Abstract

Title: Intentional Objects: A Study of Mental and Verbal Reference.
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Author: Felix Larsson
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How do we give an account of thinking and talking about non-existent things that does not presuppose anything but what we need for an account of thinking and talking about things that exist?

What has language and meaning and verbal reference to do with thinking, understanding, and mental reference?

By discussion of several sample cases, a number of distinctions are drawn and concepts introduced needed to describe intentional states in fair detail.

It is shown that the concepts and distinctions you need to describe thoughts about what exists, give you all you need to describe thoughts about what does not.

It is argued that linguistic meaning is what it takes to understand a linguistic expression and that the reference of a referring expression is fixed only for tokens and then only at the occasion of its use, prominently by speaker’s intentions and often by several means independently.

It is shown that you need not do anything else to understand the meaning of fictional discourse, than you do to understand non-fictional discourse.

Key words: intentionality; intentional object; intentional relation; reference; mental reference; verbal reference; prehension; attribution; ideation; fancy; fancy object; characterization; conception; nonce conception; stock conception; discourse conception; discourse correlation; denotation; adoption; intuition; recollection; virtual prehension; virtual object; meaning; understanding; communication; names; demonstratives; definite description; fiction; fictional object; fictional truth; fictional discourse.