In the same speech, he held that a combination of new offensive technology and mass production would change the tide in favor of the Red Army: "Modern warfare is a war of engines. The war will be won by the side that has an overwhelming preponderance in the output of engines" (Ibid. 34). In the Order of the Day, on February 23, 1942, Stalin argued that,

[i]n the course of the war the Red Army was infused with new vital forces; it received replenishments of men and equipment... It is essential that with every passing day the front should receive more tanks, aircraft guns, mortars, machine guns, rifles, automatics and ammunition (Ibid. 46).

Yet the task ahead was not merely to produce weapons of modern offensive warfare but also to use them adeptly, as Stalin held in the Order of the Day on May 1, 1942:

The Red Army...lacks only one thing – the ability to utilize to the full against the enemy the first class material with which our country supplies it. Hence, it is the task of the Red Army...to study the mechanism of their weapons to perfection...” (Ibid. 59).

These expected improvements did not reflect the Red Army’s poor battlefield performance during the first years of the war. However, they came more to the fore in the later phases of WWII when the Red Army managed to turn the tide in Stalingrad and started pushing the previously seemingly invincible German Wehrmacht back westward. New victories and material additions to the Soviet war machinery gave Moscow a reason to expect that the army now had high offensive potential. In the Order of the Day on February 23, 1943, Stalin reiterated his earlier beliefs that “the Soviet Union is more and more developing her reserves and is becoming stronger” (Ibid. 94). In addition to being able to press into service the Soviet Union’s immense resources, Stalin believed, in the Order of the Day on November 7, 1943, that “[i]n the offensive battles fought during the past year our troops gained greater experience in conducting modern warfare” (Ibid. 135). Indeed, according to Overy, “[t]he key to Soviet revival in 1942 and 1943 lay in improving the quality of both forces and in the transformation of the way in which they were used tactically on the battlefield” (1995: 211).

As a result of Hitler’s bombing campaigns, Stalin had ordered the moving of heavy industry beyond the reach of Luftwaffe. During the course of the war, the Soviet military industry manufactured more efficient weapons of offensive warfare, especially increasing the armored protection and size of weaponry in heavy tanks. When the factories that were moved finally picked up a higher production pace and new heavier tank models were introduced, the prospects of reaching further offensive victories seemed ever higher, even against Finland. The production of tanks increased steadily (Zaloga and Grandsen 1984: 146-149, 160-162; Ogorkiewicz 1970: 123-124) and the air force modernized its tactics (Von Hardesty 1982: 83-88;

1990: 155-157). Two-way radio was introduced to increase the coordination of tank forces, and repair and maintenance became effective (Sokolov and Erickson 1987: 109, 121).

Nevertheless, even if these developments created expectations of increasing offensive capacity, they did not lead to a breakthrough against Finland, nor did Commander in Chief Mannerheim indicate in his memoirs that the Finnish leadership expected that they would increase any time soon (Mannerheim 1952). Owing to the improvements of the Red Army, Stalin still had high hopes and no reason to lower its expected future ability to make use of offensive military factors and did not lower his war aims. If Helsinki had known of the scale of Stalin's offensive expectations and considered them realistic, it would have resulted in lowering the Finnish war aims. Yet, based on the Red Army's poor battlefield performance, the Finnish leadership did not have reason to expect the Soviet offensive capacity to increase dramatically any time soon. Being on top of the battlefield events, Helsinki did not lower its war aims.

A bargaining space was out of reach for the time being as the expected utility of continuing the war and the war aims were high on both sides as a result of asymmetric information about future offensive capacity. Moscow had high expectations for the future due to its sheer size, larger wartime production and the reform of the Red Army. While aware of the larger size of the enemy, Helsinki had not yet seen evidence of increasing offensive capacity from the Soviets and Moscow's war aims were not seen as justifiable. In contrast, Finland could justify its own high war aims with the actual battlefield events. Thus, the disagreement excluded a mutually acceptable bargaining solution.

6.7. Bargaining Space Opens Up

As the German defeat was becoming increasingly likely in the Finnish mind, some started to consider detaching Finland from the war. By the beginning of 1943, both Germany and the United States thought that they noticed a change in Finnish expectations about the outcome of the war. For example, in February, the Social Democratic Party declared that Finland should make peace with the Soviet Union when the time was right (Polvinen 1969: 117, 166). With a potential Soviet victory over Germany, the probability of a Finnish victory started to diminish and the expected utility of continuing the war against the Soviet Union was decreasing. It was clear that both food supplies and arms deliveries depended heavily

on Germany. The balance of forces on the Finno-Soviet front might also be disrupted if Germany was so weakened that Moscow could free troops from the German front in the south. After the German catastrophe in Stalingrad in late January 1943, the expected Soviet offensive ability increased in the Finnish mind. In consequence, the inner circle thought that Finland ought to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and not wait for the now unlikely collapse of Stalin's regime. (Vehviläinen 2002: 121).

In a meeting at the Finnish headquarters, President Ryti, Prime Minister Rangell, Commander in Chief Mannerheim and ministers Walden and Tanner agreed that this turn in German fate should lead Finland to make peace with the Soviet Union (Mannerheim 1952: 360). While the Finns expected the restoration of the 1939 border, Moscow aimed at returning to the 1940 borders, handing over Pechenga, a treaty of mutual assistance and war reparations. These demands were forwarded to British Foreign Secretary Eden. Stalin also called for a change in the Finnish government (Woodward 1971: 222-233). In effect, the Red Army's success in Stalingrad positively affected Moscow's offensive expectations and expected utility of continuing the war against Finland. After Stalingrad, Stalin argued that "the campaign showed that the striking power of the Red Army has grown" (Stalin 1946: 101).

Thus, even without official contacts between the belligerents, it was clear that the minimum requirements did not yet match. As the Finns did not lower their war aims to a level acceptable to Moscow, there was still disagreement about the Red Army's offensive potential – asymmetric information. The war aims were therefore too high on both sides. While Helsinki thought that a negotiated solution to the war should be found, Germany's complete defeat was not yet certain as the catastrophe in Stalingrad had been followed by several successes (Sandström 1991: 130). In addition, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, told the US Ambassador that, as long there were German troops in Finland, the war must go on (Polvinen 1969: 121-122).

Due to the unlikely collapse of the Soviet regime and the massive power reserves that Moscow held, negotiations were seen by the Finns as the way out of the war. In March, the United States sought to act as an intermediary in order to bring about a peace agreement. The Soviets told Washington that their minimum requirements included the restoration of the 1940 border, the removal of German troops from Finland, demobilization of the Finnish army, and war reparations. However, the Finns were not informed of the Soviet bid for peace as Washington considered the

terms unlikely to be accepted by the Finnish government (Polvinen 1979: 188-228). It was nevertheless becoming clearer to the Finns that battlefield performance would decline in the future if a weakening Germany could not send economic assistance and military material. In the meeting of the Finnish inner circle on March 20, 1943, the need to make peace in the near future was clear, even if it could result in Germany discontinuing its food aid and even if there was a risk of military conflict with Germany (Sandström 1991: 130).

The first real contacts between the Finnish and Soviet governments took place via the Belgian envoy in Stockholm (Mannerheim 1952: 369-370). Finland held on to the 1939 borders with a possibility of trading some land in the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for land in Eastern Karelia. This mild change in the war aims reflects the decreasing probability of emerging victorious as Germany's possible defeat in the future would entail a larger concentration of Soviet troops against Finland. Nevertheless, the change was not radical because the Finns were still in full control of the events on the battlefield. This did not satisfy the Soviets and the negotiations came to a halt (Polvinen 1979: 230-233; 1969: 182-183).

At the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Stalin said that he was ready to negotiate, demanding the restitution of the 1940 Peace Treaty, war reparations, the surrender of the Hanko base or the permanent incorporation of Pechenga into the Soviet Union, and the expulsion of German troops along with the demobilization of the Finnish army (Vehviläinen 2002: 128; Polvinen 1969: 186). Finland was informed through Sweden that a negotiator was welcome in Moscow. Finland restated its demands of the restoration of the 1939 border with some possible adjustments. The belligerents' minimum requirements did not match, but the negotiation contacts were not cut off (Vehviläinen 2002: 129). Nothing had changed in the theater of war, and Finland felt that the battlefield events still justified a strong negotiation position. The Soviet Union, in turn, was confident that it would crush Germany and Finland and therefore did not agree to territorial losses.

While Commander in Chief Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs that 1943 was characterized by a relative calm on the battlefield, the danger of a Soviet attack was rising as the Red Army started to pressure the Germans south of Leningrad in January 1944 (Mannerheim 1952: 373). Also, President Ryti wrote in his diary that Mannerheim was worried in early 1944 that the Red Army might be able to amount an offensive that the current defenders would prove unable to withstand without reinforcements:

“The Finnish Army could not successfully defend itself against large Soviet forces for very long...” and Prime Minister Linkomies and President Ryti were now lowering their war aims to the 1940 borders (Vehviläinen 2002: 129). In effect, the Finnish leadership started to recognize that the high Soviet expectations were not so unrealistic and information on the expected Soviet offensive capacity became less asymmetric.

On February 9, a Finnish representative was sent to Stockholm to meet with his Soviet counterpart. Yet, instead of starting actual peace negotiations, the Soviets presented preconditions such as reinstating the 1940 Peace Treaty and internment of the German soldiers in Finland. The purpose was to “get the Finns irrevocably committed before the peace negotiations proper began” (Ibid. 130). The Finnish government refused, explaining that it was impossible to negotiate unless it was clear how the preconditions should be interpreted. It was still remembered that the Soviets had started to make new demands after the 1940 Peace Treaty. Still, Molotov was adamant and confident about the Red Army’s expected offensive ability:

[T]hese were the minimum conditions for the Soviet government, he said. ‘I don’t understand why we should make concession to you. Germany has already lost this war, and you are allies of Germany, so you can just accept a position that befits a defeated country.’ The Soviet Union was, he said, strong enough to enforce any conditions it wished (Ibid. 131).

The Soviets also required Finland to pay war reparations worth 600 million US dollars and hand over Pechenga, but gave up the Hanko Peninsula (Ibid. 131). Even though the inner circle had lowered its war aims to the 1940 borders, the rest of the conditions, such as internment of the German troops in the north of Finland, were deemed impossible (Mannerheim 1952: 374). Thus the Soviet demands were deemed too harsh. As the Finnish defenses were still working, the expected utility of continuing the war was still higher than giving in to the Soviet demands, made possible by the Red Army’s successes against Germany. It was also hoped that the Russian offensive attention would be drawn primarily to fighting Germany in Central Europe. Asymmetric information had not totally disappeared. Indicating that Finland considered Molotov’s high offensive expectations to still be exaggerated, and believing in the Finnish ability to withstand the pressure, Finnish Prime Minister Ramsay wrote in April that, “I am of the opinion that the question of time is an extremely important question. The

closer we can get to the big settlement [in Central Europe] with our army intact and our people united, the better are our chances” (Vehviläinen 2002: 134).

For two and a half years the Finnish army had been inside Soviet territory. It is clear that it was beneficial to the Finns that the Red Army was simultaneously fighting the Germans in the south during this time. Yet this cannot alone explain the long war duration. During the shorter Winter War the Soviet Union had not been at war with any other state and still failed to occupy Finland. Some other factors now prompted Moscow to keep trying for a much longer time. It is also clear that Finland’s war efforts were dependent on a well functioning home front and imports from Germany. A crucial precondition for sustaining a large army for a long period of time was thus economic support from Germany. Yet this was only a precondition for the Finnish current and expected ability to make use of offensive military factors.

The Soviet Union was also heavily dependent on the Allies’ help, receiving for example weapons of motorized warfare via the ice-free ports of Murmansk (Mannerheim 1952: 324, 372). Nonetheless, also here, the events on the Soviet-German front and the military and economic aid from the Allies were only a precondition for the Soviets’ expected ability to make use of offensive military factors on the Finno-Soviet front. For Helsinki, the expected utility of continuing the war was high as long as a Soviet collapse was expected, with or without German aid. For Moscow, the expected utility of continuing the war was high as long as the Red Army’s expected offensive capacity was high, with or without Allied assistance.

After the failed peace talks, the Soviet Union decided to launch a massive attack on Finland, which reflected its high confidence in its ability to make use of the offensive military factors. The Red Army was now reinforced by the Allied material help and its own production of tanks. “The Russians were confident that they could achieve their military objectives in Finland quickly thanks to their superiority in numbers and above all in armaments” (Vehviläinen 2002: 137). On June 19, 1944, 24 Soviet divisions, aided by nearly a thousand aircraft, attacked six Finnish divisions and two brigades. The Red Army advanced some 70 kilometers in ten days and another front was opened in Eastern Karelia on June 20. But, “in a series of delaying actions over the next three weeks, the Finnish commanders managed to extricate their troops from the threat of encirclement and withdraw them in fighting condition to a line of defence hastily drawn-up north-east of Lake Ladoga” (Ibid. 138).

Nevertheless, the offensive expectations for the future were scant in Helsinki and, on June 22, the Soviet envoy in Stockholm was asked whether Moscow would be willing to restart peace negotiations. The next day the Soviets replied that they were willing to receive a Finnish delegation if Finland surrendered, but refused to negotiate with President Ryti (Carlgren 1973: 506). Prime Minister Linkomies and the majority of the government were opposed to surrendering and the Soviet demands thus went unanswered. Left with the option of continuing fighting, more material help from Germany had become acute. In the meantime, therefore, President Ryti promised Berlin to continue fighting in order that more armaments would be sent to the Finnish army, and arms were supplied in abundance (Vehviläinen 2002: 140-141; Polvinen 1969: 228). The detailed terms of peace, which were never sent to Finland, as it refused to discuss a surrender, included a possible complete occupation of Finland (Turtola 1994: 294-298). Moscow was thus emboldened by its new successes on the battlefield. And yet, the Finns had despite all odds mastered mobile defensive tactics, absorbed the Soviet onslaught intact and kept their war aims higher than what was deemed acceptable by Moscow.

By this time, the Soviet forces had exhausted themselves on the offensive and the Finnish army had recovered from the blitz attack. After having received new arms from Germany, the Finns' self-confidence was also better, and on July 11 the Soviets halted their offensive efforts. The Soviets had no reinforcements to send and finally learned the limitations to the Red Army's potential to make use of offensive military factors, especially facing the new arms the Finns had received from Germany. In consequence, one-third of the Soviet forces in the Karelian Peninsula were now reassigned to the German front in the south (Kuussaari 1957: 583) and the Soviet envoy in Stockholm soon said that Moscow was ready to negotiate (Carlgren 1973: 510-512). The Finnish ability to withdraw and deter the Red Army without a total collapse, even in the face of the massive Soviet onslaught, showed Moscow that the Finnish battlefield performance was still high enough to justify higher war aims than surrender. At this time President Ryti resigned and was replaced by Mannerheim. The new president told the Germans that Ryti's promise to keep fighting was made in a critical situation in which it was necessary to obtain material assistance in order to maintain Finland's military potential. However, Finland would now keep on fighting only as long as it was in its own interest to do so (Polvinen 1969: 235; Vehviläinen 2002: 144).

Despite the successful Finnish defense, Mannerheim was conscious of the risk of the much larger Red Army being able to break through the lines if it initiated another massive offensive (Vehviläinen 2002: 145). Such an attack might lead to a seriously weakened ability to launch counteroffensives due to a lack of space of where to absorb it. On August 29, 1944, Moscow lowered its preconditions for starting peace negotiations as an apparent reaction to the Soviet failure to make satisfactory use of the offensive military factors against the Finns. The front was not moving anymore despite the massive Soviet advantage in troop numbers, and the soldiers were needed to defeat Germany. The Soviets stated that they were prepared to negotiate if Finland publicly severed its relations with Germany and required the removal of German troops from Finland by September 15. Thus, neither surrender nor the immediate internment of the German troops was any longer among the Soviet war aims. The Finnish Parliament approved the Soviet conditions by 113 votes to 43, and military operations ceased on both sides on September 5. The new demands included the restoration of the 1940 border, the expulsion of Germans, handing over Pechenga, 300 million US dollars in war reparations, demobilization of the Finnish army and the lease of the Porkkala promontory as a Soviet naval base (Ibid. 146-147).

These conditions were considered devastating and, while Mannerheim considered continuing the war with potentially high defensive stakes, his ministers Tanner and Ramsay advised him to refrain (Paasonen 1974: 156-157). The Finnish government gave in to the Soviet demands on September 19, 1944. The powers of the small Finnish society had been consumed. In the analysis of the Commander in Chief, the offensive potential of the Finnish army was weakened and the offensive capacity of the Red Army was somewhat increased (Mannerheim 1952: 406). Thus, information on offensive potential was no longer asymmetric and the belligerents finally agreed on their relative strength.

It was time for the Finns to accept Moscow's demands as long as only limited territorial losses were entailed, and it was time for the Soviets to recognize that conquering the whole of Finland would be too arduous and time consuming, perhaps even impossible. When the discouraging battlefield events that lowered the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, became a reality, the talk of a Greater Finland and Finnish offensive nationalism diminished. This lowered the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, and the willingness to bear the costs of continued warfare, (c) . As the nationalistic rhetoric waned, the occupation of Eastern Karelia was now defended because it

might be used as an important asset in peace negotiations, and not because it had some nationalistic value (Ibid. 415-416). Nevertheless, the Finnish offensive stakes diminished only gradually as the dream of a Greater Finland was not completely buried until the Soviet offensive in June 1944 forced the Finnish troops to withdraw (Vehviläinen 2002: 108).

Two factors also lowered the Soviet war aims: the looming collapse of Nazism made conquering the Finnish territory less important for future control of Europe, lowering the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, and the asymmetric information disappeared as the Soviet inability to conquer all of Finland, $p(\text{win})$, was revealed when the new troops and technology were introduced during the final offensive. Thus, both the value of the enemy territory (offensive stakes) and the expected ability to conquer it were lowered on both sides. The opening of the bargaining space and the finding of a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict became finally possible.

6.8. Final Analysis


The hypothesis concerning the process of peacemaking and the reason for the length of the war are corroborated by the case of the Continuation War. There was a lack of learning from battlefield events as they did not covary with the war aims. Thus the strategic learning theory, representing a simple rational choice perspective, does not suffice to explain the chain of events during the war. The bounded learning theory instead offers a better explanation. Two factors contributed to the long war duration by increasing the war aims and the expected utility of continuing the war: expansive ideology increased the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, on both sides of the war, and the Soviet high offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, which were not based on the current battlefield performance, created asymmetric information. In Moscow, the perception that Finland supported Hitler in a clash between communism and National Socialism for the future control of Europe increased the value of enemy territory (offensive stakes), and offensive nationalism did the same in Finland. The Soviet military reforms and increasing military production created asymmetric information about high expected offensive capacity, as Moscow's high war aims were not justifiable based on Helsinki's analysis of the battlefield events. Thus, on both sides, the expected utility of continuing the war was higher than accepting the enemy's demands.

We can note that the within-case correlations show a good match with what was theoretically expected at the outset of the study: changes in the

current ability to use offensive military factors did not match changes in war aims on both sides of the conflict. The Finnish war aims were justified by the current offensive ability that created high expectations and by the expansive ideology that raised the value of the enemy territory. The Soviet war aims were in turn justified by expansive ideology, raising the value of the enemy territory, and by the Soviet military reforms, creating asymmetric information about future offensive capacity.

I will use some simple figures to further illustrate the war events. The distances between the different points in time are not proportional, as limitations in space make a proportional month by month account of the war infeasible. Yet the figures serve to complement the empirical material in the text. The discrepancy in the war aims, i.e. the road to creating a bargaining space, is presented in figure 6, which indicates how far the combatants were from making peace. The key to understanding the figure is the distance between the upper line, representing Finland's war aims, and the lower line, representing the Soviet war aims. The distance between the lines measures the size of the discrepancy in the belligerents' minimum demands. A peace treaty is signed when the lines converge and create a bargaining space.

FIGURE 6. Discrepancy in War Aims during the Continuation War
(Bargaining Space)



Note: Non-proportional distances. Finland: ____ The Soviet Union:

The two states' war aims diverged somewhat as the war started in 1941. This divergence in what Stalin wanted and what Finland was willing to give led Stalin to attack Finland. Stalin sought limited territorial concessions that Finland was not prepared to grant. At the onset of the war, both sides had high aims as they believed the coming war to be favorable to their cause on the basis of expectations of improved offensive capacity. Stalin sought to conquer the whole of Finland, whereas Finland aimed at regaining at least the Karelian territory that was lost to the Soviet Union during the Winter War.

After the Soviet attack, the Finns' superior ability to make use of offensive military factors granted them battle victories that created high hopes of a final victory on their terms. As compared to the Winter War, the Finns' offensive capacity was higher due to new military material, and thus their confidence and war aims were higher. Further, as the offensive turned out to be successful, the high offensive expectations increased expansive nationalism in the Finnish Parliament and the value of the enemy territory, $u(\text{win})$, increased. Finland thus started to steadily raise its war aims (the Finnish line starts to move away from the Soviet line). Yet, from strategic perspective, the war aims were justifiable based on the battlefield events.

Even if the Soviets ultimately failed to use the offensive military factors – tactics and technology – against the Finns, the reorganization, improved training and the much larger size of the Red Army also led the Soviets to initially have high hopes of total victory. However, the problem in finding a mutually acceptable bargaining solution was asymmetric information: Stalin also had high war aims, but they were not based on the battlefield events, and the Finns considered them unrealistic. President Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim did not perceive a Soviet military potential as an acute threat to the Finnish defenses before early 1944. After the Finns had demonstrated their superior ability to control the battlefield events, Moscow became interested in territorial concessions instead of seeking to conquer the whole of Finland. Thus, facing several battlefield defeats, the Soviets lowered their war aims in 1941 (the Soviet line moves closer to the Finnish line) but not enough to match Helsinki's view of the realities of the battlefield events.

When Helsinki had reached its war aim of creating a territorial basis for a Greater Finland, the Finnish offensive was halted and the front line moved little over two years. The Red Army did not manage to launch successful counterattacks, but two factors nevertheless contributed to keeping the Soviet war aims high. First, Finland refused to dissociate itself from Nazi

Germany, which kept the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, high. Second, Stalin still believed that he would eventually be able to make use of the offensive military factors and emerge victorious, which raised $p(\text{win})$, by reforming the Red Army and introducing new military technology. This means, as Helsinki based its assessment of the Red Army's expected capacity mainly on the current battlefield events, that Moscow had asymmetric information about its expected offensive capacity. Thus, because of this disagreement, the two sides' minimum peace terms did not match throughout 1942 and a bargaining space was not seen.

Two important changes took place in 1943 as a result of the Soviet battlefield successes over Germany. The Soviets' ability to make successful use of the offensive military factors improved as they could increase the number of divisions and transport new offensive material to the Finnish front. The Finns also realized this, and the information about the expected improvements of the Red Army's offensive capacity was not as asymmetric as it had been earlier. Therefore, in spite of the continued control of the battlefield, Helsinki started to lower its $p(\text{win})$. In consequence, the war aims were lowered to the 1939 borders (the Finnish line starts moving toward the Soviet one) and the expected utility of continuing the war started to decrease. Nevertheless, in late 1943, Moscow further raised its offensive expectations, introduced new demands and required the Hanko Peninsula as a military base (the Soviet line moves away from the Finnish one). Consequently, a bargaining space was not yet created as both still had a higher expected utility of continuing the war than accepting the enemy's demands.

Some changes were made in early 1944 as the Soviets gave up their demand for Hanko. And Finland, realizing that its own capacity to hold on would not last indefinitely, lowered its aims to the 1940 borders (the Finnish line continues to move toward the Soviet one), but the minimum requirements for a peace treaty still did not match. During the summer, the Red Army launched a massive attack on Finland to force its will on Helsinki. The attack this time was so successful that the Soviets raised their demands (the Soviet line moves further away from the Finnish one). However, the concomitant lowering of the Finnish demands did not lead to an opening of a bargaining space. The Finns were still able to withdraw to avoid total defeat and therefore did not accept the Soviet call for unconditional surrender. Only when the Finns finally managed to dwarf the Soviet onslaught did Moscow lower its war aims (the Soviet line moves toward the Finnish line). The offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, were lowered as a

result of the offensive failure that showed that the Soviet expectations of increasing offensive capacity were exaggerated. Furthermore, troops were needed against Germany as the Allied race to Berlin was about to start. Thus, even the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, diminished when Finland could not be conquered, i.e. as $p(\text{win})$ was lowered, and the Finnish territory was no longer valuable for the security of the Soviet Union or for the future control of Europe.


However, this time, the Finns did not raise their demands as a result of successful military action. Finland was running out of resources after many years of war (the moving Soviet line finally converges with Finnish line). Offensive nationalism and offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, waned when the Finnish offensive successes and expectations, $p(\text{win})$, disappeared. Thus, the expected utility of continuing the war weighed against the expected utility of agreeing to some territorial losses was not deemed high. Asymmetric information disappeared as the belligerents could finally agree on their relative strength and a mutually acceptable bargaining solution was found.

When both sides in a militarized conflict change their war aims and demands according to their battlefield successes or failures, a bargaining space quickly emerges. Thus, according to the strategic learning theory (Goemans 2000: 27), battlefield events signal relative strength, resolve and the expected costs of war so that an agreement on acceptable terms of peace becomes possible. However, this is often only an ideal situation. As the bounded learning theory expects, a long war easily results when confounding factors intervene to end this convenient connection between battlefield events and the expected utility of warfare. Even when the current offensive ability is limited, the belligerents do not always lower their war aims to a level acceptable to the enemy if they are imbued with an expansive ideology or have asymmetric information about offensive expectations. This may come about, for example, as a result of a belligerent's belief that offense dominance will increasingly favor its war efforts.

Figure 7 illustrates the covariance between battlefield events and war aims in Finland during the war discussed here. The fact that the lines were parallel throughout the war and moved in the same direction when changes in battlefield events took place shows that the war aims closely covaried with the actual battlefield events. Finland also had high offensive stakes. However, based on the battlefield events, the Finnish war aims were not unrealistic. Offensive successes raised the offensive stakes, rather than the other way around. It is also interesting to note that Goemans's (2000) statistical test of his alternative theory of war duration was based on a data

set where Finland was coded as a semi-repressive regime. According to his theory, semi-repressive regimes contribute to increasing war duration by raising their war aims when the battlefield events are not positive. However, the historical evidence in figure 7 does not indicate that this would have been the case. The battlefield events and Finnish war aims covaried closely throughout the war, which is disconfirming evidence.


FIGURE 7. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of Finland



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: ____ Battlefield events:

Figure 8 illustrates the covariance between battlefield events and war aims in the Soviet Union during the war. If the lines were parallel and moved in the same direction when changes in battlefield events took place, a bargaining space and a mutually acceptable peace treaty would have been within reach already in the early phases of the war, which was the case during the Winter War. The fact that the lines do not closely follow each other indicates a lack of covariance between the battlefield events and the Soviet war aims. The strategic learning theory would expect the lines to follow each other, while the bounded learning theory can better explain this lack of covariance with two factors: expansive Soviet ideology and high expected ability to make use of offensive military factors.

FIGURE 8. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of the Soviet Union



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: _____ Battlefield events: - - - -

Throughout much of the conflict, the Red Army did not control the theater of war. Nevertheless, the troops were better trained this time than during the Winter War and increasingly better equipped for offensive warfare. In general, the Continuation War took place during a more offense dominant context that gave rise to higher expectations of increasing offensive capacity than the Winter War. The Soviet war aims and expected utility of continuing the war thus remained high even in the absence of battlefield successes. Still, they were founded on asymmetric information as Finland based its assessment of the future Soviet offensive potential mainly on the current battlefield events. The belligerents therefore did not agree on the expected outcome of the conflict and the gap separated their estimates of what concessions it would have been rational to make. In addition, the ideological tension between communism and Nazism increased the value of the enemy territory, i.e. the offensive stakes, in Moscow's eyes.

It was not until the final offensive of 1944, where the Red Army failed to occupy Finland, that the actual battlefield events and war aims started to follow each other, which indicates that both actual and expected ability to make use of offensive military factors became the same and that they were reflected in the Soviet war aims. When both sides finally better adjusted their war aims on the basis of their actual battlefield performance, asymmetric information disappeared and a bargaining space emerged. Both

sides had realized the limitations to their offensive potential, $p(\text{win})$, and neither side thus had high hopes of completely defeating the enemy or getting a better deal than what their performance on the battlefield indicated. In addition, the Finnish offensive nationalism waned, which lowered the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$. Thus it was possible for the Finns to lower their war aims and give up their plans for a Greater Finland. The same happened with the Soviet offensive nationalism toward Finland: the value of the Finnish territory, $u(\text{win})$, diminished when the high Soviet offensive expectations did not materialize in Finland and Germany seemed prone to lose the war. In consequence, the Soviets no longer had high offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, and no more troops and time for offensive operations in Finland when the race toward Berlin had higher priority. At last, the war aims became so low on both sides that the expected utility of signing a peace treaty was higher than that of continuing the war.

The lesson to be drawn from the Continuation War is that it is inadequate to look merely at the general level of offense dominance in the state system to determine the expected duration of a war. What matters more is the belligerents' actual ability to use offensive military technology and tactics (the battlefield events), and factors that increase offensive expectations in the absence of battlefield successes. If states do not quickly adjust their war aims on the basis of battlefield events, it is useful to look for an expansive ideology and asymmetric information about offensive expectations that can increase the expected utility of continuing the war. As long as expansive ideology in the present case kept the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, high and there was asymmetric information about offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, the belligerents had a high expected utility of continuing the war. If the information about offensive expectations is not private, the enemy does not need to base its assessment of the expected outcome of the war merely on current battlefield events. In addition, if this information is considered credible, the probability of the belligerents agreeing on the terms of peace increases. Otherwise, the expected utility assessments are made with the help of asymmetric information, and a mutually agreeable negotiated solution is not reached.

7. THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1965

I start the chapter with a brief introduction to the background to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. After specifying the theoretical expectations, I proceed to analyze how current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the belligerents' war aims. At the end of the chapter, I also examine the nature of the most potential factors that could affect the duration of the war according to the bounded learning theory: asymmetric information and expansive ideology in the form of Pakistani religiosity and Indian nationalism.

7.1. The Road to War

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was the second in a series of severe military contestations between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The roots of this enduring conflict lie in British colonial history. In 1846 Britain sold the predominantly Muslim valley of Kashmir to the Hindu Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh. After the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Gulab Singh's great grandson, Hari Singh, could not choose whether to join India or Pakistan, and the princely state Jammu-Kashmir remained independent for two months. Yet, "[i]n October, after large numbers of tribesmen from Pakistan's North-West Frontier invaded the state, he finally agreed to join India. His decision was immediately contested by Pakistan on the basis of the state's majority Muslim population" (Schofield 2000: xiii).

The Pakistani territorial claim led to the first Kashmir War and resulted in one third of Jammu-Kashmir being controlled by Pakistan. Three UN Security Council resolutions called for a referendum in order to allow the inhabitants of the contested region to decide for themselves what their political future would be. Further, the government of India agreed in a 1948 White Paper that a referendum would be necessary to ascertain Kashmir's status. But New Delhi later reversed its position, arguing that it is "impossible to hold a plebiscite so long as the State is infested by freebooters from outside" (Wirsing 1994: 55). Thus, the referendum was never held and the Pakistani claim to the whole of Kashmir remained alive for years to come.

India had no interest in giving up the territory that it controlled and therefore had no incentive to negotiate with Pakistan. Yet, in the aftermath of the Indian defeat in the 1962 war against China, New Delhi submitted to pressure from Western powers to talks with Islamabad in return for a possible tacit defense pact with the United States. During the first round of talks in 1962, India suggested keeping the current cease fire line as the international boundary, whereas Pakistan desired the entire Jammu-Kashmir with the exception of south-eastern Jammu. After six rounds of talks, no resolution to the dispute was in sight (Schofield 2000: 99-101).

Several factors set the stage for an escalation toward a second major war between Pakistan and India. First, India signaled that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was final and complete (Ibid. 104-105). Second, in early 1965, during a limited territorial conflict in the Rann Kutch, the Indian army was perceived to have shown signs of weakness against the Pakistani armed forces by withdrawing (Schofield 2000: 107; Ganguly 2002: 41). Third, after the defeat in the hands of China, India was seeking to double the size of its military. Thus, Pakistan taking action later would have been more likely to fail (Ganguly 2002: 41-42; Schofield 2000: 106). Fourth, there were widespread demonstrations in Kashmir over the stealing of a holy relic from a Mosque. Furthermore, the Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) organization claimed to have 20 000 men ready for guerrilla war against India. Thus, the Pakistani decision-making elite believed that there was broad support for Pakistan in Kashmir (Schofield 2000: 106; Ganguly 2002: 42). Fifth, the improved relations between Pakistan and China led Islamabad to believe that Beijing would support Pakistan in the case of a war (Schofield 2000: 102).

All of these factors possibly contributed to the Pakistani leaders regarding the use of violence as a suitable policy option and perceiving a window of opportunity with offensive expectations. The weapons of war that the states had access to, such as tanks, mobile field artillery and aircraft, were indeed favorable to offensive aspirations. During these critical times, the decision-making elite on the Pakistani side included President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, although the president had the final say on matters of war and peace. Their Indian counterpart was Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.

Violations of the cease fire line had been common since the first Indo-Pakistani War of 1948. But on August 5, 1965, General Nimmo, the Chief UN military observer, reported that “armed men, generally not in uniform, began a large number of violations by crossing the cease-fire line

from the Pakistani side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side” (Blinkenberg 1972: 254). The assumed aim of this limited infiltration of a couple of thousand men, called Operation Gibraltar, was to support the local rebels to establish a pro-Pakistani regime in Kashmir (Blinkenberg 1972: 255). Yet, to the surprise of Pakistan, the anticipated revolt and support from the locals did not materialize. Brines argues that “the operation failed because the Kashmiris were in no mood to revolt... It was probably due to the fact that relatively sterile political issues were insufficient to rouse the people into risking their lives” (Brines 1968: 308). As a result, the Indian forces regained control of the Indian side and struck back across the cease fire line. Despite Pakistan’s hope to limit the scope of the conflict, the failed incursion would soon escalate into open war between India and Pakistan.

7.2. Theoretical Expectations

In the following account of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, I focus on the process whereby the belligerents first agreed to negotiate and finally created a bargaining space as the minimum demands from both sides became compatible. The key variables that I investigate are the level of current ability to use offensive military factors and the war aims. Due to the shortness of the war, the bounded learning theory expects them to soon covary after the onset of hostilities.

I also expect that expansive ideology, creating high offensive stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs, and asymmetric information about future improvements in offensive tactics and technology were weak on both sides of the conflict. Thus, the belligerents could quickly draw lessons from their battlefield performance and adjust their war aims accordingly to a mutually acceptable level. I will start the chapter by analyzing how the level of current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the war aims. At the end of the chapter I will examine the nature of religion in Pakistan and the role of nationalism in India in an effort to analyze the presence or absence of expansive ideology that can prolong wars by raising war aims and increasing the expected utility of warfare. Pakistan separated from India because the founding fathers of Pakistan argued that the religious identity of Muslims called for a separate state inspired by religious law. India, in turn, was a multi-ethnic state with many religious identities held together by nationalism. Owing to the shortness of the war, I do not expect the decision-making elites on either side of the conflict to have been affected by expansive ideology during the war

7.3. The War

Pakistan had high offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, as the value of the Kashmiri territory was deemed high, which served as a justification for the onset of hostilities. It also had clear offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, in the short term but was ill-prepared for a protracted conflict. On August 29, President Ayub Khan sent his Commander in Chief an order “to take such action that will defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken India’s resolve and bring her to a conference table without provoking a general war” (Wolpert 1993: 90). As a result, Pakistan attacked with heavy armor in Kashmir on September 1 but officially claimed that it did not violate the international border (Brines 1968: 323-325).

The territorial aim of the following Operation Grand Slam was to sever the link between India and Indian held Kashmir (Schofield 2000: 109; Blinkenberg 1972: 257; McMahan 1994: 327). While the army advanced to the southern parts of Kashmir in the Chamb sector, Bhutto and the Pakistanis in general believed that this could be done without an Indian retaliation further south along the border between Pakistan and India (Schofield 2000: 110; Blinkenberg 1972: 258). Air Marshal Khan wrote afterwards that “[i]t was assumed that widespread support existed within occupied Kashmir... Lastly, the possibility of India crossing the international frontier in the East and West Pakistan was ruled out” (Khan 1979: 75-76).

While India had a much larger army, Pakistan had the advantage of having a large number of better equipped Patton tanks facing smaller Indian tanks in the theatre of war. President Ayub Khan had strong offensive expectations at the beginning of the campaign. Relying on the expected speed and firepower of his American made tanks he boasted that “his tanks could reach New Delhi along the Grand Trunk Road in a matter of hours” (Brines 1968: 272). He also had great faith in the Pakistani army’s capacity to coordinate its offensive action and argued in the same manner as Stalin during the Continuation of War that “I have reorganized the army... It has developed formidable firepower...” (Zuberi 1984: 520). Furthermore, after the Indian defeat against China in 1962, the enemy seemed to be weak and lacking resolve in the same manner as the Iranian military war enfeebled after the 1979 revolution. Despite the same initial expectations, however, the Indo-Pakistani War would turn out to be a much shorter military contestation than the Continuation War and the Iran-Iraq War.

Ayub’s evaluation was an underestimation of the Indian ability and resolve and an overestimation of the Pakistani offensive capacity. Further-

more, the Pakistani forces lost momentum and time as a new commander was appointed in the middle of the *Blitzkrieg* operation. It took time for the old commander to return, time for him to brief the new one, and time to assume command with a good comprehension of the situation on the ground. Thus, while the new commander Khan argued that he was not ordered to take the city of Akhnur (Chaudry 1984: 734), the Indians were given crucial time to reinforce it in order to make the success of the Pakistani thrust to sever Kashmir from India increasingly improbable.

Still, the Indian forces were under heavy pressure in Kashmir and, against Pakistani expectations, New Delhi decided to launch a southern counteroffensive in the Punjab region. As a result, on September 6, India sent four divisions across the border in the direction of Lahore. Choudhury (1968: 295) argues that India sought a “blitzkrieg in which Lahore and Sialkot should be occupied so that she could then dictate peace terms,” while Blinkenberg (1972: 259) holds that the aim was merely “a retaliation against the fierce onslaught of September 1 in a dangerous area to relieve pressure there.” While there is no direct evidence of the war aims in terms of official statements, Brines (1968: 329) argues that circumstantial evidence supports the latter alternative. Furthermore, a willingness to dictate the peace terms is not the same as having new territorial goals. Thus, in both cases, and lacking evidence of the opposite, New Delhi had no new war aims beyond reincorporating the Indian controlled Kashmir into India and thus maintaining the *status quo*.

As India crossed the international border about 23 kilometers from Lahore, Pakistan was taken by surprise (James 1993: 136) and the “imminent threat to Punjab’s capital forced withdrawal of Pakistani tanks from Jammu farther north and their hasty retreat on September 7...” (Wolpert 1993: 91). The limited war for Kashmir had now escalated into a large scale confrontation in the south. On September 8, the United States halted its military deliveries to the belligerents (McMahon 1994: 329). The United Nations Security Council called for a cease fire, where both sides would return to their earlier positions prior to the onset of hostilities. But, despite hopes of cutting off Kashmir from India before New Delhi would have time to react, Pakistan’s minimum objective was not a complete military victory but forcing India to negotiate “a political settlement” over Kashmir (Ziring 1971: 63), and that was not included in the UN proposal. In consequence, the UN plan did not match Pakistan’s war aims.

For several years India had refused to consider a negotiated change to the political status of Kashmir, and now Islamabad had grasped a chance

to force a change either in the territorial *status quo* or in the Indian negotiating position. Pakistan could now see that severing Kashmir from India was increasingly improbable as more troops had to be sent to the defense of Lahore, but the Kashmir dispute still had to be solved politically. Thus, on September 7, President Ayub argued that an eventual cease fire must “open a door to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute” (James 1993: 141) and Pakistan rejected the UN proposal. The Indian attack in the south was a surprise to the Pakistanis, but the battlefield events had not yet become so critical for Pakistan that it would give up the minimum demand of a political solution to the Kashmir dispute.

India refused to negotiate at this early stage of the war as the outcome of the military solution was still unclear during the second day of its offensive. Even though Pakistan had lowered its war aims, the bargaining space was not yet formed due to the continuing discrepancy in the belligerents’ minimum demands. India sought a return to the pre-war *status quo*, and Pakistan had not given up forcing India back to the negotiation table on the question of the future status of Kashmir. In an effort to relieve Lahore after the Indian attack toward this large city, Pakistan launched a counter-offensive at Khem Karan in Punjab. But, by opening the flood gates, India trapped nearly 100 Pakistani tanks and, militarily, “for Pakistan the war was over” by September 11 (Gauhar 1993: 342). Not having prepared for a long military contestation, “Pakistan could not continue the war at the level of intensity at which it was being fought” (Ziring 1971: 62). Wolpert argues that, by now, the battlefield events revealed information about Pakistan’s relative strength:

Ayub, of course, knew how perilously low his army’s supply of bombs and bullets was by the third week of September, and knew painfully well that more than a thousand of Pakistan’s bravest soldiers were dead, fourteen of his best planes destroyed, and almost two hundred of his best tanks out of commission, many bogged down in mud (1993: 93).

There were furthermore no signs of Pakistan being able to bring much more military material to the battlefield, which could have created asymmetric beliefs of increasing offensive capacity. Some Muslim countries had sent token military hardware, but the United States cut off all shipments of arms, munitions and spare parts to both combatants (Wolpert 1993: 93). Without foreign aid, the Pakistani offensive capacity was sharply declining. As the Soviet Union continued to send weapons to India, “Ayub noted again that India is in a more advantageous position and the suspension

of American military assistance to that country was not nearly as serious as the cut-off of shipments to Pakistan” (Ziring 1971: 61).

Lacking US military aid, other options for increasing the Pakistani offensive potential were now explored. On September 19, Ayub flew to China to negotiate possible Chinese military aid. Beijing declared its willingness to support Pakistan but at the same time explained that Pakistan would have to face a protracted war in which important cities might be lost in defensive setbacks (Gauhar 1993: 353). This Chinese realism contributed to Ayub’s already negative estimation of the military situation based on the assessment of his own generals, who were opposed to prolonging the war. All the preliminary calculations had been based on the expectation of a short and limited military contestation over Kashmir (Hamid 1993: 184). However, there were no expectations of increasing offensive potential and the reality of the battlefield events soon led to learning about the combatants’ relative strength and resolve. Thus, the war aims were lowered from the goal of severing Kashmir from India and Ayub opted for a negotiated solution to the Kashmir dispute when the war started to go awry for Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan agreed to a cease fire that would come into force on September 23. Ayub had recognized that there was no military solution and only the United States had the required leverage to bring India to the negotiation table to determine Kashmir’s status in bilateral negotiations. Washington had been reluctant to do this prior to the war. Ayub wrote after the war that “[w]e reasoned with the United States...but got no response...It was the United States alone that had the requisite influence but declined to exercise it” (Khan 1967: 158). Yet, both the United Kingdom and the United States now promised Ayub that they would strive to solve the political problem of Kashmir that lay at the root of the war (James 1993: 150). Thus, Ayub assumed that Pakistan’s minimum war aim would be realized as the cease fire was believed to be “a self-executing machinery for a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute” (Wolpert 1993: 96), even if India would later refuse to negotiate any change in the status of Kashmir and the United States would find itself too entangled in Vietnam to use its political leverage in India.

The costs of war, (c) , were high for Pakistan and the probability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, was low. Also, as the military stalemate was clearly observed by both Ayub and his generals, and the expected offensive capacity was low, the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, were soon lowered. Even if some offensive stakes remained, as the Kashmiri territory was still deemed valuable

to Pakistan, whatever territorial aims Pakistan had left, they were thought to be realized at the negotiation table. Thus, as the cease fire promised the avoidance of defeat and possible future gains through future negotiations, the war aim could be lowered from severing India from Kashmir to entering negotiations on the future status of Kashmir. In consequence, the expected utility of continuing the war was also lowered.

The war had not only reached a stalemate for Pakistan but also for India. Lahore was protected behind the canal fortifications and reaching further would have been increasingly arduous for the Indian army. Blinkenberg writes that “both sides were unable to penetrate the adversary’s front, and little by little warfare developed into a stalemate” (1972: 260). Faced with the US arms embargo and empty stores of military material, the Pakistani leadership did not have asymmetric information on increasing offensive capacity. With her larger military resources, domestic production and the continuing Soviet assistance, India would have been capable of sustaining a long war (Brines 1968: 345; Syed 1992: 51), and the Indian Chief of Staff was willing to continue pressuring Pakistan militarily (Ganguly 2002: 45). Still, even if India would have been able to continue the war longer, the military stalemate did not indicate increasing offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$. Prime Minister Shastri had also reached his war aims. The war was started by Pakistan with territorial goals in the Indian controlled Kashmir, but India did not have high offensive stakes to strive for. Thus, the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, through territorial conquest was low for New Delhi. As Blinkenberg argues,

India obtained the desired result: a halt to the invasion of Kashmir, a hindrance of Kashmir being cut off from India by the Pakistani thrust to Akhnur, and finally, by the dangerous assault in the Punjab, she brought about a large scale destruction of the adversary’s armour and other military equipment (1972: 262).

While Pakistan was forced to lower her war aims as a result of low offensive capacity and expectations, both sides perceived that their minimum aims were met. India kept its part of Kashmir intact, whereas Pakistan believed that the political stalemate had now been resolved with the possibility of negotiations determining the future of the disputed territory. In effect, as the minimum demands quickly became compatible, a bargaining space opened. Both sides adjusted their war aims in accordance with the current battlefield events and without asymmetric information about expected future offensive capacity. But how was the lowering of the Pakistani war aims

possible in a state where expansive nationalism was evidently strong, and why did India not have further territorial aims despite the possibility of continuing the war longer (Brines 1968: 345)?

7.4. Pakistani Religious Nationalism

Nearly all states experience a rise in nationalist sentiments in times of war as fighting and the sense of threat can increase both feelings of belonging and popular expectations of the ability to defeat the enemy. This was true of both Pakistan and India. In Pakistan nationalism was based on religious identity rather than ethnicity and can therefore be called religious nationalism. But, as the Pakistani offensive capacity turned out to be overrated during the course of the war, even Islamabad exhibited less and less offensive religious nationalism. How was this difference between popular sentiments and the leadership's stance possible?

Widespread offensive religious nationalist sentiments advocating the idea of uniting the whole of Kashmir with Pakistan were high in Pakistan throughout the war. These sentiments remained strong, even when the battlefield events became increasingly negative, because they were boosted by a lack of knowledge of the real performance of the Pakistani troops and their expected future offensive capacity. Ziring writes that,

[o]nly the highest ranking military leaders and civil servants knew how rapidly Army and Air Force stores were being consumed. Hence lower grade officers were eager to protract the hostilities, and the urban population was convinced Pakistan could win Kashmir (Ziring 1971: 63).

“Strangely enough, public opinion in Pakistan did not seem to have realized this negative result of the conflict” (Blinkeberg 1972: 262). In its rhetoric, the Pakistani leadership sought to appease the public, who believed that the war had gone their way, but President Ayub soon departed from any pretence of offensive religious nationalism in his calculations. However, the cease fire settlement was viewed as a betrayal by the Pakistani public, who were inflamed by expansive sentiments striving to incorporate all of Kashmir to Pakistan and believed that the course of the war had been favorable for the Pakistani army (Ziring 1971: 63).

Reflecting these popular expansive sentiments, Foreign Minister Bhutto argued that, since Kashmir had a predominantly Muslim population, it had to merge with Pakistan for the sake of Pakistan's *raison d'être*. Pakistan's identity was based on the two-state solution, as the founders of Pakistan

believed that Muslims could only prosper in a state of their own and that all the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent should be confined to this Muslim state. Bhutto wrote that,

[i]f the Muslim majority can remain a part of India, then the *raison d'être* of Pakistan collapses. These are the reasons why India, to continue her domination of Jammu and Kashmir, defies international opinion. For the same reasons, Pakistan must unremittingly continue her struggle for the right of self-determination of this subject people. Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and ideologically” (Bhutto 1969).

Yet, as India attacked Pakistan in the Lahore sector, Ayub felt betrayed by Bhutto, the more hawkish Foreign Minister and favorite of the military, who had convinced Ayub that such Indian reaction would be unlikely (Wolpert 1993: 91). Thus, a rift emerged between the president and his foreign minister. Facing a larger enemy at the gates of Lahore, Bhutto was still more willing to continue the war and was of the opinion that Pakistan should continue seeking a military solution to the Kashmir dispute. However, Wolpert gives an adequate explanation for how the Pakistani president was more inclined to rationally calculate the consequences of continuing the war with scant offensive expectations than was his foreign minister, who was more concerned with offensive religious nationalism:

His age no doubt contributed to his decision, though at any age he would have been less passionately impulsive than Zulfikar Bhutto in arguing that a cease-fire meant surrender, and surrender was nothing less than the total destruction of Pakistan as a “self-respecting nation.” The field marshal understood enough about war to know that the first trick of Grand Slam had been trumped. Stubbornly prolonging the battle now would bring no victory, only heavier casualties and the loss of all future support from Washington, Moscow, London, and the UN Secretariat (Ibid. 93).

In consequence, Ayub’s expected utility of continuing the war was lowered due to the high costs of war, (c) , and his ability to learn from the battlefield events that Pakistan’s expected offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, was now low. Prior to the war, Ayub had been under the influence of hawkish military, especially junior officers, to expand the Pakistani territory in Kashmir (Akhund 1998: 86; Paul 2005: 123). While offensive religious nationalism had initially created high offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, in incorporating Kashmir to Pakistan, when the Pakistani offensive capacity waned so did offensive

religious nationalism and the offensive stakes. Even if some offensive stakes remained, as the Kashmiri territory was still deemed valuable to Pakistan, the territorial aims were believed to be able to be realized through future negotiations. Since the Pakistani religious nationalism consisted of high offensive stakes and not of asymmetric causal beliefs, it became weaker and war aims could be lowered when the war started to go awry.

Thus, as Pakistan's offensive capacity had been compromised on the battlefield (Brines 1968: 344), the Pakistani president was not blinded by offensive religious nationalism. Ayub was able to reason that abstaining from the more ambitious war aim calling for severing Kashmir from India was necessary given the unexpected Indian attack in the south and the poor offensive capacity of the Pakistani army on the battlefield. Reaching his minimum demand of a political solution to the Kashmir dispute called for giving up the military option and ending the war. "Given the difficult military prospects that Pakistani forces faced, Ayub almost certainly reasoned that the cease-fire represented the best Pakistan could expect under the circumstances" (McMahon 1994: 332). The prospects of the combatants reaching a mutually acceptable negotiation solution to the war increased with the lowering of Islamabad's war aims and the fact that New Delhi did not raise its war aims. But why did India not have new territorial goals despite the possibility of continuing the war longer?

7.5. Indian Secularism

As for India, the war did create strong nationalist sentiments, but not offensive nationalism with new territorial aims beyond the pre-war *status quo*, as in Pakistan. The roots of this lack of similar offensive religious nationalism lie in the secular nature of the Indian state. While the Pakistanis had for years continued to insist on a referendum to establish the wishes of the Kashmiris, "the Indians argued that, as a secular state, they were unwilling to countenance any arrangement for self-determination that was based on religious identity" (Ganguly 2002: 33). The secular identity of the Indian state, with a concern for economic development, and the lack of strong Hindu nationalism in 1965 explain why India had low offensive stakes (utility of winning an offensive war) and limited its war aims to merely holding on to the part of Kashmir already under its control.

Hindu nationalism could have given rise to stronger offensive stakes among the Indian leadership when the Indian army succeeded in delivering Pakistan considerable military blows in the southern parts of the

theater of war. Yet there is no evidence that Prime Minister Shashtri would have been infatuated by it. It was not earlier than during the 1980s that Hindu nationalists started to threaten the secular nature of India (Mitra 1991). Further, Varshney argues that “Hindu nationalism... declined in the 1950s. It is only in the 1980s that Hindu nationalism has risen to political visibility and strength” (1991: 1004).

Hindu nationalism would not only have provided a basis for potentially offensive nationalism to seek control over the entire Kashmir area. The tension between Hindu nationalism and the secular foundation of the Indian state also explains why India so adamantly refused to negotiate a change in Kashmir’s political status and kept the war aim of holding on to the *status quo ante bellum*. Not deciding the Kashmir problem on a religious basis had already been important for India’s first prime minister, Nehru:

Nehru argued that in order to maintain secularism in India and Hindu nationalism at bay, Kashmir must stay in India – if necessary, by force: We have always regarded the Kashmir problem as symbolic for us, as it has far reaching consequences in India. Kashmir is symbolic as it illustrates that we are a secular state... (Varshney 1991: 1002).

During the years before the outbreak of the war, Indian foreign policy was characterized by a lack of offensive stakes and “an absence of escalation of disputes with Pakistan” because of a belief that a “war in South Asia would be counterproductive” (Schofield 2007: 56). While the Indian controlled territory in Kashmir was valuable in the eyes of the Pakistanis, the Indian leadership saw low utility in acquiring any Pakistani controlled territory. Instead the focus lay on anti-colonialism and a policy of nonalignment (Ibid. 56). Shastri declared his lack of offensive ideology toward Pakistan in his first broadcast as prime minister in 1964:

India and Pakistan are two great countries linked together by common history and tradition. It is their natural destiny to be friends with each other and to enter into close co-operation between these two countries will not only be of immense benefit to them but will make a great contribution to peace and prosperity in Asia. For too long have India and Pakistan been at odds with each other... We must reverse the tide. This will require determination and good sense on the part of the governments and people of both India and Pakistan (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India 2006).

Even after the Pakistani military probe into India in Rann Kutch in early 1965 Shastri argued that “[i]n the utilization of our limited resources, we

have always given primacy to plans and projects for economic development” (Ibid.). Only after the 1965 war did the Indian leaders become increasingly convinced of the need of a military option for the sake of security (Schofield 2007: 58). Thus, India’s secularism and concern for economic development, which lacked expansionist sentiments beyond the pre-war *status quo*, made New Delhi’s nationalism defensive. It was not characterized by offensive stakes in conquering the enemy territory or by asymmetric causal beliefs about how to win the war when the battlefield events indicated no increasing offensive potential. In consequence, India preferred a quick end to the war and did not raise its war aims. Furthermore, despite the fact that India could have been able to sustain a longer war as a larger state with greater resources, the stalemate on the battlefield did not indicate that there would be increasing offensive capacity, as Lahore was still protected by the canal fortifications.

Pakistan, in turn, started the war with an overestimation of its offensive capacity and high offensive stakes to incorporate Kashmir to Pakistan. Yet, when the war started to go awry and the possibility of a political solution to the Kashmir problem emerged, the offensive stakes were lowered. Both sides were aware of their diminished offensive capacity as a result of the military stalemate. Lacking asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive capacity or asymmetric causal beliefs about how to win the war despite the military stalemate, both India and Pakistan could swiftly learn from the battlefield events about their relative strength and arrive at a mutually acceptable bargaining solution.

7.6. Final Analysis

The hypothesis on the process of peacemaking and the reason for the length of the war are corroborated by the case of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Thus, the bounded learning theory gives an adequate explanation of the chain of events during the war: lacking expansive ideology or asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity, the battlefield events quite soon revealed information about the belligerents’ relative strength. During this relatively short war, we can observe how low offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, on both sides created low war aims and how the subsequent expected utility of continuing the war was lower as compared to the expected utility of accepting the enemy’s demands at the negotiation table. The lack of expansive ideology and information enabled learning from the battlefield events as combatants adjusted their war aims in accordance with the cur-


rent offensive potential so that a bargaining space was created. Thus, as the minimum demands from both sides matched quite soon, a peace treaty was also quickly within reach.

As the war resulted in a stalemate, neither side had expansive causal beliefs or expectations of improving tactics or access to offensive military material that would have increased the expected offensive capacity. Thus the belligerents did not have asymmetric information about offensive expectations – private or otherwise contestable – that would have allowed them to have such high war aims that they would have been considered unjustifiable by the enemy. Furthermore, since India was still in control of its share of Kashmir, it had no offensive stakes in continuing the war further into Pakistan. As for Pakistan, President Ayub's expansive nationalism and offensive stakes in conquering the rest of Kashmir diminished with the waning of the Pakistani battlefield performance and the promise of a political solution. The more hawkish Foreign Minister Bhutto in turn did not have the final say in matters of war and peace.

I will use some simple figures to further illustrate the events during the war. While the distances between the different points in time are not proportional, the figures serve to complement the empirical material in the text and make the analysis easier. Figure 9 illustrates the discrepancy in war aims during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and the concomitant creation of the bargaining space. Thus it shows how far the combatants were from making peace during the war. As the minimum demands from both sides matched quite soon, a bargaining space and a peace treaty were also quickly within reach. The key to understanding the figure is the distance between the upper line, representing Pakistan's war aims, and the lower line, representing the Indian war aims.

Prior to the beginning of the war, the minimum demands from both sides were discrepant as the territorial concessions required by Islamabad were greater than the ones agreed to by New Delhi. As the bargaining space was nonexistent, Ayub decided to use a perceived window of opportunity to solve the political impasse in Kashmir. The Pakistanis had high offensive capacity at the outset of the war, on September 1, and succeeded in pushing deep into Kashmir in an effort to sever Kashmir from India. However, the Indian counterattack on September 6 in the Lahore sector forced an essential part of the Pakistani troops to relocate to the south. This was the first major battlefield event that indicated Islamabad's decreased offensive capacity.

FIGURE 9. Discrepancy in War Aims during the Indo-Pakistani War
(Bargaining Space)




Note: Non-proportional distances. Pakistan: _____ India: _____

Yet, it was only after the failure of the Pakistani counteroffensive by mid September and the meeting with the Chinese that Ayub came to the realization that the probability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, and the expected utility of continuing the war were not high. Pakistan had scant offensive ability left, and the risk of India conquering more Pakistani territory was understood. In effect, as Ayub's decision making was not guided by asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity or asymmetric causal beliefs, not only $p(\text{win})$ but also the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, could be lowered enough for the war aims to match and to make peace possible. By now, the goal of severing Kashmir from India was replaced with the minimum demand of solving the Kashmir conflict politically. India did not have territorial aims beyond preserving the prewar *status quo*, the United States and Great Britain promised to work toward a political solution and Pakistan believed in a future negotiated change in Kashmir's status. In consequence, the belligerents' minimum demands soon matched.

A bargaining space was therefore created, enabling the signing of the cease fire agreement a couple days before it would come into effect on September 23. India did not change its war aims during the conflict, and thus the cease fire agreement was made possible by the change of mind of the Pakistani leadership. Ayub's belief in outside help in restarting the political process over Kashmir turned out to be too optimistic. Still, the cease

expectations of increasing offensive capacity nor expansive ideology in the form of high offensive stakes or asymmetric causal beliefs to draw the lines apart. As expected by the bounded learning theory, the rather parallel lines indicate that India quickly learned from the battlefield events what reasonable war aims were: the military stand-off justified the upholding of the prewar borders.

FIGURE 11. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of Pakistan



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: _____ Battlefield events: - - - -

Figure 11 illustrates the covariance between battlefield events and war aims in Pakistan during the war. At the onset of the war, Islamabad had an optimistic war aim of severing Kashmir from India. The initial successes of the Pakistani army's thrust toward Akhnur seemed to justify this. The battlefield events of September 6 with the Indian counterattack in the Lahore sector, which surprised the Pakistani leadership and army, showed however that the Pakistani battlefield dominance could be waning. We can now observe a gap between war aims and actual battlefield events. Yet, for a while, the battlefield events were not so critical that they would have weakened Pakistani expansive religious nationalism (offensive stakes) and given rise to lower war aims.

This gap indicates a brief period of high war aims and expected utility of waging the war in the absence of encouraging offensive victories. Since the Indian war aims reflected the battlefield events by September 20, the Paki-

stani gap had to be closed for the war to end soon. In the end, it started to close when a military impasse resulted after mid September and President Ayub became disillusioned with Bhutto's offensive religious nationalism. Thus, the expectations and the war aims became more realistic and better matched the actual battlefield events. Ayub had neither asymmetric causal beliefs nor asymmetric expectations of increasing offensive capacity after talks with the Chinese. Thus, as the offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, were low on both sides, and Pakistan lowered its offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, there were no high war aims on either side of the conflict. As the war had soon revealed information about the combatants' relative strength, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 could therefore finally end in a mutually acceptable negotiation solution after some three weeks of fighting. With no expansive ideology or asymmetric information, the military standoff did not lead to protracted trench warfare.

As expected by the bounded learning theory, the fact that the lines soon became parallel indicates that Pakistan early learned from the battlefield events what justifiable war aims were. While the war started with offensive religious nationalism in the form of high offensive stakes on the Pakistani side, they decreased when the battlefield events became negative. In the end, President Ayub had no offensive religious nationalism or expectations of increased offensive capacity to pull the lines apart for long. Lacking asymmetric information and expansive ideology in the form of asymmetric causal beliefs, the war turned out to be a relatively short military contestation. While images of the military stalemate during the lengthy WWI may lead to a belief that defense dominance always leads to long war duration, the short Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 is a good example of how a lack of offensive capacity can lead decisions-makers to swiftly lower their war aims and rationally agree on mutually agreeable terms of peace. I will now continue to analyze the last of the four cases. The Iran-Iraq War also involved strong religious sentiments but turned out to be a much longer war. What was so different about this war that made finding a negotiated solution so arduous?

8. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I start the chapter with a brief introduction to the background to the Iran-Iraq War. After specifying the theoretical expectations, I proceed to analyze how current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the belligerents' war aims. As in the previous chapter, I also examine the nature of the most potential factors that could affect the duration of the war according to the bounded learning theory: asymmetric information and expansive ideology in the form of Iraqi nationalism and Iranian religiosity.

8.1. The Road to War

While Europe seemed to be spared from the scourge of war after WWII, the Middle East turned out to be a substantial hot spot. Even in a longer historical perspective, one of the major scenes of military action in the Middle East has been the border between Iran and Iraq. Two factors had contributed to the creation of the war-making state in this region of ancient Mesopotamia. The battle carriage that increased the mobility and reach of the warriors was first developed in the borderland between vast semiarid grass-covered plains and the river civilizations (Keegan 2003: 182). In addition to the military technology that increased the offensive potential of armies, the value of the region also raised the offensive stakes. The wealth that the agricultural produce of the flooding Euphrates and Tigris rivers became a long lasting source of military conflict between the foreign invaders.

In the 20th century, the wealth of the agricultural produce was no longer a major cause of conflict in the region, as access to oil had become the center of concern for modern civilization, and neither would the states now rely on local developments of military technology. Still, the sheer amount of military spending and number of military conflicts in the Middle East would continue to echo the ancient heritage of the war-making state. The longest and costliest of these wars, in terms of military spending and casualties, was the Iran-Iraq War. It broke out in 1980 in the midst of the regional commotion brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution the year before. The region had previously witnessed its share of aggressive warfare enabled by the creation of new

weapons technology, such as the battle carriage. Also this time it would turn out to be a theater of war where modern offensive weapons, such as tanks and air force, were used. Yet, despite the presence of offense dominant weapons, the war would not end with any side being overrun or with a negotiated solution before some eight years of devastating warfare.

There are several possible, and not mutually exclusive, causes of the war. In the broader international context, Saddam Hussein's Iraq had ambitions to take over the Arab leadership from Egypt as Egypt's revolutionary and anti-Western reputation had been diluted in the wake of the Camp David negotiations with Israel. Another underlying reason was the longstanding territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq. In the latest 1975 Algiers Treaty, Iran had with its *de facto* use of the waterway forced a redrawing of the borderline in its favor, which was a deep humiliation to Iraq (Swearingen 1988: 408). Apart from territorial issues, the religious Sunni-Shi'i controversy was also a potential cause of the war. According to Khadduri (1988: 159), the risk of Khomeini exporting the Shi'i revolution of 1979 into Iraq, with a 60 percent Shi'i population, was perceived as a great threat to the Baath regime.

In Iran the war would be run by the seven man Supreme Defense Council (SDC), with the president as Commander in Chief. The SDC would be troubled by a struggle between the moderates and the hardliners. However, the ultimate decisions of war and peace in the Islamic Republic would be made by the religious head, Ayatollah Khomeini. In Iraq, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), with Saddam Hussein in tight control of it, was responsible for coordinating the war effort.

8.2. Theoretical Expectations

In the following account of the Iran-Iraq War, I focus on the process during which the belligerents created a bargaining space as the war aims from both sides became compatible. From the perspective of the strategic learning theory, the Iran-Iraq War was an anomaly because of its length. The task is to analyze this deviation from the theory's expectation that events on the battlefield should swiftly reveal information about strength and resolve so that the belligerents can agree on the terms of peace. Something must have made at least one side of the conflict neglect or misinterpret the battlefield events.

Due to the length of the war, the bounded learning theory expects that we can find either an expansive ideology (asymmetric causal beliefs) or asym-

metric information about expected offensive potential that have caused disagreement on what reasonable war aims should be. It is also possible that an expansive ideology raised the offensive stakes. Thus, the bargaining space would not be created for a long time. I will examine the nature of nationalism in Iraq and the role of religion in Iran as potential sources of expansive ideology. The Iranian revolution of 1979 had thoroughly colored the domestic political and social discourse with religious themes, whereas Saddam Hussein's Iraq had a secular Arab nationalist foundation.

However, I will start the analysis by examining how current ability to use offensive military factors covaried with the belligerents' war aims. Because of the length of the war, the bounded learning theory expects a low covariance. If the war aims and current ability to use offensive military factors do not closely covary, we can expect an expansive ideology and/or asymmetric information about future offensive capacity to have intervened to change the level of expected offensive ability, war aims and the expected utility of continuing the war.

8.3. Early Phases of the War: Saddam's High Hopes

Whatever the underlying causes of the Iran-Iraq War were, the most imminent reason triggering this long military contestation from a rationalist perspective was an over-appreciation of Iraq's relative strength by Saddam Hussein, now facing a seemingly weakened Iran in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. On September 22, 1980, the Iraqi Air Force launched sorties against Iranian air bases in an apparent effort to copy the Israeli offensive success against its Arab neighbors in 1967. No doubt, Hussein had high offensive expectations due to the perceived weakness of the enemy and the offensive technology, such as aircraft and tanks, he had in his hands.

Yet, there is no total certainty of the ultimate aim of Iraq's aggression. A possible reason for this ambiguity is the generally deficient planning from the Iraqi side as "[t]hey did not articulate a clear and detailed set of objectives in starting their campaigns" (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 59). Nevertheless, Freedman and Karsh (1993), Tibi (1998: 156) and Yapp (1996: 428) argue that Saddam had very limited war aims of deterring Khomeini from seeking to export the Islamic revolution and occupying areas of strategic importance, so as to secure Iraq better access to the Gulf. According to Hiro (1990: 40) these objectives were the Shatt al Arab waterway, the cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr on its eastern bank, and the cities of Ahvaz and Dezful deeper in the Iranian territory. Taking over

these areas with the help of offense dominant weapons technology was not expected to be a long process. Recovered documents indicate that Hussein believed that Iraq would be able to take over the limited territorial key objectives in ten to 14 days (Zabih 1988: 169-170).

The air strikes were not as effective as expected because of the inefficiency of the Iraqi air force and the dispersion of well-bunkered targets, although the following land invasion fared somewhat better. Iraq had a total of 12 divisions facing the Iranian border, two of which were armored and three mechanized. Iran, in turn, had only four of its nine divisions along the border. As a result, the Iraqi army managed to penetrate some 15 kilometers into Iranian territory in the south, and as far as 45 kilometers in the north. Iraq soon stood a chance of occupying all the large cities in southwestern Iran (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 82-88).

The moral and fighting capacity of the Iranian military had reached a low during the Islamic revolution. The US Embassy hostage crisis had cut off Iran from spare parts to its largely American military material. Thousands of officers had been purged as a result of a failed military coup in July 1980 and about 140 000 soldiers had deserted. In effect, in reaction to the Iraqi advances, Teheran had to mobilize new volunteers, who had to fight mainly with light infantry weapons. The Iraqi army was not proficient in conducting its *Blitzkrieg*, however, which gave Iran time to reorganize its defenses. "They rarely risked bypassing an objective or opposing forces. Some combat elements halted when they met relatively light opposition, and Iraq showed little ability to maneuver its armor or use its air power" (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 90; see also Hiro 1990: 48).

As the offensive progress of the Iraqi army was greatly reduced, and failing to reach the original war aims, Hussein announced that he was ready for a cease fire on September 28, 1980. He demanded that Iran accept the territorial changes brought about by the initial Iraqi offensive, accept Iraq's complete rights over the Shatt al Arab waterway, and withdraw from three islands in the Gulf (Hiro 1990: 42). However, the Iranians, who had not yet fully mustered the strength of their military against the Iraqis, had no reason to accept such terms. With inferior forces they had succeeded in slowing down the Iraqi onslaught and, with the mobilization of new forces, their expected offensive capacity was yet to be tested. The plea for peace was left unreciprocated.

While most of the Iraqi forces were stuck in inefficient urban warfare in the cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan, the rest of the army did not conduct any significant offensive operations before November. The initial Iraqi ad-

vantage in manpower was soon lost, and maneuver was replaced by artillery assaults. As the winter came, the rains caused the road-bound Iraqi armored vehicles to be stuck in their positions. Thus, a combination of climate and a lack of proper tactics proved a crucial limitation to the Iraqi offensive ability. In fact, by late 1980, the Iraqi army had established a pattern that it did not change until 1988. "It generally failed to maneuver effectively, conduct effective offensive combined-arms operations... They moved too slowly, too little, and too late" (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 97).

The second peace feeler from Hussein was extended on November 10, 1980. In addition to Iraq's right to keep the occupied areas, he added freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Straits that were now blocked by the Iranian navy. The demands were still as unacceptable to Iran's new leadership as in September. The president of Iran, Bani-Sadr, "maintained that there would be no ceasefire talks as long as Iraq occupied Iranian soil" (Hiro 1990: 46-47). Thus, the Iranian war aims included the minimum of recovering the lost territories. These aims were warranted by the fact that Iran had not yet mustered its full military power for a counterattack. While the negative battlefield events had already made Hussein lower his war aims, they had not yet shown the level of Iran's offensive capacity. In consequence, the belligerents' war aims did not match.

In January and March 1981, Iran launched unsuccessful counterattacks to regain the occupied territory. Similarly, Iraq sought in March to advance further into Iran, but failed. From the point of view of the strategic learning theory, these battlefield failures ought to by this time have revealed such negative information about offensive ability that the belligerents' minimum demands could match. Yet, at this critical point for war duration, quite the opposite happened. Lawless (1999: 549-556) argues that Saddam may have hoped for a change in the Iranian leadership as a result of his attack. However, Saddam's daring offensive did not have the expected effect of shaking the powerbase of the new regime. Instead, the power struggle between the more moderate and the more fundamentalist religious forces was tilting in favor of the latter.

On June 20, 1981, after a spring of failed counterattacks, the more moderate President Bani Sadr was removed from office after being impeached by the Iranian Parliament for incompetence. The next president, Rajai, was the preferred choice of the clerics (Hiro 1990: 52). Their uncompromising attitude toward negotiations was reflected in Khomeini's statement that "[t]here is no question of peace or compromise, and we shall never have any discussion with them [the attackers of Islam]" (Ibid. 53). Thus,

the basis for not only high Iranian war aims but also high offensive expectations was solidifying with the religious conservatives' increasing control of the Iranian policy making elite.

8.4. Iran at a Crossroads: Increasing Offensive Expectations

On March 19, 1982, Iran launched an offensive in the Dezful-Shush region that managed to push the frontier some 40 kilometers back to the west. For the first time during the now two year long war, Iraq was on the defensive and suffered territorial losses. The strains on the Iraqi society were also mounting. While about 40 percent of the Iraqi manpower was engaged in the war, the annual oil exports were more than cut in half. In consequence, the trade deficit had reached 9.6 billion US dollars (McLachlan and Joffé 1984: 71, 80). The Kurdish rebellion in the north also started to be troublesome. We cannot directly observe the Iraqi leadership's level of offensive expectations at that point in time. Yet, it is indicative of a marked decrease that Saddam Hussein allowed the withdrawal of forward units and the commitment of the reserves after Iraq had begun to suffer serious setbacks (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 131). In accordance with this trend of diminishing offensive capacity in mid March, Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Deputy Prime Minister, declared that Iraq was prepared to withdraw from occupied areas once peace negotiations had started and showed signs of progress (Karsh 1987: 23).

If Saddam had by now interpreted the battlefield events and the domestic strains as a marked decline in Iraq's current and expected offensive capacity, Iran had opposite expectations. In early May, 1982, Iran succeeded in further regaining some of the occupied territory. And by May 23, the city of Khorramshahr was recaptured without much resistance from the withdrawing Iraqis (Ibid. 25). In consequence, Bagdad not only announced Iraq's willingness to withdraw back to the old border but also declared its readiness to accept that a commission of Muslim states would determine which side had caused the war (Hiro 1990: 63).

The Iranian president Bani Sadr had been removed as a result of poor battlefield performance and, also in Iraq, some ministers by that time called for Saddam's withdrawal from power. His reaction was to further purge dissidents, concentrate power around himself and his closest allies and increase the role of the secret services in controlling the populace (Ibid. 65-67). However, to Iran, this was a sign of weakness, which increased the

expected utility of continuing the war, as the goal of a change in regime in Bagdad was becoming increasingly within reach. Observing Iraq's growing domestic tensions, "Khomeini was among those who were quietly confident of Saddam Hussein's imminent downfall." However, Hussein also realized that something had to be done. As a result of poor battlefield performance and lacking offensive expectations on June 20, 1982, Hussein announced that Iraq would finally enact the unilateral withdrawal to the old border (Ibid. 64).

The Iranian Supreme Defense Council now had a bitter debate over whether continuing war would be useful:

The idea of an invasion was categorically opposed by the military leadership, which doubted the army's ability to carry it out. The military was supported in their judgment by some moderate politicians such as the Premier, Mir Hossein Moussavi, and the President, Sayyed Ali Khamanei, who opposed an invasion on the grounds of its high human, material and political costs (Karsh 1987: 42; see also Hiro 1990: 86).

By the summer of 1982, the conservative factions of the Iranian leadership around Khomeini had crushed the more moderate opposition and were even coming under pressure from a still more conservative group of mullahs (The New York Times, April 13, 1982). The religious hardliners and hawks with a different cost-benefit analysis thus won the debate and neglected the regular army's and the moderates' expectation of low offensive capacity.

The economic prospects were encouraging with the rising oil prices. Iran had also demonstrated an improved ability to plan and control combined arms operations, with diversionary moves and outflanking maneuvers (Karsh 1987: 42, 26). The hawks furthermore argued against the doubts of the military professionals that any limitations "could be overcome by deploying large numbers of fighters imbued with revolutionary Islamic zeal..." (Hiro 1990: 86). In effect, religious fervor was expected to raise Iran's offensive capacity and increased the probability of reaching even high war aims, $p(\text{win})$, and the expected utility of continuing the war.

On July 9, 1982, the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Rafsajani, announced the new Iranian war aims: retaining the old Algiers treaty that gave Iran the right of navigation in Shatt al Arab; repatriation of over 100 000 Iraqi citizens expelled from Iraq; 100 billion US dollars in war reparations;³¹ and punishing Saddam Hussein as a war criminal (Ibid.

³¹Karsh (1987: 25) reports a demand of 150 billion US dollars.

86). As Iraq categorically refused to consider such terms, several offenses against the Iraqi territory were launched during the summer. The attacks were however thwarted by a solid Iraqi line of defense at a heavy human cost to the attacker. The Iranian Chief of Staff threatened to resign if unqualified people continue to meddle with the conduct of the war (Karsh 1987: 26). Indeed, the rift between the regular army and the religiously inspired Pasdaran (the Islamic Revolution's Guards) and Basij (a volunteer based paramilitary force) widened as the army played a small role in the failed attacks that relied on massive frontal infantry assaults without close air support or armor (Ibid. 27).

The Iranian tendency to focus selectively only on positive battlefield events partially explains why the offensive expectations and war aims were not lowered. Farhi writes that “[e]ven after the [capture of] Khorramshahr, the war remained popular because of a series of important victories” (2004: 106). Two Iranian offensives in 1983 in the northern front were more successful, pushing the Iraqi army back several kilometers into Iraqi territory. Thus “from early 1984 onwards, the Iranian authorities, encouraged perhaps by the relative successes in the northern offensives, continued to advocate the need for a final blow against the Ba’ath regime” (Karsh 1987: 27).

Baghdad did not respond by lowering its war aims but sought to raise the cost of continued warfare for Iran by targeting civilians in urban centers and tried to draw in foreign powers by targeting oil tankers transporting Iranian oil. Teheran disregarded these efforts and launched the largest land operations to that time. During the first, in mid February 1984, over half a million men were engaged in a battle that brought no gains to Iran. During the second, the Majnun Island oilfields were captured (Ibid. 28). However, despite small battlefield victories, Iran's small gains during most of the war cost more than they appeared to have been worth. Thus, as Teheran did not lower its war aims as a result of low offensive capacity, it must have been influenced by some other factors raising the probability of victory and the expected utility of continuing the war.

8.5. Iranian Offensive Religion

The expansive tendencies that prolonged the war on the Iranian side of the conflict can be found within the realm of religion. The strong religious sentiments among the Iranian leadership raised the expected utility of continuing the war and contributed to prolonging the war in three ways. First, offensive religion raised the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, by increasing

the value of enemy territory and making a compromise with Saddam seem morally wrong. Second, offensive religion created asymmetric causal beliefs, where God was expected to help Iran to victory despite the negative battlefield events. They increased the expected ability to use offensive military factors, $p(\text{win})$. Iraq, in turn, did not agree that the ensuing Iranian high war aims were justified. Third, from a religious perspective, the cost of warfare (c) was not high, as martyrdom was not seen as a negative consequence of warfare. These factors kept the war aims high and increased the expected utility of continuing the war.

As a result of the Islamic revolutionaries managing to gain control of the government in 1979, leftist and republican guerillas staged attacks against the new regime in Teheran, and the military and the universities were subjected to major purges by the government (Arjomand 1988: 144). When the war against Iraq started later the same year, the regime saw an opportunity to better unite the people behind the principles of the new religious rule. “[T]he war offered a univocal venue for both crushing domestic opposition to the new emerging political order as well as ‘sacred defense’ against international aggression” (Farhi 2004: 104). Gieling (1999: 169) also argues that during the “early years” the war was used as an instrument for the ending of internal opposition to the regime and as a distraction from internal problems. While the dissidents lost much of their legitimacy after the early years of the war, the entire populace was still exposed to a propagated religious meaning throughout the fighting. The clerics propagated “Shi’i generated epic aspects of the war, mourning, opposition to existing values in the city, martyrdom, action as opposed to words, purity and devotion, and spiritual rewards in the afterlife” (Farhi 2004: 104).

Religion managed not only to mobilize the masses to fight for a holy cause. It also reinforced the leadership’s expectations of Iran’s offensive capacity. While Iran had to turn to Israel, Syria, China and North Korea for arms and munitions and was running out of functioning military supplies such as aircraft, Iraq continued to receive a steady flow of the latest weapons of war from, for example, France (Hiro 1990: 99). As a result, the balance of force in air power and artillery tilted in favor of Iraq (Cordesman 1984: 684). Yet, Cordesman and Wagner argue that the realities of the battlefield did not matter to the religiously motivated Iranian leadership:

It is doubtful that Khomeini or most of those around him understood the trends in the balance or would have cared if they had... The Mullahs...continued to try to substitute ideological fervor for strategy, tactics, and training (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 169-170).

Khomeini insisted that “Iran’s recent setbacks on the battlefield represented gain” as “the nation that goes for martyrdom...can hardly think of anything else. As for its economy, it does not matter” (Brumberg 2001:132). Thus, the negative events on the battlefield became increasingly irrelevant to the decision-making process of the leadership. There are three reasons for Teheran keeping the war aims high and not learning from the Iranians’ limited offensive capacity on the battlefield. First, offensive religion raised the offensive stakes. As the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, i.e. offensive stakes, was high, bearing the soaring costs of war (c) was possible without lowering the expected utility of continuing the war. The offensive stakes were high for religious reasons, as agreeing to a religiously unjust peace agreement made negotiations impossible. “Throughout the entire war, the leaders made it clear that the first and foremost reason not to negotiate a peace settlement was that, in the case of this war, peace was not in conformity with Islam” (Gieling 1999: 165).

More specifically, this meant that Saddam’s peace proposals were dealt with as un-Islamic. “All peace negotiations and calls for a settlement of the war were worthless in the eyes of the Iranian leaders unless these were accompanied by justice (*‘adâla*). Fighting had to continue until *‘adâla* had been achieved” (Ibid. 167). Owing to a religious striving for divine justice, any peace treaty would have to include the punishment of Saddam as a war criminal and his removal from power. Prime Minister Muhammad Rizâ Mahdawî Kanî referred to the Quran (49:9) in arguing that to compromise with an oppressor would be morally wrong (Gieling 1999: 165). Thus the expected utility of continuing fighting, rather than signing a peace treaty without defeating Saddam, was high due to the high utility of winning. Anecdotal evidence from early Islamic history was also used to justify not entering into peace negotiations when it implied reconciliation with unbelief, heresy and aggression (Ibid. 112).

Furthermore, the offensive religious sentiments also raised the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, by increasing the value of Iraqi territory in the eyes of the clergy now controlling the Iranian state. The road to Jerusalem was seen as going through the occupation of Iraq (Abrahamian 2008: 175). Hiro writes that,

[u]nderlying all this [willingness to accept casualties] was the deep religiosity of the Iranian Shias with strong overtones of ‘martyr complex’. They considered it their religious duty to fight evil and oppression which, in this case, they associated with Saddam Hussein. This struggle, to them, was part of another: to liberate Jerusalem from its Zionist

occupiers and oppressors. They saw the march either to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in southern Iraq, or Kadhimain near Baghdad, as part of the advance to Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam... (Hiro 1990: 106).

These sentiments are clearly reflected in a speech that Khomeini gave to Moslems making the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in 1987:

I declare my own as well as the unreserved support of the Iranian nation, Government and authorities for all Islamic struggles of nations and courageous and Moslem young people toward the liberation of Jerusalem... We will export our experiences to the whole world and present the outcome of our struggles against tyrants to those who are struggling along the path of God, without expecting the slightest reward. The result of this exportation will certainly result in the blooming of the buds of victory and independence and in the implementation of Islamic teachings among the enslaved nations (The New York Times, August 4, 1987).

In a broadcast on April 4, 1985, Khomeini further stressed offensive stakes by arguing for the utility of winning from a religious perspective:

It is our belief that Saddam wishes to return Islam to blasphemy and polytheism... If America becomes victorious ... and grants victory to Saddam, Islam will receive such a blow that it will not be able to raise its head for a long time ... The issue is one of Islam versus blasphemy, and not of Iran versus Iraq (Brumberg 2001: 133).

Second, the Iranian leadership had asymmetric causal beliefs that increased the probability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, when the war was going awry: while Hussein based his assessment of justified war aims on the battlefield events, Teheran held on to its high war aims as it deemed the expected future offensive capacity to be high due to Iran having divine help on its side. Frequent mention was made of the belief that God would aid the believers who were fighting for a “divine cause” (The New York Times, February 11, 1987) to defeat Iraq. Khomeini, for example, argued in several speeches that in the end victory would belong to the believers (Gieling 1999: 149).

In the leadership’s theological arguments the outcome of the war was dependent on the will of God, which was considered to be on Iran’s side. “According to Khomeini, victory in the war ultimately depended on the creator’s *fadl* (favour) and *lutf* (benevolence).” Thus, in the end, the outcome of the war would depend on the Iranians’ level of belief and striv-

ing in the way of God: “God would help the Iranians only if they helped Him” and in return render them victorious (Ibid. 60). Therefore, despite setbacks on the battlefield, the leadership expected the Iranian offensive capacity to increase because of the believers’ reliance on God, which was, of course, incredible in the eyes of the Iraqis. Expressing both the high offensive stakes in conquering the enemy territory and the belief in victory with God’s help, Khomeini declared that,

Islamic Revolution ... is being exported [so that] ...with the dispensation of the Supreme Lord, the banner of Islam is likely to be hoisted throughout the globe in the not-too-distant future (Brumberg 2001: 132-133)

However, there is no evidence that the overall situation in the theater of war would have given Hussein a reason to expect that the Iranians’ causal beliefs could lead to Iran emerging victorious. Thus, as Iran’s causal beliefs were asymmetric, neither Iraq nor Iran lowered their estimates of $p(\text{win})$ and war aims to a mutually acceptable level.

Third, Khomeini’s expected utility of continuing the war was also high because the perceived costs of war were low from a religious perspective. As the war dragged on, the content of his speeches suggested his growing conviction that “martyrdom was the supreme form of mystical experience” (Ibid. 128). In a speech in October 1980 Khomeini argued that “the natural world is the lowest part of creation... The true arena is the divine world which is inexhaustible.” Thus, the martyrs were helping Iran to become “a divine country” (Ibid. 128).

In summary, expansive ideology in the form of offensive religion, increasing both the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$ and creating asymmetric causal beliefs about $p(\text{win})$, led to high war aims and a high expected utility of continuing the war, as Iraq did not agree that the Iranian war aims were justified by the current battlefield events. The asymmetric causal beliefs about the chances of victory and the high offensive stakes made the Iranians bear the costs of war (c) that were further lowered because of the perceived benefits of martyrdom. As a result the expected utility of continuing the war was higher than agreeing to Iraq’s peace proposal.

As offensive warfare did not give rise to the expected successes, there was finally disillusionment with the expansive religiosity, and the moderate religious forces in the Iranian society and leadership gained ground. Freedman and Karsh write that,

the moderates steadily increased their position. They were supported in this by the growing public disenchantment, illustrated by widespread demonstration against the war and the Iranian government, and a steep drop in the number of recruits for the battlefield. When Khomeini's reluctant order to cease hostilities came at last in July 1988, there was little left of Iran's revolutionary pretensions (Freedman and Karsh 2003: 9).

Yet, the process of weakening the asymmetric causal beliefs took a very long time, as expected by the bounded learning theory. There was no common ground for Khomeini and Hussein to judge what the battlefield events suggested about the states' expected future offensive ability. Further, the offensive stakes would be lowered only after asymmetric causal beliefs and Iran's expected offensive capacity waned. In effect, the war aims were not swiftly adjusted to a mutually acceptable level that would have created a bargaining space.

8.6. Iraqi Nationalism

The Iraqi invasion of Iran ultimately gave rise to defensive, not offensive, nationalism in Iraq (Hiro 1990: 43). Neither did religion play a decisive role. Despite Hussein's referrals to a holy war, such religious connotations served the purpose of strengthening nationalism rather than solely religious sentiments in a nominal nation state that had a Shi'i majority and large Sunni and Kurdish minorities. Despite Hussein calling the Iranians infidels, he had no strong religious fervor that guided his war effort, as he had connected much of his own position to Arab nationalism. Indeed, the ruling Baath party had justified its mission by seeking to unite the Arab peoples in the face of external enemies (article 23 of the Baath Party Constitution).

According to Hiro, Saddam Hussein "tried to *reinforce* his pan-Arab line with Islamic history, describing the war as the 'Second Qadasiya' – referring to the battle of Qadasiya in 637 when Arab Muslims defeated the Persian army..." (1990: 44, my italics). Instead, the Iraqi regime was imbued with a pan-Arab Baathist ideology with a clear Arab nationalist agenda and socialist undertones. Thus, Saddam Hussein had to base national unity not on religion but on strengthening the nationalist sentiments. However, since Iraq was a multi-ethnic state, with the majority sharing the same religion with the enemy, the task was not an easy one and could not be accomplished with pan-Arabism. Kurdish nationalists had rebelled during

the mid 1970s, communist networks were active, and Shi'i political Islam was on the rise. Under these circumstances, rather than merely appealing to pan-Arabism, the wartime nationalism would be state centered, etatist, nationalism.

As the Iraqi offensive capacity was relatively high during the early phases of the war, offensive nationalist sentiments, expressing themselves in the general aims that combined Iraqi and Arab territorial claims, also increased. "The majority, who gave their allegiance to the Baath regime and ideology, together with vast sections of Arabs, showed unmistakable signs of support and pride in Iraq's military power" (Jabar 2004: 126). Thus the territorial stakes were initially high.

However, when the offensive capacity waned and the Iraqi offensive lost momentum, nationalism also diminished. As the battles on Iranian soil continued incessantly, the zeal of the Iraqis weakened and was gradually displaced by a sense of frustration. "Voluntary surrender to the enemy increased alarmingly" (Ibid. 126). Also indicative of waning nationalism was that in June, 1982, Iraq stopped announcing battlefield casualties in order to maintain popular morale (Hiro 1990: 89). In the end, the period of expansive hopes lasted only for the couple of weeks that the Iraqi onslaught managed to move forward. The limitations in Iraq's offensive capacity and the costs of continued warfare soon became increasingly visible to Saddam Hussein. In consequence, he sought to bring the war to an end by lowering the Iraqi war aims.

As Iraqi offensive capacity declined and nationalist sentiments waned, the value of the enemy territory (offensive stakes) also decreased. However, when Hussein decided to withdraw from most of the occupied territories, the nature of the war changed. Since Iran now chose to invade Iraqi territory, the Iraqis increasingly started to perceive themselves as defenders of their homeland against the religiously based aggression of Iran. "And the greater the threat seemed to be, the more Iraqi patriotism came closer to etatist nationalism. The previous trend of capitulation among the soldiery now waned, and cracks within the opposition groups developed" (Jabar 2004: 127). Yet this increase in nationalism was not offensive in nature. As it gained its potency from the perception of the Iraqis defending their homeland against external aggression, its nature was increasingly defensive (Hiro 1990: 43).

Thus, after the initial offensive successes, we cannot find a war prolonging expansive ideology in Iraq. As the offensive capacity waned, so did also any remaining offensive nationalism. Instead, Saddam's retreat to Iraqi

territory managed to enkindle defensive nationalism with the aim of securing the survival of the nation. This neither raised the value of the enemy territory (offensive stakes) nor increased the level of expected offensive capacity. Therefore, the reasons for the long war duration are better found in the Iranian leadership.

8.7. Bargaining Space Opens Up

On January 28, 1985, the lack of Iranian battlefield successes and the Iraqi confidence in the superiority of its military material led Baghdad to launch the first major Iraqi counteroffensive. While the gains were limited, the result was that Iran abandoned its human wave tactics for more conventional operations under the leadership of the regular army. Yet, despite a change in tactics, Iran failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough and the ground war came to a virtual halt until February 9, 1986 (Karsh 1987: 31).

Iran's general performance improved however as the direction of the war was placed in the hands of the regular army (Ibid. 36). In two large operations in mid February, the Iranians succeeded in advancing to the Fao Peninsula in the south and to the outskirts of the city of Sulaymaniyah in the north. As the war neared its sixth anniversary, senior Iranian spokesmen began again to stress the need to deliver a "final blow" (Ibid. 33, see also Hiro 1990: 171). For the first time in two years, Iran had succeeded in conquering and retaining significant portions of land. In April 1986, reflecting the reinforced offensive expectations, Khomeini argued that the war would end in a decisive victory by Iran by the following March (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 232; Hiro 1990: 170).

Between September 1986 and February 1987, Iran sought to capitalize on its previous offensive gains by launching a series of massive attacks on Iraq. The Iranian efforts led to scant gains, however, despite the government committing large numbers of troops in human wave attacks against the Iraqi defenses. These attacks exacted a heavy human toll of at least 200 000 casualties. By February,

Iran's leadership seems to have realized that the chances of a major breakthrough at Basra were slim... The main impact of the battle was that Iran seems to finally have faced the fact that it could not defeat Iraq by even well-prepared head-on attacks (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 254).

In March 1987, the Iranians made some gains in the north, but even then the battle “was a blood bath.” Still, despite having lost as many as 600 000 to 700 000 soldiers since the start of the war, Rafsanjani, the Parliament’s speaker, claimed that Iran would emerge victorious during the coming year (Ibid. 260-261). During April and May, an Iranian assault failed to achieve significant territorial changes at the warfront, however. In June, Rafsanjani announced that Iran would give up its human wave tactics due to their costliness in terms of casualties and concentrate instead on surprise attacks (Ibid. 282, 302). Despite the change in tactics, Khomeini said in November that “with the continuation of repeated blows, we should deprive the enemy of respite and bring closer the inevitable...defeat” (Ibid. 324). Thus, offensive religious sentiments were still high enough to keep up the offensive expectations, offensive stakes and concomitant high war aims even when the battlefield events were devastating. However, as the religious leadership continued to favor religious fervor rather than the professional advice of the regular army, Iran was facing mobilization problems and the economy was failing (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 324; Willett 2004: 53).

The land war was rather quiet at the beginning of 1988, but, on March 20, Khomeini declared anew that Iran would now strive for final victory. The following campaigns on the northern front again failed to produce the decisive breakthrough. The Iraqi army, in turn, had during the course of the war improved both its professionalism and military material. Especially the Revolutionary Guard of about 100 000 men had received extensive training in offensive operations (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 353-355). With his newly trained troops, Saddam Hussein was again confident that the Iraqi offensive capacity had increased and thus launched an attack in the south where the number of Iranian defenders had been reduced. On April 17, the Iraqi forces made quick gains against the defenders in the Fao Peninsula with the help of nerve gas (Willett 2004: 53; Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 374). The level of Iranian religious fervor had waned as “few units showed any sign of the willingness to die that had characterized Iranian forces in previous campaigns” (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 374).

On May 25, similar offensive efforts led to the capture of the city of Salamcheh, but Khomeini still refused to negotiate. Nevertheless, at the beginning of June, religious fervor started to diminish even among the religious leadership and fears of a collapse emerged: “Some Iranian clerics began lobbying Ayatollah Khomeini to end the war. If it went on much longer, they argued, it might endanger Khomeini’s Islamic revolution it-

self” (Willett 2004: 53-54). On June 25, the Iraqi army succeeded in driving 30 kilometers into Iran without serious opposition (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 383-389). The gap between the asymmetric causal beliefs of the highest religious leadership and the battlefield performance of the Iranian armed forces was by now becoming too obvious to ignore.

By July 12, 1988, Iraq was in control of virtually all of its old territory. Reminiscent of the previous problems with occupying Iranian territory, Saddam did not raise his war aim of recovering the old borders but used his offensive capacity to raise the cost of war for Iran. Thus, the following day, Saddam Hussein threatened with further invasions unless Iran withdrew from Iraqi Kurdistan in the north. On July 17, Saddam Hussein gave a speech in which he repeated his call for a cease fire and a return to the international borders (Hiro 1990: 241). The same day, President Khamanei sent a letter to the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar requesting a cease fire, which was confirmed three days later by Khomeini. Before accepting the cease fire, Iraq aided Baghdad based Iranian dissidents to invade some 135 kilometers into Iranian territory. But, after the troops were defeated, Saddam’s offensive expectations also seemed low. On August 6, Iraq reciprocated Iran’s peace offer, and the next day the belligerents agreed to enter direct negotiations (Willett 2004: 55; Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 395-398). Both sides accepted UN Resolution 598 calling for a return to the old borders.

Iraq did not raise its war aims after eight years of warfare that had resulted in several hundreds of thousands of casualties. Continuing the war into Iran could have resulted in the same popular demoralization, scant offensive successes and immense costs as during the early phases of the war of territorial expansion. While Saddam Hussein as a harsh dictator hardly felt for the dead Iraqis, he had been more sensitive than the Iranian leadership to the high casualty rates throughout the war for reasons of domestic stability. On the basis of these experiences, the Iraqi offensive expectations and war aims were not as high as in 1980. Thus, the expected utility of continuing the war was lower than suing for peace with the old international borders.

Iran in turn had trouble mobilizing recruits, and its oil revenues were not as high as Iraq’s. Therefore “Iran was no longer able to overcome its inferiority in arms, financial strength and diplomatic backing with manpower and high motivation” (Hiro 1990: 245). A letter published by the office of former Iranian president Rafsanjani in October 2006 reveals that Khomeini had been advised by Rezai, the commander of the Iranian

Revolutionary Guards, that the war was not winnable: “No victories are in sight for the next five years” (Nafisi 2006). Previously, the ordinary army had criticized the religiously motivated leadership over the conduct of the war, but this time even the religious revolutionary guard was doubtful of Iran’s expected offensive capacity. If the religious commitment of the Iranian leadership was still intact, the problem of finding enough religiously motivated fighters had finally lowered the Iranian expected offensive capacity and permitted learning from the battlefield events. Thus, without soldiers to fight the war, the offensive expectations and asymmetric causal beliefs waned and the concomitant lowering of war aims finally opened the bargaining space.

The interest in spreading the revolution was still high, but the task would not be a question of territorial conquest as the offensive stakes in conquering Iraqi territory waned with the lowering of offensive expectations. It would be performed with a different strategy – peacemaking: “[t]he leaders presented peace as being in the interest of the survival of the republic and the spreading of the revolution” (Gieling 1999: 169). The Islamic revolution would now be spread by other means than open war and territorial conquest.

Khomeini said that he “had promised to fight to the last drop of my blood and to my last breath” but “submitted to God’s will.” And “based only on the interest of the Islamic republic” at the urging of “all the high-ranking political and military experts” he now lowered his offensive expectations and war aims (The New York Times, July 21, 1988). Finally, after the Iranian powers had being exhausted, the will of God was interpreted differently and learning from battlefield events was possible.


8.8. Final Analysis

The hypothesis concerning the process of peacemaking and the reason for the length of the war are corroborated by the case of the Iran-Iraq War. There was a lack of learning from the battlefield events as they did not covary with the war aims. Thus, the strategic learning theory, representing a simple rational choice perspective, does not suffice to explain the chain of events during the war. The bounded learning theory offers a better explanation, as one factor contributed to the long war duration: expansive ideology increased the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, and created asymmetric causal beliefs that increased expected offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, as the Iranian leadership’s beliefs were not credible in the eyes of the Iraqis. Thus,

on both sides, the expected utility of continuing the war was higher for several years than accepting the enemy's demands.

We can note that the within-case correlations well match what was theoretically expected at the outset of the study: changes in the current ability to use offensive military factors did not match changes in war aims on both sides of the conflict. The Iraqi war aims were lowered with waning offensive capacity. The high Iranian war aims were in turn justified by expansive ideology, not by battlefield events. Figure 12 illustrates the discrepancy in war aims or the road to creating a bargaining space. The distances between the different points in time are not proportional. The key to understanding the figure is the distance between the upper line, representing Iran's war aims, and the lower line, representing the Iraqi war aims. The distance between the lines measures the size of the discrepancy in the belligerents' minimum demands. A cease fire is reached when the lines converge and create a bargaining space.

FIGURE 12. Discrepancy in War Aims during the Iran-Iraq War (Bargaining Space)



Note: Non-proportional distances. Iran: _____ Iraq: - - - - -

The demands from the two sides were visibly discrepant at the outset of the war in 1980. Saddam Hussein sought some territorial gains, to which Iran was not prepared to agree. The expected weakness of the new regime in Teheran in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution was clear. The fact that Iraq possessed mobile armor, artillery and fighter planes that were

believed to function efficiently in the hands of an attacker also raised expectations of offensive capacity. After grasping its window of opportunity, Baghdad reached some of its war aims and demanded that Iraq should keep the occupied territories. Iran, in turn, had not yet unleashed its total war making capacity and was confident to expel the aggressor and refused to negotiate unless Iraq withdrew to the old borders. Thus, a bargaining space was still inexistent.

With the removal of President Bani Sadr in 1981, a crucial moment for war duration, the more fundamentalist factions of the Iranian society consolidated their power in the decision-making circles. As a result, offensive religion raised the offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$ and the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$. This also increased the war aims and excluded negotiations because Iraq did not consider the Iranian war aims justifiable on the basis of the current battlefield events (the Iranian line starts to move further away from the Iraqi one). Following the successful Iranian counterattacks in 1982, Baghdad lowered its expected level of offensive capacity and war aims by unilaterally withdrawing to the old borders (the Iraqi line moves closer to the Iranian one). Still, this did not open the bargaining space because Iranians were not keen on lowering their offensive expectations or the war aim of punishing Saddam as a war criminal.

In 1986, Iran managed to occupy more of the Iraqi territory, which contributed to keeping up the offensive expectations and war aims. However, the following massive losses that Iran suffered in failed offensive actions during the same year did not lower the expected utility of continuing the war with the same war aims. It was not until mobilization problems began to emerge and Iraq delivered a serious blow to Iran in 1988 that the Iranian offensive expectations began to wane, matching the actual ability to use offensive military factors and finally leading to a lowering of the war aims (the lines converge). The realities of the battlefield and the recruitment problems had finally diminished the asymmetric causal beliefs promising God's help to Iran. As a result of lowering offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, the offensive stakes in conquering Iraqi territory, $u(\text{win})$, were lowered and the spreading of the revolution would be undertaken by other means.


Iraq in turn had improved its offensive capacity, which enabled it to strike back at Iran, but this did not lead Saddam Hussein to pursue an expansive strategy or increase his war aims. First, the fighting power of the Iraqi soldiers had proved to be lower when engaging the enemy in the enemy territory. Second, local support of the ethnic Arabs in Iran had proven to be weaker than expected. Third, the Iraqi economy was in a shambles

and could not support a continuation of the war. Thus, in 1988, the Iraqi stakes were no longer offensive, as at the beginning of the war, and a bargaining space finally opened.

If both sides in a militarized conflict change their war aims and demands according to their battlefield successes or failures, a bargaining space quickly emerges. Thus, as the strategic learning theory assumes, battlefield events signal relative strength and resolve so that an agreement on acceptable terms of peace becomes possible. Yet this is often only an ideal situation. A long war easily results if confounding factors intervene to end this convenient connection between battlefield events and the expected utility of warfare. The case of the Iran-Iraq War shows that offensive religion, especially in the form of asymmetric causal beliefs, is a factor that can raise war aims to a level where the expected utility of continued warfare is so high that a long war ensues.

Ironically, while the religious fervor of the Iranian leadership had given rise to high offensive expectations and war aims, “the very fervor destroyed its ability to conduct a war with the military professionalism it needed to win” (Codersman and Wagner 1990: 592). Saddam, in turn, had low offensive expectations after the initial offenses and the prevalent type of nationalism in Iraq during the war failed to take an offensive form for the greater part of the war. As soon as Iran lowered its war aims enough to reflect the battlefield events, a mutually acceptable negotiated solution was within reach.


FIGURE 13. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of Iraq



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: ____ Battlefield events:

Figure 13 illustrates the covariance between battlefield events and war aims in Iraq during the war. The fact that the lines are parallel and moved in the same direction when changes in battlefield events took place throughout the war shows that the war aims closely covaried with the actual battlefield events. Thus, based on mere battlefield events, the Iraqi war aims were not unrealistic. Figure 14 illustrates the covariance between battlefield events and war aims in Iran during the war. If the lines were parallel and moved in the same direction when changes in battlefield events took place, a bargaining space and a peace treaty would already have been within reach in the early phases of the war. However, the fact that the lines do not closely follow each other indicates a lack of covariance between the battlefield events and Teheran's war aims. The strategic learning theory would expect the lines to be parallel. The bounded learning theory, in turn, explains this anomaly with Iranian offensive religiosity raising the offensive stakes and creating asymmetric causal beliefs.

FIGURE 14. Covariance of Battlefield Events and the War Aims of Iran



Note: Non-proportional distances. War aims: _____ Battlefield events: - - - -

While Iraq lowered its war aims as soon as its offensive efforts came to naught, Iran kept its war aims extremely high throughout most of the war even in the absence of significant battlefield victories. In 1982 and later on in 1985, a slight improvement took place in its offensive performance, but it was not large enough to justify the high war aims. It was not un-

til Saddam's successful counterattack of 1988 that the actual battlefield events and the war aims became parallel and moved in the same direction in Iran. Since Iraq had already adjusted its war aims in accordance with the battlefield events, this created a bargaining space that made peacemaking possible. Both sides had realized the limitations in their offensive potential, and the battlefield events finally revealed information about relative strength. Thus, neither side had high hopes of completely defeating the enemy or getting a better deal than what their performance on the battlefield indicated. The expected utility of signing a peace treaty on terms that both could agree upon was finally higher than continuing the war.

It can be argued that the relative equality of the belligerents contributed to the long war duration. Yet this equality can only be a precondition for the war lasting such a long time. It would merely decrease the chance of any side suffering a defeat during the early campaigns, and it would not explain why the belligerents considered that continuing the war was useful. Quite the contrary, the expected utility of continuing warfare against an equal enemy should have to be deemed to be low.

It is also possible that the revolutionary regime in Iran used the war as a means of consolidating its domestic political power. This argument is to some extent plausible. Chubin and Tripp (1988) argue that Iran sought to use the war as a means of both spreading its revolutionary message and reshaping its internal polity. "Initially, the war helped the Iranian government suppress its opposition and rally the people around the flag" (Moshiri 1991: 132). During the first year of the war, it was easy to label the leftist Mujahedin activists fighting the new central government as traitors and to thus diminish their popular support. This also seems to support Goemans's (2000) alternative explanation of long wars, where he argues that leaders in a semi-repressive government react to negative battlefield events by raising their war aims because of the fear of punishment in the case of defeat. Yet, by 1983, Teheran had effectively succeeded in suppressing the rebels' armed struggle (Moshiri 1991: 130; Hiro 1990: 69) and the remaining six years of costly warfare call for a different explanation of the expected utility in continuing the war. It is thus doubtful whether the Iranian government should be viewed only as semi-repressive. For example, Freedom House rates Iran as "not free" throughout the long Iran-Iraq War.

Rather than being beneficial, the long war was in the end harmful to Teheran. One of the political parties that were allowed to function after the Islamic revolution was the leftist Tudeh Party. Its journal "warned that an Iranian invasion would be detrimental to the future of the Islamic Re-

public” (Hiro 1990: 101). For every year, the balance of offensive military technology tilted more and more in favor of Iraq due to Baghdad’s ability to borrow funds and import the latest weapons of offensive warfare (Cordesman 1984: 684; Hiro 1990: 99). Gieling (1999: 165-165) further argues that by 1987 “it must have been obvious to the leaders that a military victory on land as well as in the Gulf had become unattainable. There was, however, no indication that the regime was prepared to change its policies.”

All their ideological ambitions and claims notwithstanding, the war left Iran’s Islamic fundamentalism enfeebled in terms of domestic and foreign influence (Cordesman and Wagner 1990: 591). Furthermore, Iran’s economic development fell back by 20 years (Moshiri 1991: 133). Therefore, after the initial phases of the war, continuing the war for a total of eight years should have had a rather low utility for the government in Teheran, and the decision was not likely to be a result of domestic political reasoning for the sake of creating stability or fear of punishment.

Finally, just as in the Finno-Soviet Continuation War, it is possible that the meddling of outside powers affected the war duration. Baghdad in particular received considerable deliveries of military material from external actors, which undoubtedly aided Iraq in fighting Iran, which has a much larger population. Yet, such aid affects the expected utility of continuing the war and war aims by increasing the belligerents’ current ability to make use of offensive military factors. This can be affected by a range of factors beyond the scope of the bounded learning theory without diminishing its explanatory value.

The lesson to be drawn from the Iran-Iraq War is that it is inadequate to look merely at the general level of offense dominance in the state system to determine the expected duration of a war. What matters more is the belligerents’ actual ability to use these offensive military factors (the battlefield events) and the presence or absence of expansive ideology, such as offensive religion. Chubin writes about the Iran-Iraq war that “it was not about, simply or principally, a dispute over territory, but rather a conquest over power and ideas” (1984: 13). What the Iran-Iraq War had in common with the Continuation War is not only reflected in the Soviet and Iranian high hopes of being able to increase their offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, despite significant limitations to the current performance. The two long military contestations were also imbued with ideas about the high value of winning, $u(\text{win})$.

9. SUMMING UP THE FOUR CASES

The four cases corroborate the theoretical expectations of the bounded learning theory. Short wars were characterized by a high covariance between the actual battlefield events and the war aims, while either expansive ideology or asymmetric information ended this convenient connection during the long wars. During the Winter War, both belligerents quite soon adjusted their war aims in accordance with their actual battlefield performance. The same happened during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The apparent reason was the lack of expansive ideology, especially asymmetric causal beliefs, and the lack of asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity. The offensive stakes turned out to be modest during the short wars, as they were lowered as soon as the expected offensive capacity waned and the combatants learned of their limited capacity to reach their earlier high war aims.

During the Winter War, offense dominance was limited by the forested terrain, the Finnish lack of motorized troops, and the poor training of the Soviet troops. Thus, neither side succeeded in running over the enemy. The war, however, turned out to be a short one. Finland was not yet associated with Hitler's national socialism seeking the destruction of the Soviet Union. Both states also had scant expectations that their offensive tactics or technology would improve, which lowered their expected ability to use offensive military factors, $p(\text{win})$, and created no asymmetric information. In consequence, Stalin did not refrain from lowering the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, and war aims when the offensive war efforts were not producing results. Finland, in turn, was imbued with defensive rather than offensive nationalism. Thus, also the Finnish offensive stakes and war aims were low and a mutually acceptable bargaining solution could be soon reached.

During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Pakistan was flooded with religious sentiments that demanded the continuation of the war, but the Pakistani president was unaffected by them when the war started to go awry and lowered the offensive stakes. India, in turn, exhibited no offensive nationalism and was content with retaining the prewar territorial *status quo*. India, as a larger state, could have endured a longer war, but the stalemate on the battlefield did not suggest that the offensive military factors would radically improve. Thus, despite the limitations to offense dominance and

a stalemate on the battlefield, swift learning from the battlefield events was characteristic of the short wars. Both the strategic learning theory and the bounded learning theory, expecting covariance between the current ability on the battlefield and the war aims, can account for the course of events during the short wars. However, this is not the case in the long wars.

While the duration of the Iran-Iraq War would be affected by the religious sentiments of much of the Iranian populace and leadership, Pakistan's leadership distanced itself sooner from offensive religious nationalism. The apparent difference is that the regime in Iran based its legitimacy on religion, whereas in Pakistan it was the nation state – not so much the national leadership – that based its legitimacy on religion. Thus, Pakistani President Ayub, with a background in the military rather than being a religious authority, was in a better position to interpret the battlefield events and realize how limited the future offensive potential was. As the offensive successes disappeared, the offensive stakes also waned and there were no asymmetric causal beliefs or asymmetric information to keep them high. Iranians, in turn, overestimated their offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, due to causal beliefs assuming God's help to Iran. These causal beliefs became asymmetric as they were deemed incredible by Saddam, who based his estimates on Iran's actual poor battlefield performance in offensive operations. Furthermore, offensive religion created high offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, for Iran in conquering Iraq, whereas Ayub was content with a promise of further negotiations on changing the political status of Kashmir. In consequence, a bargaining space was out of reach for a much longer time during the Iran-Iraq War.

In the Continuation War, offense dominance had increased in the theater of war, but the armed hostilities would last much longer than during the more defense dominant Winter War. Thus the results do not confirm the offense-defense theorists' (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999) expectations of increasing offense dominance shortening war duration. As the Finnish offensive capacity proved to be high, expansive nationalism increased and raised the value of the enemy territory, $u(\text{win})$, in the form of offensive stakes. From a strategic perspective, the Finnish offensive battlefield successes justified the increasing war aims. In contrast to the shorter Winter War, however, Stalin did not this time respond to the negative battlefield events by lowering his war aims so that a negotiated solution could be swiftly reached. In his eyes, the expected Soviet offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, was high and Finland was allied with Nazi Germany aiming at the destruction of the Soviet state in an ideological struggle for the future dominance of

Europe. The security threat to the state raised the Soviet offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, by increasing the value of the Finnish territory.

The Soviet expectation that the reform of the Red Army and the rising military industry would soon contribute to offensive successes was asymmetric information – either unknown or incredible in the eyes of the Finns observing the Red Army's poor battlefield performance. Thus, a gap between the belligerents' war aims delayed the creation of a bargaining space and increased war duration. While in all the cases the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, always weakened when the offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, waned,³² the delays in learning from the battlefield events were not as long during the Continuation War as during the Iran-Iraq War. In the Continuation War, private or incredible expectations could be tested as soon as the new military technology and tactics became available on the battlefield. In contrast, asymmetric causal beliefs did not wither away as quickly during the Iran-Iraq War because there was no common ground for evaluating how to win the war. For the Iranian leadership, God rather than the battlefield events was the main indicator of expected future offensive potential. Thus the Iran-Iraq War turned out to be the longest one.

As the strategic learning theory alone, assuming swift learning from the battlefield events, cannot account for long war duration, Goemans expects that it can be explained by the presence of semi-repressive regimes that raise their war aims when the war starts to go awry. Yet, Finland, which Goemans (2000b) classifies as semi-repressive both during the Winter War and the Continuation War, did not raise its war aims or leave them intact when the probability of victory, $p(\text{win})$, started to diminish. The process-tracing in the empirical chapters indicates to the contrary that the Finnish war aims quite closely followed the Finnish battlefield performance. Thus, the causes for the absence of a bargaining space during the long Continuation War are best found in the Soviet offensive expectations and stakes.

According to the bounded learning theory, the sum of the belligerents' offensive expectations, as expressed by the probability of winning, $p(\text{win})$, easily becomes more than one with asymmetric causal beliefs and informa-

³²The Soviet offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, toward Finland waned because of both low offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, and the disappearance of the German threat to the existence of the Soviet Union. If only high offensive expectations had disappeared and Finland did not dissociate itself from Germany, the security of the state could still have created high defensive stakes, $u(\text{loss})$, and prevented the finding of a negotiated solution, as during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848).

tion. Also, offensive stakes, as expressed by the utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, easily become high with the idea that the enemy territory is valuable. High $p(\text{win})$ and $u(\text{win})$ create high war aims. When at least one state's war aims are not justifiable on the basis of the battlefield events, however, the expected utility of continuing the war becomes greater for both sides than agreeing to the enemy's demands. Under the circumstances, there is no mutually acceptable bargaining solution, and the war will be long.

Table 4 summarizes the four case studies by presenting the values of the hypothesized war prolonging variables and the length of war. The empirical results indicate, in accordance with the expectations of the bounded learning theory, that the battlefield events covaried with the war aims only during the short wars. In turn, the strategic learning theory, as a simplistic rational choice approach, would have anticipated swift learning from the battlefield events with the empirical expectation that the battlefield events and war aims should always covary. The results also show, in addition to a lack of covariance, that the long wars involved high offensive stakes, which increased $u(\text{win})$ on at least one side of the conflict. There were also either asymmetric causal beliefs or asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive military capacity, which increased $p(\text{win})$ on at least one side of the conflict.

TABLE 4. Presence of War Prolonging Variables and War Duration

| | Lack of covariation | Asymmetric causal beliefs (expansive ideology) | High offensive stakes | Asymmetric information | War duration |
|---------------------------|---------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| Winter War | No | No | No | No | Short |
| Continuation War | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Long |
| Indo-Pakistani War | No | No | No | No | Short |
| Iran-Iraq War | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Long |

As expected, asymmetric causal beliefs were associated with the longest militarized conflict, the Iran-Iraq War. The short Winter War and Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, in turn, had none of the war prolonging variables when the war started to go awry and the enemy could not be overrun. Stalin was content with limited territorial changes providing security for Leningrad. If the Pakistani president was affected by the popular offensive religious sentiments that increased $u(\text{win})$ at the outset of the conflict, there were no traces of it when the initially high offensive expectations, $p(\text{win})$, diminished and the decision to lower the war aims was made. In the absence of asymmetric information or asymmetric causal beliefs, the offensive stakes and war aims were lowered as a result of vanishing offensive potential. In Iran, the ousting of the moderate president Bani Sadr marks a different course of offensive religion taken by the Iranian leadership as asymmetric causal beliefs took over and kept both offensive stakes and war aims high for several years despite discouraging battlefield events. Similarly, the Finnish-German connection and expected improvements of the Red Army would in 1941 create high Soviet offensive stakes and asymmetric information that were not present during the earlier Winter War.

The results suggest that what matters for war duration is not the existence of offense or defense dominance in the state system, as the offense-defense theorists (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999) suggest, but the belligerents' actual ability to use the current military technology and tactics (battlefield events) and factors that can prevent learning from the battlefield events: asymmetric information about the expected offensive capacity and expansive ideology in the form of stakes and asymmetric causal beliefs. Thus, if at least one side has an idea about the high utility of winning, $u(\text{win})$, i.e. offensive stakes, and about the ease of reaching that goal, $p(\text{win})$, i.e. the expected ability to use offensive military factors despite discouraging battlefield events, the war will be long. Even if the high utility of winning seems to be dependent on the ease of reaching that goal, they both increase the expected utility of continuing the war [$p(\text{win}) * u(\text{win}) + p(\text{loss}) * u(\text{loss}) - c$]. While high defensive stakes, i.e. low $u(\text{loss})$, can contribute to long war duration as the belligerent is then prepared to bear the costs of war (c), mere exaggerated defensive capacity, low $p(\text{loss})$, would lead to a swift defeat. Thus, exaggerated offensive capacity, high $p(\text{win})$, which makes the sum of the belligerents' $p(\text{win})$ more than one, makes the creation of the bargaining space increasingly difficult and is the key to understanding long war duration.

Since offense dominance is mostly limited, the enemy is seldom swiftly overrun even in the presence of modern tanks and aircraft unless there are clear asymmetries in the belligerents' size. Offense-defense balance can however have an indirect effect on war duration if offense dominance contributes to asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity, which was the case in the Continuation War, where Stalin's belief in the Red Army's ability to soon introduce the latest weapons of offensive warfare raised $p(\text{win})$. Limited offensive successes, which can be assumed to be more common under offense dominance than when defense has the advantage, can also increase the offensive stakes, $u(\text{win})$, which was the case with Finland during the Continuation War. I now continue to an evaluation of the implications of the empirical results for Jervis's (1978) analysis of the security dilemma.

10. CONCLUSION

10.1. Six Worlds of the Security Dilemma

In the classical realist tradition, aggression in the face of perceived threats, even distant ones, has been viewed as a natural consequence of states' rational quest for security in an anarchical state system. For example, Morgenthau argues that preventive war, however "abhorrent in democratic public opinion, is in fact a natural outgrowth of the balance of power" (1948/85: 229). While the offense-defense theorists perceive more peaceful interstate relations when defense has the advantage, they still assume that that offense dominance exacerbates the security dilemma and increases the risk of war (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999). Yet the empirical results of this study are clear: wars are not on average shorter when offense has the advantage. As wars are not shorter in offense dominant eras, security dilemma can be alleviated by a weaker motivation for both aggression and arms racing.

While the hazard analyses indicated that the mere existence of offense dominant military factors in the state system is not associated with shorter war duration, the case studies tested the hypothesized reason for this lack of statistical association. Offense dominance has never been absolute or close to absolute due to the permanent, temporary and institutional limitations. Even if technological and tactical developments in the state system were to indicate increasing offense dominance, what matters is whether the belligerents can actually use the offense dominant military factors. For example, the Iranian offensive capacity was reduced by the weapons embargo limiting access to offense dominant weapons technology such as aircraft and by the poor training of the religiously inspired forces. The Soviets also had problems, especially with access to trained military personnel after Stalin's purges of the officer core and because of limited mobility in the forested terrain. Thus, with prevalent limitations to offense dominance, there is no guarantee that one side will be quickly overrun.

And, as the bounded learning theory holds, the finding of a mutually acceptable bargaining solution (bargaining space) is not an easy process if expansive ideology and asymmetric information end the covariance between the battlefield events and war aims. Therefore, the ensuing negotiation process easily becomes protracted and increases the duration of the war.

Indeed, the offense-defense theorists have implicitly based their expectations of war duration on an overestimation of offense dominance and a neglect of war prolonging variables. Thus states' quest for security in the face of the security dilemma by arms racing or war initiation can be based on false expectations of war duration. If state security has been believed to be threatened by offense dominance exacerbating the security dilemma (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999), state security can actually have been worsened by the long war that was meant to improve it.

We can analyze the security dilemma with the help of simple tables. The security dilemma depicts the realist predicament of states acting in anarchy, and offense-defense theory has developed it into an aid for rational decision-making. On the basis of the assumption that general offense dominance in the state system ought to give rise to shorter wars, Jervis (1978) formulated hypotheses about how the offense-defense balance affects the security dilemma. In his seminal article *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*, Jervis argued that the offense-defense balance, and whether offensive postures can be differentiated from defensive ones, yield different levels of security dilemma. Table 5 depicts what he designates as the "four worlds of the security dilemma" (1978: 211).³³ The explanation here follows Jervis's account.

In the first world, it is impossible to create security without threatening others, as offense is believed to have the advantage and an offensive posture is not distinguishable from a defensive one. Thus, arms races are likely and attacking is the best defense. Even *status quo* states behave like aggressors and the security dilemma is doubly dangerous. In the second world, the inability to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures creates a security dilemma but, since defense is perceived to have the advantage, it is not extreme. In the third world, there are security problems. Because offense is believed to have the advantage, aggression is possible, but war preparations are easy to detect as an offensive posture can be distinguished from a defensive one. Finally, in the fourth world, the security dilemma can be escaped altogether since defense is believed to have the advantage and it is possible to distinguish an offensive posture from a defensive one.

Yet this representation of how perceptions of or beliefs about the offense-defense balance and ability to distinguish postures influence the

³³Since beliefs and perceptions can be best argued to affect state behavior, the table uses beliefs about the offense-defense balance, rather than the actual offense-defense balance, as one of the explanatory variables.

security dilemma can be called the worlds of misperception because Jervis's analysis of the security dilemma depends on underestimated war duration when offense has the advantage. Better informed decisions about war and peace are based on the recognition that offense dominance is never absolute or even close to absolute. Wars seldom end with the enemy being swiftly overrun merely because of the relative dominance of offensive military technology. It is also important to recognize that, as neither side is swiftly overrun, expansive ideology and asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity easily end the connection between the actual battlefield performance and the war aims. Thus, peacemaking becomes a more protracted process and increases war duration.

TABLE 5. Effect of False Beliefs about War Duration on Security Dilemma

| | <i>Offense believed to have the advantage</i> | <i>Defense believed to have the advantage</i> |
|---|---|---|
| <i>Offensive posture not distinguishable from defensive one</i> | 1 DOUBLY DANGEROUS SECURITY DILEMMA | 2 SECURITY DILEMMA, BUT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MAY BE COMPATIBLE. |
| <i>Offensive posture distinguishable from defensive one</i> | 3 NO SECURITY DILEMMA, BUT AGGRESSION POSSIBLE. WARNING GIVEN. | 4 DOUBLY STABLE |

As the negotiation process starts, the enemy's expected utility of continuing the war and war aims can be higher than expected by the aggressor, even if the enemy has shown little offensive ability on the battlefield. For example, Saddam Hussein started the war with an underestimation of the scope of Iran's religiously supported war aims and ended up in a long and costly war that consumed much of Iraq's resources. Similarly, Finland fought a long war against the Soviet Union, where Stalin was not prepared to give up due to high stakes and offensive expectations despite Finland's battlefield dominance. In both cases the expected utility of continuing the war remained higher than giving in to the enemy's demands.

Based on the empirical results of this study, it is possible to make a different analysis of the security dilemma, especially when offense is domi-

nant. We can analytically compare Jervis’s four worlds, which rely on empirically misperceived war duration when the balance favors offense, with four additional worlds in table 6. The two worlds associated with offense dominance are different from Jervis’s worlds. Thus, we have a total of six unique scenarios or worlds of security dilemma depending on the beliefs guiding decision-making. In table 6, more accurate beliefs about both the limitations to offense dominance and the impact of an expansive ideology and asymmetric information on war duration inform decision-making. In consequence, there is an additional way of alleviating the realist security dilemma. It does not rely on the military factors favoring the defense, which Jervis and other defensive realists emphasize, but on better perceiving the risks of warfare when offense is dominant.

As offense dominance is always limited and seldom guarantees that the enemy will be swiftly overrun, the risk of a longer and therefore also often a more costly war increases. While offense dominant wars are started with the expectation of a swift victory (Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1999), the higher probability of ending up in a longer war when offense is dominant will not only increase the costs of warfare but also the risk of the initiator losing (Slantchev 2004). The risk of ending up in a longer and therefore more costly war than expected by Jervis (1978) and Van Evera (1999), which also increases the risk of the initiator losing, should diminish states’ expected utility of starting a war. This should logically also alleviate the security dilemma in offense dominant eras, in contrast to Jervis’s (1978) analysis.

TABLE 6. Effect of Correct Beliefs about War Duration on Security Dilemma

| | <i>Offense believed to have the advantage</i> | <i>Defense believed to have the advantage</i> |
|---|---|---|
| <i>Offensive posture not distinguishable from defensive one</i> | 5 ALLEVIATED SECURITY DILEMMA | 6 SECURITY DILEMMA, BUT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MAY BE COMPATIBLE. |
| <i>Offensive posture distinguishable from defensive one</i> | 7 NO SECURITY DILEMMA AND AGGRESSION LESS LIKELY. WARNING GIVEN. | 8 DOUBLY STABLE |

As the expected utility of starting a war decreases when offense has the advantage, Jervis's first world would be replaced by the fifth world in table 6. Here the security dilemma would not be doubly dangerous, as Jervis expects, but alleviated compared with Jervis's account. The strategy of creating security with expansion (and even wars for gain) would be seen in many cases as not more likely to succeed when compared with defense dominant eras. Offense dominant weapons would not be perceived as equally threatening if the limitations to offense dominance are recognized and it is realized that offense dominance is not associated with shorter war duration. In consequence, with correct beliefs, the spiral of action and counteraction causing arms racing, which the realist security dilemma thrives on, would be weakened and less likely to lead to war than Jervis assumes.

With correct beliefs, arms do not lack utility. *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you wish for peace, prepare for war), a central realist dictum, would remain as compelling as before because the deterrent mechanism of potentially long and costly wars depends on the prospect of the defender being able to convince the potential aggressor of its holding-on power, which can only be achieved by adequate military capability. And yet, the expected utility of starting a war would often be diminished because of the uncertainty of knowing whether the offense dominant weapons systems would actually guarantee a swift victory, or a victory at all. There is no assurance that the attacker will, with only a relatively small capability advantage, be able to win the war, or that the attacker will, with much more troops, do so more quickly and at a smaller cost than usual.

Further, how the offensive expectations in the enemy state and the prospects for a mutually acceptable bargaining solution would develop during the conflict is unknown. The logic somewhat resembles that of nuclear deterrence with a feared but seemingly irrational counterstrike capability that holds the potential of realizing MAD – mutually assured destruction. In this case, however, MAD would be replaced with the risk of a long and costly conventional war as the enemy may refuse to make peace even after observing the potentially discouraging battlefield events. This was the case when Saddam attacked Iran with the false expectation of a swift victory aided by aircraft and tanks.

The third world would be replaced by the seventh world. In the third world, there is possibly no security dilemma because signaling of intent is possible. Yet, there are security problems as “aggression is possible, and perhaps easy” (Jervis 1978: 213). In the seventh world, the general risk of war for the sake of security or profit is diminished since offensive postures

are easily detected. However, aggression is not perceived to be equally easy for the same reasons that operate in the fifth world. Therefore aggression is also less tempting because it is often more costly, as offense dominance does not guarantee a decrease in war duration. The second and fourth worlds would not be different. Perceived defense dominance could discourage aggression by creating a defensive doctrine and tactics.

10.2. Force Ratios and First-Move Advantage

The alleviated security dilemma can be illustrated also with how changes in the required force ratios to swiftly win a war change the impetus for arms racing and how the diminished likelihood of leaders seeing a first-move advantage lowers the risk of arms racing developing into open war. The offense-defense theory expects that the required ratio of forces in the attacker's favor, if the attacker is to swiftly win the war, changes when offense has the advantage. It is assumed that the attacker using offense dominant technology and tactics does not need to have a massive overall advantage in numbers in order to be able to push through the enemy lines and swiftly win the war (Lieber 2000: 74). Not only is it possible to win with a smaller advantage in troop numbers:

When offense has the advantage, it is impossible for states of equal size to enjoy high level of security simultaneously; arms races will be intense because when one country adds forces its adversary will have to make a larger addition to restore its ability to defend (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998: 47-48).

The logical result, assuming rational decision-making, is a need to quickly respond to changes in the military balance of power. And since more defensive weapons are required to counter the offensive ones, as compared to defense dominance, the response cannot be mild. This leads to arms racing. Arms races fuel the security dilemma, which, according to Jervis, "can not only create conflicts and tension but also provide the dynamics triggering war" (1976: 67).

Yet, if offense dominance does not make it easier to bring a war to a quick end, it suggests that there are no dramatic changes in the required power ratios to swiftly win the war. Thus a potential defender does not need to fear that a small increase in another state's military capabilities will increase the attacker's chances of quickly running over the defender more when offense is dominant than in defense dominant eras. The result is that

the impetus to swiftly respond in kind to other states arming has the advantage is not as great as Jervis (1978) assumes. This alleviated fear reduces the perceived need of immediate and across-the-board reciprocation that causes arms racing. While the fear that the security dilemma thrives on is being alleviated, the security dilemma will not totally disappear, however, since we cannot expect correct beliefs always to be prevalent. Neither can we assume that the expected utility of starting a war is always less than the expected utility of staying at peace as the causes of war can be many and not always related to the expected probability of winning or the costs brought about by the length of the war. Similarly, great changes in a potential enemy's military capabilities will always incite fear, regardless of whether offense dominance is limited or close to absolute.

Nevertheless, not only the risk of arms racing becomes smaller when the general utility of quickly and massively responding to changes in the balance of power diminishes. The risk of arms racing spiraling into open war also becomes smaller when "the advantages of striking first" (Jervis 1976: 67) start fading away. Perceived first-move advantage, which Van Evera (1999) argues is a function of the offense-defense balance and can create a need of preemptive military action, becomes smaller with correct beliefs about the limitations to offense dominance. Beliefs about the first-move advantage have been argued to lie behind, for example, the escalation of the pre-WWI crisis into open war (Van Evera 1984, 1985; Snyder 1984). Still, if wars are on average not shorter when offense is dominant, there is no reason to expect the aggressor to be more likely to win the entire war during the first battles or to be able to use the initial gains after a surprise attack to swiftly roll over the rest of the enemy territory. Also, as Slantchev (2004) has shown, long war duration is associated with a decrease in the aggressor's chances of winning. If wars are known to be longer than expected by the offense-defense theorists and the aggressor is known to be less likely to win when wars become long, the perceived first-move advantage also becomes smaller when offense is dominant. Thus, even in the presence of arms racing, the risk of war preparations inexorably leading to open war is diminished.

The differences between correct beliefs and the over-appreciated first-move advantage that creates a need of preemptive action can be exemplified with a simple game of prisoner's dilemma. The game illustrates also how differences in beliefs create a varying need to swiftly and resolutely respond in kind to small increases in a potential enemy's armaments. The prisoner's dilemma builds on a story of two suspected criminals. The police

do not have enough evidence to convict any of them to a long prison term without one squealing on the other. If one squeals (defects), the other gets 20 years in prison and the squealer goes free. If both squeal, both get ten years in prison. If no one squeals but both cooperate, both get only one year in prison.

If false beliefs about the first-move advantage or force ratios guide decision-making when offense is dominant, the prisoner’s dilemma looks like the story above, which is illustrated in table 7. Because of the risk of the other state being able to use a small military advantage to swiftly win a war, the possible outcome of not starting to arms race when the other increases its military capabilities is a defeat or even a loss of sovereignty (a long prison sentence of 20 years). Similarly, because of the risk of the other state attacking first, the possible outcome of not seeking to attack first is a defeat or loss of sovereignty. Therefore, even if cooperation by not arms racing or attacking first would result in the best outcome for both states (the shortest prison term of only one year), no state will risk that a potential enemy will, with small increases in armaments or by attacking first, markedly increase its chances of swiftly winning. Thus, both will choose to arms race and to seek attacking first if arms racing is perceived to increase the risk of an impending attack. This choice of mutual defection is based on the basic realist assumption that state survival is the foremost national interest. Jervis writes that “states that seek security may believe that the best, if not the only, route to that goal is to attack and expand” (1976: 63).

TABLE 7. Prisoner’s Dilemma when False Beliefs Guide Decision-Making

| | | | |
|----------------|-----------|--|--|
| | | ACTOR A | |
| | | Cooperate | Defect |
| ACTOR B | Cooperate | Both get 1 year | A goes free B gets 20 years |
| | Defect | A gets 20 years B goes free | Both get 10 years <i>(Outcome)</i> |

Order of preferences: DC>CC>DD>CD

However, if we change the actors' beliefs about the cost of abstaining from arms racing and seeking to attack first, when the other state does not abstain, alongside with the actors' expected benefits of managing to attacking first, there are changes in the probability of arms racing and seeking to attack first. These changes can be seen in table 8. If the defender only gets ten years in prison if it cooperates by not responding to small increases in the enemy's military capabilities, and the enemy gets the same ten years in prison if it defects by attacking with only a small military capability advantage, as both end up in a war with uncertain length and outcome and high costs, the actors' preferred course of action changes. Similarly, if both a state that does not seek to attack first and a state seeking to utilize a first-move advantage get the same ten years of prison, as both end up in a war of uncertain length and outcome and high costs, the actors' preferred course of action changes. Since the outcome of attacking first or attacking with only small capability advantage is always ten years and the outcome of not attacking first and not responding to small increases in the enemy's military capabilities is either one or ten years, the best bet will be not to start arms racing and there is no need to seek attacking first for security reasons.

Thus, in table 8, the decision-makers do not believe that the outcome of the war and state security are determined by whether the defender responds to small changes in the balance of power or by who makes the first move. There mutual cooperation is enabled by the defender's alleviated fear of easily losing sovereignty. The attacker's expected costs of warfare associated with long war duration are also greater than in table 7, where a swift and easy victory could be expected to materialize. Nevertheless, if a state does not have territory in which to absorb the first attack, the need for making the first move remains.

Correct beliefs about the lower costs of cooperation when not swiftly and decisively responding to increases in a potential enemy's armaments or not seeking to attack first change the order of preferences for both actors. In table 7 the actors seek to avoid the worst outcome, where they cooperate by not arms racing or attacking while the enemy defects (CD). They therefore settle for the third best outcome, mutual defection (DD), by both arming and seeking to use the perceived first-move advantage. Yet, in table 8, mutual defection by both arming and seeking to attack first (DD) would result in the same outcome of ten years in prison, i.e. an unclear result of the war and the need to bear the costs of potentially long war, as when only one state defects (DC and CD). When there are no dramatic changes in the force ratios in the attacker's favor or a first-move advantage that could

bring the highest reward of quickly subduing the enemy (go free) or the worst possible outcome of quickly being overrun (20 years in prison), it is more beneficial for both states not to arms race or seek attacking first and get only one year in prison (CC), i.e. solve the dispute with negotiations, than become entangled in a war of uncertain outcome and high costs (ten years in prison).

TABLE 8. Prisoner’s Dilemma when Correct Beliefs Guide Decision-Making

| | | | |
|----------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| | | ACTOR A | |
| | | Cooperate | Defect |
| ACTOR B | Cooperate | Both get 1 year <i>(Outcome)</i> | Both get 10 years |
| | Defect | Both get 10 years | Both get 10 years |

Order of preferences: CC>DC=CD=DD

Thus, assuming correct beliefs, the perceived need for arms racing and seeking to attack first is greatly reduced when offense is dominant. Even without the favorable payoffs in table 8, as soon as the expected pay off for cooperation starts to increase (a shorter prison term) the risk of arms racing and war diminishes. If war duration is realized to be longer and the probability of the initiator then winning is understood to be lower than Jervis (1978) suggests, the outcome of the game turns out to be mutual cooperation, as no state will believe that they will have to respond to small changes in a potential enemy’s military capabilities or move first in order to preserve their sovereignty.

I argued earlier that classical realism directly prescribes, and structural realism assumes, rational decision-making in response to the problems of anarchy. Considering this analysis of the security dilemma, the question is whether the use of force has been too readily advocated as a rational course of action. The fact that offense dominance in the state system is not associated with shorter wars has clear consequences for how the actors should

perceive the security dilemma. Yet it is possible that realism has contributed to insecurity and made the security dilemma a self-fulfilling prophecy by excessively prescribing the use of force for the sake of security.

It can also be argued that bounded rationality and sufficing (“good enough” orientation) in decision-making under stress prevent behavioral changes. However, rational decision-making in response to the challenges of the international state system, which is a major tenet of realism, would strive to recognize the hazards of warfare when offense has the advantage. If warfare is not more frequent in offense dominant eras, as has been claimed by the critics (Lieber 2000, 2005; Gortzak et al. 2005) in response to Van Evera’s (1998, 1999) opposite claim, decision-makers are probably more aware of the risks of warfare than Jervis’s (1978) analysis of the security dilemma and offense dominance assumes. In that case, tables 6 and 8, rather than 5 and 7, already guide many states’ decision-making by creating rational incentives to act so as not to fuel arms racing or turn arms racing into open war. And yet, some states still have an exaggerated belief in the power of the offense, as was shown by Stalin’s attack on Finland in 1941 and Saddam Hussein’s miscalculation in 1980, which led to long and costly wars.

10.3. Final Reflections

This study departed from the recognition that realism has provided the study of international relations and war with important concepts, such as the security dilemma and the offense-defense balance. Still, the historical overview gave a good example of how the reduction of offensive armaments has been and continues to be difficult because of the widespread state interest in ensuring survival and increasing international influence. Thus Jervis’s (1978) solution to alleviating the realist security dilemma by focusing our attention on defensive weapons systems is not very realistic in an anarchical world where the self-help logic of political realism still often dominates. As Rousseau’s metaphor of the Stag Hunt explains, even though we were better off cooperating in catching the stag or in qualitative arms reduction, if one actor defects, the whole endeavor runs the risk of leading to dire consequences for the rest of the actors – the stag will not be caught, i.e. one state alone having offensive weapons systems would increase the risk of war and endanger the survival and position of other states in the state system.

Against this background, this study devised the bounded learning theory, which deviates from the understanding of war duration found in the systemic offense-defense theorists' assumptions. While Jervis (1978) and Van Evera (1999) argue that offense dominance is associated with shorter war duration, this study has argued that what is crucial for war duration is not the general level of offense dominance in the state system but the actual ability of states to use the often limited offensive military factors (battlefield events) and the possible lack of learning from battlefield events because of expansive ideology or asymmetric information about expected augmentations of offensive military capacity.

The empirical part of the study consisted of an initial statistical analysis of the systemic offense-defense theory and four case studies testing the bounded learning theory. The hazard models refuted the offense-defense theorists' argument that systemic offense dominance is associated with shorter war duration. The results point at a potential problem with the assumption of swift and less costly wars that Jervis and Van Evera attach to offense dominance. In reality, absolute or even close to absolute offense dominance is impossible and therefore a swift collapse of the enemy defenses is not an everyday event. Even when attacking is relatively easier than defending, offense dominance is seldom strong enough to ensure that the size of the defending army does not matter. Moreover, the ensuing negotiation process is not always as smooth as expected.

The four case studies corroborate the theoretical expectations of the bounded learning theory. The two short wars involved a lack of expansive ideology (offensive stakes or asymmetric causal beliefs) and no asymmetric information about increasing offensive capacity. Thus the battlefield events soon revealed information about capabilities and resolve, and the belligerents could then adjust their war aims to a level that allowed their minimum demands to match. In the end, a bargaining space that enabled a swift negotiated end to the wars soon emerged. The two long wars were characterized by the presence of expansive ideology or asymmetric information. In consequence, the battlefield events were not reflected in the war aims and it took a much longer time to find a mutually acceptable bargaining solution, in which both sides considered the enemy's war aims justifiable.

An incorporation of this kind of new variables that show asymmetries in causal beliefs and in information about expected offensive capacity is not a critique of rational choice *per se* but an improvement of the early assumption (Blainey 1973; Bueno de Mesquita 1981) that the sum of the

belligerents' probabilities of winning, $p(\text{win})$, amount to one. Goemans (2000: 30) argues that the battlefield events quickly reveal private information about relative strength and resolve. Yet, as this study has shown, long wars involve asymmetric information and causal beliefs, and thus the belligerents do not agree on their relative strength and resolve. The sum of their expected offensive capacity, $p(\text{win})$, is therefore more than one. As the combatants' high $p(\text{win})$ is expressed in high and incompatible war aims, the creation of a bargaining space becomes a protracted process.

This study also refines the simple assumptions of the offense-defense theorists, who neglect the limitations to offense dominance and how expansive ideology and asymmetric information about expected improvements in offensive capacity can hamper learning from current battlefield events. Thus, it is inadequate to look merely at the general level of offense dominance in the state system to determine the expected duration and costs of war. General systemic offense dominance can however have an indirect impact on war duration if it creates asymmetric information, as one side has high expectations of increasing its offensive capacity. For example, during the Continuation War, Stalin's expectations of increasing offensive capacity coincided with general improvements in offensive tactics and weapons during WWII. In Finland, expansive ideology was strengthened by the army's offensive successes on the battlefield, which were made possible by the general offensive developments as compared to the earlier Winter War.

General offense dominance can also have an impact on war duration if offense dominance is absolute and always permits a quick incapacitation of the enemy's fighting forces. If offense dominance were absolute or close to absolute, all of this theoretical exercise would come to naught. Yet, in reality, offense dominance is limited by permanent factors such as weather and terrain, temporary factors such as technology and training, and institutional factors such as norms. Therefore, as the quick and easy victory that offense-defense theorists predict to be the result of offense dominance does not materialize, the problem of ending wars at the negotiation table becomes very real. I hope that the cases studies have contributed to a better understanding of the problem of finding a mutually acceptable negotiation solution (bargaining space) to interstate wars. Even if the results of the hazard models concerning the lack of an association between the offense-defense balance and war duration were to be challenged by some future study differently categorizing various periods of time as offense and defense dominant, the bounded learning theory would still stand on its own

by increasing our understanding of the difficult process towards peacemaking from a rational choice perspective.

This study has not merely consisted of a statistical test of the offense-defense theorists' assumptions about war duration and case studies testing the bounded learning theory. It is also a critique of realism that assumes decision-makers to be rational problem solvers. The title of the study, *War and Unreason*, and the initial quote from Nietzsche refer to two things. First, there has been tendency of political realism (Morgenthau 1948/85), especially offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001), to proscribe war as a rational tool in the hands of decision-makers without considering the often limited nature of offense dominance and the effect of expansive ideology and asymmetric information on war duration. Second, as the bounded learning theory suggests, the duration of wars is not always decided by fully informed rational calculation unaffected by the decision-makers' different ideas and expectations.

Realism has been accused of functioning as a self-fulfilling prophecy by nurturing the very aggressive behaviors it assumes to lie at the core of human nature (Freyberg-Inan 2004). The results of this study do not say anything about the prevalence of warfare. Yet, if Van Evera (1999) is correct in arguing that most wars are started when offense is perceived to be dominant, decision-makers have not been as rational as expected by realism. Or, realism itself has contributed to irrational decision-making by too often prescribing the use of force as a normal tool of statecraft, especially when offense has the advantage.

The first option, implying great limitations in the state leaders' ability to calculate the outcome and course of wars, would call for a refinement of realism's descriptive assumptions about statecraft as a purely rational tool. The second option, implying great limitations to the utility of the use of force, would call for a refinement of realism's prescriptions for how to ensure the realization of state survival and national interest through successful statecraft. In any case, the fact that many wars during the past century have been long and costly suggests that some wars start as a result of grave miscalculations of what will happen after hostilities start. Either the limitations to offense dominance at the outset of the war are downplayed or the factors complicating the ensuing negotiation process are overlooked.

Jervis's (1978) analysis of the security dilemma makes some concessions to offensive realism by arguing that warfare results in shorter war duration when offense is dominant, the implication of which is that it can then be deemed more rational to attack. The argument that the security dilemma can vary in time and space is a valuable theoretical insight. Fearon calls

Jervis's article "one of the most influential articles on international relations written in the last 25 years" (1997: 1). Yet the price of portraying defense dominance as the primary condition for increased peaceful interstate relations is the worsening of the security dilemma when offense has the advantage by lowering the threshold to considering aggression more likely to succeed. False beliefs about shorter war duration merely create misleading incentives for arms racing and warfare. In a world where both the anarchical state system and human ingenuity boost the development of offensive weapons, qualitative arms reduction to reduce states' offensive capacity appears impossible on a multilateral basis. Under the circumstances, an appeal to realism and national interest to become involved only in short and inexpensive wars, and not relying on offense dominance to shorten war duration, holds better promise of changing actual state behavior.

The United States' recent long struggle to bring military operations to an end in Iraq and Afghanistan is a case in point illustrating the need for restraint. The keystone US Army warfighting doctrine FM 100-5 has correctly indicated an emphasis on offense dominance in the modern era. The 1976 version "argued the virtues of armored warfare" after the lessons of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and in 1982 "there was a sharpened appreciation of operational depth and maneuver" (FM 100-5, 1993). Yet, critics argue that "[t]hen the hybris set in... Read the doctrine today and you will see a struggle to trump each set of superlatives – *Full Spectrum Dominance* is a good example" (Johnson 2006).

Indeed, the recently much publicized *Doctrine of Rapid Dominance* (Ullman and Wade 1996) seems to epitomize the present day overconfidence in what the offense can accomplish and downplay the risks involved. For example, despite the possible offense dominance created by the revolution in military affairs, which characterized the beginning of the wars in Iraq in 2003 and in Afghanistan in 2001, limitations to offense dominance, when the enemy is hard to find, and neglected religious and nationalist factors driving the irregular defenders complicated the objective of quickly ending all military operations. Thus, the central policy implications of the study are twofold: if one seeks to avoid long wars, neither the level of offense dominance, which is often believed to guarantee a swift *Blitzkrieg*, nor the ease of finding a negotiated bargaining solution when it fails, should be exaggerated. To stay at peace often has higher utility than warfare, even when attacking is easier than defending.

Although states are located in a rather invariable international anarchy, as realism assumes, we should perceive a smaller risk of war than Jervis (1978) assumes when offense has the advantage. It may be common know-

ledge that wars are not on average particularly short when defense has the advantage and therefore no exaggerated incentives for warfare then exist. But with an understanding that wars are not particularly short even when attacking is relatively easier, the motivation to make war would be weakened also then, no matter whether states are motivated by greed, lust for power (Morgenthau 1948/85) or security (Waltz 1979). Thus, the efforts of defensive realism to specify the conditions for less conflicting interstate relations in an anarchical world have not come to naught in an era when offensive weapons systems continue to be developed. The task is important for the theoretical and empirical development of defensive realism.

A further study to better test the bounded learning theory would call for a comparative study of more cases. This study has concentrated on both very short and very long wars. Thus, the question emerges of how to explain wars of different length beyond the long-short dichotomy. The theoretical expectation has been that asymmetric information about expected increases in offensive capacity withers away faster than asymmetric causal beliefs because there is a common ground on which to evaluate the belligerents' battlefield performance as soon as the new military technology and tactics are introduced. Thus, even in this study there has been some scope for variation beyond the long-short dichotomy.

Nevertheless, wars of medium length would lead to the theoretical expectation that the same factors, especially asymmetric information and stakes, still influence decision-makers' expected utility calculations. The asymmetric causal beliefs must be weaker, however, so that they do not hamper learning from the battlefield events as long as during the Iran-Iraq War. This would call for a more subtle measurement of asymmetric causal beliefs and the reasons for their weakening. Also, the new military technology and material must be tested faster on the battlefield than during the Continuation War so that asymmetric information can more quickly disappear as the decision-makers learn to adjust their war aims according to the battlefield events.

In addition to introducing cases representing medium war duration, a large-N statistical analysis of all the wars would be desirable in order to increase the external validity of the results and to introduce statistical controls. Yet, to ensure a correct coding of the explanatory variables, such a large undertaking would require a detailed and more time consuming study of all the wars waged during the past two centuries, which has been beyond the scope of this study. And, finally, the bounded learning theory argued that offensive stakes are not wholly independent of the factors im-

pacting the expected ability to use offensive military factors: asymmetric causal beliefs and asymmetric information, or the current offensive ability. While there was some preliminary evidence indicating that this is the case, the question calls for further study.

Apart from being a critique of the offense-defense theory and an effort to further develop defensive realism with a theoretical refinement of our understanding of war duration from a rational choice perspective by incorporating new variables such as ideas, the theoretical inspiration for the study has been neoclassical realism. It is important to recognize that the way in which state leaders perceive the security dilemma and react to it depends on their expectations of the likely outcome of different courses of action. Thus, against the expectation of classical and structural realism, the security dilemma varies in time and space depending on how decision-makers apprehend reality. If they filter reality with offense-defense theory that creates an expectation of quick and easy wars when offense is dominant, the risk of wars is expected to be higher and therefore also easily becomes higher. If they instead believe that offense dominance is seldom so strong that it shortens war duration on average, the risk of wars is expected to be lower and the prospects of peaceful interstate relations increase.

From a realist perspective, a successful foreign policy begins with the need for ensuring survival, which has its practical necessities if we assume rational behavior on the part of the decision-makers. Yet, in the end, perceptions matter for the choice of policy: how offense dominance and its effects on war duration and the security dilemma are perceived creates different expectations of what is considered rational behavior in an anarchical state system. In the words of Lewis Carroll...

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – no more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you *can* make your words mean so many different things” (Lewis Carroll 1871, *Through the Looking-Glass*: chapter VI).

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SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING

(Summary in Swedish)

Studiet av de mellanstatliga krigens längd har fått mindre uppmärksamhet än studiet av deras orsaker. Men, med tanke på de ökade kostnader, inte minst i form av mänskligt lidande, som långa krig medför, borde detta forskningsområde inte anses vara mindre viktigt. I sin banbrytande artikel *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma* argumenterar Jervis (1978) för att krig är kortare och att säkerhetsdilemmat är dubbelt så farligt, då vapentechnologin gör offensiv krigsföring lättare än defensiva krigsföring.

Jag argumenterar i denna avhandling för att Jervis har fel om både krigens längd samt säkerhetsdilemmat under offensiv dominans. Studien avser för det första att testa om det finns ett statistiskt samband mellan olika mått på offensiv-defensiv balans i statssystemet och de mellanstatliga krigens längd. Studien avser för det andra att skapa och testa en teori, *bounded learning theory*, som bättre förklarar krigens längd. Efter att ha testat teorin, drar studien med stöd i empirin logiska slutsatser om säkerhetsdilemmat som skiljer sig från Jervis (1978) argument.

Det statistiska testet består av en Hazard analys med hjälp av Bennett och Stams (1996) kontrollvariabler och data om krigens längd. Slutsatsen är att de fyra olika måtten på offensiv-defensiv balans som används i analysen (Adams 2003-2004; Quester 1977; Van Evera 1998; Jervis 1978) inte har ett statistiskt signifikant samband med krigens längd. Resultatet går emot offensiv-defensiv-teorins "sunt förnuft"-antagande om att krigen borde vara kortare när det är lättare att anfalla än att försvara. Offensiv-defensiv teorin har inte tagit hänsyn till att de offensiva fördelarna ofta är begränsade och sällan tillåter en stat att skyndsamt militärt köra över en annan stat.

Den teoretiska analysen inleds med en systematisering av de faktorer som begränsar de offensiva fördelarna. Dessa består av permanenta, temporära och institutionella faktorer. Permanenta faktorer inkluderar väder, klimat och geografi. Temporära faktorer inkluderar teknologi och träning. Institutionella faktorer inkluderar normer och statens strukturer. Om permanenta faktorer ökar de offensiva fördelarna kan temporära faktorer neutralisera deras effekt. Detsamma gäller omvänt. Dock kan ingen av dessa två faktorer neutralisera de institutionella faktorernas effekt. Oavsett hur

t.ex. geografin eller teknologin påverkar arméernas offensiva kapacitet i förhållande till deras defensiva kapacitet kan de inte påverka t.ex. folkrättens begränsande effekt.

Om de offensiva fördelarna ofta är så begränsade att en snabb och avgörande seger uteblir, bestäms ett krigs längd inte sällan av den förhandlingsprocess där de krigande parterna försöker att finna en ömsesidigt acceptabel förhandlingslösning. Enligt en enkel *rational choice* modell (*strategic learning theory*) är förklaringen rättfram: staterna observerar varandras militära färdigheter på slagfältet och justerar sina målsättningar och krav därefter. Den sida som har övertaget ställer högre krav än den sida som är underlägsen. De krigande parternas målsättningar och krav kommer då snart att avspeglar händelserna på slagfältet så att en ömsesidigt acceptabel förhandlingslösning uppstår. Även Goemans (2000) alternativa teori som förklarar långa krig med hjälp av staternas inre struktur accepterar detta grundläggande synsätt enligt vilket staterna snabbt förväntas lära sig av händelserna på slagfältet. *Bounded learning theory*, som är denna studies teoretiska perspektiv, argumenterar istället för att stater inte alltid snabbt lär sig av händelserna på slagfältet. Istället har staterna ofta högre förväntningar av offensiv kapacitet än verkligheten ger fog för.

Två specifika variabler kan fördröja lärandeprocessen och därmed förlänga krig: expansiv ideologi och asymmetrisk information. Asymmetrisk information innebär att minst en av de krigande parterna har förväntningar om att dess offensiva kapacitet kommer att öka på grund av ny teknologi eller taktik. Asymmetrisk information uppstår då den andra parten antingen inte vet om dessa förväntningar eller inte betraktar dem som trovärdiga. Även om händelserna på slagfältet är negativa, håller den till synes svagare staten sina målsättningar uppe medan den starkare staten inte sänker sina krav och målsättningar. Slutresultatet är att båda parter har en större förväntad nytta av att fortsätta kriget än av att acceptera motståndarens krav. Även om offensiv dominans i statsystemet inte visade sig ha ett statistiskt samband med krigens längd kan offensiv dominans ha en indirekt effekt genom att skapa förväntningar om ökad offensiv kapacitet och därmed asymmetrisk information.

Expansiv ideologi kan vara politisk, nationalistisk eller religiös. Den kommer till uttryck i asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar och i uppfattningar om sakfrågans värde (*stakes*). Asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar bygger på en tro att någon kraft som är bortom fiendens förståelse kommer att ge seger. Dessa uppfattningar bygger inte på händelserna på slagfältet och kan, på samma sätt som var fallet med asymmetrisk information, där-

för leda till höga offensiva förväntningar även när kriget går dåligt. Staten kan då höja sina målsättningar, men eftersom fienden inte är benägen att ha samma kausala uppfattningar blir de asymmetriska och oenighet kommer att råda om vilka krav som kan betraktas som berättigade. Som ett resultat av oförmågan att korrekt lära sig från händelserna på slagfältet blir summan av båda sidors förväntade probabilitet att vinna kriget över ett. Därmed kommer båda sidorna att ställa så höga krav på varandra att det inte finns något handlingsutrymme (*bargaining space*) som skulle möjliggöra en ömsesidigt godtagbar fredlig lösning på konflikten.

Expansiv ideologi kan också öka sakfrågans värde. Sakfrågan kan handla om materiella (t.ex. territoriell expansion) eller immateriella (t.ex. ledarskap i statssystemet) faktorer. I båda fall leder sakfrågans höga värde till att staten har höga målsättningar och krav. Om båda sidor har höga krav finns det inget handlingsutrymme. Sakfrågans värde kan dock minska snabbt om den offensiva kapaciteten visar sig vara för låg för att förverkliga dessa målsättningar. Sakfrågans värde är därför inte helt oberoende av de faktorer som påverkar statens förväntade offensiva kapacitet: asymmetrisk information och asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar.

I alla dessa fall – asymmetrisk information, asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar och en högt värderad sakfråga – har båda sidor så höga målsättningar och krav att det inte finns utrymme för någon förhandlingslösning. Då är också den förväntade nyttan av att fortsätta kriget högre än nyttan av att acceptera fiendens krav vilket medför att kriget blir långt. Asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar är dock den faktor som leder till de allra längsta krigen. Asymmetrisk information försvinner när den nya förväntade teknologin eller taktiken prövas på slagfältet. Båda parter i konflikten kommer till sist att använda händelserna på slagfältet som en gemensam referensram för att formulera sina målsättningar och krav och för att bedöma hur berättigade fiendens målsättningar och krav är. När asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar råder saknar parterna dock en gemensam referensram för att bedöma detta eftersom det finns olika åsikter om kausalitet och olika åsikter om vad som utgör evidens för att någon part är mer benägen att vinna kriget än den andra.

För att preliminärt testa denna *bounded learning theory* genomförs fyra fallstudier, där varje fall utgörs av ett mellanstatligt krig. Fallen är strategiskt valda på olika kriterier. För det första används kunskapen om den beroende variabeln, krigets längd, för att maximera variationen genom att välja två krig som är långa och två som är korta. Utöver detta används en *mest lika-design* för att kontrollera andra möjliga förklaringsfaktorer. Det

korta finsk-ryska Vinterkriget och det långa Fortsättningskriget passar bäst för detta syfte eftersom de krigande parterna i dessa krig var de samma. Kriget mellan Iran och Irak under 1980-talet väljs för att det har varit det längsta kriget med bara två stater sedan 1823. För att utsätta hypotesen för ett hårt test väljs också 1965 års korta krig mellan Pakistan och Indien då pakistanierna såg ut att vara påverkade av en expansiv ideologi, vilket borde ha lett till ett långt krig.

Processpåring används för att testa den teoretiska förväntningen att korta krig karakteriseras av en samvariation mellan staternas målsättningar och förmåga att använda offensiva militärfaktorer, medan det i långa krig finns låg samvariation mellan dessa faktorer. Dessutom undersöks om beslutsfattarna hade asymmetrisk information eller en expansiv ideologi då man bestämde sig för att ha högre målsättningar än vad händelserna i slagfältet rättfärdigade. Den teoretiska förväntningen är att åtminstone någon av dessa faktorer var närvarande i långa krig men inte under korta krig.

Vinterkriget

Analysen av det korta Vinterkriget bekräftar de teoretiska förväntningarna. Eftersom varken Sovjetunionen eller Finland hade en expansiv ideologi eller asymmetrisk information under kriget, avslöjade händelserna på slagfältet snabbt de krigande parternas relativa styrka. Denna lärandeprocess gjorde det möjligt för dem att justera sina målsättningar och krav i enlighet med deras offensiva potential så att ett handlingsutrymme skapades.

Kriget började i december 1939 med att Sovjetunionen krävde större eftergifter än vad Finland ville acceptera. I början av kriget höjde Moskva optimistiskt sina offensiva förväntningar och ställde ännu större krav på Helsingfors. Krigets verklighet visade dock snart att den offensiva kapaciteten var låg på båda sidorna. Redan i januari 1940 sänktes de sovjetiska målsättningarna från en fullständig ockupation av Finland till begränsade territoriella eftergifter runt Leningrad. Dessa lägre målsättningar avspeglade mer korrekt den röda arméns offensiva kapacitet. Stalin hade inte en expansiv ideologi som skulle ha skapat asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar eller höjt sakfrågans värde bortom att öka Leningrads säkerhet med begränsade finska territoriella eftergifter. Finland i sin tur var villigt att förhandla redan i början av kriget och hade ingen expansiv ideologi eller asymmetrisk information om förväntad offensiv förmåga. Båda parterna kunde därför lära sig av händelserna på slagfältet och sänka sina målsätt-

ningar till en nivå som avspeglade deras offensiva kapacitet. Det skapades därmed ett förhandlingsutrymme och Finland och Sovjetunionen kunde också snabbt nå en ömsesidigt acceptabel förhandlingslösning.

De finska målsättningarna och händelserna på slagfältet samvarierade genom hela kriget. Själva skapandet av förhandlingsutrymmet var därför beroende av att Stalin skulle sänka sina målsättningar då det offensiva kriget inte gick som förväntat. Medan begränsningarna i staternas offensiva förmåga gjorde en snar kollaps av någon stat osannolik, gjorde avsaknaden av expansiv ideologi och asymmetrisk information förhandlingsprocessen snabb. För båda stater blev snabbt den förväntade nyttan av att sluta fred högre än den förväntade nyttan av att fortsätta kriget.

Fortsättningskriget

Analysen av det långa Fortsättningskriget bekräftar de teoretiska förväntningarna. Både Sovjetunionen och Finland hade en expansiv ideologi och höga målsättningar under kriget. Stalin hade också asymmetrisk information om den röda arméns offensiva kapacitet. Det tog därför lång tid för de krigande parterna att via händelserna på slagfältet lära känna deras relativa styrka. Stalins bristande förmåga att lära hindrade Sovjetunionen från att justera sina målsättningar och krav i enlighet med sin offensiva potential. Därmed förstördes också möjligheten att snabbt skapa ett handlingsutrymme.

Finland kontrollerade det mesta på slagfältet under merparten av kriget. Trots detta sänkte Sovjetunionen inte sina målsättningar och krav. I Stalins ögon var Finland en allierad till Tyskland som hotade Sovjetunionens existens. Så länge Stalin hade offensiva förväntningar samtidigt som kontakten mellan Hitler och Finland bestod, kunde Sovjetunionen inte sänka sina krav från en ockupation av Finland för att på så vis nå en förhandlingslösning. Sakfrågans värde var hög också i Finland. Den finska nationalismen hade blivit mera offensiv och man eftersträvade nu att inkorporera delar av Sovjetunionen i Storfinland. Båda parterna satte därmed stort värde på fiendeterritoriet.

Utöver sakfrågans höga värde hade Stalin också asymmetrisk information om den röda arméns förväntade offensiva kapacitet. Efter Vinterkriget beordrade Stalin en militärreform för att förbättra arméns undermåliga prestationsförmåga. Stalin sänkte därför inte sina krav och målsättningar även när kriget gick väldigt dåligt för Sovjetunionen. Ledarna i Helsingfors i sin tur visste antingen inte om Stalins höga förhoppningar, eller så be-

traktade de dem som orealistiska. Därmed sänktes inte de finska kraven till en nivå som skulle ha skapat utrymme för en förhandlingslösning.

Först efter flera år av offensiva försök, och efter att ha frambringat en stor kraftsamling på fronten utan avgörande resultat, blev det möjligt att dra lärdom av händelserna på slagfältet. Varken militärreformen eller den större militära produktionen kunde förverkliga Stalins höga förväntningar och till sist sänktes de territoriella kraven på Finland. Sakfrågans (finska territoriets) värde minskade också i och med att Hitler såg ut att förlora kriget och kunde inte längre hota Sovjetunionens säkerhet. Medan den offensiva finska nationalismen och drömmen om Storfinland stärktes i krigets inledning, då den finska offensiva kapaciteten visade sig vara betydelsefull, minskade sakfrågans värde och kraven på Sovjetiskt territorium i takt med att den finska offensiva kapaciteten sinade.

Till sist hade båda staterna samvariation mellan offensiv kapacitet och målsättningar och en ömsesidigt godtagbar förhandlingslösning kunde nås. Därmed blev den förväntade nyttan av att sluta fred högre för båda parterna jämfört med att fortsätta kriget. Även om de offensiva fördelarna hade ökat med ny teknologi och taktik visade sig Fortsättningskriget vara mycket längre än Vinterkriget. Därför räcker det inte med att analysera de offensiva fördelarna utan att ta hänsyn till de faktorer som höjer offensiva förväntningar även i avsaknad av framgångar på slagfältet.

Kriget mellan Indien och Pakistan 1965

Analysen av det korta kriget mellan Indien och Pakistan under 1965 bekräftar de teoretiska förväntningarna. Eftersom varken de högsta beslutsfattarna i Pakistan eller Indien hade en expansiv ideologi eller asymmetrisk information under kriget, avslöjade händelserna i slagfältet snabbt krigandeparternas relativa styrka. Denna lärandeprocess gjorde det möjligt för dem att justera sina målsättningar och krav i enlighet med sin offensiva potential så att ett handlingsutrymme skapades.

Kriget började med ett pakistanskt missnöje över att Indien inte ville förhandla om Kashmirs status. I början av kriget hade Islamabad höga offensiva förväntningar och ville få större territoriella eftergifter i Kashmir än Indien ville ge. Krigets verklighet visade dock snart att den offensiva kapaciteten var låg på båda sidorna och Pakistan gav snart upp målsättningen att militärt skära av Indien från Kashmir. Då USA lovade att Kashmirfrågan skulle kunna avgöras vid förhandlingsbordet trodde Islamabad att denna lägre målsättning skulle förverkligas och accepterade eldupphöret.

Pakistan genomsyrades av en expansiv ideologi då beslutet om kriget fattades i och med att sakfrågans värde var hög. sakfrågans värde (*stakes*) är dock inte oberoende av de offensiva förväntningarna och Pakistans president Ayub blev snart desillusionerad då kriget inte gick enligt planerna. Av händelserna på slagfältet kunde han därmed lära sig att Pakistans förväntade offensiva kapacitet var låg och kriget kostsamt. Indien i sin tur hade varken expansiv ideologi eller asymmetrisk information om ökande offensiv kapacitet. Makthavarna i New Delhi var nöjda med att behålla det territoriella *status quo* som tidigare hade rått. I och med avsaknaden av asymmetrisk information och asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar kunde båda parterna lära sig av händelserna på slagfältet och sänka sina målsättningar till en nivå som avspeglade deras offensiva kapacitet. Därmed kunde Pakistan och Indien också snart nå en ömsesidigt acceptabel förhandlingslösning.

De indiska målsättningarna och händelserna på slagfältet samvarierade genom hela kriget. Skapandet av förhandlingsutrymmet var därför beroende av att Ayub skulle sänka sina målsättningar då det offensiva kriget inte gick som förväntat. Medan begränsningarna i staternas offensiva förmåga gjorde en snabb kollaps av någon stat osannolik, blev krigsmålsättningarna tillräckligt låga för fienden att acceptera på grund av avsaknaden av asymmetriska kausala uppfattningar och asymmetrisk information samt tron att värdefullt territorium kunde nås genom förhandlingar. Den förväntade nyttan av att sluta fred blev fort högre för båda staterna jämfört med den förväntade nyttan av att fortsätta kriget.

Iran-Irak-kriget

Analysen av det långa Iran-Irak kriget bekräftar de teoretiska förväntningarna. Iran hade en expansiv ideologi och höga målsättningar under kriget. Det tog därför lång tid för händelserna på slagfältet att avslöja information om de krigande parternas relativa styrka. Denna brist i det iranska ledarskapets förmåga att lära hindrade Iran från att justera sina målsättningar och krav i enlighet med sin offensiva potential så att ett handlingsutrymme snabbt kunde ha skapats.

Kriget började med Iraks anfall och Irak hade då höga offensiva förväntningar. Kriget utvecklades dock snabbt till ett dött lopp där ingendera sidan förmådde att visa avgörande offensiv förmåga. Eftersom Saddam Hussein inte hade asymmetriska trosuppfattningar om hur man kan vinna kriget, sänkte han snart sina målsättningar i enlighet med sin

offensiva förmåga. Dessutom sänktes sakfrågans värde snabbt efter att den offensiva kapaciteten visade sig vara begränsad. För iranierna hade dock sakfrågan ett högt värde och man satte stort värde på fiendeterritoriet. Iranierna trodde dessutom att Gud skulle ge dem segern och de räknade därför med att chansen att vinna kriget var större än vad händelserna på slagfältet indikerade. Därmed blev den förväntade nyttan av att fortsätta kriget högre än att godta Saddams Husseins fredsförslag.

Först efter flera år av försök och i samband med stora förluster och mobiliseringsproblem, blev det möjligt att dra lärdom av händelserna på slagfältet. Då Irans förväntade offensiva kapacitet inte längre var så hög, kunde målsättningarna sänkas. Värdet i att sprida revolutionen var fortfarande hög men detta skulle nu göras genom andra metoder än territoriella erövringar. Till sist fanns det alltså samvariation mellan staternas offensiva kapacitet och målsättningar och en ömsesidigt godtagbar förhandlingslösning kunde nås. Därmed blev den förväntade nyttan av att sluta fred högre för båda parterna jämfört med att fortsätta kriget.

Säkerhetsdilemmat

Säkerhetsdilemmat, den problematiska situation där en stats försök att öka sin säkerhet genom upprustning minskar andra staters säkerhet, har använts som ett analytiskt verktyg i den realistiska traditionen. Jervis (1978) menar att säkerhetsdilemmat är mindre allvarligt under defensiv dominans. Genom att anta att det är lättast att nå en snabb seger under offensiv dominans skapar Jervis dock en morot för att inleda krig. Om kriget inte är kortare under offensiv dominans, som den statistiska analysen har visat, borde det inte vara så lockande att inleda krig. Därmed förvärras inte säkerhetsdilemmat.

Med kunskap om att kriget inte är kortare under offensiv dominans, och att längre krig ökar risken att förlora (Slantshev 2004), har staterna inte lika stort behov av att snabbt och kraftigt reagera på att andra stater rustar upp. Därför minskar risken för kapprustning. Kapprustning behöver inte heller leda till en situation där parterna tror att den offensiva vapentechnologin gör det lönsamt att vara den som attackera först. Därför minskar risken att kapprustning leder till krig. Med utgångspunkt i staternas egenintresse, som realismen fäster stor vikt vid istället för normativa förbud mot krig, kan man nå fredligare relationer mellan stater än Jervis antar. Med detta argument är studien ett bidrag till den defensiva realismen.

Studien är en kritik av att offensiv-defensiv-teorin inte tar hänsyn till begränsningarna i offensiv dominans vilket gör att teorins förväntning om att offensiv dominans ger upphov till korta krig inte infrias. En stat lyckas sällan snabbt köra över en annan stat med hjälp av offensiv dominant militär teknologi, *ceteris paribus*. *Bounded learning theory* är också en teoretisk utveckling av enklare *rational choice*-modeller genom att ta hänsyn till nya variabler som förklarar hur det kan vara svårt att nå en ömsesidigt acceptabel förhandlingslösning på krig då stater räknar sin förväntade nytta av fred respektive fortsatt krig.

Studien har inspirerats av neoklassisk realism: det är staternas perceptioner och inte alltid den verkliga maktbalansen på slagfältet som avgör krigens längd. Staterna lär sig inte alltid om den relativa maktbalansen och chansen att vinna genom att observera händelserna på slagfältet. Krigföring avslöjar helt enkelt inte alltid sådan information om parternas relativa makt som skulle göra det möjligt att nå en snabb förhandlingslösning.

APPENDIX A

Classification of the Systemic Offense-Defense Balance, 1816-1992

| Scholar | Time-period | Offense-Defense Balance |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|
| Adams (2003-2004) | 1800-1849 | Offense |
| | 1850-1933 | Defense |
| | 1934-1945 | Offense |
| | 1946-1992 | Defense (Deterrence) |
| Quester (1977) | 1815-1918 | Defense |
| | 1919-1945 | Intermediate (Indeterminate) |
| | 1946-1949 | Offense |
| | 1950-1954 | Defense |
| | 1955-1960 | Offense |
| | 1961-1977 | Defense |
| Van Evera (1998) | 1816-1855 | Defense |
| | 1856-1871 | Intermediate |
| | 1872-1918 | Defense |
| | 1919-1945 | Offense |
| | 1946-1992 | Defense |
| Jervis (1978) ³⁴ | 1864-1871 | Offense |
| | 1872-1918 | Defense |
| | 1919-1973 | Offense |
| | 1974-1978 | Defense |

³⁴ Jervis (1978) is not precise about the periodization of the offense-defense balance. However, I use Gortzak, Haftel and Sweeney's (2005) interpretation of Jervis's text as the data.

APPENDIX B

Interstate Wars in Bennett and Stam's Updated Data Set

| War name | Start year | Length in months |
|------------------------------------|------------|------------------|
| Franco-Spanish | 1823 | 4 |
| Mexican-American | 1846 | 22 |
| Austro-Sardinian | 1848 | 16 |
| 1 st Schleswig-Holstein | 1848 | 6 |
| Roman Republic | 1849 | 2 |
| La Plata | 1851 | 12 |
| Crimean | 1854 | 28 |
| Anglo-Persian | 1856 | 6 |
| Italian Unification | 1859 | 5 |
| Italo-Roman | 1860 | 10 |
| Italo-Sicilian | 1860 | 2 |
| Franco-Mexican | 1862 | 58 |
| 2 nd Schleswig-Holstein | 1864 | 6 |
| Lopez | 1864 | 63 |
| Spanish-Chilean | 1866 | 6 |
| Seven Weeks | 1866 | 1 |
| Franco-Prussian | 1870 | 10 |
| Russo-Turkish | 1877 | 9 |
| Pacific | 1879 | 58 |
| Central American | 1885 | 4 |
| Serbo-Bulgarian | 1885 | 3 |
| Sino-Japanese | 1894 | 9 |
| Greco-Turkish | 1897 | 5 |
| Spanish-American | 1898 | 4 |
| Boxer Rebellion | 1900 | 15 |
| Russo-Japanese | 1904 | 16 |
| Central American | 1906 | 3 |
| Central American | 1907 | 11 |
| Italo-Turkish | 1911 | 12 |
| First Balkan | 1912 | 7 |
| Second Balkan | 1913 | 2 |
| World War I | 1914 | 52 |
| Hungarian-Allies | 1919 | 5 |
| Greco-Turkish | 1919 | 41 |
| Russo-Polish | 1920 | 6 |
| Sino-Soviet | 1929 | 4 |
| Manchurian | 1931 | 19 |

| | | |
|-------------------------|------|-------|
| Chaco | 1932 | 36 |
| Sino-Japanese | 1937 | 96 |
| Changkufeng | 1938 | 1 |
| German-Czech | 1938 | 0.033 |
| German-Austrian | 1938 | 0.1 |
| Nomohan | 1939 | 4 |
| Russo-Finnish | 1939 | 4 |
| World War II | | |
| German-Polish | 1939 | 1 |
| German Belgian | 1940 | 0.11 |
| German-Netherlands | 1940 | 0.1 |
| German-Danish | 1940 | 0.033 |
| German-Norwegian | 1940 | 2 |
| German-French | 1940 | 1.5 |
| Italo-Greek | 1940 | 2 |
| Pacific | 1941 | 45 |
| Western | 1942 | 60 |
| Eastern | 1941 | 46 |
| German-Yugoslav | 1941 | 0.33 |
| German-Greek | 1941 | 0.67 |
| Franco-Thai | 1940 | 3 |
| 1 st Kashmir | 1947 | 24 |
| Palestine | 1948 | 8 |
| Korean | 1950 | 36 |
| Russo-Hungarian | 1956 | 1 |
| Sinai | 1956 | 1 |
| Sino-Indian | 1962 | 1 |
| Vietnamese I | 1964 | 121 |
| Second Kashmir | 1965 | 5 |
| Six Day | 1967 | 0.2 |
| Israeli-Egyptian | 1970 | 0.25 |
| Football | 1969 | 0.15 |
| Bangladesh | 1971 | 2 |
| Yom Kippur | 1973 | 3 |
| Turko-Cypriot | 1974 | 1 |
| Vietnamese II | 1975 | 3 |
| Ethiopian-Somalian | 1977 | 8 |
| Ugandan-Tanzanian | 1978 | 6 |
| Iran-Iraq | 1980 | 96 |
| Falklands | 1982 | 3 |
| Israeli-Syria (Lebanon) | 1982 | 2 |
| Sino-Vietnamese | 1985 | 60 |
| Kuwait War | 1990 | 0.1 |
| Gulf War | 1991 | 2.83 |

APPENDIX C

Interstate Wars in the Correlates of War Data Set

| War name | Start year | Length in days |
|---------------------------|------------|----------------|
| Franco-Spanish | 1823 | 221 |
| Russo-Turkish | 1828 | 507 |
| Mexican-American | 1846 | 632 |
| Austro-Sardinian | 1848 | 143 |
| First Schleswig-Holstein | 1848 | 247 |
| Roman Republic | 1849 | 55 |
| La Plata | 1851 | 200 |
| Crimean | 1853 | 861 |
| Anglo-Persian | 1856 | 141 |
| Italian Unification | 1859 | 75 |
| Spanish-Moroccan | 1859 | 156 |
| Italo-Roman | 1860 | 19 |
| Italo-Sicilian | 1860 | 97 |
| Franco-Mexican | 1862 | 1757 |
| Ecuadorian-Columbian | 1863 | 15 |
| Second Schleswig-Holstein | 1864 | 111 |
| Lopez | 1864 | 1936 |
| Spanish-Chilean | 1865 | 197 |
| Seven Weeks | 1866 | 42 |
| Franco-Prussian | 1870 | 223 |
| First Central American | 1876 | 30 |
| Russo-Turkish | 1877 | 267 |
| Pacific | 1879 | 1762 |
| Anglo-Egyptian | 1882 | 67 |
| Sino-French | 1884 | 291 |
| Second Central American | 1885 | 19 |
| Franco-Thai | 1893 | 22 |
| Sino-Japanese | 1894 | 242 |
| Greco-Turkish | 1897 | 94 |
| Spanish-American | 1898 | 114 |
| Boxer Rebellion | 1900 | 59 |
| Sino-Russian | 1900 | 55 |
| Russo-Japanese | 1904 | 586 |
| Third Central American | 1906 | 55 |
| Fourth Central American | 1907 | 64 |
| Spanish-Moroccan | 1909 | 260 |

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| Italo-Turkish | 1911 | 386 |
| First Balkan | 1912 | 185 |
| Second Balkan | 1913 | 31 |
| World War I | 1914 | 1567 |
| Russo-Polish | 1919 | 613 |
| Hungarian-Allies | 1919 | 111 |
| Greco-Turkish | 1919 | 1256 |
| Franco-Turkish | 1919 | 720 |
| Lithuanian-Polish | 1920 | 140 |
| Sino-Soviet | 1929 | 109 |
| Manchurian | 1931 | 505 |
| Chaco | 1932 | 1093 |
| Saudi-Yemeni | 1934 | 55 |
| Italo-Ethiopian | 1935 | 220 |
| Sino-Japanese | 1937 | 1615 |
| Changkufeng | 1938 | 14 |
| Nomonhan | 1939 | 129 |
| World War II | 1939 | 2175 |
| Russo-Finnish | 1939 | 104 |
| Franco-Thai | 1940 | 53 |
| First Kashmir | 1948 | 169 |
| Palestine | 1948 | 143 |
| Korean | 1950 | 1130 |
| Russo-Hungarian | 1956 | 23 |
| Sinai | 1956 | 9 |
| Assam | 1962 | 34 |
| Vietnamese | 1965 | 3735 |
| Second Kashmir | 1965 | 50 |
| Six Day | 1967 | 6 |
| Israeli-Egyptian | 1969 | 520 |
| Football | 1969 | 5 |
| Bangladesh | 1971 | 15 |
| Yom Kippur | 1973 | 19 |
| Turco-Cypriot | 1974 | 13 |
| Vietnamese-Cambodian | 1975 | 1348 |
| Ethiopian-Somalian | 1977 | 226 |
| Ugandan-Tanzanian | 1978 | 165 |
| Sino-Vietnamese | 1979 | 22 |
| Iran-Iraq | 1980 | 2890 |
| Falklands | 1982 | 88 |
| Israel-Syria (Lebanon) | 1982 | 138 |
| Sino-Vietnamese | 1987 | 33 |
| Gulf War | 1990 | 253 |

